Public report — dioxide, published 30 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
95findings with an exact file:lineof 104 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
30/102dimensions across the health lenses17495 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
mikelane/dioxide is in good overall health (71%), but at least one category below sits in Adequate-or-worse territory — most items are improvements, and the weakest category contains work to schedule, not shelve.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Security (58%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 31 High finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)); 10 Medium CVE finding(s) (OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities); Grow the ADR log (currently 3) (Architecture documentation).
For scale: Small (~17,495 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.4 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
1.0× (at 71% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.4 person-years of build effort (about ~€56,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 58% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 1.0× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 31 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-automated.yml (30), dependabot.yml.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.4 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 58%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 31 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-automated.yml (30), dependabot.yml. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 31 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-automated.yml (30), dependabot.yml.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
33
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
17
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the 31 high-priority static analysis findings, prioritizing release-automated.yml and dependabot.yml. Next, address the 10 medium-priority OSV dependency vulnerabilities, starting with uv.lock. Concurrently, expand the architecture documentation to include eight ADRs and restructure the project to separate production code under a src/ directory. Finally, update the README to accurately reflect the current state of the project, specifically regarding Docker configuration.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 31 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-automated.yml (30), dependabot.yml.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 95 of 104 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Container.scan (cyclomatic 41) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with container.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Container._build_lifecycle_dependency_order (cyclomatic 33) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with container.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Container._build_transitive_failure_message (cyclomatic 29) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with container.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 12 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Container.scan (cognitive 76) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with container.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Container._build_lifecycle_dependency_order (cognitive 72) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with container.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Container._build_transitive_failure_message (cognitive 60) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with container.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
21 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is python/dioxide/container.py.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×31.github/dependabot.yml:10detected by semgrep finding
Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected · ×2demos/scripts/build-demo.py:70detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 31 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-automated.yml (30), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (31 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-demo.py, generate-narration.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2132 · ×10uv.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 10 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock (10). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with uv.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain entities own their behaviour (invariant-enforcing commands) rather than being data-only structs driven by a foreign service.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a domain type's identity-bearing field stays immutable — a `pub` mutable field under a hand-rolled Hash/PartialEq breaks the value-identity invariant.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (diesel/sea-orm/sqlx) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a README to the 5 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.8 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether behaviour is captured as executable Gherkin specifications (a plus for shared understanding) — only assessed when a BDD framework is present.
Method: Filesystem scan: BDD framework presence (SpecFlow, Gherkin files) when a project references a BDD tool. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~18760 lines of test source are present (.py) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Cargo manifest), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.py, .rs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — none of 3 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .py, .rs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.py) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for Rust: aggregate-vs-value-object classification cannot be told apart in source (every struct-holding-struct reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable — advisory (the Swift/Dart parity)
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no in-repo typed-id idiom — primitive-obsession recorded as advisory DM8, DM2 not gated
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for Rust: a cross-crate domain leak cannot be told apart in source from a legitimate shared-kernel crate, and most repositories ship a single crate — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for Rust: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Rust source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph the source-only frontend cannot resolve (inferred/generic call owners decline) — advisory
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:10— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 3 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6.0.2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:151— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6.0.2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:154— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:159— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dtolnay/rust-toolchain/commits/stable --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:166— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:171— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `Swatinem/rust-cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/Swatinem/rust-cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:177— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: PyO3/maturin-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `PyO3/maturin-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/PyO3/maturin-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:213— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v6.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v6.0.0 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:227— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6.0.2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:230— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:235— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dtolnay/rust-toolchain/commits/stable --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:238— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: PyO3/maturin-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `PyO3/maturin-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/PyO3/maturin-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:244— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v6.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v6.0.0 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:261— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:268— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:367— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6.0.2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:370— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:375— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `astral-sh/setup-uv@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/astral-sh/setup-uv/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:378— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:430— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:437— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:444— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:486— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish/commits/release/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-automated.yml:502— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6.0.2 --jq .sha`.
