Public report — OpenSleigh, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 14:28 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Mizrael/OpenSleigh

Regression detected bounded contexts not declared
54% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
lower third — near Weak

Small · 5,405 LoC · 61 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (43%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

54/57dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
33findings with an exact file:lineof 53 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
57/98dimensions across the health lenses5405 LoC · 61 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

mizrael/OpenSleigh is in a workable but fragile state (54%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

It is strongest in Performance (88%) — it's in strong shape there. Code Health (81%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (43%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (57%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow and knowledge is concentrated in too few people (a bus-factor risk).

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Make types internal by default (Library API & versioning); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); EnsureCreated() with a versioned schema-migration mechanism (EF… (Schema migrations).

For scale: Small (~5,405 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Performance foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 43% · 46% weightMaturity 57% · 25% weightSecurity 60% · 14% weightArchitecture 75% · 8% weightCode Health 81% · 4% weightPerformance 88% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 43 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 54 → ~63.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 13%Plumbing 31%Tests 56%
New since the last scan (53+)

53 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D1 · SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cyclomatic 20) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs
  • D2 · SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cognitive 19) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/OutboxMessage.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs
  • D8 · Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • D10 · No assertions: ReleaseAsync_should_unlock_instance tests/OpenSleigh.Tests/InMemorySagaStateRepositoryTests.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/DbContext.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.PostgreSQL/SqlBusConfiguratorExtensions.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaInfrastructureCreator.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageSubscriber.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/ISagaInstance.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/ISagaInstance.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/ISagaInstance.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/SagaExecutionService.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/Transport/MessageDispatcher.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment tests/OpenSleigh.E2ETests/E2ETestsBase.cs
  • D18 · Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored
  • D19 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget.yml
  • D30 · High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1
  • D35 · Change coupling: SagaExecutionService.cs ↔ SagaInstance.cs src/OpenSleigh/SagaExecutionService.cs
  • D35 · Change coupling: ChannelFactory.cs ↔ RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/ChannelFactory.cs
  • D35 · Change coupling: SagaState.cs ↔ SqlOutboxRepository.cs src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/SagaState.cs
  • D35 · Change coupling: KafkaMessageParser.cs ↔ QueueReferenceFactory.cs src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageParser.cs
  • D36 · Unpinned build actions
  • D36 · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
  • P12 · CI test gate excludes suites by filter
  • P12 · CI test gate excludes suites by filter
  • P12 · CI test gate excludes suites by filter
  • IC1 · Fake-async — async method never awaits src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/RabbitMessageParser.cs
  • AX1 · Captive dependency: singleton InMemorySubscriber captures transient IMessageProcessor src/OpenSleigh.InMemory/Messaging/InMemorySubscriber.cs
  • AX1 · Captive dependency: singleton KafkaMessageHandler captures transient IMessageProcessor src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageHandler.cs
  • AX2 · Stateful singleton: InMemorySubscriber src/OpenSleigh.InMemory/Messaging/InMemorySubscriber.cs
  • AX2 · Stateful singleton: ChannelFactory src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/ChannelFactory.cs
  • AX2 · Stateful singleton: RabbitPersistentConnection src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/RabbitPersistentConnection.cs
  • AX2 · Stateful singleton: RabbitMessageSubscriber src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs
  • AX2 · Stateful singleton: KafkaMessageSubscriber src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageSubscriber.cs
  • P8 · Schema created with EnsureCreated() (no migration path) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SagaDbContext.cs
  • PF3 · Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false)
  • SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,100–€21,000
Cost to rebuild€4,100–€21,000 (0.1 person-years (68–216 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityLow — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 54% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 44% boilerplate · 27% straight-line · 29% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€12,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 43% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×1.0) — service/app, transaction-script/CRUD × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
+10.6 pts · Medium effort · Library API & versioning
2
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
+10.6 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup
3
Replace EnsureCreated() with a versioned schema-migration mechanism (EF Core migrations) so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.
+10.6 pts · Medium effort · Schema migrations

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 43%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (5,405 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 43%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch OpenSleigh OpenSleigh OpenSleigh.InMemory InMemory OpenSleigh.InMemory->OpenSleigh OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo Mongo OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo->OpenSleigh OpenSleigh.Persistence.PostgreSQL PostgreSQL OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL SQL OpenSleigh.Persistence.PostgreSQL->OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL->OpenSleigh OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQLServer SQLServer OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQLServer->OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL OpenSleigh.Reporting Reporting OpenSleigh.Reporting->OpenSleigh OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka Kafka OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka->OpenSleigh OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ RabbitMQ OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ->OpenSleigh

