Public report — airi, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 21:57 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Moeru-Ai/airi

No baseline yet — first run coverage not measuredno automated tests
37% At Risk
Maturity 63% Adequate Code Health 60% Adequate Security 53% Adequate Architecture 47% Weak Readiness 20% Critical

Small · 5,415 LoC · 2 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (20%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

55/58dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
148findings with an exact file:lineof 162 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
58/104dimensions across the health lenses5415 LoC · 2 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

moeru-ai/airi carries serious gaps (37%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (20%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Architecture (47%) is the next concern — the code resists change, so features cost more over time.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Small (~5,415 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 60% Adequate · gated by R7, X5 Architecture 47% Weak · gated by R11, R9 Maturity 63% Adequate · gated by D16, D34 Readiness 20% ⚠ Critical · gated by D9, R8, P3, P5, P6 Security 53% Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 20% · 47% weightArchitecture 47% · 26% weightSecurity 53% · 14% weightCode Health 60% · 8% weightMaturity 63% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 20 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 37 → ~53.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 42%Plumbing 49%Tests 9%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,000–€15,000
Cost to rebuild€3,000–€15,000 (0.1 person-years (50–161 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 37% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 32% boilerplate · 22% straight-line · 46% branching logic
Dead frontend code~32855 LoC unreachable (441 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€9,100 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 20% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — library/CLI, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+17.4 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
+17.4 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
3
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+17.4 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 20%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (5,415 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 20%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch stage-tamagotchi-godot stage-tamagotchi-godot

At a glance — Code Health · 60% · Adequate · gated by R7, X5

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 8.6 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 8.5 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 10.0 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 9.1 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 8.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 7.9 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 6.0
The Ugly
R7 · React / TS Dead Code 3.9 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 47% · Weak · gated by R11, R9

The Good
D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 9.9 AX10 · Repo Code composition 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.0 D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 6.0
The Ugly
R11 · React / TS Import Boundaries 1.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 0.0

At a glance — Maturity · 63% · Adequate · gated by D16, D34

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.9 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 7.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 7.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 6.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 0.6 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 3.3

At a glance — Readiness · 20% · Critical · gated by D9, R8, P3, P5, P6

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 10.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 3.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 4.8 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 53% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 9.0 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.6 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D37 · .NET / C# Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 4.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components51High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration4High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1Medium

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the single missing test case to ensure basic coverage. Next, implement static security analysis and codify disaster recovery procedures, including backups and restore documentation, to protect data and operations. Then, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports. Finally, maintain an accurate changelog for every release to ensure clear version history.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+17.4 ptsLowTest Distribution
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+17.4 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+17.4 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+17.4 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.+16.9 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+16.1 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.+4.5 ptsMediumImport Boundaries
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.+4.5 ptsMediumCircular Imports

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 29 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 66% mixed · 34% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/ci.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
pnpm-lock.yaml4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/deploy-cloudflare-workers-dev-server.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/deploy-cloudflare-workers-preview-deploy.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/deploy-cloudflare-auth-ui.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/autofix.yaml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/crowdin-cron-sync.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/crowdin-manual-upload.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/StageRoot.cs6.2MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
apps/stage-web/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
packages/stage-ui-live2d/src/components/scenes/Live2D.vue7.0MixedChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: Live2D.vue ↔ Stage.vue
apps/stage-pocket/src/App.vue7.0MixedChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: App.vue ↔ App.vue
services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js7.1MixedCyclomatic Complexity: handleCommand (cyclomatic 36)
integrations/minecraft/src/debug/web/app.js7.2MixedCyclomatic Complexity: summarizeEvent (cyclomatic 16)
.github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cyclomatic 27)
services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/content.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: readInputValue (cyclomatic 19)
engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback (cyclomatic 17)
engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/tools/dumpRenderStages.mjs7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: readFrames (cognitive 22)
apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/main.ts8.0Near-cleanChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: main.ts ↔ main.ts

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 55 of 58 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D7D9D12D13D15D16D17D18D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D36D37D38AX10AX3AX4AX5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9X1X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 148 of 162 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fde3b-a0ce-7346-9153-8f182824402d.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 1 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was handleCommand at 36.

handleCommand (cyclomatic 36)services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:417
pickBestChildAnchor (cyclomatic 30)services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:262
StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cyclomatic 27)engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs:129
readInputValue (cyclomatic 19)services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/content.js:251
StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback (cyclomatic 17)engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.cs:147

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 handleCommand (cyclomatic 36) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with background.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 pickBestChildAnchor (cyclomatic 30) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with background.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cyclomatic 27) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

8 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources at 33.

StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cognitive 33)engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs:129
pickBestChildAnchor (cognitive 32)services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:262
handleCommand (cognitive 27)services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:417
executeTool (cognitive 26)integrations/minecraft/src/debug/web/app.js:1060
StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback (cognitive 24)engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.cs:147

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cognitive 33) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 pickBestChildAnchor (cognitive 32) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with background.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 handleCommand (cognitive 27) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with background.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs · ×4engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs:0
TooManyMethods: StageRoot · ×2engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/StageRoot.cs:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs, app.js, background.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Pipeline.cs, StageRoot.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: stage-tamagotchi-godot

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 12 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 0 mechanizable ADRs, 0 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

What to do

  1. Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenes/Stage.vue (29×21=609); packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/airi-card.ts (11×48=528); packages/stage-pages/src/pages/settings/modules/speech.vue (15×21=315)

Hotspot: packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenes/Stage.vue · ×10packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenes/Stage.vue

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor0.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

17 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 5415 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

TodoCommentengines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/StageRoot.cs:251

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 projects, 25 .cs files, 5576 hand-written lines of code (5415 production / 161 test), 1 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.0/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

What to do

  1. Improve ADR Quality — currently 7.0/10. — Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.0/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 2 redundant across 45 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/StageRoot.cs:251

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with StageRoot.cs, StageSceneController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 2 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

45 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

168 finding(s): 0 critical, 164 high, 4 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×50.github/workflows/autofix.yaml:16detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (19), deploy-cloudflare-workers-dev-server.yml (10), deploy-cloudflare-workers-preview-deploy.yml (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable NuGet packages (direct or transitive).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 3 low.

High IaC: DS-0002apps/stage-web/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×3apps/stage-web/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 of 18 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs.

Orphaned knowledgeengines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs
Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: index.ts↔index.ts 76%; Live2D.vue↔Stage.vue 75%; App.vue↔App.vue 71%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: Live2D.vue ↔ Stage.vue · ×8packages/stage-ui-live2d/src/components/scenes/Live2D.vue
Change coupling: index.ts ↔ index.ts · ×2apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/index.ts

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (.github/SECURITY.md) is present but lists no reporting contact.

Disclosure policy has no reporting contact

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Disclosure policy has no reporting contact finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

205 finding(s): 9 critical, 89 high, 90 medium, 17 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×41pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×9pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 41 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (41). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (41 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 9 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 1 of 2 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 1) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.

What to do

  • Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
  • Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/services/airi/plugins/types.ts:46 · apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/windows/widgets/index.ts:75 — types.ts:46
  • integrations/minecraft/src/cognitive/perception/rules/rules.test.ts:601 · integrations/minecraft/src/cognitive/perception/rules/rules.test.ts:647 — rules.test.ts:601
  • integrations/satori-bot/src/core/loop/scheduler.ts:46 · integrations/telegram-bot/src/bots/telegram/index.ts:175 — scheduler.ts:46
  • apps/ui-server-auth/src/modules/sign-in.test.ts:20 · apps/ui-server-auth/src/modules/sign-in.test.ts:91 — sign-in.test.ts:20
  • apps/ui-server-auth/src/modules/auth-fetch.ts:62 · apps/ui-server-auth/src/modules/auth-fetch.ts:106 — auth-fetch.ts:62
  • apps/stage-pocket/src/pages/devtools/gesture-circle.vue:97 · apps/stage-web/src/pages/devtools/gesture-circle.vue:97 — gesture-circle.vue:97
  • apps/stage-pocket/vite.config.ts:38 · apps/stage-web/vite.config.ts:40 — vite.config.ts:38
  • apps/stage-pocket/src/workers/vad/vad.ts:151 · apps/stage-web/src/workers/vad/vad.ts:151 — vad.ts:151

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 · Import Boundaries1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • apps/component-calling/uno.config.ts:16 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../uno.config) — import the package by name instead. — uno.config.ts:16
  • apps/stage-pocket/uno.config.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../uno.config) — import the package by name instead. — uno.config.ts:3
  • apps/stage-tamagotchi/uno.config.ts:4 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../uno.config) — import the package by name instead. — uno.config.ts:4
  • apps/stage-web/uno.config.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../uno.config) — import the package by name instead. — uno.config.ts:3
  • apps/ui-server-auth/src/modules/analytics-adapters/posthog.ts:5 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../../../posthog.config) — import the package by name instead. — posthog.ts:5
  • apps/ui-server-auth/uno.config.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../uno.config) — import the package by name instead. — uno.config.ts:3
  • packages/scenarios-stage-tamagotchi-browser/uno.config.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../uno.config) — import the package by name instead. — uno.config.ts:3
  • packages/stage-shared/src/uno-settings-icons.test.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../uno.config) — import the package by name instead. — uno-settings-icons.test.ts:3

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — engine.ts:142, index.ts:549, router.ts:224, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — app.js, Stage.vue, VRMModel.vue, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 837 application, 104 tooling and 406 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (837 application, 104 tooling, 406 test roots considered) (×7) — index.ts, index.ts, index.vue, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — main.ts:8, main.ts:29, main.ts:26
  • Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
  • Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — index.vue:2

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/services/electron/index.ts → apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/services/electron/window.ts → apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/windows/shared/window.ts → apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/services/electron/index.ts — index.ts
  • integrations/minecraft/src/debug/debug-service.ts → integrations/minecraft/src/debug/index.ts → integrations/minecraft/src/debug/server.ts → integrations/minecraft/src/utils/logger.ts → integrations/minecraft/src/debug/debug-service.ts — debug-service.ts
  • integrations/minecraft/src/skills/actions/collect-block.ts → integrations/minecraft/src/skills/actions/ensure.ts → integrations/minecraft/src/skills/crafting.ts → integrations/minecraft/src/skills/actions/collect-block.ts — collect-block.ts
  • integrations/twitter-services/src/config/index.ts → integrations/twitter-services/src/utils/logger.ts → integrations/twitter-services/src/config/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/stage-layouts/src/components/Backgrounds/default/index.ts → packages/stage-layouts/src/components/Backgrounds/default/index.vue → packages/stage-layouts/src/components/Backgrounds/default/preview.vue → packages/stage-layouts/src/components/Backgrounds/default/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/chat/components/action-menu/index.ts → packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/chat/components/action-menu/index.vue → packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/chat/components/action-menu/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/providers/index.ts → packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/providers/speech-provider-settings.vue → packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/providers/transcription-provider-settings.vue → packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/providers/index.ts — index.ts
  • packages/stage-ui/src/composables/api.ts → packages/stage-ui/src/libs/auth-fetch.ts → packages/stage-ui/src/libs/auth.ts → packages/stage-ui/src/stores/auth.ts → packages/stage-ui/src/composables/api.ts — api.ts

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/1 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health60%Adequate — gated by R7, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture47%Weak — gated by R11, R9Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity63%Adequate — gated by D16, D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness20%Critical — gated by D9, R8, P3, P5, P6Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security53%Adequate — gated by D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 47 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~528 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
  • D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 5415 LoC across 2 projects the codebase is small and single-purpose, so explicit bounded contexts are not needed.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — none of 1 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (2 value object(s))
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 110 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×50
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/autofix.yaml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/autofix.yaml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/autofix.yaml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:27 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:67 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:71 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:78 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:79 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:87 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:93 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:116 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:120 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:127 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:128 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:161 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:164 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:165 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:177 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:180 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/crowdin-cron-sync.yml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/crowdin-cron-sync.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×41
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.29.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.29.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @better-auth/oauth-provider 1.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.14.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.14.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @opentelemetry/auto-instrumentations-node 0.73.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.75.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger 2.7.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.9.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.12
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — adm-zip 0.5.16: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.6.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — app-builder-lib 26.8.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 26.15.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.11
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.13
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.11
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.11
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.11
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.22
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.6.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.11
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — builder-util-runtime 9.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 9.7.0
  • + 16 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×9
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @vitest/browser 4.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.1.6
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @vitest/browser 4.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.1.8
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @vitest/browser 4.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.1.10
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — better-auth 1.4.21: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.6.11
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.4
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — gh-pages 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.0
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — protobufjs 7.5.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.5
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.8.4
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — tar 7.5.9: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.19
D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×8
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: Live2D.vue ↔ Stage.vue packages/stage-ui-live2d/src/components/scenes/Live2D.vue — `packages/stage-ui-live2d/src/components/scenes/Live2D.vue` (context stage-ui-live2d) and `packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenes/Stage.vue` (context stage-ui) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 75% of the time (9 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: App.vue ↔ App.vue apps/stage-pocket/src/App.vue — `apps/stage-pocket/src/App.vue` (context stage-pocket) and `apps/stage-web/src/App.vue` (context stage-web) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 71% of the time (10 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: main.ts ↔ main.ts apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/main.ts — `apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/main.ts` (context stage-tamagotchi) and `apps/stage-web/src/main.ts` (context stage-web) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 60% of the time (9 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: i18n.ts ↔ index.ts apps/stage-web/src/modules/i18n.ts — `apps/stage-web/src/modules/i18n.ts` (context stage-web) and `packages/i18n/src/index.ts` (context i18n) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: index.vue ↔ preview-stage.vue apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/pages/index.vue — `apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/pages/index.vue` (context stage-tamagotchi) and `packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/settings/model-settings/preview-stage.vue` (context stage-ui) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: App.vue ↔ App.vue apps/stage-pocket/src/App.vue — `apps/stage-pocket/src/App.vue` (context stage-pocket) and `apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/App.vue` (context stage-tamagotchi) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 50% of the time (7 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: developer.vue ↔ developer.vue apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/pages/settings/system/developer.vue — `apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/renderer/pages/settings/system/developer.vue` (context stage-tamagotchi) and `apps/stage-web/src/pages/settings/system/developer.vue` (context stage-web) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 50% of the time (7 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: Live2D.vue ↔ live2d.vue packages/stage-ui-live2d/src/components/scenes/Live2D.vue — `packages/stage-ui-live2d/src/components/scenes/Live2D.vue` (context stage-ui-live2d) and `packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/settings/model-settings/live2d.vue` (context stage-ui) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 50% of the time (6 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 apps/stage-web/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned knowledge engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Warning — 37 finding(s)
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×10
  • Hotspot: packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenes/Stage.vue packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenes/Stage.vue — packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenes/Stage.vue changed 29 times in last 90 days, max complexity 21. 8 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/airi-card.ts packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/airi-card.ts — packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/airi-card.ts changed 11 times in last 90 days, max complexity 48. 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: packages/stage-pages/src/pages/settings/modules/speech.vue packages/stage-pages/src/pages/settings/modules/speech.vue — packages/stage-pages/src/pages/settings/modules/speech.vue changed 15 times in last 90 days, max complexity 21. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: packages/server-runtime/src/index.ts packages/server-runtime/src/index.ts — packages/server-runtime/src/index.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 92.
  • Hotspot: packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/hearing.ts packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/hearing.ts — packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/hearing.ts changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 37. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/speech.ts packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/speech.ts — packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/speech.ts changed 14 times in last 90 days, max complexity 15. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: packages/core-agent/src/runtime/chat-orchestrator-runtime.ts packages/core-agent/src/runtime/chat-orchestrator-runtime.ts — packages/core-agent/src/runtime/chat-orchestrator-runtime.ts changed 8 times in last 90 days, max complexity 26. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: packages/stage-ui/src/stores/chat/session-store.ts packages/stage-ui/src/stores/chat/session-store.ts — packages/stage-ui/src/stores/chat/session-store.ts changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 29. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: packages/server-sdk/src/client.ts packages/server-sdk/src/client.ts — packages/server-sdk/src/client.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 52.
  • Hotspot: packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/artistry-autonomous.ts packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/artistry-autonomous.ts — packages/stage-ui/src/stores/modules/artistry-autonomous.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 51. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×4
  • FileTooLong: visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 742 lines.
  • FileTooLong: chrome-extension/background.js services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:0 — FileTooLong — 602 lines.
  • FileTooLong: web/app.js integrations/minecraft/src/debug/web/app.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1772 lines.
  • FileTooLong: tools/dumpRenderStages.mjs engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/tools/dumpRenderStages.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 664 lines.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×2
  • TooManyMethods: StageRoot engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/StageRoot.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 391 lines, 34 methods.
  • TooManyMethods: StagePostProcessCompositorEffect engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Pipeline.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 1063 lines, 43 methods.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×2
  • Change coupling: index.ts ↔ index.ts apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/index.ts — `apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/index.ts` and `apps/stage-tamagotchi/src/main/windows/settings/index.ts` change together 76% of the time (19 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: hearing-config-dialog.vue ↔ hearing-config.vue packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/dialogs/audio-input/hearing-config-dialog.vue — `packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/dialogs/audio-input/hearing-config-dialog.vue` and `packages/stage-ui/src/components/scenarios/dialogs/audio-input/hearing-config.vue` change together 70% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · handleCommand (cyclomatic 36) · ×1
  • handleCommand (cyclomatic 36) services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:417 — handleCommand has cyclomatic complexity 36 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · pickBestChildAnchor (cyclomatic 30) · ×1
  • pickBestChildAnchor (cyclomatic 30) services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:262 — pickBestChildAnchor has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cyclomatic 27) · ×1
  • StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cyclomatic 27) engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs:129 — StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · readInputValue (cyclomatic 19) · ×1
  • readInputValue (cyclomatic 19) services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/content.js:251 — readInputValue has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback (cyclomatic 17) engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.cs:147 — StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · summarizeEvent (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • summarizeEvent (cyclomatic 16) integrations/minecraft/src/debug/web/app.js:773 — summarizeEvent has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/StageRoot.cs:251 — // TODO: — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1187.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cognitive 33) · ×1
  • StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources (cognitive 33) engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs:129 — StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.EnsureResources has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · pickBestChildAnchor (cognitive 32) · ×1
  • pickBestChildAnchor (cognitive 32) services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:262 — pickBestChildAnchor has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · handleCommand (cognitive 27) · ×1
  • handleCommand (cognitive 27) services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/background.js:417 — handleCommand has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · executeTool (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • executeTool (cognitive 26) integrations/minecraft/src/debug/web/app.js:1060 — executeTool has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback (cognitive 24) engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.cs:147 — StagePostProcessCompositorEffect._RenderCallback has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · summarizeEvent (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • summarizeEvent (cognitive 24) integrations/minecraft/src/debug/web/app.js:773 — summarizeEvent has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · readFrames (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • readFrames (cognitive 22) engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/tools/dumpRenderStages.mjs:325 — readFrames has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · readInputValue (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • readInputValue (cognitive 19) services/computer-use-mcp/chrome-extension/content.js:251 — readInputValue has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: stage-tamagotchi-godot — stage-tamagotchi-godot: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 14 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×3
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 apps/stage-web/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 server/apps/api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 server/apps/api/production/railway/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2
  • redundant comment engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/StageRoot.cs:251 — "TODO:" —
  • redundant comment engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/scene/StageSceneController.cs:31 — "NOTICE: Godot yaw and pointer X have opposite signs for the expected stage orbit." — keep but limit to only the sign convention; the NOTICE banner is already informative.
D11 · Test Reliability · No tests discovered · ×1
  • No tests discovered — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) built and ran but no tests were discovered, so reliability couldn't be exercised.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 17 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/scripts/visuals/StagePostProcessCompositorEffect.Resources.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 11 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (12 orphaned of 18 analysed files in total).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Disclosure policy has no reporting contact · ×1
  • Disclosure policy has no reporting contact — .github/SECURITY.md is present but no reporting contact (email / URL / mailto) was found — a coordinated-disclosure policy must tell reporters where to send a report.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .168artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list engines/stage-tamagotchi-godot/stage-tamagotchi-godot.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json0artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .4artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .205artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fde3b-a0ce-7346-9153-8f182824402d · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 110 · Warnings: 37 · Recommendations: 14 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 21:57 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md