Public report — go-food-delivery-microservices, published 29 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
120findings with an exact file:lineof 127 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
37/107dimensions across the health lenses38338 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
mehdihadeli/go-food-delivery-microservices is sound in substance but carries real gaps (65%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Event Sourcing (100%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (60%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (63%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness (Knowledge Freshness); Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation); Make entity setters private/init-only (Encapsulated state).
For scale: Medium (~38,338 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.8 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 internal/pkg/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3540 internal/pkg/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 internal/pkg/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 internal/pkg/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 internal/pkg/go.mod
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.9× (at 65% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.8 person-years of build effort (about ~€120,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 60% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) — DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration, event sourcing × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.8 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 60%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
27
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
24
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, resolve the dormant codebase issues to ensure knowledge freshness. Next, establish an ADR log to document significant architectural decisions and their rationale. Then, enforce encapsulation by making entity setters private or init-only, ensuring state changes occur through methods that uphold invariants. After that, invert domain-to-infrastructure dependencies by declaring interfaces in the domain and implementing them in the infrastructure layer. Finally, define repositories per aggregate root to ensure child entities are accessed through their roots, preventing invariant bypass.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 36 of 37 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 37 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 120 of 127 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
8 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was FxCustomLogger.LogEvent at 33. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being grpcerrors.ParseError at 21 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 FxCustomLogger.LogEvent (cyclomatic 33) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with fx.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 mappings.ConfigureOrdersMappings (cyclomatic 21) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with mappings_profile.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 orders.configOrdersMetrics (cyclomatic 21) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with orders_fx.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 12 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 TracingOpenTelemetry.configExporters (cognitive 45) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with tracing.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FxCustomLogger.LogEvent (cognitive 37) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with fx.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 OtelMetrics.configExporters (cognitive 34) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with metrics.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×13.github/workflows/ci.yml:19detected by semgrep finding
Low: use-of-unsafe-block · ×11internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:39detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 13 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with postgres.go (4), ci.yml (3), bun_postgres.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
Resolve the 11 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with reflection_helper.go (10), type_mapper.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
101 of 101 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is internal/pkg/rabbitmq/consumer/rabbitmq_consumer.go.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×12package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4internal/pkg/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×9package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841internal/pkg/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 12 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (9), package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (8), package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
`Entity` exposes exported guard-free setter(s) (SetUpdatedAt, SetEntityType) that rewrite business state without enforcing invariants. — entity.go:65
What to do
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
The domain package `github.com/mehdihadeli/go-food-delivery-microservices/internal/services/orderservice/internal/orders/exceptions/domain_exceptions` imports `http-transport` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — invalid_delivery_address_error.go:4
The domain package `github.com/mehdihadeli/go-food-delivery-microservices/internal/services/orderservice/internal/orders/features/creating_order/v1/events/domain_events` imports `http-transport` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — order_created.go:7
The domain package `github.com/mehdihadeli/go-food-delivery-microservices/internal/services/orderservice/internal/orders/features/submitting_order/v1/events/domain_events` imports `http-transport` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — order_submitted.go:6
The domain package `github.com/mehdihadeli/go-food-delivery-microservices/internal/services/orderservice/internal/orders/models/orders/aggregate` imports `http-transport` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — order.go:11
What to do
Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.
`ProductRepository` leaks the persistence query-machinery type `ListQuery` into its contract. A repository should be a persistence PORT over an aggregate ROOT — expose intention-revealing whole-aggregate operations (Save/FindByID) and keep framework types, query specifications and business logic out of its contract so callers can't bypass the aggregate's invariants. (×2) — product_repository.go:11, product_repository.go:13
`orderReadRepository` leaks the persistence query-machinery type `ListQuery` into its contract. A repository should be a persistence PORT over an aggregate ROOT — expose intention-revealing whole-aggregate operations (Save/FindByID) and keep framework types, query specifications and business logic out of its contract so callers can't bypass the aggregate's invariants. — order_repository.go:13
What to do
Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
`mongoOrderProjection.onOrderCreated` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern — write the message to an outbox table in the SAME transaction as the state change, and dispatch it from there afterwards — or your platform's equivalent (a broker transaction, or an outbox library from your own ecosystem). — mongo_order_projection.go:60
What to do
Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether Apply/When folds reconstruct state purely from the event (no DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random or IO) so replay is reproducible.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events are immutable facts (init-only/readonly) — a settable event member lets stored history be rewritten.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ES3 · PII in the event store10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the append-only event log avoids un-erasable personal data (or has a crypto-shredding strategy) — a GDPR right-to-erasure risk.