Architecture — module dependency matrix

22 modules, 58 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…ore.OpenApi.GeneratedOpenSleigh.PersistenceOpenSleigh.QueriesOpenSleigh.ReportingOpenSleigh.Utils…time.CompilerServicesOpenSleigh.TransportOpenSleigh.OutboxOpenSleigh…gh.InMemory.Messaging…leigh.InMemory.Outbox…stence.Mongo.Entities…sistence.SQL.Entities…h.DependencyInjection…leigh.Persistence.SQL…h.Reporting.EndpointsOpenSleigh.InMemory…igh.Persistence.Mongo…ersistence.PostgreSQL…Persistence.SQLServer…leigh.Transport.Kafka…gh.Transport.RabbitMQ…ore.OpenApi.Generated1OpenSleigh.Persistence2OpenSleigh.Queries3OpenSleigh.Reporting4OpenSleigh.Utils5…time.CompilerServices6OpenSleigh.Transport7OpenSleigh.Outbox8OpenSleigh9…gh.InMemory.Messaging10…leigh.InMemory.Outbox11…stence.Mongo.Entities12…sistence.SQL.Entities13…h.DependencyInjection14…leigh.Persistence.SQL15…h.Reporting.Endpoints16OpenSleigh.InMemory17…igh.Persistence.Mongo18…ersistence.PostgreSQL19…Persistence.SQLServer20…leigh.Transport.Kafka21…gh.Transport.RabbitMQ2229911233174423212122446139511241314613971211521163374132621

At a glance — Code Health · 81% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 75% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 57% · Adequate · gated by D16, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 43% · Weak · gated by P8, P10

At a glance — Security · 60% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

At a glance — Performance · 88% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection11High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components3High / Critical

Roadmap

First, restrict the library's public API by making types internal by default to allow safe internal refactoring. Next, document recovery time and recovery point objectives, ensuring a tested restore procedure is in place. Then, replace ad-hoc database creation with versioned schema migrations to ensure safe and reproducible production changes. Additionally, enable automated dependency scanning and updates to improve security and performance tooling. Finally, implement version stamping in build manifests to ensure all releases are traceable.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.+10.6 ptsMediumLibrary API & versioning
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+10.6 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Replace EnsureCreated() with a versioned schema-migration mechanism (EF Core migrations) so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.+10.6 ptsMediumSchema migrations
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.+10.4 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+10.4 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+10.2 ptsMediumObservability
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Startup.cs.+3.3 ptsLowComment Value
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.+3.1 ptsLowBus Factor

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 19 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 32% mixed · 68% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/docs.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/nuget.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/OpenSleigh/SagaExecutionService.cs6.7MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/OpenSleigh/ISagaInstance.cs6.9MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs7.2MixedCyclomatic Complexity: SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cyclomatic 20)
src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/DbContext.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.PostgreSQL/SqlBusConfiguratorExtensions.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaInfrastructureCreator.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageSubscriber.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/OpenSleigh/Transport/MessageDispatcher.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
tests/OpenSleigh.E2ETests/E2ETestsBase.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/OutboxMessage.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)
tests/OpenSleigh.Tests/InMemorySagaStateRepositoryTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: ReleaseAsync_should_unlock_instance
src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/ChannelFactory.cs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: ChannelFactory.cs ↔ RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs
src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/SagaState.cs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: SagaState.cs ↔ SqlOutboxRepository.cs
src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageParser.cs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: KafkaMessageParser.cs ↔ QueueReferenceFactory.cs
samples/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common(net8.0)
samples/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.API/Startup.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 54 of 57 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 57 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D21D22D24D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D36D38AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P5P6P8PF1PF2PF3X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 33 of 53 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc806-cf9c-7457-9ba8-2ac998d2317e.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D21, D22, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore at 20.

SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cyclomatic 20)src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:86

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore at 19.

SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cognitive 19)src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:86

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/OutboxMessage.cs:23
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:49
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:186

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

61 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 28 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1005 test methods: 987 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 18 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, 7 mock references across 335 tests.

No assertions: ReleaseAsync_should_unlock_instancetests/OpenSleigh.Tests/InMemorySagaStateRepositoryTests.cs:105
Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×7

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: not included — too large to re-run within its budget; e2e: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 33 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 5405 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.7.

