Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
michisan/michi-api is in a workable but fragile state (51%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Code Health (87%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (79%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (34%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (63%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like… (Observability).
For scale: Medium (~27,529 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.5 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (87%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 34 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 51 → ~65.
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €26,000–€130,000
| Cost to rebuild | €26,000–€130,000 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 51% quality) |
| Size & shape | Medium · 34% boilerplate · 54% straight-line · 12% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.5 person-years of build effort (about ~€79,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 34% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Trajectory
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Event-Driven
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 11 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 7 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to automatically build and test code on every push or pull request. Next, formalize disaster recovery and backup procedures by codifying geo-recovery in infrastructure as code and documenting recovery time and point objectives. Then, extend structured logging across all service-like projects to ensure full production observability. After that, implement an approval gate for production deployments to enforce review requirements. Finally, begin maintaining an Architecture Decision Record log to capture significant design choices and their rationale.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +15.6 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +15.6 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production. | +9.7 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion. | +9.3 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +1.7 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 6 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with casdoor.yaml (2), CreatedOneUserWebhook.bru, GetDefaultApplication.yml. | +1.1 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +2.0 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps. | +1.9 pts | Medium | Data Protection |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Libs/CasdoorAdmin/casdoor.yaml | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| Apps/Api/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| Bruno/Casdoor/Organization_API/GetDefaultApplication.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| Bruno/Casdoor/Organization_API/GetOrganizations.yml | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| Bruno/Michi/Users/CreateOne/CreatedOneUserWebhook.bru | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| Bruno/Michi/Users/UpdateOne/UpdatedOneUserWebhook.bru | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneUser.Aggregate.cs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: UserAggregate.BuildOne (cyclomatic 27) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Entities/BuildOneUser.Entity.cs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: UserEntity.BuildOne (cyclomatic 24) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: OrganizationAggregate.BuildOne (cyclomatic 20) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/UpdateOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: OrganizationAggregate.UpdateOne (cyclomatic 19) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BaseOrganization.Aggregate.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: Dead code: IsCurrentUserNotBelongsThisOrganization |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Infrastructure/CreateOne/Webhooks/CreatedOneOrganization.WebhookHandler.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Infrastructure/DeleteOne/Adapters/DeleteOneOrganization.Adapter.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (27 lines × 2) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Infrastructure/CreateOne/Webhooks/CreatedOneUser.WebhookHandler.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (26 lines × 3) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Infrastructure/DeleteOne/Adapters/DeleteOneUser.Adapter.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Application/Common/Validators/OrganizationWebhook.Validator.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) |
| Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Infrastructure/CreateOne/Adapters/CreateOneUser.Adapter.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 9) |
| E2E/Api/Aspire/ApiAppFactory.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| Libs/ServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 54 of 58 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 36 of 121 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UserAggregate.BuildOne at 27.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UserAggregate.BuildOne at 26.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
6 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 13 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D9 · Test Distribution
173 test methods: 161 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 12 e2e.
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 173 tests.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
58 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
What to do
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 70 packages use a banned license.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneUser.Aggregate.cs (3×27=81); Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs (2×20=40); Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/UpdateOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs (2×19=38)
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 18283 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
D18 · Solution Shape
10 projects, 612 .cs files, 28727 hand-written lines of code (18283 production / 10444 test), plus 16213 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 26 inter-project edges (build failed).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
The Michi API project has strong documentation: a single README covering the API and an accompanying CleanArchitecture.md that thoroughly explains monorepo vs polyrepo, monolith vs microservices, bounded contexts, ports/adapters, CQRS/DDD, and several other architectural patterns. The README is reasonably complete but lacks concrete setup steps for running tests (e.g., test commands) and a runnable example of the API endpoint; CleanArchitecture.md is excellent but does not cover code structure or how to add new features.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The Michi API project has strong documentation: a single README covering the API and an accompanying CleanArchitecture.md that thoroughly explains monorepo vs polyrepo, monolith vs microservices, bounded contexts, ports/adapters, CQRS/DDD, and several other architectural patterns. The README is reasonably complete but lacks concrete setup steps for running tests (e.g., test commands) and a runnable example of the API endpoint; CleanArchitecture.md is excellent but does not cover code structure or how to add new features.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
D24 · Comment Value
12 valuable / 2 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with ApiAppFactory.cs, Extensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
2 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Split Michi.Apps.Api finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D27 · Navigability
100 % of calls cross a namespace and 1 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
D28 · Secrets (history)
6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 6 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with casdoor.yaml (2), CreatedOneUserWebhook.bru, GetDefaultApplication.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
11 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 9 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
AX10 · Code composition
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX5 · Architecture & structure
AX6 · Interface segregation
- `IConfigService` declares 42 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ConfigService.Interface.cs:3
- `IOrganizationWebhook` declares 45 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — OrganizationWebhook.Interface.cs:3
- `IOrganizationObjectAccountItemWebhook` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — OrganizationWebhook.Interface.cs:22
- `IOrganizationObjectWebhook` declares 156 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — OrganizationWebhook.Interface.cs:47
- `ICreateOneOrganizationDto` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CreateOneOrganizationDto.Interface.cs:5
- `ICreateOneOrganizationInput` declares 30 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CreateOneOrganizationInput.Interface.cs:3
- `ICreateOneOrganizationRequest` declares 30 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CreateOneOrganizationRequest.Interface.cs:3
- `ICreateOneOrganizationSagaHandler` declares 41 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CreateOneOrganizationSagaHandler.Interface.cs:11
- `IUpdateOneOrganizationDto` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UpdateOneOrganizationDto.Interface.cs:5
- `IUpdateOneOrganizationInput` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UpdateOneOrganizationInput.Interface.cs:3
- `IUpdateOneOrganizationRequest` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UpdateOneOrganizationRequest.Interface.cs:3
- `IUserWebhook` declares 48 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UserWebhook.Interface.cs:3
- `IUserObjectRoleWebhook` declares 30 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UserWebhook.Interface.cs:38
- `IUserObjectPermissionWebhook` declares 60 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UserWebhook.Interface.cs:52
- `IUserObjectWebhook` declares 513 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UserWebhook.Interface.cs:98
- `ICreateOneUserDto` declares 36 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CreateOneUserDto.Interface.cs:5
- `ICreateOneUserInput` declares 30 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CreateOneUserInput.Interface.cs:3
- `ICreateOneUserRequest` declares 30 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — CreateOneUserRequest.Interface.cs:3
- `IUpdateOneUserDto` declares 27 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UpdateOneUserDto.Interface.cs:5
- `IUpdateOneUserInput` declares 27 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UpdateOneUserInput.Interface.cs:3
- `IUpdateOneUserRequest` declares 27 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UpdateOneUserRequest.Interface.cs:3
- `ICategoryModel` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ICategory.Model.cs:3
- `ICurrencyModel` declares 27 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ICurrency.Model.cs:3
- `IEdgeModel` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IEdge.Model.cs:3
- `IMultimediaModel` declares 21 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IMultimedia.Model.cs:5
- `INodeModel` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — INode.Model.cs:3
- `IOrderModel` declares 33 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IOrder.Model.cs:5
- `IOrderHasPaymentModel` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IOrderHasPayment.Model.cs:3
- `IOrderItemModel` declares 45 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IOrderItem.Model.cs:3
- `IOrganizationModel` declares 30 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IOrganization.Model.cs:3
- `IPaymentMethodModel` declares 21 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IPaymentMethod.Model.cs:3
- `IProductModel` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IProduct.Model.cs:3
- `IProductVariantModel` declares 21 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IProductVariant.Model.cs:3
- `IPromotionModel` declares 39 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IPromotion.Model.cs:5
- `IStoreModel` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IStore.Model.cs:5
- `IStoreHasProductVariantModel` declares 24 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IStoreHasProductVariant.Model.cs:3
- `ITaxModel` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ITax.Model.cs:3
- `IUnitModel` declares 24 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IUnit.Model.cs:3
- `IUserModel` declares 39 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IUser.Model.cs:3
- `IBaseEvent` declares 30 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — BaseEvent.Interface.cs:8
- 2 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 42.
What to do
- Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation
AX9 · CQS / query purity
C1 · Data Protection
What to do
- Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
- `CreateOneOrganizationCommandHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateOneOrganization.CommandHandler.cs:13
- `CreateOneOrganizationCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateOneOrganization.CommandHandler.cs:25
- `CreateOneOrganizationExternalEventHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateOneOrganizationExternal.EventHandler.cs:12
- `CreateOneOrganizationExternalEventHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateOneOrganizationExternal.EventHandler.cs:21
- `DeleteOneOrganizationCommandHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteOneOrganization.CommandHandler.cs:13
- `DeleteOneOrganizationCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteOneOrganization.CommandHandler.cs:25
- `DeleteOneOrganizationExternalEventHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteOneOrganizationExternal.EventHandler.cs:11
- `DeleteOneOrganizationExternalEventHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteOneOrganizationExternal.EventHandler.cs:20
- `UpdateOneOrganizationCommandHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UpdateOneOrganization.CommandHandler.cs:13
- `UpdateOneOrganizationCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UpdateOneOrganization.CommandHandler.cs:25
- `UpdatedOneOrganizationEventHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UpdateOneOrganizationExternal.EventHandler.cs:11
- `UpdatedOneOrganizationEventHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UpdateOneOrganizationExternal.EventHandler.cs:20
- `CreateOneUserExternalEventHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateOneUserExternal.EventHandler.cs:12
- `CreateOneUserExternalEventHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CreateOneUserExternal.EventHandler.cs:20
- `DeleteOneUserCommandHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteOneUser.CommandHandler.cs:14
- `DeleteOneUserCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — DeleteOneUser.CommandHandler.cs:24
- `UpdateOneUserCommandHandler..ctor` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UpdateOneUser.CommandHandler.cs:14
- `UpdateOneUserCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — UpdateOneUser.CommandHandler.cs:24
What to do
- Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency
- `Commands.UpdateOneOrganizationCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — UpdateOneOrganization.CommandHandler.cs:25
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability
- Only 2/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
P8 · Schema migrations
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×2) — Common.Module.cs:31, Common.Module.cs:41
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 124/128 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×4) — Migrations.cs:8, ClientCredentials.Authenticator.cs:39, ClientCredentials.Authenticator.cs:46, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~1.9 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 87% | Adequate — gated by D18 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 79% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 63% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 34% | Weak — gated by P1, P3, P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 64% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Event-Driven | 65% | Adequate — gated by ED4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 39 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 82 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
- ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
- ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 9 finding(s)
- Secret: generic-api-key Bruno/Casdoor/Organization_API/GetDefaultApplication.yml:1050
- Secret: generic-api-key Bruno/Casdoor/Organization_API/GetOrganizations.yml:636
- Secret: generic-api-key Bruno/Michi/Users/CreateOne/CreatedOneUserWebhook.bru:14
- Secret: generic-api-key Libs/CasdoorAdmin/casdoor.yaml:9080
- Secret: generic-api-key Libs/CasdoorAdmin/casdoor.yaml:10698
- Secret: generic-api-key Bruno/Michi/Users/UpdateOne/UpdatedOneUserWebhook.bru:14
- High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- High IaC: DS-0002 Apps/Api/Dockerfile
Warning — 35 finding(s)
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Hotspot: Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneUser.Aggregate.cs Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneUser.Aggregate.cs
- Hotspot: Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs
- Hotspot: Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/UpdateOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/UpdateOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs
- Hotspot: Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Entities/BuildOneUser.Entity.cs Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Entities/BuildOneUser.Entity.cs
- Off the main sequence: Michi.Apps.AppHost
- Off the main sequence: Michi.Libs.ServiceDefaults
- Off the main sequence: Michi.Libs.Shared
- Off the main sequence: Michi.Libs.Casdoor.Admin
- UserAggregate.BuildOne (cyclomatic 27) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneUser.Aggregate.cs:11
- UserEntity.BuildOne (cyclomatic 24) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Entities/BuildOneUser.Entity.cs:11
- OrganizationAggregate.BuildOne (cyclomatic 20) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs:11
- OrganizationAggregate.UpdateOne (cyclomatic 19) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/UpdateOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs:12
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- Dead code: IsCurrentUserNotBelongsThisOrganization Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BaseOrganization.Aggregate.cs:44
- Build failed
- UserAggregate.BuildOne (cognitive 26) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneUser.Aggregate.cs:11
- UserEntity.BuildOne (cognitive 23) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Entities/BuildOneUser.Entity.cs:11
- OrganizationAggregate.BuildOne (cognitive 19) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BuildOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs:11
- OrganizationAggregate.UpdateOne (cognitive 18) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Aggregates/UpdateOneOrganization.Aggregate.cs:12
- Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Infrastructure/CreateOne/Webhooks/CreatedOneOrganization.WebhookHandler.cs:57
- Duplicated block (27 lines × 2) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Infrastructure/DeleteOne/Adapters/DeleteOneOrganization.Adapter.cs:27
- Duplicated block (26 lines × 3) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Infrastructure/CreateOne/Webhooks/CreatedOneUser.WebhookHandler.cs:53
- Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Infrastructure/DeleteOne/Adapters/DeleteOneUser.Adapter.cs:27
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Application/Common/Validators/OrganizationWebhook.Validator.cs:14
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 9) Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Infrastructure/CreateOne/Adapters/CreateOneUser.Adapter.cs:72
- Coverage not measured
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
- redundant comment E2E/Api/Aspire/ApiAppFactory.cs:44
- redundant comment Libs/ServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs:16
- No tests discovered
- No ADRs found
- Bounded contexts not declared
- Split Michi.Apps.Api
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Apps/Api/Dockerfile
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
Info — 68 finding(s)
- Outdated: AWSSDK.S3
- Outdated: FluentValidation
- Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions
- Outdated: HotChocolate
- Outdated: HotChocolate.AspNetCore
- Outdated: HotChocolate.AspNetCore.Authorization
- Outdated: HotChocolate.Data.EntityFramework
- Outdated: HotChocolate.Types.NodaTime
- Outdated: HotChocolate.Types.Scalars
- Outdated: HotChocolate.Types.Spatial
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect
- Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design
- Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools
- Outdated: Microting.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql
- Outdated: Microting.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql.Json.Microsoft
- Outdated: Microting.EntityFrameworkCore.MySql.NetTopologySuite
- Outdated: NodaTime.Serialization.SystemTextJson
- Outdated: Scalar.AspNetCore
- Outdated: WolverineFx
- Outdated: WolverineFx.EntityFrameworkCore
- Outdated: WolverineFx.MemoryPack
- Outdated: WolverineFx.MySql
- Outdated: WolverineFx.Nats
