Public report — vertical-slice-api-template, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
117findings with an exact file:lineof 232 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
75/107dimensions across the health lenses11817 LoC · 12 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
mehdihadeli/vertical-slice-api-template carries serious risk (58%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Code Health (93%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Security (51%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (56%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: authorization at every handler (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture); Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism (Audit Trail).
For scale: Small (~11,817 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Business logic 20%Plumbing 51%Tests 28%Generated 1%
New since the last scan (2+)
2 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.
D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/k8s/node-exporter.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deployments/k8s/node-exporter.yaml
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€34,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 51% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.9) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 6 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 51%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
6 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
89 modules, 98 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
50
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
26
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
7
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, enforce authorization at every handler by adopting a protected-by-default approach to ensure all endpoints are secured. Next, harden the web security posture by adding critical response headers to establish defense in depth. Then, implement a structural audit mechanism to log all sensitive changes immutably. Finally, resolve the identified issues in dependency hygiene and infrastructure-as-code to eliminate medium-severity risks.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 6 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
Test Quality: No assertions (empty test): category_trait_test
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 71 of 75 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 75 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 117 of 232 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Off the main sequence: Vertical.Slice.Template.KiotaClients · ×2
What to do
Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
53 test methods: 45 unit, 8 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 4 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 53 tests.
No assertions (empty test): category_trait_test · ×3tests/Vertical.Slice.Template.TestsShared/XunitCategories/Tests.cs:7
No assertions: validate_service_dependenciestests/Vertical.Slice.Template.DependencyTests/DependencyTests.cs:14
Mock framework: NSubstitute
What to do
Resolve the 3 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with Tests.cs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with DependencyTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 6 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The Vertical Slice API Template repository has a strong README with an excellent table of contents and clear Use This Template guidance. It is well-organized: the main document lists Install/Features/Libraries/Getting Started/Setup (including Dev Certificate, Conventional Commit, Formatting, Analizers), Application Structure sub-sections, a dedicated How to Run section covering both local development and load-testing via k6, and Migration Scripts for database migrations. However, there is no architecture or design documentation (no markdown files) and only 6% XML coverage across the template project families, leaving much of the API surface undocumented.
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The Vertical Slice API Template repository has a strong README with an excellent table of contents and clear Use This Template guidance. It is well-organized: the main document lists Install/Features/Libraries/Getting Started/Setup (including Dev Certificate, Conventional Commit, Formatting, Analizers), Application Structure sub-sections, a dedicated How to Run section covering both local development and load-testing via k6, and Migration Scripts for database migrations. However, there is no architecture or design documentation (no markdown files) and only 6% XML coverage across the template project families, leaving much of the API surface undocumented.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
1 of 12 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split Shared
What to do
Resolve the 1 Split Shared finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
97 % of calls cross a namespace and 15 % go through an interface, but 92 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 7.8/10. — 97 % of calls cross a namespace and 15 % go through an interface, but 92 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×10.github/workflows/labeler.yml:27detected by semgrep finding
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext · ×15deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml:22detected by semgrep finding
Low: stacktrace-disclosuresrc/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Shared/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions/WebApplicationExtensions.Infrastructure.cs:21detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 15 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with aspire-dashboard.yaml, elasticsearch.yaml, grafana.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 10 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with publish.yml (8), labeler.yml, release-drafter.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with WebApplicationExtensions.Infrastructure.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: KSV-0014 · ×18deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×32deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 32 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with aspire-dashboard.yaml (5), elasticsearch.yaml (5), grafana.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (32 warning-level).
Resolve the 18 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with aspire-dashboard.yaml, postgres-configmap.yaml, elasticsearch.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
61 of 61 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Shared/Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs.
Dormant codebase
Largest orphaned filesrc/Shared/Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with TypeExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`DiagnosticsProvider` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_activitySource, _listener, _meter; e.g. `_activitySource` at line 28). — DiagnosticsProvider.cs:10
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.
Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.
What to do
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.
What to do
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.
`ProductCreatedDomainEvent.CategoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — ProductCreatedDomainEvent.cs:17
`IEvent.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — IEvent.cs:13
`IMessage.MessageId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — IMessage.cs:7
`IMessage.CorrelationId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — IMessage.cs:8
`Event.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Event.cs:8
What to do
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether cross-context integration events stay loosely coupled — no producer-owned enums/domain types leaking to consumers. Shared-kernel/contracts types are allowed.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): integration-event properties scanned for producer-domain type/enum leaks versus primitives and shared-kernel types. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
`AuditableEntity` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — AuditableEntity.cs:5
What to do
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×6) — ProductCreatedDomainEvent.cs:35, ProductCreatedDomainEvent.cs:36, ProductCreatedDomainEvent.cs:37, …
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 11 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Only 3/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 4, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 34 use(s) across 12,157 production line(s) (~2.8/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 58/69 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×11) — CatalogsConfigurations.cs:24, RedisPubSubExtensions.cs:10, RedisPubSubExtensions.cs:20, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~1.5 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 75 suppression(s) across the 50656 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 32 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — This is a dotnet-new template — at-rest encryption and key-vaulting are deferred to the application you build from it. Add ASP.NET Data Protection / column encryption + a key vault for your real data store when you productionise.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — analyzer environment
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0109 deployments/k8s/config-maps/postgres-configmap.yaml— ConfigMap with secrets
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/elasticsearch.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/grafana.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/jaeger.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/kibana.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/loki.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/node-exporter.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/otel-collector.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/postgresql.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/prometheus.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/rabbitmq.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/redis.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/tempo.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/vertical-slice-template-api.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/k8s/zipkin.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: DS-0002 src/App/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/App/Dockerfile.dev— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/labeler.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: release-drafter/release-drafter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `release-drafter/release-drafter@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:30— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:39— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nuget/setup-nuget@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nuget/setup-nuget@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nuget/setup-nuget/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:74— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:89— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:97— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:105— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-drafter.yml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: release-drafter/release-drafter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `release-drafter/release-drafter@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×5
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— fast-uri 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
NoWarnInCsproj tests/Directory.Build.props:9— CS1587 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj tests/Directory.Build.props:9— CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj tests/Directory.Build.props:9— CS1998 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj tests/Directory.Build.props:9— NU5105 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
D10 · Test Quality· No assertions (empty test) · ×3
No assertions (empty test): category_trait_test tests/Vertical.Slice.Template.TestsShared/XunitCategories/Tests.cs:7— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
No assertions (empty test): feature_trait_test tests/Vertical.Slice.Template.TestsShared/XunitCategories/Tests.cs:11— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
No assertions (empty test): bug_trait_test tests/Vertical.Slice.Template.TestsShared/XunitCategories/Tests.cs:15— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/k8s/elasticsearch.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/k8s/elasticsearch.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0022 deployments/k8s/elasticsearch.yaml— Specific capabilities added
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/k8s/elasticsearch.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployments/k8s/elasticsearch.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/k8s/grafana.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/k8s/grafana.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deployments/k8s/grafana.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/k8s/grafana.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployments/k8s/grafana.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/k8s/jaeger.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/k8s/jaeger.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deployments/k8s/jaeger.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/k8s/jaeger.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployments/k8s/jaeger.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/k8s/kibana.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/k8s/kibana.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/k8s/kibana.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployments/k8s/kibana.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/k8s/loki.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/aspire-dashboard.yaml:22— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation deployments/k8s/elasticsearch.yaml:55— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/grafana.yaml:21— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/jaeger.yaml:19— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/kibana.yaml:18— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/loki.yaml:20— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/node-exporter.yaml:19— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/otel-collector.yaml:23— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/postgresql.yaml:16— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/prometheus.yaml:20— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/rabbitmq.yaml:16— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/redis.yaml:18— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/tempo.yaml:21— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/vertical-slice-template-api.yaml:18— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployments/k8s/zipkin.yaml:18— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Prerelease dependency: ErrorProne.NET.CoreAnalyzers — ErrorProne.NET.CoreAnalyzers resolves to 0.7.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
Prerelease dependency: StyleCop.Analyzers — StyleCop.Analyzers resolves to 1.2.0-beta.556, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
Prerelease dependency: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Hybrid — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Hybrid resolves to 9.0.0-preview.9.24556.5, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore resolves to 1.10.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.GrpcNetClient — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.GrpcNetClient resolves to 1.10.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Process — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Process resolves to 1.10.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
TodoComment src/Shared/EF/Interceptors/AuditInterceptor.cs:23— // var userId = GetCurrentUser(); // TODO: Get current user — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Shared/Validation/Extensions/RegistrationExtensions.cs:13— // TODO: problem with registering internal validators — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment tests/Vertical.Slice.Template.TestsShared/Fixtures/SharedFixture.cs:78— // //// TODO: Breaking change in the testcontainer upgrade — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Dead code: GetImplementedInterfacesToMap src/Shared/Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs:476— Method GetImplementedInterfacesToMap — no references found in solution.
Dead code: IsPrimitive src/Shared/Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs:556— Method IsPrimitive — no references found in solution.
Dead code: IsRecord src/Shared/Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs:700— Method IsRecord — no references found in solution.
Change coupling: CreateProductEndpoint.cs ↔ GetProductByIdEndpoint.cs src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/CreatingProduct/v1/CreateProductEndpoint.cs— `src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/CreatingProduct/v1/CreateProductEndpoint.cs` and `src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/GettingProductById/v1/GetProductByIdEndpoint.cs` change together 53% of the time (8 of the 15 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: GetProductByIdEndpoint.cs ↔ GetProductsByPageEndpoint.cs src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/GettingProductById/v1/GetProductByIdEndpoint.cs— `src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/GettingProductById/v1/GetProductByIdEndpoint.cs` and `src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/GettingProductsByPage/v1/GetProductsByPageEndpoint.cs` change together 53% of the time (8 of the 15 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×2
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— ajv 8.17.1: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json— yaml 2.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin yaml to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry).