TodoComment · ×10src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/DbContext.cs:72

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

61 projects, 832 source files, 12060 hand-written lines of code (5405 production / 6655 test), 153 inter-project edges.

Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored
Shell project: OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common(net8.0)samples/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common.csproj

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 387 exposed types.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 1 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentsamples/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.API/Startup.cs:22

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 21 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

84 % of calls cross a namespace and 19 % go through an interface, but 74 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.0/10. — 84 % of calls cross a namespace and 19 % go through an interface, but 74 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×11.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:48detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docs.yml (5), codeql-analysis.yml (4), nuget.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: SagaExecutionService.cs↔SagaInstance.cs 62%; ChannelFactory.cs↔RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs 55%; SagaState.cs↔SqlOutboxRepository.cs 50%

Change coupling: SagaExecutionService.cs ↔ SagaInstance.cs · ×4src/OpenSleigh/SagaExecutionService.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies (OSV).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `InMemorySubscriber` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `IMessageProcessor messageProcessor`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `IMessageProcessor` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — InMemorySubscriber.cs:8
  • `KafkaMessageHandler` is registered as a SINGLETON but its constructor takes `IMessageProcessor messageProcessor`, which is registered as Transient. The singleton captures one instance of the transient dependency forever — defeating its lifetime (a per-request DbContext shared across all requests is a classic data-corruption/threading bug). Make the singleton resolve `IMessageProcessor` per-use (inject `IServiceScopeFactory` or a factory func), or align the lifetimes. — KafkaMessageHandler.cs:8

What to do

  • Don't inject scoped/transient services into singletons; resolve them per-use via IServiceScopeFactory or a factory delegate, or align the lifetimes.
AX10 · Code composition7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `InMemorySubscriber` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_stoppingCts, _consumerTask, disposedValue; e.g. `_stoppingCts` at line 35). — InMemorySubscriber.cs:8
  • `ChannelFactory` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_publishChannel, _consumeChannel; e.g. `_publishChannel` at line 70). — ChannelFactory.cs:7
  • `RabbitPersistentConnection` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_disposed; e.g. `_disposed` at line 30). — RabbitPersistentConnection.cs:8
  • `RabbitMessageSubscriber` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_channel, _linkedCts; e.g. `_channel` at line 44). — RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs:9
  • `KafkaMessageSubscriber` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_stoppingCts, _consumerTask; e.g. `_stoppingCts` at line 43). — KafkaMessageSubscriber.cs:10

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A placeholder string ("lorem ipsum") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — SagaWithState.cs:43

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `ParseMessageAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — RabbitMessageParser.cs:21
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — IBusConfiguratorExtensions.cs:60

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • The root README is 63 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.

What to do

  • Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 11 of 21 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 469/624 types (75%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
  • No <Version>/<VersionPrefix>/GitVersion/MinVer detected. A published library needs explicit semantic versioning so consumers can reason about breaking changes.

What to do

  • Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
  • Stamp a semantic version (csproj <Version> or GitVersion/MinVer) and follow semver for breaking changes.
P2 · Observability5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 7/13 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 13, 4 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
  • Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
P8 · Schema migrations3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

  • `EnsureCreated()` builds the schema once and can't evolve it — there's no upgrade path for an existing production database, and it bypasses the migrations history. Adopt a versioned schema-migration mechanism (with EF Core: `dotnet ef migrations add` + `Migrate()` on startup) so schema changes are versioned and applied safely. — SagaDbContext.cs:13

What to do

  • Replace EnsureCreated() with a versioned schema-migration mechanism (EF Core migrations) so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

PF2 · Allocation hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • Only 59/161 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.

What to do

  • In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 81/86 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×4) — IHostExtensions.cs:10, IChannelExtensions.cs:114, RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs:130, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. — RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs:72

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×7) — SubscribersBackgroundService.cs:27, SubscribersBackgroundService.cs:31, SubscribersBackgroundService.cs:44, …

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.6 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 18 suppression(s) across the 28319 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health81%StrongSolid.
Architecture75%StrongSolid.
Maturity57%Adequate — gated by D16, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness43%Weak — gated by P8, P10Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security60%Adequate — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance88%StrongStrongest area.
Not included — 41 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (15 value object(s))
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 6 event handler(s); a message-bus package
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 13 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×11
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:51 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:57 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:82 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: ruby/setup-ruby@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `ruby/setup-ruby@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/ruby/setup-ruby/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:36 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/configure-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/configure-pages@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/configure-pages/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:45 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:56 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nuget.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 — Snappier 1.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Warning — 26 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×10
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/DbContext.cs:72 — //TODO: not sure this one is necessary — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.PostgreSQL/SqlBusConfiguratorExtensions.cs:43 — // TODO: this sucks hard — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaInfrastructureCreator.cs:10 — //TODO: not sure I want to keep this. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageSubscriber.cs:56 — // TODO: check if it's possible to get rid of this — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/ISagaInstance.cs:37 — //TODO: this might become an enum — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/ISagaInstance.cs:39 — //TODO: this should be private — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/ISagaInstance.cs:42 — //TODO: do we really need this? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/SagaExecutionService.cs:91 — // TODO: transaction — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/OpenSleigh/Transport/MessageDispatcher.cs:32 — // TODO: send outboxMessage + descriptor to deadletter — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment tests/OpenSleigh.E2ETests/E2ETestsBase.cs:36 — //TODO: — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×4
  • Change coupling: SagaExecutionService.cs ↔ SagaInstance.cs src/OpenSleigh/SagaExecutionService.cs — `src/OpenSleigh/SagaExecutionService.cs` and `src/OpenSleigh/SagaInstance.cs` change together 62% of the time (8 of the 13 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: ChannelFactory.cs ↔ RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/ChannelFactory.cs — `src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/ChannelFactory.cs` and `src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs` change together 55% of the time (6 of the 11 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: SagaState.cs ↔ SqlOutboxRepository.cs src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/SagaState.cs — `src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/SagaState.cs` and `src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlOutboxRepository.cs` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
  • Change coupling: KafkaMessageParser.cs ↔ QueueReferenceFactory.cs src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageParser.cs — `src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageParser.cs` and `src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/QueueReferenceFactory.cs` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cyclomatic 20) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:86 — SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 9 of the 20 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 2 function literals inside it that branch (lines 90, 139). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×1
  • No assertions: ReleaseAsync_should_unlock_instance tests/OpenSleigh.Tests/InMemorySagaStateRepositoryTests.cs:105 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
D18 · Solution Shape · Monorepo · ×1
  • Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored — This repository contains 3 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `src/OpenSleigh.sln` — the other 2 (`samples/OpenSleigh.Samples.Blazor/OpenSleigh.Samples.Blazor.sln`, `samples/OpenSleigh.Samples.ECommerce/OpenSleigh.Samples.ECommerce.sln`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1172.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore (cognitive 19) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:86 — SqlSagaStateRepository.LockAsyncCore has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Of this number, 10 points are the body's own statements and 9 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1
  • Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1 — SharpCompress 0.30.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 11 floating ref(s) across 3 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
  • PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 1 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (codeql-analysis.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 1 sibling workflow in the same repository is already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/OutboxMessage.cs:23 — src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/OutboxMessage.cs:23-41 | src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/Entities/OutboxMessage.cs:27-45 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/Entities/OutboxMessage.cs:23` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:49 — src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:49-66 | src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/MongoSagaStateRepository.cs:56-73 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:49` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:186 — src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:186-198 | src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/MongoSagaStateRepository.cs:156-167 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL/SqlSagaStateRepository.cs:186` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 16 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/RabbitMessageSubscriber.cs, src/OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo/MongoSagaStateRepository.cs, src/OpenSleigh.InMemory/InMemorySagaStateRepository.cs, src/OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ/IChannelExtensions.cs, src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageHandler.cs, src/OpenSleigh/Outbox/MessageEnvelope.cs, src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaMessageSubscriber.cs, src/OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka/KafkaPublisher.cs (+8 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common(net8.0) samples/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common.csproj — `OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.Common(net8.0)` contributes only 8 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 54k LoC across 61 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment samples/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2/OpenSleigh.Samples.Sample2.API/Startup.cs:22 — "This method gets called by the runtime. Use this method to add services to the container." — delete - boilerplate for ConfigureServices; only one of these two lines is meaningful
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Info — 7 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×7
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — OpenSleigh.Tests(net8.0) references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — OpenSleigh.E2ETests(net8.0) references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — OpenSleigh.Persistence.SQL.Tests(net8.0) references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — OpenSleigh.Transport.RabbitMQ.Tests(net8.0) references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — OpenSleigh.Persistence.Mongo.Tests(net8.0) references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — OpenSleigh.Transport.Kafka.Tests(net8.0) references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — OpenSleigh.Reporting.Tests(net8.0) references NSubstitute.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .11artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list src/OpenSleigh.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json3artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc806-cf9c-7457-9ba8-2ac998d2317e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md