Method: Roslyn (event-sourcing gated): high-confidence PII flagged Warning; ambiguous name-like fields adjudicated by language model as person versus fictional. Advisory without model, definitive with.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 1 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.5 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README claims domain-driven design is used in some services but omits any DDD content
README claims using inbox pattern for idempotency and exactly-once delivery but omits any such content
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims domain-driven design is used in some services but omits any DDD content; README claims using inbox pattern for idempotency and exactly-once delivery but omits any such content.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 70 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~10351 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:19— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:31— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@preview`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/preview --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/labeler.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: release-drafter/release-drafter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `release-drafter/release-drafter@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-drafter.yml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: release-drafter/release-drafter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `release-drafter/release-drafter@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/bun/postgres/bun_postgres.go:73— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/bun/postgres/bun_postgres.go:89— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gorm_db.go:125— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gorm_db.go:147— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/postgrespgx/postgres.go:143— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/postgrespgx/postgres.go:161— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/postgressqlx/postgres.go:108— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: string-formatted-query internal/pkg/postgressqlx/postgres.go:126— String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×12
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/containerd/containerd 1.7.6: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/containerd/containerd is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/containerd/containerd@v1.7.29`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of github.com/containerd/containerd 1.7.6 clears all 9 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5064, GO-2026-5338, GO-2026-5622.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/docker/cli 24.0.6+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/docker/cli is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/docker/cli@v29.2.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/golang-jwt/jwt 3.2.2+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/golang-jwt/jwt if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. (in 4 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2@v2.3.3`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 2.3.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/jackc/pgx/v4 4.18.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.2 (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of github.com/jackc/pgx/v4 4.18.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5004.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.1.9: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/opencontainers/runc is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/opencontainers/runc@v1.2.8`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.1.9 clears all 6 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/google.golang.org/grpc/otelgrpc 0.45.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.46.0 (in 4 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk 1.19.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.43.0 (in 4 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.15.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.17.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of golang.org/x/net 0.15.0 clears all 16 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 4.3.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of js-yaml 4.1.0 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 4.18.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of lodash 4.17.21 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/docker/docker 24.0.6+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 25.0.6 (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of github.com/docker/docker 24.0.6+incompatible clears all 9 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-3829.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.4.3: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/jackc/pgx/v5@v5.9.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.4.3 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of golang.org/x/crypto 0.13.0 clears all 20 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.58.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.79.3 (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of google.golang.org/grpc 1.58.2 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 internal/services/catalogwriteservice/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 internal/services/orderservice/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root'
Warning — 78 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×9
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— ajv 8.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/ClickHouse/ch-go 0.58.2: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/ClickHouse/ch-go is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/ClickHouse/ch-go@v0.65.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 2 lockfiles)
Medium CVE: GO-2025-3540 internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 9.2.1 (github.com/redis/go-redis/v9): GO-2025-3540 — upgrade to 9.5.5 (in 4 lockfiles)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/uptrace/bun/driver/pgdriver 1.1.16: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.2.15 (in 4 lockfiles)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver 1.12.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.17.7 (in 4 lockfiles)
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 internal/pkg/go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.12.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles)
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 internal/pkg/go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.13.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] internal/pkg/go.mod— google.golang.org/protobuf 1.31.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.33.0 (in 4 lockfiles)
Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 internal/pkg/go.mod— stdlib 1.22.99 (net/http/internal): GO-2025-3563 — fixed in Go 1.23.8; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. (in 4 lockfiles) One upgrade of stdlib 1.22.99 clears all 43 advisories it raises: GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/event_serializer.go:28— internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/event_serializer.go:28-40 | internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/message_serializer.go:30-42 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/event_serializer.go:83— internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/event_serializer.go:83-95 | internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/message_serializer.go:92-104 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:272— internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:272-285 | internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:450-462 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gormdbcontext/gorm_dbcontext_extensions.go:157— internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gormdbcontext/gorm_dbcontext_extensions.go:157-169 | internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gormdbcontext/gorm_dbcontext_extensions.go:222-234 