mikolaj-jankowski/Clean-Architecture-And-Domain-Driven-Design-Solution-Template

Executive summary

mikolaj-jankowski/Clean-Architecture-And-Domain-Driven-Design-Solution-Template scores 52 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, while seven of its eight lenses score higher still: Event-Driven at 100 and Domain Modelling at 79, both rated Exemplary, Code Health at 73 and Performance at 70, both rated Strong, and Architecture at 61, Maturity at 60 and Security and Compliance at 57, all rated Adequate. Watchdog judged it as a template, sample or demo, meant to be read or copied, so the dimensions about building, releasing and running a product don't apply, and its lenses are rated against a lower bar. The score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The score is lower than those seven because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 41 and is rated Adequate. Its Secret Scanning dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning and to codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 52 to about 61.

34 findings are critical: eight in Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary, eight in Secret Scanning, four in Explicit Debt, four in IaC & Container Security, four in Secrets (history), two in Captive dependencies, two in Dependency Vulnerabilities, one in Project dependency cycles and one in Static Analysis (SAST).

Watchdog couldn't measure CQS / query purity and Runtime accessibility in this code, so those dimensions are left out of the score. The product code is 2,978 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €4,900, to rebuild.

Code Health 73 Strong Architecture 61 Adequate, capped by Stateful singletons Maturity 60 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 41 Adequate, capped by Secret Scanning, DR & Backup and Outbound HTTP resilience Security and Compliance 57 Adequate Domain Modelling 79 ★ Exemplary Event-Driven 100 ★ Exemplary Performance 70 Strong

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Production Readiness 41 · counts for 45%Security and Compliance 57 · counts for 25%Maturity 60 · counts for 14%Architecture 61 · counts for 8%Performance 70 · counts for 4%Code Health 73 · counts for 2%Domain Modelling 79 · counts for 1%Event-Driven 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 41 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 52 to about 61.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Business logic 11%Supporting code 66%Tests 9%Generated by tools 15%

New since the last survey: 41 findings

These 41 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 6 October 2026.

Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Secret Scanning · REDACTED
Explicit Debt · Dead code: ReplaceAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/ICacheService.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: ExecuteSqlQueryAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/ICustomerReadService.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: ExecuteSqlQueryAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/IOrderReadService.cs
Secrets (history) · REDACTED
Secrets (history) · REDACTED
Secrets (history) · REDACTED
Secrets (history) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: RequestTokenUsingPasswordGrantAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: RefreshAccessTokenAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Dispatch content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Events/DomainEventDispatcher.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SendEmailAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: SendWelcomeEmail content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: GetTemplateAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailTemplateFactory.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its CancellationToken: CalculateDiscountBaseOnLast31DaysSpendingAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/OrderDomainService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its CancellationToken: BrowseCustomers content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/ReadServices/AdminReadService.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its CancellationToken: GetAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/CacheService.cs
Captive dependencies · Captive dependency: singleton DomainEventsProcessor captures transient IDomainEventDispatcher content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs
Captive dependencies · Captive dependency: singleton EventMapperFactory resolves transient CustomerCreatedEventMapper from the root provider content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/DependencyInjectionInstaller.cs
Stateful singletons · Stateful singleton: DomainEventsProcessor content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs
Stateful singletons · Stateful singleton: IntegrationEventsProcessor content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs
Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/DependencyInjectionInstaller.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/VerifyEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/VerifyEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 8 findings

These 8 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 6 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

Coupling · Off the main sequence: CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.UnitTests (Application) → CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure (Infrastructure)
Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/VerifyEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs
Async & latency hygiene · Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false)

Rebuild cost: about €4,900 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€1,600 to €8,100, for 27 to 85 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	Very high, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.7 at a score of 52. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 2,978 lines of product code, of which 48% is declarations and boilerplate, 39% straight logic and 14% logic with branches

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2).

Raises the score by about 9 points · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Raises the score by about 7 points · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or a Polly policy and an explicit timeout) to each client registration flagged here, so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.