+ 6 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×6
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— django 5.2.9: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares django 4.0.0, but the vulnerable 5.2.9 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own django entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package django`)). This is 1 of 24 advisories this scan raises against django 5.2.9, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.2.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.2.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of django 5.2.9 clears all 24 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], PYSEC-2026-197, PYSEC-2026-198, PYSEC-2026-199, PYSEC-2026-200, PYSEC-2026-201, PYSEC-2026-2090, PYSEC-2026-2091, PYSEC-2026-2092, PYSEC-2026-2449, PYSEC-2026-42, PYSEC-2026-43, PYSEC-2026-45, PYSEC-2026-50, PYSEC-2026-52, PYSEC-2026-53, PYSEC-2026-55.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— jaraco-context 6.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — jaraco-context is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package jaraco-context`)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— soupsieve 2.8: [GHSA redacted] — soupsieve is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package soupsieve`)). One upgrade of soupsieve 2.8 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— starlette 0.50.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares starlette 0.27.0, but the vulnerable 0.50.0 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own starlette entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package starlette`)). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against starlette 0.50.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.3.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.3.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of starlette 0.50.0 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], PYSEC-2026-248.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— urllib3 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — urllib3 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package urllib3`)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against urllib3 2.5.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.7.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.7.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of urllib3 2.5.0 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— wheel 0.45.1: [GHSA redacted] — wheel is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package wheel`)).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· Build action pinned to a mutable branch · ×1
Build action pinned to a mutable branch — 3 CI action reference(s) point at a mutable BRANCH rather than a version tag or a commit SHA, 3 of them on a THIRD-PARTY action: `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable` (.github/workflows/release-automated.yml:159), `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable` (.github/workflows/release-automated.yml:235), `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1` (.github/workflows/release-automated.yml:486). A branch re-points on every upstream push, so whatever its tip holds when the job runs executes inside your pipeline with that job's secrets — a version tag at least moves only when the publisher cuts a release. Pin these to a full commit SHA first; the remaining tag refs are the same control at a lower blast radius.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— cryptography 46.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cryptography is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package cryptography`)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against cryptography 46.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 46.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 46.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of cryptography 46.0.3 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], PYSEC-2026-35.
Warning — 57 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×10
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2132 uv.lock— click 8.3.1: PYSEC-2026-2132 — upgrade to 8.3.3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— filelock 3.20.0: [GHSA redacted] — filelock is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package filelock`)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against filelock 3.20.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.20.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.20.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of filelock 3.20.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2151 uv.lock— flask 3.1.2: PYSEC-2026-2151 — this repo declares flask 2.0.0, but the vulnerable 3.1.2 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own flask entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package flask`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— idna 3.11: [GHSA redacted] — idna is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package idna`)).
Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2987 uv.lock— pygments 2.19.2: PYSEC-2026-2987 — pygments is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package pygments`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— pytest 9.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares pytest 8.4.2, but the vulnerable 9.0.1 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own pytest entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package pytest`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— requests 2.32.5: [GHSA redacted] — requests is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package requests`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— setuptools 80.9.0: [GHSA redacted] — setuptools is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package setuptools`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— virtualenv 20.35.4: [GHSA redacted] — virtualenv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package virtualenv`)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] uv.lock— werkzeug 3.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — werkzeug is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or raise its floor in your own manifest and re-resolve (`uv lock --upgrade-package werkzeug`)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against werkzeug 3.1.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of werkzeug 3.1.4 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/services.py:42— examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/services.py:42-55 | examples/migrations/from-injector/before/app/services.py:36-49 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/services.py:71— examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/services.py:71-84 | examples/migrations/from-injector/before/app/services.py:65-78 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) python/dioxide/exceptions.py:506— python/dioxide/exceptions.py:506-519 | python/dioxide/exceptions.py:728-741 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) examples/migrations/from-dependency-injector/after/app/main.py:23— examples/migrations/from-dependency-injector/after/app/main.py:23-34 | examples/migrations/from-dependency-injector/before/app/main.py:19-30 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) examples/migrations/from-dependency-injector/after/app/services.py:33— examples/migrations/from-dependency-injector/after/app/services.py:33-44 | examples/migrations/from-dependency-injector/before/app/services.py:24-35 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/adapters.py:76— examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/adapters.py:76-86 | examples/migrations/from-injector/before/app/adapters.py:64-74 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) python/dioxide/container.py:2950— python/dioxide/container.py:2950-2961 | python/dioxide/container.py:3630-3640 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) python/dioxide/container.py:1886— python/dioxide/container.py:1886-1894 | python/dioxide/container.py:2168-2175 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) python/dioxide/container.py:2243— python/dioxide/container.py:2243-2250 | python/dioxide/container.py:2289-2296 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Container.scan (cyclomatic 41) python/dioxide/container.py:2569— Container.scan has cyclomatic complexity 41 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Container._build_lifecycle_dependency_order (cyclomatic 33) python/dioxide/container.py:2996— Container._build_lifecycle_dependency_order has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Container._build_transitive_failure_message (cyclomatic 29) python/dioxide/container.py:1307— Container._build_transitive_failure_message has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Container._check_captive_dependencies (cyclomatic 22) python/dioxide/container.py:1170— Container._check_captive_dependencies has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ScopedContainer._create_instance (cyclomatic 19) python/dioxide/container.py:3572— ScopedContainer._create_instance has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Container.debug (cyclomatic 17) python/dioxide/container.py:1845— Container.debug has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Container._parse_decorators_from_ast (cyclomatic 17) python/dioxide/container.py:2379— Container._parse_decorators_from_ast has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Hotspot: python/dioxide/container.py python/dioxide/container.py— python/dioxide/container.py changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 41. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1266.
Container.scan (cognitive 76) python/dioxide/container.py:2569— Container.scan has cognitive complexity 76 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 53, error handling 7, boolean chains 6, loops 6, ternaries 4 (nesting depth added 31). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._build_lifecycle_dependency_order (cognitive 72) python/dioxide/container.py:2996— Container._build_lifecycle_dependency_order has cognitive complexity 72 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 41, loops 19, error handling 11, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 41). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._build_transitive_failure_message (cognitive 60) python/dioxide/container.py:1307— Container._build_transitive_failure_message has cognitive complexity 60 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 36, loops 13, ternaries 7, error handling 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 31). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._check_captive_dependencies (cognitive 49) python/dioxide/container.py:1170— Container._check_captive_dependencies has cognitive complexity 49 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 30, loops 12, error handling 5, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 28). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._parse_decorators_from_ast (cognitive 42) python/dioxide/container.py:2379— Container._parse_decorators_from_ast has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 34, boolean chains 4, loops 3, error handling 1 (nesting depth added 27). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ScopedContainer._create_instance (cognitive 36) python/dioxide/container.py:3572— ScopedContainer._create_instance has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23, loops 9, error handling 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 17). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container.debug (cognitive 30) python/dioxide/container.py:1845— Container.debug has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 12, if/else 9, loops 9 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container.resolve (cognitive 28) python/dioxide/container.py:959— Container.resolve has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20, error handling 8 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._collect_graph_data (cognitive 28) python/dioxide/container.py:2151— Container._collect_graph_data has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 5, error handling 2, ternaries 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._discover_lazy_adapters (cognitive 26) python/dioxide/container.py:2336— Container._discover_lazy_adapters has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 10, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._explain_type (cognitive 25) python/dioxide/container.py:1996— Container._explain_type has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, ternaries 10, loops 2 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._build_adapter_not_found_message (cognitive 22) python/dioxide/container.py:1455— Container._build_adapter_not_found_message has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, ternaries 5, loops 3 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
api_stability_steps.step_look_at_major_versions (cognitive 19) features/steps/api_stability_steps.py:406— api_stability_steps.step_look_at_major_versions has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 4, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ServiceNotFoundError.__init__ (cognitive 19) python/dioxide/exceptions.py:693— ServiceNotFoundError.__init__ has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, ternaries 7 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
PaymentService.process_order_payment (cognitive 16) examples/patterns/external-api/app/domain/services.py:32— PaymentService.process_order_payment has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: error handling 8, if/else 7, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._is_registered_in_container (cognitive 16) python/dioxide/container.py:1266— Container._is_registered_in_container has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Container._create_auto_injecting_factory (cognitive 16) python/dioxide/container.py:2904— Container._create_auto_injecting_factory has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7, loops 5, error handling 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) demos/scripts/build-demo.py:49— demos/scripts/build-demo.py:49-71 | demos/scripts/generate-narration.py:68-90 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) examples/patterns/circular-deps/solution.py:287— examples/patterns/circular-deps/solution.py:287-307 | examples/patterns/dependency-chain/app/main.py:41-61 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) python/dioxide/django.py:207— python/dioxide/django.py:207-226 | python/dioxide/flask.py:189-208 | python/dioxide/ninja.py:215-234 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) features/steps/scan_performance_steps.py:350— features/steps/scan_performance_steps.py:350-369 | features/steps/scan_performance_steps.py:592-614 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 4) python/dioxide/celery.py:175— python/dioxide/celery.py:175-192 | python/dioxide/django.py:206-223 | python/dioxide/flask.py:188-205 | python/dioxide/ninja.py:214-231 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) python/dioxide/container.py:3047— python/dioxide/container.py:3047-3061 | python/dioxide/container.py:3612-3627 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) python/dioxide/container.py:1223— python/dioxide/container.py:1223-1235 | python/dioxide/container.py:2925-2945 | python/dioxide/container.py:3049-3061 | python/dioxide/container.py:3615-3627 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/main.py:19— examples/migrations/from-injector/after/app/main.py:19-31 | examples/migrations/from-injector/before/app/main.py:15-27 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected demos/scripts/build-demo.py:70— Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected demos/scripts/generate-narration.py:89— Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.py) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 21 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: python/dioxide/container.py, python/dioxide/exceptions.py, features/steps/api_stability_steps.py, features/steps/scan_performance_steps.py, features/steps/benchmark_steps.py, features/steps/fakes_philosophy_steps.py, python/dioxide/lifecycle.py, python/dioxide/adapter.py (+13 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cargo sbom` or `cargo cyclonedx` for the Cargo dependency graph — or `cargo auditable build`, which embeds it in the shipped binary, `cyclonedx-py` over the resolved Python environment/lockfile, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a Codecov configuration (codecov.yml, target 92.5%) and a coverage step in CI (`pytest tests/ --cov=dioxide --cov-report=xml --cov-report=te…`) show(s) coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.py), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Cargo manifest) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fb087-9050-73fb-8ea4-8a385898d6d0 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 39 · Warnings: 57 · Recommendations: 6 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 30-07-2026 @ 00:58 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.