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/testfixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:49— internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/testfixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:49-62 | internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/test_fixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:57-69 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:252— internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:252-262 | internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:264-274 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:30— internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:30-40 | internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:67-77 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/testfixture/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:89— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/testfixture/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:89-99 | internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/test_fixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:100-110 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) internal/pkg/otel/metrics/metrics.go:72— internal/pkg/otel/metrics/metrics.go:72-82 | internal/pkg/otel/tracing/tracing.go:73-82 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:106— internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:106-115 | internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:145-154 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/configurations/mappings/mapping_profile.go:39— internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/configurations/mappings/mapping_profile.go:39-48 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/configurations/mappings/mapping_profile.go:55-64 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/pkg/es/models/stream_name/stream_name.go:29— internal/pkg/es/models/stream_name/stream_name.go:29-36 | internal/pkg/es/models/stream_name/stream_name.go:42-49 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/pkg/http/customecho/middlewares/otel_metrics/metric.go:326— internal/pkg/http/customecho/middlewares/otel_metrics/metric.go:326-333 | internal/pkg/http/customecho/middlewares/otel_metrics/metric.go:345-352 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:206— internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:206-216 | internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:234-241 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/products/features/searching_products/v1/endpoints/search_products_endpoint.go:47— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/products/features/searching_products/v1/endpoints/search_products_endpoint.go:47-68 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/features/searchingproduct/v1/search_products_endpoint.go:44-64 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_configurator.go:55— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_configurator.go:55-75 | internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/configurations/orders/orders_configurator.go:57-77 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:128— internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:128-147 | internal/pkg/postgresgorm/repository/gorm_generic_repository.go:105-126 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/products/features/deleting_products/v1/commands/delete_product_handler.go:42— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/products/features/deleting_products/v1/commands/delete_product_handler.go:42-61 | internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/products/features/updating_products/v1/commands/update_product_handler.go:42-62 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) internal/pkg/rabbitmq/bus/rabbitmq-bus.go:165— internal/pkg/rabbitmq/bus/rabbitmq-bus.go:165-182 | internal/pkg/rabbitmq/bus/rabbitmq-bus.go:210-227 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:117— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:117-134 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:145-162 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) internal/pkg/eventstroredb/esdb_serilizer.go:247— internal/pkg/eventstroredb/esdb_serilizer.go:247-263 | internal/pkg/eventstroredb/esdb_serilizer.go:271-287 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/infrastructure/infrastructure_configurator.go:29— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/infrastructure/infrastructure_configurator.go:29-45 | internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/configurations/orders/infrastructure/infrastructure_configurator.go:29-45 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:44— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:44-59 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:42-57 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:69— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:69-84 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_fx.go:72-87 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) internal/pkg/eventstroredb/esdb_serilizer.go:198— internal/pkg/eventstroredb/esdb_serilizer.go:198-211 | internal/pkg/eventstroredb/esdb_serilizer.go:222-235 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:209— internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:209-222 | internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:233-246 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/event_serializer.go:57— internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/event_serializer.go:57-68 | internal/pkg/core/serializer/json/message_serializer.go:66-77 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/features/creatingproduct/v1/create_product.go:58— internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/features/creatingproduct/v1/create_product.go:58-69 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/features/updatingproduct/v1/update_product.go:53-64 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:49— internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:49-55 | internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:126-132 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:86— internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:86-92 | internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:165-171 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:73— internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:73-78 | internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:137-142 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:176— internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:176-181 | internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:184-189 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
FxCustomLogger.LogEvent (cyclomatic 33) internal/pkg/logger/external/fxlog/fx.go:36— FxCustomLogger.LogEvent has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
mappings.ConfigureOrdersMappings (cyclomatic 21) internal/services/orderservice/internal/orders/configurations/mappings/mappings_profile.go:15— mappings.ConfigureOrdersMappings has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
orders.configOrdersMetrics (cyclomatic 21) internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/configurations/orders/orders_fx.go:33— orders.configOrdersMetrics has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
mapper.Map (cyclomatic 19) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:164— mapper.Map has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
TracingOpenTelemetry.configExporters (cyclomatic 19) internal/pkg/otel/tracing/tracing.go:149— TracingOpenTelemetry.configExporters has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
rabbitMQProducer.PublishMessageWithTopicName (cyclomatic 18) internal/pkg/rabbitmq/producer/rabbitmq_producer.go:75— rabbitMQProducer.PublishMessageWithTopicName has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
mapper.CreateMap (cyclomatic 17) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:72— mapper.CreateMap has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
rabbitMQConsumer.Start (cyclomatic 17) internal/pkg/rabbitmq/consumer/rabbitmq_consumer.go:101— rabbitMQConsumer.Start has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 101 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1205.
TracingOpenTelemetry.configExporters (cognitive 45) internal/pkg/otel/tracing/tracing.go:149— TracingOpenTelemetry.configExporters has cognitive complexity 45 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 43, loops 2 (nesting depth added 26). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FxCustomLogger.LogEvent (cognitive 37) internal/pkg/logger/external/fxlog/fx.go:36— FxCustomLogger.LogEvent has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 30, loops 6, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
OtelMetrics.configExporters (cognitive 34) internal/pkg/otel/metrics/metrics.go:127— OtelMetrics.configExporters has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 32, loops 2 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
rabbitMQConsumer.Start (cognitive 23) internal/pkg/rabbitmq/consumer/rabbitmq_consumer.go:101— rabbitMQConsumer.Start has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, loops 3, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
esdbSubscriptionAllWorker.SubscribeAll (cognitive 22) internal/pkg/eventstroredb/subscription_all_worker.go:72— esdbSubscriptionAllWorker.SubscribeAll has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, loops 3, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
rabbitMQProducer.PublishMessageWithTopicName (cognitive 22) internal/pkg/rabbitmq/producer/rabbitmq_producer.go:75— rabbitMQProducer.PublishMessageWithTopicName has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, boolean chains 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
mapper.CreateMap (cognitive 21) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:72— mapper.CreateMap has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, boolean chains 8 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
mongoGenericRepository.Update (cognitive 20) internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:350— mongoGenericRepository.Update has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
mappings.ConfigureOrdersMappings (cognitive 20) internal/services/orderservice/internal/orders/configurations/mappings/mappings_profile.go:15— mappings.ConfigureOrdersMappings has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
orders.configOrdersMetrics (cognitive 20) internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/configurations/orders/orders_fx.go:33— orders.configOrdersMetrics has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
mapper.mapStructs (cognitive 19) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:331— mapper.mapStructs has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
typemapper.discoverTypes (cognitive 19) internal/pkg/reflection/typemapper/type_mapper.go:29— typemapper.discoverTypes has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
mongoGenericRepository.Search (cognitive 18) internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:194— mongoGenericRepository.Search has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 4 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
config.BindConfigKey (cognitive 16) internal/pkg/config/config_helper.go:23— config.BindConfigKey has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
mapper.Map (cognitive 16) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:164— mapper.Map has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9, boolean chains 7 (nesting depth added 1). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
mapper.configProfile (cognitive 16) internal/pkg/mapper/mapper.go:219— mapper.configProfile has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
rabbitMQConsumer.handleReceived (cognitive 16) internal/pkg/rabbitmq/consumer/rabbitmq_consumer.go:290— rabbitMQConsumer.handleReceived has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 3 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×1
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 internal/pkg/go.mod— github.com/klauspost/compress 1.17.0 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — github.com/klauspost/compress is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.18.7`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 lockfiles)
Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/testfixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:168— internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/testfixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:168-193 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/configurations/catalogs/catalogs_configurator_seed.go:71-96 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 4) internal/pkg/bun/postgres/bun_postgres.go:79— internal/pkg/bun/postgres/bun_postgres.go:79-97 | internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gorm_db.go:137-155 | internal/pkg/postgrespgx/postgres.go:151-169 | internal/pkg/postgressqlx/postgres.go:116-134 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 3) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/testfixture/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:156— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/testfixture/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:156-174 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/testfixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:107-125 | internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/test_fixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:115-132 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gormdbcontext/gorm_dbcontext_extensions.go:58— internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gormdbcontext/gorm_dbcontext_extensions.go:58-72 | internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gormdbcontext/gorm_dbcontext_extensions.go:173-187 | internal/pkg/postgresgorm/gormdbcontext/gorm_dbcontext_extensions.go:238-252 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/products/features/get_product_by_id/v1/endpoints/get_product_by_id_endpoint.go:42— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/products/features/get_product_by_id/v1/endpoints/get_product_by_id_endpoint.go:42-56 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/products/features/gettingproductbyid/v1/get_product_by_id_endpoint.go:39-53 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:107— internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:107-118 | internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:187-197 | internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:214-224 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/testfixture/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:46— internal/services/catalogreadservice/internal/shared/testfixture/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:46-55 | internal/services/catalogwriteservice/internal/shared/testfixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:48-58 | internal/services/orderservice/internal/shared/test_fixtures/integration/integration_test_fixture.go:56-66 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:297— internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:297-305 | internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:312-320 | internal/pkg/otel/tracing/utils/utils.go:326-335 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:150— internal/pkg/mongodb/repository/mongo_generic_repository.go:150-158 | internal/pkg/postgresgorm/repository/gorm_generic_repository.go:128-138 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:39— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:55— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:76— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:92— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:115— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:132— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:154— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:171— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:183— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/reflectionhelper/reflection_helper.go:193— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block internal/pkg/reflection/typemapper/type_mapper.go:35— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Dormant codebase — 101 of 101 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 101 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— diff 4.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — diff is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin diff to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry).
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.go) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fafb6-1cc6-7588-ac23-53f1a23ea7a6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 32 · Warnings: 78 · Recommendations: 15 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 21:09 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.