Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
mikolaj-jankowski/Clean-Architecture-And-Domain-Driven-Design-Solution-Template is in a workable but fragile state (51%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Code Health (79%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (41%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Domain Modelling (55%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~3,381 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
79%
Strong
Architecture
76%
Strong
Maturity
63%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
41%
Adequate · gated by P5, P7
Security
64%
Adequate
Domain Modelling
55%
Adequate · gated by DM2
Event-Driven
100% ★
Exemplary
Performance
60%
Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 41% · 45% weightDomain Modelling 55% · 25% weightPerformance 60% · 14% weightMaturity 63% · 8% weightSecurity 64% · 4% weightArchitecture 76% · 2% weightCode Health 79% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 41 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 51 → ~60.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 10%Plumbing 66%Tests 8%Generated 15%
New since the last scan (1+)
- D21 · LLM evaluation failed
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,600–€8,200
| Cost to rebuild | €1,600–€8,200 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 51% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 48% boilerplate · 38% straight-line · 14% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€4,900 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 41% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
2
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
3
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 41%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
9.7
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
10.0
D39 · .NET / C#
IL Efficiency
9.7
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
8.6
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X2 · Repo
Cancellation propagation
7.6
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X5 · Repo
Nullable reference types
9.8
The Bad
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
8.9
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D22 · .NET / C#
Internal API Consistency
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
9.7
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX2 · Repo
Stateful singletons
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
10.0
AX9 · Repo
CQS / query purity
10.0
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
D9 · .NET / C#
Test Distribution
10.0
D10 · .NET / C#
Test Quality
10.0
D11 · .NET / C#
Test Reliability
10.0
D12 · .NET / C#
Dependency Hygiene
10.0
D13 · .NET / C#
Secret Scanning
10.0
D14 · .NET / C#
License Compliance
10.0
ED5 · Repo
Idempotency
6.5
P10 · Repo
Library API & versioning
6.0
P2 · Repo
Observability
7.5
P8 · Repo
Schema migrations
10.0
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Ugly
At a glance — Event-Driven
The Good
At a glance — Performance
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 6 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, codify disaster recovery by documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures in your infrastructure code, as current backups are insufficient. Next, enhance outbound HTTP resilience by implementing retry policies to prevent external failures from taking down the application. Then, improve deployment safety by adding health checks and automated rollback strategies to catch bad releases quickly. Finally, tighten release hygiene by maintaining a clear changelog and restricting the public API surface to protect consumers from internal changes.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +9.1 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down. | +9.1 pts | Medium | Outbound HTTP resilience |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +9.0 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +9.0 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers. | +8.8 pts | Medium | Library API & versioning |
| Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply. | +8.7 pts | Medium | Idempotency |
| Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production. | +8.3 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs. | +2.6 pts | Medium | Strongly-typed ids |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 65 of 68 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 68 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D22D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9DM2DM5DM6DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P10P2P4P5P6P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 0 of 14 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D21 Naming Consistency — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling
7 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
Off the main sequence: CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 16 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution
14 test methods: 14 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 14 tests.
Mock framework: Moq
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 31 packages use a banned license.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Filters/MassTransit/EventsFilter.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Do you agree with this assessment?
D17 · Explicit Debt
5 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2978 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.7.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape
7 projects, 153 source files, 3349 hand-written lines of code (2978 production / 371 test), plus 670 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 13 inter-project edges.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
This Clean Architecture and Domain-Driven Design template is a well-written, comprehensive document with an explicit table of contents listing every section (Installation through Cross-Cutting Concerns to Authentication). It describes the CQRS separation of read/write operations, observability via OpenTelemetry/Aspire Dashboard, and selected use cases demonstrating layer communication. The outline is complete for each named topic; no content was clipped and all visible sections are present.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — This Clean Architecture and Domain-Driven Design template is a well-written, comprehensive document with an explicit table of contents listing every section (Installation through Cross-Cutting Concerns to Authentication). It describes the CQRS separation of read/write operations, observability via OpenTelemetry/Aspire Dashboard, and selected use cases demonstrating layer communication. The outline is complete for each named topic; no content was clipped and all visible sections are present.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D22 · Internal API Consistency
0 API inconsistencies across 5 exposed types.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value
12 valuable / 1 redundant across 56 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.
What to do
- Improve Comment Value — currently 6.0/10. — 12 valuable / 1 redundant across 56 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 7 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability
99 % of calls cross a namespace and 6 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
6 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 5 medium, 0 low.
High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0
What to do
- Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D31 · IaC & Container Security
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
8 of 12 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D39 · IL Efficiency
3 of 233 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX10 · Code composition
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX2 · Stateful singletons
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX4 · Dependency direction
- `CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.UnitTests` is a Application project but references `CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
What to do
- Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX5 · Architecture & structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX6 · Interface segregation
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX9 · CQS / query purity
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
- `CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.cs:3
- `OrderCreatedDomainEvent.OrderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — OrderCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
- `OrderCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — OrderCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM5 · Encapsulated state
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
- `CustomerConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — CustomerConfiguration.cs:8
- `CustomerRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — CustomerRepository.cs:8
- `OrderConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — OrderConfiguration.cs:8
- `OrderItemConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — OrderItemConfiguration.cs:7
- `OrderRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — OrderRepository.cs:8
What to do
- Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM8 · Value-object opportunities
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED2 · Event/command shape
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED3 · Event naming
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED5 · Idempotency
- `CreateOrder.CreateOrderCommandHandler.Consume` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateOrderCommandHandler.cs:30
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
Do you agree with this assessment?
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
Do you agree with this assessment?
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `Consume` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:12
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — MassTransitInstaller.cs:34
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a README to the 7 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning
- 155/181 types (86%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
What to do
- Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability
- Only 2/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
- Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
- The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
- Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P8 · Schema migrations
Do you agree with this assessment?
PF1 · Benchmark discipline
- No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
- Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Do you agree with this assessment?
PF2 · Allocation hygiene
What to do
- Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 1 use(s) across 3,736 production line(s) (~0.3/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Do you agree with this assessment?
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
- Only 0/96 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
What to do
- In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
Do you agree with this assessment?
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
- Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
Do you agree with this assessment?
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 19/32 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×13) — CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:28, DomainEventsProcessor.cs:104, IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:100, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
- Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. — LoggingFilter.cs:29
What to do
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~0.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 79% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 76% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 63% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 41% | Adequate — gated by P5, P7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 64% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Domain Modelling | 55% | Adequate — gated by DM2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Performance | 60% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 40 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — This is a dotnet-new template — authorization is deferred to the application you build from it. Add [Authorize]/policies (or imperative guards) when you wire up real users; until then there are no real endpoints to protect.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D21 Naming Consistency — LLM evaluation failed
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- P1 CI/CD gates — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. Automated CI/CD gates are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 1 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0
Warning — 8 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0
- Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0
- Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0
- Medium CVE: AngleSharp 0.17.1
- Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.14.0
D21 · Naming Consistency
- LLM evaluation failed
D5 · Coupling
- Off the main sequence: CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured
Recommendation — 3 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
Info — 2 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality
- Mock framework: Moq
- Mock framework: Moq
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list content/CA.And.DDD.Template.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 6 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 2 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Email — 15 field(s)
- ChangeEmailCommand.NewEmail content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/ChangeEmailCommand.cs:3
- CreateCustomerCommand.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
- CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler._emailService content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:9
- CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler._emailTemplateFactory content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:10
- CustomerDto.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/GetCustomer/CustomerDto.cs:3
- Customer.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Customer.cs:10
- Customer.IsEmailVerified content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Customer.cs:11
- Customer.EmailMaxLength content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/CustomerConstants.cs:15
- CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
- CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.NewEmailAddress content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.cs:3
- CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.OldEmailAddress content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.cs:3
- CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEvent.NewEmailAddress content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEvent.cs:3
- Email.EmailRegex content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Email.cs:9
- Smtp.EmailFrom content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Settings/Smtp.cs:3
- EmailService._emailTemplateFactory content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs:12
Name — 7 field(s)
- BrowseCustomerDto.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Admin/BrowseCustomers/BrowseCustomersDto.cs:4
- CreateCustomerCommand.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
- CustomerDto.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/GetCustomer/CustomerDto.cs:3
- Customer.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Customer.cs:8
- Customer.FullNameMinLength content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/CustomerConstants.cs:13
- Customer.FullNameMaxLength content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/CustomerConstants.cs:14
- CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
Address — 6 field(s)
- CreateCustomerCommand.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
- CreateOrderCommand.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/CreateOrderCommand.cs:3
- Address.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Address.cs:12
- Customer.PostalCodeMaxLength content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/CustomerConstants.cs:7
- Order.PostalCodeMaxLength content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/OrderConstants.cs:8
- ShippingAddress.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/ShippingAddress.cs:8
Date of birth — 2 field(s)
- CreateCustomerCommand.BirthDate content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
- Age.BirthDate content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Age.cs:9