Duplicated block (19 lines × 3) src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Commands/CommandHandlerMetrics.cs:56— src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Commands/CommandHandlerMetrics.cs:56-74 | src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Commands/CommandHandlerMetrics.cs:92-110 | src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Commands/CommandHandlerMetrics.cs:133-151 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Commands/CommandHandlerMetrics.cs:56` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 3) src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Query/QueryHandlerMetrics.cs:56— src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Query/QueryHandlerMetrics.cs:56-74 | src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Query/QueryHandlerMetrics.cs:92-110 | src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Query/QueryHandlerMetrics.cs:133-151 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/Observability/CoreDiagnostics/Query/QueryHandlerMetrics.cs:56` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Off the main sequence: Vertical.Slice.Template.KiotaClients — Vertical.Slice.Template.KiotaClients: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Vertical.Slice.Template.ConnectedServiceClients — Vertical.Slice.Template.ConnectedServiceClients: abstractness 0.08, instability 0.00, distance 0.92 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
No assertions: validate_service_dependencies tests/Vertical.Slice.Template.DependencyTests/DependencyTests.cs:14— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not measured · ×1
Test reliability not measured — analyzer environment — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry), so no test ever ran. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — it is excluded from the score. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed.
BarePragmaDisable src/Shared/Cache/DependencyInjectionExtensions.cs:11— #pragma warning disable EXTEXP0018 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BareSuppressMessage tests/Vertical.Slice.Template.UnitTests/Products/Features/CreatingProduct/v1/CreateProductTests.cs:17— SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
TypeExtensions.AddImplementationsAsTransient (cognitive 30) src/Shared/Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs:596— TypeExtensions.AddImplementationsAsTransient has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
OpenApiVersioningDocumentTransformer.CreateInfoForApiVersion (cognitive 26) src/Shared/OpenApi/AspnetOpenApi/OpenApiVersioningDocumentTransformer.cs:41— OpenApiVersioningDocumentTransformer.CreateInfoForApiVersion has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ConfigureSwaggerGenVersioningOptions.CreateInfoForApiVersion (cognitive 26) src/Shared/OpenApi/Swashbuckle/ConfigureSwaggerGenVersioningOptions.cs:49— ConfigureSwaggerGenVersioningOptions.CreateInfoForApiVersion has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) src/Shared/OpenApi/AspnetOpenApi/OpenApiVersioningDocumentTransformer.cs:42— src/Shared/OpenApi/AspnetOpenApi/OpenApiVersioningDocumentTransformer.cs:42-66 | src/Shared/OpenApi/Swashbuckle/ConfigureSwaggerGenVersioningOptions.cs:50-74 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/OpenApi/AspnetOpenApi/OpenApiVersioningDocumentTransformer.cs:42` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/Shared/EF/StronglyTypedIdValueConverterSelector.cs:37— src/Shared/EF/StronglyTypedIdValueConverterSelector.cs:37-53 | src/Shared/EF/StronglyTypedIdValueConverterSelector.cs:56-71 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/EF/StronglyTypedIdValueConverterSelector.cs:37` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/CreatingProduct/v1/CreateProduct.cs:45— src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/CreatingProduct/v1/CreateProduct.cs:45-49 | src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/CreatingProduct/v1/ProductCreatedDomainEvent.cs:46-50 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Products/Features/CreatingProduct/v1/CreateProduct.cs:45` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read.
Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Vertical.Slice.Template.DependencyTests` with 30 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 94 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.5 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 11723 LoC across 12 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
redundant comment src/Shared/Abstractions/Caching/ICacheRequest.cs:6— "Works like FluentValidation with defining nested or separate class for our command or query" — delete - explains the pattern but restates 'works like FluentValidation'
Split Shared — Generic catch-all name with 9k LoC and 58 namespaces is a sprawling grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: split the 58 namespaces into focused shared libraries
Low: stacktrace-disclosure src/App/Vertical.Slice.Template/Shared/Extensions/WebApplicationExtensions/WebApplicationExtensions.Infrastructure.cs:21— Stacktrace information is displayed in a non-Development environment. Accidentally disclosing sensitive stack trace information in a production environment aids an attacker in reconnaissance and information gathering. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Dormant codebase — 61 of 61 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 61 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Largest orphaned file · ×1
Largest orphaned file src/Shared/Core/Extensions/TypeExtensions.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
D18 · Solution Shape· Build did not complete in the analyzer · ×1
Build did not complete in the analyzer — `dotnet build` reported 1 error(s) but no C# compiler diagnostic, so this is a build-environment gap rather than a code defect. The usual causes are a project that targets a platform this run cannot build (a Windows-only target framework on a Linux worker) or a build step that shells out to a tool the image does not carry. Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped. Semantic analysis is independent of this build and covers every project that loaded — but a project whose restore did not complete has no resolved references, so treat its results as absent rather than clean. Worth checking on your side too: a build that needs undeclared host tooling, or that cannot run off its own platform, is the same wall a new contributor hits.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
provenance: not applicable — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
0
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Run 019fc869-f591-7580-91d9-be3efce623a5 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 1 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 43 · Warnings: 83 · Recommendations: 10 · Info: 96 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 16:16 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.