Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
manonworld/manon carries serious gaps (44%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (30%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (46%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Keep the changelog current (Release Hygiene); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Hobby (~1,841 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
54%
Adequate · gated by R1, R7
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
46%
Weak · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
30%
Weak · gated by R4, P3, P5, P6
Security
68%
Adequate · gated by D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 30% · 47% weightMaturity 46% · 26% weightCode Health 54% · 14% weightSecurity 68% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 30 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 44 → ~55.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (15+)
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 front-end/app/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Redis/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Redis/Dockerfile
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) front-end/app/src/Components/Layout/Preloaders/RefreshButton.js
- P12 · Coverage collected but not gated
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €610–€3,100
| Cost to rebuild | €610–€3,100 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 44% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
| Dead frontend code | ~121 LoC unreachable (3 file(s)) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,800 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 30% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
2
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 11 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a robust disaster recovery strategy by codifying backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure as code, while clearly documenting recovery time and objectives. Next, maintain a current changelog with versioned entries for each release to ensure accurate historical records. Then, increase test coverage by adding tests for all unreached modules to ensure comprehensive validation. After that, implement type checking in the build process to improve code reliability. Finally, clean up dependencies by removing unused packages and correctly categorizing type and test-only dependencies.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +14.1 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub. | +14.1 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +13.5 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +6.3 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +10.9 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +10.5 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion. | +8.6 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +6.7 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redis/Dockerfile | 2.8 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| front-end/app/Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| front-end/app/package-lock.json | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| back-end/.docker/php/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| .coveralls.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| .travis.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| back-end/app/.env | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| back-end/app/composer.lock | 7.2 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 32 of 34 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 34 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D38M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 64 of 71 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The project has two README files (one for Symfony backend and one for React frontend) plus architecture/design docs markdown files but no actual design documentation. The main content is installation via docker-compose and a Create React App front end with available-scripts coverage; the Docker/Makefile section is solid. However the READMEs are thin, only documenting the tech stack, docker-compose install, and the start/test/run lifecycle for each component (Symfony backend and frontend), while omitting critical guidance such as how to run tests on the Symfony side, how to configure Grafana or MySQL, and where to find the generated DDD boilerplate code. The Create React App README is also thin despite its many commands.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The project has two README files (one for Symfony backend and one for React frontend) plus architecture/design docs markdown files but no actual design documentation. The main content is installation via docker-compose and a Create React App front end with available-scripts coverage; the Docker/Makefile section is solid. However the READMEs are thin, only documenting the tech stack, docker-compose install, and the start/test/run lifecycle for each component (Symfony backend and frontend), while omitting critical guidance such as how to run tests on the Symfony side, how to configure Grafana or MySQL, and where to find the generated DDD boilerplate code. The Create React App README is also thin despite its many commands.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key .coveralls.yml:2
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with .coveralls.yml, .travis.yml, .env. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
15 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 4 medium, 3 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 Redis/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0001 Redis/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 Redis/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
5 of 5 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is back-end/app/src/Command/Ddd/CreateDdd/CreateDddCommand.php.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
114 finding(s): 16 critical, 59 high, 28 medium, 11 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]front-end/app/package-lock.json
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]front-end/app/package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 33 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (32), composer.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
- Resolve the 15 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (15). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 2 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README claims ReactJS@latest Alpine Docker Image but the evidence shows a separate front-end package.json with materialize-css and react-scripts
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README claims ReactJS@latest Alpine Docker Image but the evidence shows a separate front-end package.json with materialize-css and react-scripts.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add phpstan or psalm (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: phpstan or psalm — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
- A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.
What to do
- Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
- Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
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R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 10 plain JS — the untyped files are front-end/app/src/App.js, front-end/app/src/App.test.js, front-end/app/src/Components/Infrastructure/Routes.js, front-end/app/src/Components/Infrastructure/WebSocketListener.js, front-end/app/src/Components/Layout/Preloaders/RefreshButton.js, front-end/app/src/Components/Layout/Preloaders/RequestPreloader.js (+4 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
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R10 · Code Duplication
- front-end/app/src/Components/Layout/Preloaders/RefreshButton.js:1 · front-end/app/src/Components/Layout/Preloaders/RequestPreloader.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — RefreshButton.js:1
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
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R3 · Large Files
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R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×5) — serviceWorker.js, WebSocketListener.js, RefreshButton.js, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
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R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
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R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 2 application, 1 tooling and 2 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (2 application, 1 tooling, 2 test roots considered) (×3) — WebSocketListener.js, RefreshButton.js, RequestPreloader.js
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in front-end/app/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
- Only test files import it — move it to devDependencies. — App.test.js:2
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
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R9 · Circular Imports
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 54% | Adequate — gated by R1, R7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 46% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 30% | Weak — gated by R4, P3, P5, P6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 68% | Adequate — gated by D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~266 lines of test source are present (.php, .js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (composer.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.php) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (composer.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .php, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.php, .js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Clover XML — `vendor/bin/phpunit --coverage-clover coverage.xml`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 57 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] back-end/app/composer.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 Redis/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 back-end/.docker/php/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0025 back-end/.docker/php/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 front-end/app/Dockerfile
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key .coveralls.yml:2
- Secret: generic-api-key .travis.yml:31
- Secret: generic-api-key back-end/app/.env:18
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] front-end/app/package-lock.json
Warning — 5 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 Redis/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 front-end/app/Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 Redis/Dockerfile:5
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Redis/Dockerfile:1
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Redis/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0014 back-end/.docker/php/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 front-end/app/Dockerfile
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 3 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 15 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 114 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |