Executive summary
This system holds an adequate standing with a health score of 56%, indicating a workable asset that carries real operational risk. While the architecture is robust and the codebase is small, the low readiness score suggests the system is fragile in production. The value tied up here is modest, requiring only about one engineer-year to rebuild, which limits the financial exposure of a total failure but increases the urgency of stabilizing daily operations.
The primary risk is operational instability. With a readiness score of 47%, the system lacks the safety nets needed for reliable deployment. This means changes are more likely to cause outages or defects, directly impacting user trust and support costs. The lack of visible release protections further amplifies this, as there is no clear guardrail to stop a bad build from reaching users. This instability creates a drag on velocity, making every change more expensive and time-consuming than it needs to be.
A secondary concern is the hidden cost of technical debt. The code quality signals indicate a complexity tax that makes maintenance harder. While the system is small, this inefficiency compounds over time, slowing down feature delivery. The good news is that the system is well-architected and easy to understand, meaning a new team could pick it up without significant onboarding friction. This structural clarity is a valuable asset that should be preserved.
The highest-leverage action is to add automated security scanning to the continuous integration pipeline. This step is cheap, quick, and prevents security regressions from ever reaching production. It pays for itself by avoiding the annual cost of manual fixes and potential breaches. Focus here first because it secures the system with minimal effort, allowing the team to address other readiness issues with a safer foundation. The picture is partial, as some advanced modeling and event-driven aspects were not measured, but the core operational risks are clear.
Code Health
73%
Adequate · gated by D1, D2, D3
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
63%
Adequate · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
47%
Weak · gated by R8, P3
Security
57%
Adequate · gated by D30, D36
Accessibility
66%
Adequate
Performance
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 47% · 46% weightSecurity 57% · 25% weightMaturity 63% · 14% weightAccessibility 66% · 8% weightCode Health 73% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weightPerformance 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 47 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 56 → ~63.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,700–€19,000
| Cost to rebuild | €3,700–€19,000 |
|---|---|
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 56% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€11,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 47% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
2
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
3
The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 47%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
A velocity tax on every change
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 4.7/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 8–18% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
The top fix pays for itself
The top-ranked fix costs roughly 3–10 engineer-days once. Not doing it costs about 0.2–1.1 engineer-days every year, paid as drag on the ~912 lines this team changes annually — a bill that arrives whether or not anyone books it. On those figures the fix breaks even in roughly 32–646 months and is free after that. Method, stated so this is not read as a quotation: debt from the ranked task's effort band; interest = annual changed lines (measured, annualised from the 90-day window) ÷ an ASSUMED 150–400 lines per engineer-day × the 8–18% drag implied by the code-quality signals; breaking point = debt ÷ annual interest. A modelled planning range built from measured inputs and one named assumption — not a quotation, a valuation, or a certified figure.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D4 · JavaScript
Code Duplication
10.0
R1 · React / TS
Type Safety
10.0
R10 · React / TS
Code Duplication
9.9
R2 · React / TS
Cyclomatic Complexity
8.6
R3 · React / TS
Large Files
8.0
R7 · React / TS
Dead Code
10.0
X25 · Repo
Inert configuration knob
10.0
X29 · Repo
Per-element action decided by a fixed element
10.0
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
D9 · JavaScript
Test Distribution
10.0
D10 · JavaScript
Test Quality
10.0
D12 · JavaScript
Dependency Hygiene
9.6
D13 · JavaScript
Secret Scanning
10.0
D14 · JavaScript
License Compliance
10.0
P1 · Repo
CI/CD gates
10.0
P10 · Repo
Library API & versioning
10.0
P6 · Repo
Release Hygiene
10.0
R4 · React / TS
Test Coverage
9.4
R5 · React / TS
Dependency Freshness
10.0
R6 · React / TS
Tooling
10.0
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Accessibility
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 34 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 11 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, integrate static security analysis into the CI pipeline to block security regressions at build time, and immediately resolve the identified high-severity dependency vulnerabilities. Next, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and correctly categorizing development-only tools to improve hygiene. Finally, ensure deployment safety by verifying that release approvals are enforced and documenting key architectural decisions to maintain clear, accessible design records.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +8.4 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +8.4 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 21 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (21). | +2.2 pts | Medium | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7). | +1.0 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form). | +2.0 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +1.0 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with recma-jsx-rewrite.js. | +1.0 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite (cyclomatic 71) |
| packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: recma-document.recmaDocument (cyclomatic 98) |
| docs/_component/layout.jsx | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: layout.Layout (cyclomatic 60) |
| docs/_asset/editor.jsx | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: editor.Playground (cyclomatic 25) |
| website/mdx-loader.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: mdx-loader.rehypePrettyCodeBlocks (cyclomatic 27) |
| packages/mdx/lib/plugin/remark-mark-and-unravel.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: remark-mark-and-unravel.remarkMarkAndUnravel (cyclomatic 26) |
| docs/_component/sort.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: sort.sortItems (cyclomatic 24) |
| docs/_component/nav.jsx | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: nav.NavigationItem (cyclomatic 18) |
| packages/mdx/lib/core.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: core.createProcessor (cyclomatic 18) |
| packages/esbuild/lib/index.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: vfileMessageToEsbuild (cognitive 21) |
How the grades work
Critical — 36
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 57
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Minor — 20
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 35
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 54 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D19D21D26D28D29D30D34D35D36D43AC1AC2AC3AC5AC6AC7AX10AX3AX4M1M2M3M4P1P10P3P4P6PF3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X24X25X29
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 91 of 113 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Watchdog duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — the repository root (puppeteer) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows coverage is measured in your own CI. Commit the lcov/Cobertura report it produces and the real number is read on the next scan. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces, and the real number is read on the next scan.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.js, .jsx) and the reliability runner does support this ecosystem — it drives jest, vitest, mocha and egg-bin — but every JavaScript/TypeScript test package this repository declares runs its suite in a real browser, which the re-runner has no way to launch. the root package declares `puppeteer` and its `scripts.test` is `npm run build && npm run format && npm run test-coverage`. So flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's browser-driven test support, not a missing .js/.jsx runner and not a finding about this repository.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (packages/esbuild/package.json), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: a UI framework dependency ('preact'). The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, or an npm dev script. None was found, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. Watchdog then boots it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no Java or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
15 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was recma-document.recmaDocument at 98.
recmaJsxRewrite::(anonymous)::leave (cyclomatic 33) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:214
recmaDocument::(anonymous)::enter (cyclomatic 17) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:330
recma-document.recmaDocument (cyclomatic 98)packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:51
recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite (cyclomatic 71)packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:62
layout.Layout (cyclomatic 60)docs/_component/layout.jsx:35
What to do
- Resolve the 2 recmaJsxRewrite finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with recma-jsx-rewrite.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 recmaDocument finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with recma-document.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 recma-document.recmaDocument (cyclomatic 98) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with recma-document.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
15 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite at 138.
recmaJsxRewrite::(anonymous)::leave (cognitive 77) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:214
recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite (cognitive 138)packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:62
recma-document.recmaDocument (cognitive 123)packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:51
layout.Layout (cognitive 69)docs/_component/layout.jsx:35
sort.sortItems (cognitive 41)docs/_component/sort.js:28
What to do
- Resolve the 2 recmaJsxRewrite finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with recma-jsx-rewrite.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite (cognitive 138) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with recma-jsx-rewrite.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 recma-document.recmaDocument (cognitive 123) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with recma-document.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D3 · God Classes
4 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
FunctionTooLong: recma-document.recmaDocument packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:51
What to do
- Resolve the 4 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with recma-document.js, editor.jsx, recma-jsx-rewrite.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
9 production modules (npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations, and main-sequence distance (abstractness) is not computed for these modules yet.
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D9 · Test Distribution
21 test methods: 21 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 21 `it`/`test` case(s) across 12 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.
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D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 19 tests.
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
8 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 30 graded, 0 pinning defect(s), across 10 package.json (10 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded: this dimension grades what SHIPS. Whether any of these packages is DEPRECATED or UNMAINTAINED is not graded — registry.npmjs.org's latest-version answer carries neither, and release age does not stand in for a maintenance status. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
Outdated (npm): @rollup/pluginutils
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 30 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 30 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 10 product package.json manifest(s). Its 102 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js. Counted over 11 of the 41 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The repository's READMEs are excellent: the root README is a well-written marketing doc that describes MDX as an authorable JSX format with examples and links to docs, while each package README (esbuild, loader, mdx, node-loader, preact, react, remark-mdx, rollup) documents its own directory. All packages have complete, well-ordered documentation covering What is this?, When should I use this?, Install, Use, API with parameters and returns, Types, Compatibility, Security, Contribute, and License sections. A strong README for the Vue MDX provider package: it is well-structured with a visible table of contents and an ordered list of sections (What is this?, When should I use this?, Install, Use, API, Types, Compatibility, Security, Contribute, License), and each section is clearly documented. The document is clipped mid-Use at the 'Note' marker but the outline lists all those sections; no missing-overview or missing-installation guidance for a package README. (9 of 19 sampled documents could not be assessed: 1 of 3 evaluation groups failed.)
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 10 build units (npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
11 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 10 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 10 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
34 finding(s): 0 critical, 22 high, 8 medium, 4 low.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
- Resolve the 21 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (21). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).
- Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
8 of 11 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js. Counted over 11 of the 41 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Orphaned knowledgepackages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with recma-jsx-rewrite.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
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AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label htmlFor> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — docs/_asset/editor.jsx:346
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure
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AC5 · ARIA correctness
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `a.cta:active, button:active, a.cta.active, button.active` sets color: #f0f6fc on background-color: hsl(39deg 97% 58%) — 1.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/_asset/index.css:517
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 13 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
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AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P10 · Library API & versioning
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2079 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
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R1 · Type Safety
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R10 · Code Duplication
- packages/preact/lib/index.js:60 · packages/react/lib/index.js:65 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — packages/preact/lib/index.js:60
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- leave has cyclomatic complexity 33 and cognitive complexity 77; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:214
- enter has cyclomatic complexity 32 and cognitive complexity 55; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:81
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 32 and cognitive complexity 42; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:71
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 24 and cognitive complexity 38; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/mdx/lib/plugin/remark-mark-and-unravel.js:27
- createProcessor has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 16; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/mdx/lib/core.js:161
- handleEsm has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 30; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:489
- enter has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 14; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:330
- vfileMessageToEsbuild has cyclomatic complexity 15 and cognitive complexity 21; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/esbuild/lib/index.js:162
- onvisit has cyclomatic complexity 15 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — packages/remark-mdx/test/index.js:477
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
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R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
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R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×2) — script/jsx-loader.js, packages/node-loader/lib/condition.development.js
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R5 · Dependency Freshness
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R6 · Tooling
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R7 · Dead Code
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)
- Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — packages/mdx/index.js:2
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
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R9 · Circular Imports
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
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X25 · Inert configuration knob
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 73% | Adequate — gated by D1, D2, D3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 63% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 47% | Weak — gated by R8, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 57% | Adequate — gated by D30, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 66% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no browser-driven test runner (puppeteer)
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P2 Observability — This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source (10 module(s), 61 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `c8 --reporter=lcovonly <your existing test command>` (c8 is already a devDependency here)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 36 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
AC2 · Forms & labels
- <textarea> without a programmatic label docs/_asset/editor.jsx:346
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Orphaned knowledge packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- REDACTED
Serious — 57 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
D3 · God Classes
- FunctionTooLong: recma-document.recmaDocument packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:51
- FunctionTooLong: editor.Playground docs/_asset/editor.jsx:131
- FunctionTooLong: recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:62
- FunctionTooLong: layout.Layout docs/_component/layout.jsx:35
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- recmaJsxRewrite::(anonymous)::leave (cyclomatic 33) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:214
- recmaJsxRewrite::(anonymous)::enter (cyclomatic 32) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:81
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- recmaDocument::(anonymous)::enter (cyclomatic 17) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:330
- recmaDocument::(anonymous)::handleEsm (cyclomatic 17) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:489
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- recmaJsxRewrite::(anonymous)::leave (cognitive 77) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:214
- recmaJsxRewrite::(anonymous)::enter (cognitive 55) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:81
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test reaches this file script/jsx-loader.js
- No test reaches this file packages/node-loader/lib/condition.development.js
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.7:1) docs/_asset/index.css:517
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- recma-document.recmaDocument (cyclomatic 98) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:51
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite (cyclomatic 71) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:62
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- layout.Layout (cyclomatic 60) docs/_component/layout.jsx:35
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- mdx-loader.rehypePrettyCodeBlocks (cyclomatic 27) website/mdx-loader.js:226
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- remark-mark-and-unravel.remarkMarkAndUnravel (cyclomatic 26) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/remark-mark-and-unravel.js:19
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- editor.Playground (cyclomatic 25) docs/_asset/editor.jsx:131
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- sort.sortItems (cyclomatic 24) docs/_component/sort.js:28
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- nav.NavigationItem (cyclomatic 18) docs/_component/nav.jsx:75
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- core.createProcessor (cyclomatic 18) packages/mdx/lib/core.js:161
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- recma-jsx-rewrite.recmaJsxRewrite (cognitive 138) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:62
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- recma-document.recmaDocument (cognitive 123) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:51
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- layout.Layout (cognitive 69) docs/_component/layout.jsx:35
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- sort.sortItems (cognitive 41) docs/_component/sort.js:28
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- remarkMarkAndUnravel (cognitive 41) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/remark-mark-and-unravel.js:19
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- recmaDocument::(anonymous)::handleEsm (cognitive 30) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:489
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- editor.Playground (cognitive 26) docs/_asset/editor.jsx:131
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- mdx-loader.rehypePrettyCodeBlocks (cognitive 23) website/mdx-loader.js:226
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- vfileMessageToEsbuild (cognitive 21) packages/esbuild/lib/index.js:162
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- nav.NavigationItem (cognitive 19) docs/_component/nav.jsx:75
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- core.createProcessor (cognitive 16) packages/mdx/lib/core.js:161
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- REDACTED
P12 · CI test-gate honesty
- Coverage collected but not gated
R10 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) packages/preact/lib/index.js:60
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function leave (cyclomatic 33, cognitive 77) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:214
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function enter (cyclomatic 32, cognitive 55) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-jsx-rewrite.js:81
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 32, cognitive 42) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:71
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 24, cognitive 38) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/remark-mark-and-unravel.js:27
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function createProcessor (cyclomatic 18, cognitive 16) packages/mdx/lib/core.js:161
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function handleEsm (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 30) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:489
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function enter (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 14) packages/mdx/lib/plugin/recma-document.js:330
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function vfileMessageToEsbuild (cyclomatic 15, cognitive 21) packages/esbuild/lib/index.js:162
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function onvisit (cyclomatic 15, cognitive 12) packages/remark-mdx/test/index.js:477
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Unused dependency '@docsearch/css'
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Unused dependency '@next/mdx'
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Unused dependency '@sparticuz/chromium'
Minor — 12 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No ADRs
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No SAST
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Type-only dependency 'hast-util-to-jsx-runtime' in production deps packages/mdx/index.js:2
Minor — 8 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated (npm): @rollup/pluginutils
- Outdated (npm): @types/estree
- Outdated (npm): @types/hast
- Outdated (npm): @types/mdx
- Outdated (npm): acorn
- Outdated (npm): estree-util-scope
- Outdated (npm): source-map
- Outdated (npm): unist-util-visit
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-19ee7a337153482bb124500d71dd22d8/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 2 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-19ee7a337153482bb124500d71dd22d8/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off . | 11 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 34 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |