ecommerce-monolith — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

meysamhadeli/ecommerce-monolith carries serious risk (45%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (93%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (29%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (45%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture).

For scale: Small (~5,667 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 77% Strong Architecture 93% ★ Exemplary Maturity 71% Strong Readiness 45% Weak · gated by D12, P7 Security 29% Weak · gated by D29, C1, C2 Domain Modelling 62% Adequate · gated by DM1, DM2 Event-Driven 100% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Security 29% · 46% weightReadiness 45% · 25% weightDomain Modelling 62% · 14% weightMaturity 71% · 8% weightCode Health 77% · 4% weightArchitecture 93% · 2% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight

Raise Security 29 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 45 → ~58.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 8%Plumbing 47%Tests 34%Generated 11%

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,200–€21,000

Cost to rebuild	€4,200–€21,000 (0.1 person-years (70–220 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 45% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 41% boilerplate · 45% straight-line · 14% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€13,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 29% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — service/app, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 6 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with action.yml (4), ci.yml, release-drafter-labeler.yml.

+8.7 pts · Low effort · Static Analysis (SAST)

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

+13.9 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection

Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.

+13.9 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 29%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (5,667 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 29%

→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause

18 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.

Evidence: DM5 setters: 1 · DM4 anemic: 1 · DM2 primitive ids: 16

→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

46 modules, 63 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Strong

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.9 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.1 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 7.5 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.9

The Bad

X1 · Repo Async correctness 6.4 X4 · Repo Structured logging 6.1

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Exemplary

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 7.6 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.2 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 8.3 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX7 · Repo Slice cohesion 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

The Bad

D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 6.7

At a glance — Maturity · 71% · Strong

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0

The Bad

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0

The Ugly

D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 4.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 45% · Weak · gated by D12, P7

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

P2 · Repo Observability 6.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 2.4 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 4.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 29% · Weak · gated by D29, C1, C2

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.6 C3 · Repo Audit Trail 7.5

The Bad

S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.0

The Ugly

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 3.5 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 62% · Adequate · gated by DM1, DM2

The Good

DM3 · Repo Integration-event coupling 10.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 9.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 9.6 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0

The Ugly

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 3.5 DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 9.6 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	6	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	2	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, encrypt sensitive data at rest and manage keys in a vault, or skip if infrastructure handles this. Next, enforce default-deny access controls on all endpoints using authorization attributes or imperative guards. Then, add security response headers like Content-Security-Policy to strengthen the web-security posture. After that, implement a structural audit trail using an EF SaveChanges interceptor to log sensitive changes immutably. Finally, resolve high-priority findings in static analysis, starting with the action and CI configuration files.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 6 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with action.yml (4), ci.yml, release-drafter-labeler.yml.	+8.7 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).	+13.9 pts	Medium	Data Protection
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.	+13.9 pts	Medium	Access Controls
Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+6.6 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.	+12.4 pts	Medium	Web-Security Posture
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.	+9.6 pts	Medium	Audit Trail
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+4.6 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.	+6.6 pts	Medium	Outbound HTTP resilience

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 9 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 44% mixed · 56% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
.github/actions/docker-build-publish/action.yml	4.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
Dockerfile	6.5	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.github/workflows/ci.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/release-drafter-labeler.yml	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/BuildingBlocks/Core/EventDispatcher.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: GetHeaders
src/BuildingBlocks/Web/TypeProvider.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: IsRecord
src/BuildingBlocks/TestBase/TestBase.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: TestFixture (LCOM4 5)
ECommerce/Data/readme.md	9.5	Near-clean	Documentation Quality: The two .md files (ECommerce.Data) only show setup commands ('dotnet ef migrations add Init ...') without describing what data model or database exists, leaving the reader unable to determine whether this is a domain layer or an infrastructure file.
src/BuildingBlocks/Logging/Extensions.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 62 of 66 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 66 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D31D35AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2C3DM1DM2DM3DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 16 of 89 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc7ad-812b-738a-b13e-95e2a6db5181.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: TestFixture (LCOM4 5)src/BuildingBlocks/TestBase/TestBase.cs:27

What to do

Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with TestBase.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

42 test methods: 35 unit, 7 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

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D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 42 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 3 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky); other: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

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D12 · Dependency Hygiene2.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

57 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 5 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: AutoMapper

Deprecated: CSharpGuidelinesAnalyzer · ×5

Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Abstractions · ×57

What to do

Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 61 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 2 dead symbols across 4997 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9.

Dead code: GetHeaders · ×2src/BuildingBlocks/Core/EventDispatcher.cs:96

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D18 · Solution Shape9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 projects, 262 source files, 6701 hand-written lines of code (4997 production / 1704 test), plus 1121 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 12 inter-project edges (build failed).

Thin analysable surface across projects

Build did not complete in the analyzer

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The README is a strong project description with a clear objective and an outline of the document's contents. It lists seven sparkling goals (Vertical Slice Architecture, DDD, CQRS/mediatr, MediatR coupling reduction, Postgres DB, unit/integration/end-to-end tests) and begins to detail them under 'The Goals of This Project'. The table of contents is complete with Development Setup, Dotnet Tools Packages, How to Run, Docker Compose, and the outline sections present. However, only one README file (the ECommerce-Monolith main readme) is shown; the two .md files are thin at 15 words each and do not add much beyond the initial setup commands, so the documentation's completeness and depth fall below an average level.

The two .md files (ECommerce.Data) only show setup commands ('dotnet ef migrations add Init ...') without describing what data model or database exists, leaving the reader unable to determine whether this is a domain layer or an infrastructure file.ECommerce/Data/readme.md

XML-doc coverage: BuildingBlocks · ×3src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.csproj

What to do

Resolve the 1 The two .md files (ECommerce.Data) only show setup commands ('dotnet ef… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with readme.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

32 valuable / 1 redundant across 145 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentsrc/BuildingBlocks/Logging/Extensions.cs:33

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split ECommerce

What to do

Resolve the 1 Split ECommerce finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 94 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×6.github/actions/docker-build-publish/action.yml:31detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 6 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with action.yml (4), ci.yml, release-drafter-labeler.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

`InventoryItems` references the aggregate root `Inventory` directly (via `Inventory`) — hold its `InventoryId` instead. — InventoryItems.cs:16
`InventoryItems` references the aggregate root `Product` directly (via `Product`) — hold its `ProductId` instead. — InventoryItems.cs:18
`Order` references the aggregate root `Customer` directly (via `Customer`) — hold its `CustomerId` instead. — Order.cs:17
`Product` references the aggregate root `Category` directly (via `Category`) — hold its `CategoryId` instead. — Product.cs:17

What to do

Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

`IEvent.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — IEvent.cs:10
`ProductAddedToInventoryDomainEvent.InventoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — AddProductToInventory.cs:22
`ProductAddedToInventoryDomainEvent.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — AddProductToInventory.cs:22
`ProductUpdatedToInventoryDomainEvent.InventoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — AddProductToInventory.cs:25
`ProductUpdatedToInventoryDomainEvent.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — AddProductToInventory.cs:25
`ProductDamagedDomainEvent.InventoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DamageProduct.cs:23
`ProductDamagedDomainEvent.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DamageProduct.cs:23
`ProductSoldDomainEvent.InventoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — SellProduct.cs:24
`ProductSoldDomainEvent.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — SellProduct.cs:24
`NewOrderRegisteredDomainEvent.InventoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — RegisterNewOrder.cs:28
`NewOrderRegisteredDomainEvent.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — RegisterNewOrder.cs:28
`OrderInitialedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — RegisterNewOrder.cs:31
`OrderDiscountAppliedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — RegisterNewOrder.cs:35
`OrderShipmentAppliedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — RegisterNewOrder.cs:39
`OrderTotalPriceAddedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — RegisterNewOrder.cs:43
`ProductCreatedDomainEvent.CategoryId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — CreateProduct.cs:30

What to do

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM3 · Integration-event coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether cross-context integration events stay loosely coupled — no producer-owned enums/domain types leaking to consumers. Shared-kernel/contracts types are allowed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): integration-event properties scanned for producer-domain type/enum leaks versus primitives and shared-kernel types. Deterministic, hard fact.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`OrderItem` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OrderItem.cs:8

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

`Product` exposes publicly writable state (ProfitMargin). — Product.cs:11

What to do

Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED3 · Event naming9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

`IntegrationEventWrapper` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — IntegrationEventWrapper.cs:5
`InternalCommand` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — InternalCommand.cs:5

What to do

Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.

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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

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M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Only 2/6 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 2/3 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 3, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness6.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×2) — Extensions.cs:57, Extensions.cs:59

What to do

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 23/40 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×17) — Extensions.cs:113, Extensions.cs:131, TestBase.cs:93, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. — EventDispatcher.cs:82

What to do

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

~0.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 4 suppression(s) across the 32600 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	77%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	93%	Exemplary	Solid.
Maturity	71%	Strong	Solid.
Readiness	45%	Weak — gated by D12, P7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	29%	Weak — gated by D29, C1, C2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	62%	Adequate — gated by DM1, DM2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Not included — 41 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice + CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 8 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×6

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/docker-build-publish/action.yml:31 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/docker-build-publish/action.yml:39 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/docker-build-publish/action.yml:45 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/docker-build-publish/action.yml:51 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-drafter-labeler.yml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: release-drafter/release-drafter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `release-drafter/release-drafter@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1

Vulnerable: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 13.0.1 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1

High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.

Warning — 10 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×5

Deprecated: CSharpGuidelinesAnalyzer — CSharpGuidelinesAnalyzer 3.8.5 — Legacy
Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 — Legacy
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.2.2 — Other,Legacy
Deprecated: Serilog.Sinks.Elasticsearch — Serilog.Sinks.Elasticsearch 10.0.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `Elastic.Serilog.Sinks`; migrate the reference to it.
Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.

D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×2

Dead code: GetHeaders src/BuildingBlocks/Core/EventDispatcher.cs:96 — Method GetHeaders — no references found in solution.
Dead code: IsRecord src/BuildingBlocks/Web/TypeProvider.cs:9 — Method IsRecord — no references found in solution.

D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1

single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 45 commit(s) sampled).

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1

Low cohesion: TestFixture (LCOM4 5) src/BuildingBlocks/TestBase/TestBase.cs:27 — TestFixture's methods form 5 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. No coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output anywhere in the repo, or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.

Recommendation — 8 finding(s)

D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1

Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `ECommerce.Api` with 24 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 89 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.87 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The two .md files (ECommerce.Data) only show setup commands ('dotnet ef migrations add Init ...') without describing what data model or database exists, leaving the reader unable to determine whether this is a domain layer or an infrastructure file. · ×1

The two .md files (ECommerce.Data) only show setup commands ('dotnet ef migrations add Init ...') without describing what data model or database exists, leaving the reader unable to determine whether this is a domain layer or an infrastructure file. ECommerce/Data/readme.md — Add a brief description of the ECommerce.Data project's purpose and its relation to the main ECommerce-Monolith repo.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1

Bounded contexts not declared — At 5k LoC the codebase is mid-range but its 6 projects exceed the ~5-project threshold that signals multi-module structure requiring boundaries. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1

redundant comment src/BuildingBlocks/Logging/Extensions.cs:33 — "AddCustomSerilog, above `.`: Only show ef-core information in error level" — minor stylistic guard; remove or replace with a WHY note if it is truly only showing EF Core info

D26 · Project Cohesion · Split ECommerce · ×1

Split ECommerce — At 3k LoC the project is large but it spans 43 unrelated namespaces (order, payment, inventory, shipping, logistics) and its size alone does not justify splitting. Suggested: by namespace: OrderProcessing, PaymentGateway, InventoryStock, ShippingCalculator

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (45 commit(s) sampled).

Info — 63 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×57

Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Abstractions — Asp.Versioning.Abstractions 8.1.0 → 10.1.0 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Http — Asp.Versioning.Http 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc — Asp.Versioning.Mvc 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer — Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: AsyncAwaitBestPractices — AsyncAwaitBestPractices 9.0.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 13.0.1 → 16.2.0 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Bogus — Bogus 35.6.1 → 35.6.5 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: EFCore.NamingConventions — EFCore.NamingConventions 9.0.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Figgle — Figgle 0.5.1 → 0.6.6 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 7.0.0 → 8.10.0 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.11.0 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 11.3.0 → 11.3.1 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Humanizer.Core — Humanizer.Core 2.14.1 → 3.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: MassTransit — MassTransit 8.3.4 → 9.2.0 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.4.1 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Meziantou.Analyzer — Meziantou.Analyzer 2.0.182 → 3.0.138 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.2.2 → 2.3.11 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost — Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by BuildingBlocks).
+ 32 more in this group — see findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×3

XML-doc coverage: BuildingBlocks src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.csproj — BuildingBlocks: 1 % XML-doc coverage (2/249).
XML-doc coverage: ECommerce src/ECommerce/ECommerce.csproj — ECommerce: 0 % XML-doc coverage (1/455).
XML-doc coverage: ECommerce.Api src/ECommerce.Api/ECommerce.Api.csproj — ECommerce.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/1).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1

Mock framework: NSubstitute — BuildingBlocks references NSubstitute.

D18 · Solution Shape · Build did not complete in the analyzer · ×1

Build did not complete in the analyzer — `dotnet build` reported 1 error(s) but no C# compiler diagnostic, so this is a build-environment gap rather than a code defect. The usual causes are a project that targets a platform this run cannot build (a Windows-only target framework on a Linux worker) or a build step that shells out to a tool the image does not carry. Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped. Semantic analysis is independent of this build and covers every project that loaded — but a project whose restore did not complete has no resolved references, so treat its results as absent rather than clean. Worth checking on your side too: a build that needs undeclared host tooling, or that cannot run off its own platform, is the same wall a new contributor hits.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	6	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	2	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc7ad-812b-738a-b13e-95e2a6db5181 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 2 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Phone — 2 field(s)

Customer.Mobile src/ECommerce/Customers/Models/Customer.cs:12
CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.Mobile src/ECommerce/Customers/Models/Customer.cs:36

Meysamhadeli/ecommerce-Monolith

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 77% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 71% · Strong

At a glance — Readiness · 45% · Weak · gated by D12, P7

At a glance — Security · 29% · Weak · gated by D29, C1, C2

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 62% · Adequate · gated by DM1, DM2

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts