Public report — UIEffect, published 10 Sep 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Public
Codebase survey Measured under the Code Assurance Index, but not filed — nothing here carries a record a reader can check independently. How a survey is verified No record

Mob-Sakai/UIEffect

Measured 10 September 2026, 23:30 UTC

No regression
50% Provisional

Small · 11,275 LoC · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (42%)

Findings by grade

28 critical 3 serious 10 minor 34 could not be resolved — could be critical — see Limitations

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
10 September 2026, 23:30 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index does not certify, approve or guarantee this codebase; it records a reproducible number and the evidence it was computed from. The standard is authored by Canine Development, who also build Watchdog — its only implementation today. That is said here so the number is checked rather than believed.

Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

16/19dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
28findings with an exact file:lineof 41 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
19/114dimensions across the health lenses11275 LoC — wide & deep
Chapters

Executive summary

This system holds a provisional health score of 50%, indicating a fragile state that requires immediate attention to prevent operational disruption. While the asset is small, its current configuration exposes the business to significant security risks that could compromise data integrity and trust. The low confidence level reflects incomplete analysis, meaning this assessment captures only a partial picture of the overall technical landscape.

The value at stake is modest, with a rebuild effort estimated at roughly 0.1 person-years or €18,000. This low cost suggests that the system is not deeply entrenched, making it easier to pivot or replace if necessary. However, the current composition reveals a heavy reliance on boilerplate code, which may obscure the core business logic and make future maintenance more difficult than the size implies. The limited test coverage further amplifies the risk of introducing defects during any changes.

The primary theme is security exposure, which is the most critical weakness. With a security score of 42%, the system lacks essential protections against common vulnerabilities. This is not merely a technical debt issue but a direct business risk that could lead to data breaches or compliance failures. Addressing the 15 high-severity findings identified by static analysis tools offers the highest return on investment, as these issues are likely the most exploitable and costly to fix later. Ignoring them leaves the business vulnerable to attacks that could have been easily prevented.

A secondary theme is operational transparency, where the lack of documentation and testing guidance creates friction for new team members. Without clear instructions on how to run tests or understand design decisions, onboarding becomes slow and error-prone. Adding a testing section to the main documentation and recording key architectural decisions will significantly improve maintainability. These steps are low-effort but high-impact, ensuring that future changes can be made safely and efficiently. Focusing on these areas first will stabilize the system and reduce long-term costs.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 42% · 54% weightMaturity 57% · 30% weightReadiness 63% · 16% weight

Raise Security 42 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~61.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 25%Plumbing 74%Tests 1%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6,000–€30,000
Cost to rebuild€6,000–€30,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (100–318 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 50% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 51% boilerplate · 24% straight-line · 25% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€18,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 42% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 15 High finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 11 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once.
+10.6 pts · Medium effort · Static Analysis (SAST)
2
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
+7.9 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation
3
Resolve the 1 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with ProjectSettings.asset.
+3.1 pts · Low effort · Secrets (history)

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 42%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (11,275 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 42%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 15 High finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 11 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 15 High finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 11 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once.

At a glance — Architecture · — · — ·

At a glance — Maturity · 57% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 63% · Adequate · gated by P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 42% · Weak · gated by D29, D36 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection26High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures2High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components1Medium

Roadmap

First, resolve the high-severity static analysis findings and remove the historical secret from ProjectSettings.asset to secure the codebase. Next, document key architectural decisions in a standard ADR format to clarify design context and consequences. Finally, update the root README to accurately reflect the project's capabilities and include clear instructions for running the test suite.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 15 High finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 11 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once.+10.6 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).+7.9 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 1 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with ProjectSettings.asset.+3.1 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+3.1 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+3.1 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+3.1 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.+5.4 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.+4.1 ptsMediumDocumentation accuracy

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 6 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 83% mixed · 17% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/test.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/test-urp.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/deploy.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/release.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
Packages/src/Editor/UIEffectEditor.cs8.0Near-cleanChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: UIEffectEditor.cs ↔ UIEffectContext.cs

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 28

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 3

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 10

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 34

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 16 of 19 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 19 dimensions across the health lenses
D9D10D13D19D21D28D29D30D34D35D36M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 28 of 41 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a08da8-7dc1-75d8-af66-ecd8064613b9.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cognitive complexity computed for it: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
  • D4 Code Duplication — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.cs) was not read by duplication detection: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load.
  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository's production source is C#, but it contains no MSBuild project file (no `.csproj`/`.sln`) — a build-less C# tree, e.g. a Unity/Godot package whose project files the editor generates, or a scripts-only repo — so there was nothing for the collector to restore, build or run. This is a limitation of what we can read, not a defect in the repo: coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. To have it read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference (.NET: C#, VB.NET and F# alike), lcov — `swift test --enable-code-coverage` or `xcodebuild -enableCodeCoverage YES` then `xcrun llvm-cov export -format=lcov` (Swift/Xcode), `cargo llvm-cov --lcov`, `go test -coverprofile`, `rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` or covertool (Erlang/BEAM), `flutter test --coverage` or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov` (Dart/Flutter), `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport` via the sbt-scoverage plugin in `project/plugins.sbt` (Scala/sbt), jest/nyc, JaCoCo/Cobertura XML, coverage.py … most ecosystems' coverage tools can emit one) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored and real coverage will be read. You can widen what we reach: optional: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and the real number is read on the next scan.
  • D9 Test Distribution — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 2 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite. You can widen what we reach: moving the tests into dedicated test projects inside the analyzed solution would let the unit/integration/BDD/E2E split be classified — but the counting gap is ours, so nothing is deducted either way.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. No dependency manifest this pass reads for hygiene (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D30 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. This IS a .NET repository, and .NET dependencies are the ones this dimension reads natively — from `<PackageReference>` elements via `dotnet list package`. What is missing here is not coverage of your ecosystem but the MSBuild project file that declaration lives in: this tree carries no .csproj/.vbproj/.fsproj, so there is no package list to read. The enumeration above is the set of manifests a separate reader parses, which is why yours is not in it.
  • D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. License scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (4721 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (9 contributor(s) across 312 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 96% of the history; the other 8 hold 0.5% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `Packages/src/Runtime/Internal/ProjectSettings/PreloadedProjectSettings.cs`, `Packages/src/Runtime/Utilities/TmpProxy.cs` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
  • AX10 Code composition — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • Production source was not modelled — run is Degraded — No code model read .cs, so the complexity, duplication and architecture dimensions were scored over a minority of this repository rather than its product, and dimensions that abstained did so for want of a model rather than for want of findings. The grade is NOT representative of this repository; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.
  • Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace did not read this repository's production source, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 test methods: 2 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 2 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The READMEs for the UIEffect v5 package are excellent and well-structured. They open with a branding banner, show release badges, and link to prerelease status, Unity versions, TextMeshPro/ShaderGraph support, and an OpenUPM/npm package URL, plus PR welcome and Twitter follow buttons. The document outline is visible in the top navigation bar (📝 Description, 📌 Key Features, 🎮 Demo, ⚙ Installation, 🔄 Upgrading from v4 to v5, 🚀 Usage, 🔡 Contributing) with each section named, and the main content begins at the Description heading before being clipped by the scanner. The READMEs are complete for a project that is itself described as 'UIEffect v5' in the banner.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The READMEs for the UIEffect v5 package are excellent and well-structured. They open with a branding banner, show release badges, and link to prerelease status, Unity versions, TextMeshPro/ShaderGraph support, and an OpenUPM/npm package URL, plus PR welcome and Twitter follow buttons. The document outline is visible in the top navigation bar (📝 Description, 📌 Key Features, 🎮 Demo, ⚙ Installation, 🔄 Upgrading from v4 to v5, 🚀 Usage, 🔡 Contributing) with each section named, and the main content begins at the Description heading before being clipped by the scanner. The READMEs are complete for a project that is itself described as 'UIEffect v5' in the banner.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-keyProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset @ ea3bc4c:292 (committed 2017-08-17)detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with ProjectSettings.asset. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 finding(s): 0 critical, 26 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 11 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `Packages/src/Runtime/Internal/ProjectSettings/PreloadedProjectSettings.cs` (line 185, line 309), `Packages/src/Runtime/Utilities/TmpProxy.cs` (line 332) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

High: run-shell-injection · ×26.github/workflows/deploy.yml:19detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 High finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 11 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 issue-level, 15 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.

Scanner failed to run — not a clean resultdetected by osv-scanner (run failure)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 48 of the 83 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.8 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: UIEffectEditor.cs↔UIEffectContext.cs 58%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: UIEffectEditor.cs ↔ UIEffectContext.csPackages/src/Editor/UIEffectEditor.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with UIEffectEditor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM
No dependency advisory monitoring

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • 36 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists — searched for: `rag`, `langchain`, `llamaindex`, `pinecone`, `weaviate`, `qdrant`, `embeddings`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets — this tree has no MSBuild project file, so CodeQL's csharp pack (which traces a build) and NuGet security analyzers (which are referenced from a project) have nothing to attach to as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 11230 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets — this tree has no MSBuild project file, so CodeQL's csharp pack (which traces a build) and NuGet security analyzers (which are referenced from a project) have nothing to attach to — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Maturity57%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness63%Adequate — gated by P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security42%Weak — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 89 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — cyclomatic complexity not measured — .cs exposed no member bodies
  • D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
  • D14 License Compliance — Licence collector did not produce a result
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — cognitive complexity not measured — .cs exposed no member bodies
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.cs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 2 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D4 Code Duplication — Duplication not measured — .cs not exposed to the token comparison
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 28 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×26
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/deploy.yml:19 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: watchdog-unverified-download-in-run .github/workflows/deploy.yml:19 — This CI step downloads a file over the network and then treats what came back as CODE — it unpacks it, marks it executable, or puts its directory on the job's PATH — and nothing in this step checks that the bytes are the ones the author published. Transport security is not integrity: TLS proves which host answered, not that the artefact on it is untampered, and it says nothing about a compromised release bucket, a hijacked mirror, a stale CDN edge, or a maintainer account used to replace a published archive. In a build job the blast radius is the whole pipeline — the fetched code runs with the job's environment and tokens in scope, and anything the job compiles afterwards with a tool taken from that archive is shipped to users. Record the artefact's digest in this workflow and check it before anything is unpacked or added to the PATH — `echo "<sha256> <file>" | sha256sum -c -`, letting a mismatch fail the step. Pin the value here rather than downloading `<artefact>.sha256` from the artefact's own host: whoever can serve different bytes serves a matching digest beside them, so a same-origin checksum answers a corrupted mirror and not a compromised one. Where the release is signed, verify the signature instead (`gpg --verify`, `cosign verify-blob`, `minisign -V`), which needs no pinning because its trust root is a key rather than a host, and additionally proves who built it.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:31 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: cycjimmy/semantic-release-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `cycjimmy/semantic-release-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/cycjimmy/semantic-release-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/release.yml:39 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/test-urp.yml:61 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input / an `env` value in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input / an `env` value is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test-urp.yml:88 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test-urp.yml:91 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test-urp.yml:100 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: mob-sakai/unity-builder@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `mob-sakai/unity-builder@fix/support-unity6.6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/mob-sakai/unity-builder/commits/fix/support-unity6.6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test-urp.yml:109 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test-urp.yml:110 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test-urp.yml:111 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/test.yml:61 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input / an `env` value in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input / an `env` value is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:88 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:91 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:100 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: mob-sakai/unity-builder@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `mob-sakai/unity-builder@fix/support-unity6.6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/mob-sakai/unity-builder/commits/fix/support-unity6.6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test.yml:109 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test.yml:110 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test.yml:111 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml:114 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: mob-sakai/unity-test-runner@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `mob-sakai/unity-test-runner@fix/support-unity6.6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/mob-sakai/unity-test-runner/commits/fix/support-unity6.6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test.yml:121 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test.yml:124 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/test.yml:125 — This step hands a repository secret to a third-party action that is NOT pinned to an immutable reference. A tag - `@v1`, `@v1.2.2`, `@main` - is a pointer the action's owner can repoint at any moment, so the code that receives this secret is whatever that owner publishes next, and it can change without a single commit to this repository or any review by you. An action runs in the job's own process: it can read every secret bound to the step, everything in the workspace, and the runner's network. Pin the action to a full 40-character commit SHA, which names one immutable tree - `uses: owner/repo@<40-character SHA>`, resolved with `gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq .sha` - and review the diff before you move it. Where the secret is a long-lived personal access token, scope it down or replace it with the per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN` as well: pinning bounds WHICH code runs, not what the credential can do.
  • + 1 more in this group — see findings.md.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1
  • Secret: generic-api-key ProjectSettings/ProjectSettings.asset @ ea3bc4c:292 (committed 2017-08-17) — gitleaks matched rule 'generic-api-key' here, in git history. Deleting the file does not remove it — the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup — so the act is to ROTATE this credential and treat it as compromised. The "Rotate the exposed credentials" row carries the full procedure, including when a `.gitattributes` provenance declaration is the correct answer instead.
D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×1
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: UIEffectEditor.cs ↔ UIEffectContext.cs Packages/src/Editor/UIEffectEditor.cs — `Packages/src/Editor/UIEffectEditor.cs` (context Editor) and `Packages/src/Runtime/UIEffectContext.cs` (context Runtime) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 58% of the time (14 of the 24 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump or a formatter/rename sweep is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 14 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `a6781b92` feat: add `GradationIntensity` and `GradationColorFilter` properties; `53db1e62` feat: add `EdgeColorGlow` option; `6b8dc5ec` feat: add `TransitionTexSpeed` option — run `git show` on any of them.
Serious — 3 finding(s)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 11 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s), 3 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
M1 · Documentation (README) · README may be stale · ×1
  • README may be stale — 36 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · JavaScript dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • JavaScript dependencies are not locked — No package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock — JS installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit your package manager's lockfile and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
Minor — 10 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) If flagged rows sit in content that is not this repository's own authored code — tool-emitted artifacts, recorded scanner output, wholesale-vendored third-party files — declare that provenance in .gitattributes (`path/** linguist-generated` or `linguist-vendored`): this scanner honors the repository's own declarations and stops counting such content, history-anchored rows included, on the next scan. The declaration is a reviewable statement about provenance, not a suppression — never use it on files that carry your own credentials.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Scanner failed to run · ×1
  • Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 4 CI config file(s) in this repository, the scripts they invoke, and this repository's own composite actions — matched against the provenance acts by name (`attest-build-provenance`, `actions/attest`, `slsa-github-generator`, `cosign attest`, `in-toto`, `--provenance`) plus npm/PyPI trusted publishing. An attestation produced by a tool none of those names, or by a pipeline whose configuration is not in this repository, is not seen by this check.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files, the scripts they invoke and its own composite actions, its root build manifest and its release manifest, its release task runner if it has one, and its own release automation script — plus the trusted-publishing declarations that sign on the registry's side. A signature produced by a pipeline whose configuration is not in this repository, or by a signer whose name is none of the ones this check carries, is not seen here.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files, the scripts they invoke and its own composite actions, any SBOM committed to the repository, the SBOM configuration declared in its build and release manifests, and the container-build SBOM inputs. An SBOM produced by a pipeline whose configuration is not in this repository, or by a generator whose name is none of the ones this check carries, is not seen here.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No dependency advisory monitoring · ×1
  • No dependency advisory monitoring — Nothing in this repository re-checks its pinned dependencies when an advisory is published: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration (`.github/dependabot.yml`, `renovate.json`), no advisory scanner invoked from CI and no committed scanner configuration (`deny.toml`, `.cargo/audit.toml`, `osv-scanner.toml`, `.snyk`). The manifests present — `npm` (package.json) — pin versions that advisories are published against on the advisory database's clock, not this repository's, so every advisory that lands against a pinned version stays unseen until someone points a scanner at the tree (any already published are reported under D30, one row per package — this row names the control whose absence lets them accumulate). GitHub's Dependabot alerts, if switched on in the repository settings, notify but leave nothing in the tree; a committed configuration is what makes the control reviewable and carries it to a fork or mirror. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per manifest listed (or a `renovate.json`) so each advisory arrives as a pull request against the affected lockfile; or wire the ecosystem's own advisory scanner into CI on a `schedule:` trigger — npm: `npm audit` / `pnpm audit` / `yarn npm audit`.
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation · No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
  • No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×1
  • README/code drift — README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists — searched for: `rag`, `langchain`, `llamaindex`, `pinecone`, `weaviate`, `qdrant`, `embeddings`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets — this tree has no MSBuild project file, so CodeQL's csharp pack (which traces a build) and NuGet security analyzers (which are referenced from a project) have nothing to attach to as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 11230 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-791f82895d3e47a5963e78b3cd08389f/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-791f82895d3e47a5963e78b3cd08389f/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .26artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 2 file(s) — `Packages/src/Runtime/Internal/ProjectSettings/PreloadedProjectSettings.cs`, `Packages/src/Runtime/Utilities/TmpProxy.cs` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 01a08da8-7dc1-75d8-af66-ecd8064613b9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md