- XML-doc coverage: Michi.Apps.Api Apps/Api/Michi.Apps.Api.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Michi.Apps.AppHost Apps/AppHost/Michi.Apps.AppHost.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Michi.Libs.Casdoor.Admin Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Michi.Libs.Casdoor.Admin.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Michi.Libs.CasdoorClient Libs/CasdoorClient/Michi.Libs.CasdoorClient.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Michi.Libs.Database Libs/Database/Michi.Libs.Database.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Michi.Libs.ServiceDefaults Libs/ServiceDefaults/Michi.Libs.ServiceDefaults.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Michi.Libs.Shared Libs/Shared/Michi.Libs.Shared.csproj
- git history depth insufficient
- No exposed public API
- git history depth insufficient
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 6 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list Michi.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 11 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 2 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Email — 34 field(s)
- OrganizationObjectWebhook.UseEmailAsUsername Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Application/Common/Webhooks/Organization.Webhook.cs:77
- UserEntity.Email Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Entities/BaseUser.Entity.cs:12
- IOrganizationObjectWebhook.UseEmailAsUsername Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Interfaces/OrganizationWebhook.Interface.cs:87
- UserObjectWebhook.Email Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/Common/Webhooks/User.Webhook.cs:111
- UserObjectWebhook.EmailVerified Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/Common/Webhooks/User.Webhook.cs:112
- UserObjectWebhook.MfaEmailEnabled Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/Common/Webhooks/User.Webhook.cs:248
- UserAggregate.Email Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BaseUser.Aggregate.cs:12
- IUserObjectWebhook.Email Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Interfaces/UserWebhook.Interface.cs:132
- IUserObjectWebhook.EmailVerified Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Interfaces/UserWebhook.Interface.cs:133
- IUserObjectWebhook.MfaEmailEnabled Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Interfaces/UserWebhook.Interface.cs:261
- ICreateOneUserDto.Email Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/CreateOne/Interfaces/CreateOneUserDto.Interface.cs:10
- ICreateOneUserInput.Email Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/CreateOne/Interfaces/CreateOneUserInput.Interface.cs:6
- ICreateOneUserRequest.Email Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/CreateOne/Interfaces/CreateOneUserRequest.Interface.cs:6
- ChildProviderPayload.EmailRegex Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:59
- UserMappingPayload.Email Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:101
- ApplicationPayload.UseEmailAsSamlNameId Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:144
- ApplicationPayload.EnableLinkWithEmail Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:146
- OrganizationPayload.UseEmailAsUsername Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/OrganizationPayload.cs:56
- UserInfoPayload.Email Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserInfoPayload.cs:6
- UserInfoPayload.EmailVerified Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserInfoPayload.cs:7
- UserPayload.Email Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserPayload.cs:77
- UserPayload.EmailVerified Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserPayload.cs:78
- UserPayload.MfaEmailEnabled Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserPayload.cs:214
- OrganizationResponse.UseEmailAsUsername Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Organizations/Responses/Organization.Response.cs:113
- UsersGetUserQueryParams.Email Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Api/UsersGetUser.Api.cs:11
- UserResponse.Email Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Responses/User.Responses.cs:59
- UserResponse.EmailVerified Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Responses/User.Responses.cs:62
- UserResponse.MfaEmailEnabled Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Responses/User.Responses.cs:467
- IUserModel.Email Libs/Database/Lib/Domain/Models/IUser.Model.cs:7
- UserModel.Email Libs/Database/Lib/Infrastructure/Models/User.Model.cs:9
- CommonDomainErrors.EmailNotMatchCode Libs/Shared/Lib/Application/Errors/CommonDomain.Error.cs:8
- UserResponse.Email Libs/Shared/Lib/Application/Responses/User.Response.cs:10
- UserPayloadEvent.Email Libs/Shared/Lib/Domain/Events/Users/Common/UserPayload.Event.cs:10
- IUserResponse.Email Libs/Shared/Lib/Domain/Responses/User.Response.cs:8
Phone — 30 field(s)
- UserEntity.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Organizations/Domain/Common/Entities/BaseUser.Entity.cs:15
- UserObjectWebhook.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/Common/Webhooks/User.Webhook.cs:113
- UserObjectWebhook.MfaPhoneEnabled Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/Common/Webhooks/User.Webhook.cs:247
- UpdateOneUserDto.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/UpdateOne/Dtos/UpdateOneUser.Dto.cs:10
- UpdateOneUserInput.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/UpdateOne/Inputs/UpdateOneUser.Input.cs:13
- UpdateOneUserRequest.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/UpdateOne/Requests/UpdateOneUser.Request.cs:15
- UserAggregate.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Aggregates/BaseUser.Aggregate.cs:15
- IUserObjectWebhook.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Interfaces/UserWebhook.Interface.cs:134
- IUserObjectWebhook.MfaPhoneEnabled Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Interfaces/UserWebhook.Interface.cs:260
- ICreateOneUserDto.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/CreateOne/Interfaces/CreateOneUserDto.Interface.cs:13
- ICreateOneUserInput.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/CreateOne/Interfaces/CreateOneUserInput.Interface.cs:9
- ICreateOneUserRequest.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/CreateOne/Interfaces/CreateOneUserRequest.Interface.cs:9
- IUpdateOneUserDto.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/UpdateOne/Interfaces/UpdateOneUserDto.Interface.cs:10
- IUpdateOneUserInput.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/UpdateOne/Interfaces/UpdateOneUserInput.Interface.cs:8
- IUpdateOneUserRequest.Phone Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/UpdateOne/Interfaces/UpdateOneUserRequest.Interface.cs:8
- UserMappingPayload.Phone Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:106
- ApplicationPayload.FormCssMobile Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:186
- ApplicationPayload.FormBackgroundUrlMobile Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:190
- UserInfoPayload.Phone Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserInfoPayload.cs:13
- UserPayload.Phone Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserPayload.cs:79
- UserPayload.MfaPhoneEnabled Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserPayload.cs:213
- UsersGetUserQueryParams.Phone Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Api/UsersGetUser.Api.cs:12
- UserResponse.Phone Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Responses/User.Responses.cs:65
- UserResponse.MfaPhoneEnabled Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Responses/User.Responses.cs:464
- IUserModel.Phone Libs/Database/Lib/Domain/Models/IUser.Model.cs:10
- UserModel.Phone Libs/Database/Lib/Infrastructure/Models/User.Model.cs:12
- CommonDomainErrors.PhoneNumberNotMatchCode Libs/Shared/Lib/Application/Errors/CommonDomain.Error.cs:15
- UserResponse.Phone Libs/Shared/Lib/Application/Responses/User.Response.cs:13
- UserPayloadEvent.Phone Libs/Shared/Lib/Domain/Events/Users/Common/UserPayload.Event.cs:13
- IUserResponse.Phone Libs/Shared/Lib/Domain/Responses/User.Response.cs:11
Name — 10 field(s)
- UserObjectWebhook.FirstName Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/Common/Webhooks/User.Webhook.cs:106
- UserObjectWebhook.LastName Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Application/Common/Webhooks/User.Webhook.cs:107
- IUserObjectWebhook.FirstName Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Interfaces/UserWebhook.Interface.cs:127
- IUserObjectWebhook.LastName Apps/Api/Contexts/Accounts/Users/Domain/Common/Interfaces/UserWebhook.Interface.cs:128
- UserMappingPayload.FirstName Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:102
- UserMappingPayload.LastName Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/ApplicationPayload.cs:104
- UserPayload.FirstName Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserPayload.cs:72
- UserPayload.LastName Libs/CasdoorAdmin/Payloads/UserPayload.cs:73
- UserResponse.FirstName Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Responses/User.Responses.cs:44
- UserResponse.LastName Libs/CasdoorClient/Lib/Users/Responses/User.Responses.cs:47
Government ID (SSN / passport / tax) — 2 field(s)
- IStoreHasTaxModel.TaxId Libs/Database/Lib/Domain/Models/IStoreHasTax.Model.cs:6
- StoreHasTaxModel.TaxId Libs/Database/Lib/Infrastructure/Models/StoreHasTax.Model.cs:8