Raises the score by about 3 points · Medium effort · Outbound HTTP resilience

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €4,900 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 41 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 9 points for low effort, because it clears the 8 Secret Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

41 modules, with 74 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 5 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 1 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	3 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain	4 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Enums	5 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Settings	6 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.BrowseOrders	7 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Customers	8 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Customers.DomainEvents	10 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Orders.DomainEvents	12 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.ChangeEmail	13 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.CreateCustomer	14 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.GetCustomer	15 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.VerifyEmail	18 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Orders	19 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.CreateOrder	20 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.GetOrder	22 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Persistance.MsSql	23 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared	27 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers	28 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Authentication.LoginUser	29 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Authentication.RefreshUserToken	33 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Events	34 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Persistance.Configuration.Infrastructure
1 (global)
2 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Exceptions
3 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain
4 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Enums
5 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Settings
6 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.BrowseOrders																2
7 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Customers	1
8 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Customers.DomainEvents	3
9 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Customers.Exceptions	5
10 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Orders.DomainEvents	1
11 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Orders.Exceptions	1
12 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.ChangeEmail					1
13 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.CreateCustomer					1
14 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.GetCustomer					1											2
15 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.VerifyEmail					1
16 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.VerifyEmail.DomainEventHandlers						1
17 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.CreateOrder.DomainEventHandlers							1
18 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Orders	1				1
19 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.CreateOrder	1											2
20 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.GetOrder												2				2
21 CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain.Orders.Policies												2
22 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Persistance.MsSql					2							2
23 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared		1		1						1				1			1
24 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Installers															1
25 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Persistance.Configuration.Domain.Customers					3										1
26 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Persistance.Configuration.Domain.Orders												5			1
27 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers																2
28 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Authentication.LoginUser																1
29 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Authentication.RefreshUserToken																1
30 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.ChangeEmail.DomainEventHandlers						1										1
31 CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.CreateCustomer.DomainEventHandlers						1										2
32 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Authentication			1													1
33 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Events	6															2
34 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Persistance.Configuration.Infrastructure																1
35 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.ReadServices				1										1	1	2
36 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Shared	1	1	3													4
37 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure										1					2	3	1
38 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.BackgroundTasks			2													1				1	1
39 CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Filters.MassTransit	3														1	1				1
40 CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi.Controllers				1				1	1	1	1		1	1			1	1	1

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 73% · Strong ·

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.6 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 7.8 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.8 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.6 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 6.5 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 8.2

The Bad

X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 5.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 5.3

At a glance — Architecture · 61% · Adequate · gated by AX2 ·

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D22 · .NET / C# Internal API Consistency 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.7 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0

The Bad

AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.8

The Ugly

AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 4.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 3.5

At a glance — Maturity · 60% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 8.1 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 7.8 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.2 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 6.0

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 3.0

At a glance — Readiness · 41% · Adequate · gated by D13, P5, P7 ·

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 9.0 P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.5 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 57% · Adequate ·

The Good

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 7.2 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 8.2 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.1 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0

The Bad

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 6.0

The Ugly

S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 3.5

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 79% · Exemplary ·

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM10 · Repo One transaction, one aggregate 10.0 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 10.0 DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 6.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

The Bad

DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 5.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 10.0 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 10.0

At a glance — Performance · 70% · Strong ·

The Good

PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.1 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures	13	High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration	10	High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	5	High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection	4	High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the eight leaked secrets in configuration files to secure credentials. Codify disaster recovery by documenting RTO/RPO and implementing IaC-based backups, while adding resilience policies to outbound HTTP clients to prevent dependency failures from taking down the application. Finally, harden the web security posture by adding essential response headers and ensure reliable deployments by implementing health checks and immutable image tags for safe rollbacks.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2).	+9.3 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+7.1 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or a Polly policy and an explicit timeout) to each client registration flagged here, so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.	+3.5 pts	Medium	Outbound HTTP resilience
Resolve the 4 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED.	+1.1 pts	Low	Secrets (history)
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.	+2.0 pts	Medium	Web-Security Posture
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED.	+0.9 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED.	+0.9 pts	Low	Dependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED.	+0.9 pts	Low	IaC & Container Security

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 26 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 4% slop · 31% mixed · 65% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.0	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.5	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs	5.4	Mixed	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED	5.4	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
content/tests/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.UnitTests/Queries/GetCustomer/GetCustomerQueryHandlerTests.cs	5.8	Mixed	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED	6.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs	7.6	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs	7.6	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/AuthenticationInstaller.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/ReadServices/OrderReadService.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/CacheService.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/ICacheService.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: ReplaceAsync

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 34

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 54

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 34

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 2

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 89 of 95 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 6 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 95 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D22D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39D44AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8DM1DM10DM11DM12DM2DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P10P2P4P5P6P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 100 of 122 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a15fed-0d95-7df5-a475-a8d45d91fe7a.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. No coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us. You can widen what we reach: optional: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output anywhere in the repo, or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (4 contributor(s) across 213 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 92% of the history; the other 3 hold 2.7% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/PaginationParameters.cs`, `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/DomainException.cs`, `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
AX9 CQS / query purity — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 4 query handlers were classified, but the query-purity walk could not open any of their bodies: it recognises a value-returning entry point named Execute/Handle/Consume (±Async), or one implementing a member of the handler interface the type was classified on, and the handlers in this repository have neither. Scoring the set anyway would report every unopened handler as pure, so AX9 abstains instead of publishing a perfect score it did not measure.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — keycloak_web Pulling aspire-dashboard Pulling postgresdb Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden redis Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden rabbitmq Error context canceled aspire-dashboard Error context canceled keycloak_web Error context canceled mailhog Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: mailhog Pulling postgresdb Pulling redis Pulling rabbitmq Pulling keycloak_web Pulling mailhog Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden postgresdb Error context canceled keycloak_web Error context canceled aspire-dashboard Error context canceled redis Error context canceled rabbitmq Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D21, D22, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Stronggated by 4 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (21–23 lines × 2)content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:21

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:76

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:106

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Persistance/Configuration/Infrastructure/DomainEventConfiguration.cs:10

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (21–23 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DomainEventsProcessor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DomainEventsProcessor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

8 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 16 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 test methods: 14 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 14 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 8 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 261 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 31 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 221 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt7.8 / 10Adequategated by 4 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 deducted debt markers + 3 dead symbols across 2978 LoC in the .NET projects (1.1/KLoC) → score 7.8.

WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×4content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:10

TodoComment · ×4REDACTED:55

Dead code: ReplaceAsync · ×3content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/ICacheService.cs:7

CommentedOutCodecontent/tests/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.UnitTests/Queries/GetCustomer/GetCustomerQueryHandlerTests.cs:19

What to do

Resolve the 4 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs, DomainEventsProcessor.cs, IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED, AuthenticationInstaller.cs, OrderReadService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with ICacheService.cs, ICustomerReadService.cs, IOrderReadService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 projects, 153 source files, 3349 hand-written lines of code (2978 production / 371 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 670 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 6 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

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D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

This is a well-structured README for a Clean Architecture and Domain-Driven Design template covering installation, motivation, domain components (aggregates/policies/domain services/events), architecture layers (presentation/infrastructure/application/domain), eventual consistency, CQRS, and authentication. It begins with an overview of what the project is and ends with a watch button link, giving it strong contextual framing for readers who are new to Clean Architecture.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — This is a well-structured README for a Clean Architecture and Domain-Driven Design template covering installation, motivation, domain components (aggregates/policies/domain services/events), architecture layers (presentation/infrastructure/application/domain), eventual consistency, CQRS, and authentication. It begins with an overview of what the project is and ends with a watch button link, giving it strong contextual framing for readers who are new to Clean Architecture.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming ConsistencyStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Typo in field name 'conntectionString' (double 't') compared to the standard spelling 'connection' used in other contexts or implied by the type. While this is a single instance, it breaks the lexical consistency of the term 'connection' within the codebase.

Inconsistent spelling of 'Integration'. The migration column name 'IntergrationEventId' is misspelled (missing 'a'), whereas the class 'IntegrationEventsProcessor' and other references use the correct spelling 'Integration'.

Inconsistent spelling of 'Repository'. The field '_customerRespository' is misspelled (missing 'p'), while the mock field '_customerRepositoryMock' and the interface 'ICustomerRepository' use the correct spelling.

What to do

Resolve the 1 Typo in field name 'conntectionString' (double 't') compared to the… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent spelling of 'Integration'. The migration column name… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent spelling of 'Repository'. The field '_customerRespository'… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D22 · Internal API ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 API inconsistencies across 5 exposed types.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md.

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D24 · Comment ValueExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

18 valuable / 1 redundant across 38 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentcontent/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Program.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 8 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

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D27 · Navigability9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 % of calls cross a namespace and 6 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 4 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.2 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 3 medium, 0 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 3 file(s) — `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/PaginationParameters.cs` (lines 3–4, line 18), `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/DomainException.cs` (lines 3–5), `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs` (line 9, lines 10–11, line 49) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 3 of those file(s) — `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/PaginationParameters.cs`, `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/DomainException.cs`, `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs` — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.2 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security8.1 / 10Adequategated by 4 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 5 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 of 12 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs. Counted over 12 of the 147 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×3content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

Resolve the 3 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs, AuthenticationInstaller.cs, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D39 · IL Efficiency9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 of 248 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetcontent/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Persistance/Configuration/Domain/Customers/CustomerConfiguration.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 8 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

`DomainEventsProcessor` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `IDomainEventDispatcher domainEventDispatcher`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `IDomainEventDispatcher` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:26
Building the SINGLETON `EventMapperFactory` resolves `CustomerCreatedEventMapper`, registered as Transient, from the provider it was handed — the ROOT provider, outside any scope. The root provider keeps that instance for the life of the process, so the singleton is handed one transient `CustomerCreatedEventMapper` forever (ASP.NET Core's scope validation rejects it in Development and lets it through in Production). Create a scope per use (`IServiceScopeFactory.CreateScope()`) and resolve `CustomerCreatedEventMapper` from the scope's provider, or align the lifetimes. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/DependencyInjectionInstaller.cs:37

What to do

Don't inject scoped/transient services into singletons; resolve them per-use via IServiceScopeFactory or a factory delegate, or align the lifetimes.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition4.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX2 · Stateful singletons3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

`DomainEventsProcessor` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_assemblies; e.g. `_assemblies` at line 42). — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:15
`IntegrationEventsProcessor` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_assemblies; e.g. `_assemblies` at line 37). — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:13

What to do

Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

The namespaces CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.GetCustomer ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.BrowseOrders ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.GetOrder ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared → CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers (CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared.IAdminReadService → CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers.BrowseCustomersDto, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/IAdminReadService.cs:1

What to do

Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

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AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

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DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

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DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

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DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. An id wrapper is recognised by VALUE SEMANTICS, not by being a struct — a record struct, a record class (`record ApartmentId(Guid Value)`) or a class declared by a typed-id base (`class MemberId : TypedIdValueBase`) all count, while a plain mutable class (reference equality) and a verb-phrase query record (`GetCustomerById`) do not. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

`CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
`CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.cs:3
`OrderCreatedDomainEvent.OrderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/DomainEvents/OrderCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
`OrderCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/DomainEvents/OrderCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3

What to do

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

`CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler.cs:8
`CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler.cs:16
`CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:7
`CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:17
`CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/VerifyEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs:6
`CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/VerifyEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs:8
`OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:6
`OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:12

What to do

Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).

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DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

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ED3 · Event naming10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED5 · Idempotency9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

`CreateCustomer.CreateCustomerCommandHandler.Consume` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandHandler.cs:19

What to do

Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`Consume` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:12
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/MassTransitInstaller.cs:34

What to do

Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

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M1 · Documentation (README)8.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a README to the 7 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

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M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it all sits under content/ alongside the root build files, so the conventional src/ boundary between the product and its tooling isn't drawn.

What to do

Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests — searched for: `microservice`, `service-mesh`, `istio`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:216
README.md runs `./kc.sh export --dir /tmp/export --users different_files`, but `kc.sh` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:540

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests; README.md runs `./kc.sh export --dir /tmp/export --users different_files`, but `kc.sh` does not exist.

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P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P2 · Observability7.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 2/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 4, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

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P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

`services.AddHttpClient<IAuthenticationService, KeycloakAuthenticationService>()` registers an outbound HTTP client with no resilience handler, retry policy or timeout of its own in its builder chain. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default). — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/DependencyInjectionInstaller.cs:52

What to do

Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or a Polly policy and an explicit timeout) to each client registration flagged here, so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

No benchmark suite was found by the two searches this check runs. FIRST, a BenchmarkDotNet package reference in any project file — every project the workspace loaded, plus a walk of project files on disk that never loaded, because a benchmark suite is exactly the project a partial load drops. SECOND, a script harness: a file whose name contains `benchmark` and ends `.py`, `.sh`, `.ps1`, `.bash`, `.rb`, `.js` or `.mjs`, credited ONLY when this repository's CI text also mentions benchmarks — a harness no pipeline runs is read as a fixture, deliberately. Neither search can see a benchmark suite in another ecosystem's idiom (a Go `testing.B` file, a JMH or criterion project, a pytest-benchmark run), so this is 'no benchmark found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).

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PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — in .NET Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit; off .NET, with comments and strings blanked, Go's sync.Pool, preallocated slices/maps, Grow, strconv.Append* and buf[:0] reuse; the JVM's NIO buffer views, MemorySegment, primitive collections, pools and literal presizes (plus Kotlin primitive arrays and value classes, Scala AnyVal and @specialized); Swift's reserveCapacity, ContiguousArray, withUnsafe* access and ~Copyable. Activated off .NET on the same floor (400 lines, and benchmarks or 8 uses); Rust and garbage-collected scripting languages are not applicable. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 1 use(s) across 3,756 production line(s) (~0.3/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.

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X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

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X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

`serviceScopeFactory.CreateScope()` (line 25) creates an `IServiceScope`, and it is dropped: `CreateScope().ServiceProvider` never names the scope, so nothing can release it. A scope owns every scoped service resolved from it — the `DbContext`, its connection, anything registered `AddScoped` — and releases them only when the scope itself is disposed; nothing here ever does, so each scope's services stay alive until the process ends. Create it with `using var scope = …CreateScope();` (or `await using` for `CreateAsyncScope`), or, when it must outlive the method, dispose it from the owning type's `Dispose`. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:25

What to do

Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X2 · Cancellation propagation6.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 19/38 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×19) — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:28, content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:20, content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:61, …
3 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.
Accepts a CancellationToken and never uses it, while it calls something that takes one — so a caller who cancels still waits for that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible). (×3) — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/OrderDomainService.cs:14, content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/ReadServices/AdminReadService.cs:18, content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/CacheService.cs:21

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

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X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

`body` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through an HTML e-mail body with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs:24

What to do

Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X4 · Structured logging5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Filters/MassTransit/LoggingFilter.cs:29

What to do

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

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X5 · Nullable reference types8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

4/5 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 5 suppression(s) across the 21181 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	73%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	61%	Adequate — gated by AX2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity	60%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	41%	Adequate — gated by D13, P5, P7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	57%	Adequate	Acceptable, with room to improve.
Domain Modelling	79%	Exemplary	Solid.
Event-Driven	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Performance	70%	Strong	Solid.

Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Not included — 39 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — 4 query handlers detected, but none of their entry-point bodies could be walked — the query-purity oracle recognises a value-returning Execute/Handle/Consume (±Async) entry point or one that implements the classifying handler interface's member, and this codebase's handlers were classified but never read. This is an engine limitation, not a finding about the repository.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — keycloak_web Pulling aspire-dashboard Pulling postgresdb Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden redis Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden rabbitmq Error context canceled aspire-dashboard Error context canceled keycloak_web Error context canceled mailhog Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: mailhog Pulling postgresdb Pulling redis Pulling rabbitmq Pulling keycloak_web Pulling mailhog Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden postgresdb Error context canceled keycloak_web Error context canceled aspire-dashboard Error context canceled redis Error context canceled rabbitmq Error context canceled Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C2 Access Controls — This is a dotnet-new template — authorization is deferred to the application you build from it. Add [Authorize]/policies (or imperative guards) when you wire up real users; until then there are no real endpoints to protect.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (2,978 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (content), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 3 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P1 CI/CD gates — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. Automated CI/CD gates are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 34 finding(s)

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×8

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure · ×8

Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler.cs:8 — `CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler.cs:16 — `CustomerEmailChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:7 — `CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:17 — `CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/VerifyEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs:6 — `CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/VerifyEmail/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEventHandler.cs:8 — `CustomerEmailVerifiedChangedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:6 — `OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `IConsumer` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:12 — `OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler` (domain layer) names `ConsumeContext` from `MassTransit` — a messaging type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.

D17 · Explicit Debt · WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×4

WriteOnlyPrivateField content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:10 — private IEmailTemplateFactory _emailTemplateFactory — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:18 — private IServiceScopeFactory _serviceScopeFactory — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:16 — private IServiceScopeFactory _serviceScopeFactory — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField content/tests/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.UnitTests/Queries/GetCustomer/GetCustomerQueryHandlerTests.cs:17 — private ITestHarness _harness — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.

D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×4

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×4

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

AX1 · Captive dependencies · Captive dependency · ×2

Captive dependency: singleton DomainEventsProcessor captures transient IDomainEventDispatcher content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:26 — `DomainEventsProcessor` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `IDomainEventDispatcher domainEventDispatcher`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `IDomainEventDispatcher` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes.
Captive dependency: singleton EventMapperFactory resolves transient CustomerCreatedEventMapper from the root provider content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/DependencyInjectionInstaller.cs:37 — Building the SINGLETON `EventMapperFactory` resolves `CustomerCreatedEventMapper`, registered as Transient, from the provider it was handed — the ROOT provider, outside any scope. The root provider keeps that instance for the life of the process, so the singleton is handed one transient `CustomerCreatedEventMapper` forever (ASP.NET Core's scope validation rejects it in Development and lets it through in Production). Create a scope per use (`IServiceScopeFactory.CreateScope()`) and resolve `CustomerCreatedEventMapper` from the scope's provider, or align the lifetimes.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

AX3 · Project dependency cycles · Namespace dependency cycle · ×1

Namespace dependency cycle content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/IAdminReadService.cs:1 — The namespaces CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.GetCustomer ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.BrowseOrders ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Order.GetOrder ↔ CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared → CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers (CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Shared.IAdminReadService → CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Admin.BrowseCustomers.BrowseCustomersDto, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

Serious — 54 finding(s)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×19

Async method without CancellationToken: SendWelcomeEmail content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/DomainEventHandlers/CustomerCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:28 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RequestTokenUsingPasswordGrantAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:20 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RefreshAccessTokenAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:61 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Publish content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:104 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Publish content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:100 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Dispatch content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Events/DomainEventDispatcher.cs:14 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SendEmailAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs:14 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SendWelcomeEmail content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs:33 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetTemplateAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailTemplateFactory.cs:11 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: BrowseCustomers content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/AdminController.cs:24 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetCustomer content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/CustomersController.cs:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: CreateCustomer content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/CustomersController.cs:37 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: ChangeEmail content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/CustomersController.cs:47 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: VerifyEmail content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/CustomersController.cs:57 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetOrder content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/OrdersController.cs:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: BrowseOrders content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/OrdersController.cs:37 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: CreateOrder content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Controllers/OrdersController.cs:47 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Login REDACTED:40 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RefreshToken REDACTED:61 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×5

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×4

TodoComment REDACTED:55 — //TODO: comment — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/AuthenticationInstaller.cs:20 — //TODO: set to true on production env — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/ReadServices/OrderReadService.cs:56 — //TODO: Rewrite this query — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/CacheService.cs:14 — //TODO: Add expiration time — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×3

Dead code: ReplaceAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/ICacheService.cs:7 — Method ReplaceAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including CA.And.DDD.Template.Application, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: ExecuteSqlQueryAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/ICustomerReadService.cs:7 — Method ExecuteSqlQueryAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including CA.And.DDD.Template.Application, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: ExecuteSqlQueryAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/IOrderReadService.cs:8 — Method ExecuteSqlQueryAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including CA.And.DDD.Template.Application, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×3

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its CancellationToken · ×3

Async method drops its CancellationToken: CalculateDiscountBaseOnLast31DaysSpendingAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/OrderDomainService.cs:14 — Accepts a CancellationToken and never uses it, while it calls something that takes one — so a caller who cancels still waits for that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).
Async method drops its CancellationToken: BrowseCustomers content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/ReadServices/AdminReadService.cs:18 — Accepts a CancellationToken and never uses it, while it calls something that takes one — so a caller who cancels still waits for that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).
Async method drops its CancellationToken: GetAsync content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/CacheService.cs:21 — Accepts a CancellationToken and never uses it, while it calls something that takes one — so a caller who cancels still waits for that work. Pass the token on (or, where the work must outlive the caller, start it without awaiting it so the choice is visible).

AX2 · Stateful singletons · Stateful singleton · ×2

Stateful singleton: DomainEventsProcessor content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:15 — `DomainEventsProcessor` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_assemblies; e.g. `_assemblies` at line 42).
Stateful singleton: IntegrationEventsProcessor content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:13 — `IntegrationEventsProcessor` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_assemblies; e.g. `_assemblies` at line 37).

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
REDACTED

D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×1

CommentedOutCode content/tests/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.UnitTests/Queries/GetCustomer/GetCustomerQueryHandlerTests.cs:19 — 6 consecutive commented-code lines

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (21–23 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (21–23 lines × 2) content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:21 — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:21-43 | content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:62-82 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:21` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:76 — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:76-84 | content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:71-79 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:76` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it and carries on into the declaration that follows — the window is the tail of one member plus the head of the next, so no call can be substituted for those exact lines, and the smallest declaration that contains all of them is the type they sit in. The repeated unit is the member each site sits in: where those members' bodies are the same, move one whole member to the shared location and have the others delegate to it; where the copies are a run of near-identical overloads or wrappers that differ only in their signatures, the repetition IS the run — a one-line delegation has no helper inside it to lift — so generate the run from the set it enumerates, or accept it and keep each member's own documentation with it.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:106 — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:106-115 | content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:102-111 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/DomainEventsProcessor.cs:106` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Persistance/Configuration/Infrastructure/DomainEventConfiguration.cs:10 — content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Persistance/Configuration/Infrastructure/DomainEventConfiguration.cs:10-15 | content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Persistance/Configuration/Infrastructure/IntegrationEventConfiguration.cs:11-16 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: the declarations holding them bind `builder` to `EntityTypeBuilder<DomainEvent>` in one and `EntityTypeBuilder<IntegrationEvent>` in another, and the duplicated lines use it. The extracted unit therefore needs a parameter type that fits BOTH — their common supertype where they have one, or a new abstraction over them where they do not — and settling that is the step that comes BEFORE the extraction above. Where the two types are deliberately unrelated, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.

ED5 · Idempotency · Non-idempotent mutation · ×1

Non-idempotent mutation: CreateCustomer.CreateCustomerCommandHandler.Consume content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommandHandler.cs:19 — `CreateCustomer.CreateCustomerCommandHandler.Consume` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Fake-async · ×1

Fake-async — async method never awaits content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/DomainEventHandlers/OrderCreatedDomainEventHandler.cs:12 — `Consume` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.

P5 · DR & Backup · No DR/backup evidence · ×1

No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×1

Outbound HTTP without resilience content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/DependencyInjectionInstaller.cs:52 — `services.AddHttpClient<IAuthenticationService, KeycloakAuthenticationService>()` registers an outbound HTTP client with no resilience handler, retry policy or timeout of its own in its builder chain. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection — and cascade — until the call gives up on its own (100 s for HttpClient's default).

SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1

NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness · DI scope created and never disposed · ×1

DI scope created and never disposed content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/BackgroundTasks/IntegrationEventsProcessor.cs:25 — `serviceScopeFactory.CreateScope()` (line 25) creates an `IServiceScope`, and it is dropped: `CreateScope().ServiceProvider` never names the scope, so nothing can release it. A scope owns every scoped service resolved from it — the `DbContext`, its connection, anything registered `AddScoped` — and releases them only when the scope itself is disposed; nothing here ever does, so each scope's services stay alive until the process ends. Create it with `using var scope = …CreateScope();` (or `await using` for `CreateAsyncScope`), or, when it must outlive the method, dispose it from the owning type's `Dispose`.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped · Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×1

Untrusted text written into markup unescaped content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs:24 — `body` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through an HTML e-mail body with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.

Minor — 32 finding(s)

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids · Primitive id on a domain type · ×4

Primitive id on a domain type: CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3 — `CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.CustomerId content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.cs:3 — `CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: OrderCreatedDomainEvent.OrderId content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/DomainEvents/OrderCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3 — `OrderCreatedDomainEvent.OrderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: OrderCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/DomainEvents/OrderCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3 — `OrderCreatedDomainEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×3

Orphaned file content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/AuthenticationInstaller.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file REDACTED:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.

M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×2

README/code drift README.md:216 — README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests — searched for: `microservice`, `service-mesh`, `istio`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, REDACTED); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift README.md:540 — README.md runs `./kc.sh export --dir /tmp/export --users different_files`, but `kc.sh` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in field name 'conntectionString' (double 't') compared to the standard spelling 'connection' used in other contexts or implied by the type. While this is a single instance, it breaks the lexical consistency of the term 'connection' within the codebase. · ×1

Typo in field name 'conntectionString' (double 't') compared to the standard spelling 'connection' used in other contexts or implied by the type. While this is a single instance, it breaks the lexical consistency of the term 'connection' within the codebase. — Rename to 'connectionString' (symbols: CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.BackgroundTasks.IntegrationEventsProcessor.conntectionString, CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.BackgroundTasks.IntegrationEventsProcessor._publishEndpoint)

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent spelling of 'Integration'. The migration column name 'IntergrationEventId' is misspelled (missing 'a'), whereas the class 'IntegrationEventsProcessor' and other references use the correct spelling 'Integration'. · ×1

Inconsistent spelling of 'Integration'. The migration column name 'IntergrationEventId' is misspelled (missing 'a'), whereas the class 'IntegrationEventsProcessor' and other references use the correct spelling 'Integration'. — Rename to 'IntegrationEventId' (symbols: CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Migrations.Operations.Builders.CreateTableBuilder<...> IntergrationEventId, CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.BackgroundTasks.IntegrationEventsProcessor._publishEndpoint)

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent spelling of 'Repository'. The field '_customerRespository' is misspelled (missing 'p'), while the mock field '_customerRepositoryMock' and the interface 'ICustomerRepository' use the correct spelling. · ×1

Inconsistent spelling of 'Repository'. The field '_customerRespository' is misspelled (missing 'p'), while the mock field '_customerRepositoryMock' and the interface 'ICustomerRepository' use the correct spelling. — Rename to '_customerRepository' (symbols: CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.Customer.CreateCustomer.CreateCustomerCommandHandler._customerRespository, CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.UnitTests.Customer.ChangeEmailTests.ChangeEmailCommandHandlerTests._customerRepositoryMock)

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1

redundant comment content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.WebApi/Program.cs:11 — "Add services to the container." — Delete - 'services.InstallEntityFramework(configuration)' is self-describing.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

REDACTED

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 3 of 12 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 12 of the 147 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Authentication/KeycloakAuthenticationService.cs, content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/AuthenticationInstaller.cs, REDACTED. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1

IL efficiency: 3 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Persistance/Configuration/Domain/Customers/CustomerConfiguration.cs:11 — 3 of 248 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.Persistance.Configuration.Domain.Customers.CustomerConfiguration.Configure @ content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Persistance/Configuration/Domain/Customers/CustomerConfiguration.cs:11, 382 IL instructions; that pulled this dimension to 9.8/10. These bodies are far past the JIT's inline budget, so splitting them does not make them inlinable — what moves the number is emitting less: collapsing LINQ chains and closures on hot paths, and interpolation built eagerly where it is only sometimes used.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Commented-out code · ×1

Commented-out code content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Installers/MassTransitInstaller.cs:34 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

M3 · Folder & project structure · No src/ separation · ×1

No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it all sits under content/ alongside the root build files, so the conventional src/ boundary between the product and its tooling isn't drawn.

P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1

Logging is not universal — Only 2/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 4, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1

No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

PF1 · Benchmark discipline · No performance benchmarks · ×1

No performance benchmarks — No benchmark suite was found by the two searches this check runs. FIRST, a BenchmarkDotNet package reference in any project file — every project the workspace loaded, plus a walk of project files on disk that never loaded, because a benchmark suite is exactly the project a partial load drops. SECOND, a script harness: a file whose name contains `benchmark` and ends `.py`, `.sh`, `.ps1`, `.bash`, `.rb`, `.js` or `.mjs`, credited ONLY when this repository's CI text also mentions benchmarks — a harness no pipeline runs is read as a fixture, deliberately. Neither search can see a benchmark suite in another ecosystem's idiom (a Go `testing.B` file, a JMH or criterion project, a pytest-benchmark run), so this is 'no benchmark found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1

No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×1

No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No inbound model validation detected · ×1

No inbound model validation detected — No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1

Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 19/38 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept · ×1

Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept — 3 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.

X4 · Structured logging · Interpolated log message defeats structured logging · ×1

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Filters/MassTransit/LoggingFilter.cs:29 — Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere · ×1

Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere — 4/5 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1

Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 5 suppression(s) across the 21181 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

Minor — 2 finding(s)

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2

Mock framework: Moq — CA.And.DDD.Template.Application.UnitTests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure.UnitTests references Moq.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-39094c3767904cce95070e895a5b9351/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-39094c3767904cce95070e895a5b9351/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	4	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list content/CA.And.DDD.Template.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	5	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	10	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 3 file(s) — `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Shared/PaginationParameters.cs`, `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/DomainException.cs`, `content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Shared/EmailService.cs` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet).	0	—

Run 01a15fed-0d95-7df5-a475-a8d45d91fe7a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 20 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 9 field(s)

ChangeEmailCommand.NewEmail content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/ChangeEmail/ChangeEmailCommand.cs:3
CreateCustomerCommand.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
CustomerDto.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/GetCustomer/CustomerDto.cs:3
Customer.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Customer.cs:10
CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.Email content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3
CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.NewEmailAddress content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.cs:3
CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.OldEmailAddress content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailChangedDomainEvent.cs:3
CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEvent.NewEmailAddress content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerEmailVerifiedDomainEvent.cs:3
Smtp.EmailFrom content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Infrastructure/Settings/Smtp.cs:3

Name — 5 field(s)

BrowseCustomerDto.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Admin/BrowseCustomers/BrowseCustomersDto.cs:4
CreateCustomerCommand.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
CustomerDto.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/GetCustomer/CustomerDto.cs:3
Customer.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Customer.cs:8
CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.FullName content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/DomainEvents/CustomerCreatedDomainEvent.cs:3

Address — 4 field(s)

CreateCustomerCommand.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
CreateOrderCommand.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Order/CreateOrder/CreateOrderCommand.cs:3
Address.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Address.cs:12
ShippingAddress.PostalCode content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Orders/ShippingAddress.cs:8

Date of birth — 2 field(s)

CreateCustomerCommand.BirthDate content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Application/Customer/CreateCustomer/CreateCustomerCommand.cs:3
Age.BirthDate content/src/CA.And.DDD.Template.Domain/Customers/Age.cs:9

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 73% · Strong ·

At a glance — Architecture · 61% · Adequate · gated by AX2 ·

At a glance — Maturity · 60% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 41% · Adequate · gated by D13, P5, P7 ·

At a glance — Security · 57% · Adequate ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 79% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Performance · 70% · Strong ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts