Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
mchekin/rpg carries serious gaps (36%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Accessibility (80%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (20%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (36%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Small (~12,802 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
36%
Weak · gated by R1, R3
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
42%
Weak · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
20% ⚠
Critical · gated by R4, R6, P3, P5
Security
74%
Adequate · gated by D38
Accessibility
80%
Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 20% · 46% weightCode Health 36% · 25% weightMaturity 42% · 14% weightSecurity 74% · 8% weightAccessibility 80% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 20 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 36 → ~48.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (19+)
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 docker/cron/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/cron/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 docker/php/Dockerfile
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- R1 · Type Safety
- R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue
- R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue
- R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 3 locations) resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue
- R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 3 locations) resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue
- R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue
- R10 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue
- R4 · Test Coverage
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,500–€23,000
| Cost to rebuild | €4,500–€23,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 36% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€14,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 20% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: phpstan or psalm — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
2
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 20%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: phpstan or psalm — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
The Good
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 7 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 1 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, integrate static analysis and security scanning into the CI pipeline to prevent regressions. Next, formalize disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure code and documentation. Then, expand test coverage to include all production modules. After that, establish automated linting, type checking, and testing in CI. Finally, implement health checks and immutable image tags to ensure reliable deployments and rollbacks.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: phpstan or psalm — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +14.6 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +14.6 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +14.6 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +14.6 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding. | +12.7 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +5.5 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Add an explicit build/compile step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is compiled before merge. | +8.4 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up. | +7.3 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| docker/cron/Dockerfile | 2.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| package-lock.json | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| composer.lock | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| docker/php/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0029 |
| resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| database/seeders/DataRowsTableSeeder.php | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: DataRowsTableSeeder.run (cyclomatic 22) |
| app/Modules/Trade/Application/Services/ManageStoreService.php | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) |
| server.php | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: tainted-filename |
| app/Models/Character.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: Character |
| app/Modules/Character/Domain/Character.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: Character |
| app/Modules/Equipment/Domain/Inventory.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| database/migrations/2019_08_31_182034_create_items_table.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| database/migrations/2017_05_16_181330_create_battle_rounds_table.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) |
| database/migrations/2017_05_16_144929_create_battles_table.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) |
| database/seeders/TranslationsTableSeeder.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) |
| database/migrations/2020_02_29_205957_create_inventory_item.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| resources/views/auth/login.blade.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: login.blade.php ↔ register.blade.php |
| resources/views/pages/index.blade.php | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: index.blade.php ↔ navbar.blade.php |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 36 of 38 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 38 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D38AC1AC2AC3AC5AC7AX5M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 73 of 80 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was DataRowsTableSeeder.run at 22.
DataRowsTableSeeder.run (cyclomatic 22)database/seeders/DataRowsTableSeeder.php:14
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was DataRowsTableSeeder.run at 21.
DataRowsTableSeeder.run (cognitive 21)database/seeders/DataRowsTableSeeder.php:14
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D3 · God Classes
2 god class(es) detected.
TooManyMethods: Character app/Models/Character.php:42
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D4 · Code Duplication
8 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) app/Modules/Trade/Application/Services/ManageStoreService.php:42
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)app/Modules/Equipment/Domain/Inventory.php:117
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)database/migrations/2019_08_31_182034_create_items_table.php:27
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3)database/migrations/2017_05_16_144929_create_battles_table.php:22
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)database/seeders/TranslationsTableSeeder.php:57
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The project's documentation is clear and complete for a single README plus two architecture/design docs (docker_environment.md and local_environment.md), covering the online game with an inline Travis badge, a running-in-development guide split between Docker and local steps, detailed requirements/installation, and a Using Admin Dashboard walkthrough. The outline is visible in both documents; the main gap is that the README itself only names the project and license, offering no setup or usage guidance for new contributors beyond the two docs (e.g. how to run tests, contribute code), so it is thin but not missing.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — The project's documentation is clear and complete for a single README plus two architecture/design docs (docker_environment.md and local_environment.md), covering the online game with an inline Travis badge, a running-in-development guide split between Docker and local steps, detailed requirements/installation, and a Using Admin Dashboard walkthrough. The outline is visible in both documents; the main gap is that the README itself only names the project and license, offering no setup or usage guidance for new contributors beyond the two docs (e.g. how to run tests, contribute code), so it is thin but not missing.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-keyresources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:57
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
Medium: tainted-filenameserver.php:17
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 3 medium, 1 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 docker/cron/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 docker/cron/Dockerfile:26
Low IaC: DS-0005docker/cron/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
39 of 39 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is database/seeders/DataRowsTableSeeder.php.
Dormant codebase
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: login.blade.php↔register.blade.php 77%; index.blade.php↔navbar.blade.php 50%
Change coupling: login.blade.php ↔ register.blade.php resources/views/auth/login.blade.php
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
86 finding(s): 12 critical, 46 high, 21 medium, 7 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] composer.lock
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 35 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (32), composer.lock (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (35 issue-level).
- Resolve the 11 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (9), composer.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with composer.lock (2), package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
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AC2 · Forms & labels
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AC3 · Page structure
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AC5 · ARIA correctness
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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M1 · Documentation (README)
- The root README is 49 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.
What to do
- Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README claims a Docker guide at docs/docker_environment.md but the docker/ directory contains only cron/mysql/nginx/php subdirectories and no such guide exists
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README claims a Docker guide at docs/docker_environment.md but the docker/ directory contains only cron/mysql/nginx/php subdirectories and no such guide exists.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no build/compile step was matched — changes may merge without being compiled. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.
What to do
- Add an explicit build/compile step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is compiled before merge.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add phpstan or psalm (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: phpstan or psalm — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are resources/js/components/FlashMessages.vue, resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue, resources/js/components/PopupModal.vue, resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue, resources/js/components/StoreTrade.vue.
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue:149 · resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:203 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — InventoryManagement.vue:149
- resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue:240 · resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:282 · resources/js/components/StoreTrade.vue:365 — the 3 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — InventoryManagement.vue:240
- resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue:311 · resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:353 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — InventoryManagement.vue:311
- resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:469 · resources/js/components/StoreTrade.vue:462 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — StoreManagement.vue:469
- resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue:378 · resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:420 · resources/js/components/StoreTrade.vue:409 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — InventoryManagement.vue:378
- resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue:397 · resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:433 · resources/js/components/StoreTrade.vue:422 — the 3 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — InventoryManagement.vue:397
- resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:421 · resources/js/components/StoreTrade.vue:410 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — StoreManagement.vue:421
- resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue:204 · resources/js/components/InventoryManagement.vue:220 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — InventoryManagement.vue:204
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
- 2 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue (412), resources/js/components/StoreTrade.vue (402).
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage
- 0% of 5 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R5 · Dependency Freshness
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling
- test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×2)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 36% | Weak — gated by R1, R3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 42% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 20% | Critical — gated by R4, R6, P3, P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 74% | Adequate — gated by D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 80% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 68 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No styled element found in the parsed markup — AC6 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~586 lines of test source are present (.php) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (composer.json and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.php) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (composer.json and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .php, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.php) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 24 aggregate root(s) (types guarding their own state behind command methods — this language has no AggregateRoot base to inherit); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Clover XML — `vendor/bin/phpunit --coverage-clover coverage.xml`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R7 Dead Code — Not measured — no application, tooling or test entry point was detected, so no file can be shown to be reachable or unreachable. Declare an entry (package.json main/module/exports, src/index.*, or an index.html script) to enable reachability.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 54 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] composer.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] composer.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] composer.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] composer.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 docker/cron/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 docker/cron/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 docker/php/Dockerfile
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] composer.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] composer.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key resources/js/components/StoreManagement.vue:57
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Warning — 19 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 docker/cron/Dockerfile:26
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/cron/Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 docker/php/Dockerfile:1
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) app/Modules/Trade/Application/Services/ManageStoreService.php:42
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) app/Modules/Trade/Application/Services/ManageStoreService.php:83
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) database/migrations/2017_05_16_181330_create_battle_rounds_table.php:16
D3 · God Classes
- TooManyMethods: Character app/Models/Character.php:42
- TooManyMethods: Character app/Modules/Character/Domain/Character.php:13
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: login.blade.php ↔ register.blade.php resources/views/auth/login.blade.php
- Change coupling: index.blade.php ↔ navbar.blade.php resources/views/pages/index.blade.php
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- DataRowsTableSeeder.run (cyclomatic 22) database/seeders/DataRowsTableSeeder.php:14
D16 · Bus Factor
- dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- DataRowsTableSeeder.run (cognitive 21) database/seeders/DataRowsTableSeeder.php:14
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: tainted-filename server.php:17
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) app/Modules/Equipment/Domain/Inventory.php:117
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) database/migrations/2019_08_31_182034_create_items_table.php:27
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) database/migrations/2017_05_16_144929_create_battles_table.php:22
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) database/seeders/TranslationsTableSeeder.php:57
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) database/migrations/2020_02_29_205957_create_inventory_item.php:24
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0005 docker/cron/Dockerfile
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Dormant codebase
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 1 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 7 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 86 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |