Public report — BookLibrary, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-07-2026 @ 19:36 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Mt89vein/BookLibrary

68% Strong
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Strong

Small · 5,987 LoC · 14 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (60%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

52/55dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
33findings with an exact file:lineof 50 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
55/97dimensions across the health lenses5987 LoC · 14 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

mt89vein/BookLibrary is in good health (68%). It can be evolved and operated with normal engineering discipline; the items below are improvements, not blockers.

It is strongest in Code Health (90%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (84%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (60%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (69%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`yarn… (CI/CD gates); readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback).

For scale: Small (~5,987 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (90%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 60% · 46% weightSecurity 69% · 25% weightPerformance 75% · 14% weightMaturity 82% · 8% weightArchitecture 84% · 4% weightCode Health 90% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 60 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 68 → ~72.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 13%Plumbing 56%Tests 17%Generated 13%
New since the last scan (15+)

15 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/Abonent.cs
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/ValueObjects/AbonentName.cs
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/Book.cs
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/Author.cs
  • D17 · BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/BorrowInfo.cs
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D18 · Solution references a project that does not exist BookLibrary.sln
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,700–€18,000
Cost to rebuild€3,700–€18,000 (0.1 person-years (61–194 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor1.0× (at 68% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 57% boilerplate · 25% straight-line · 19% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€11,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 60% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.3) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, vertical slice × a 1.0× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
+7.1 pts · Medium effort · Outbound HTTP resilience
2
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`yarn test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
+6.9 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates
3
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
+6.9 pts · Medium effort · Deployment & Rollback

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 60%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (5,987 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 60%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch BookLibrary.Api Api BookLibrary.Infrastructure Infrastructure BookLibrary.Api->BookLibrary.Infrastructure BookLibrary.Application Application BookLibrary.Domain Domain BookLibrary.Application->BookLibrary.Domain BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs BackgroundJobs BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs->BookLibrary.Infrastructure BookLibrary.Kafka Kafka BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs->BookLibrary.Kafka BookLibrary.Consumers Consumers BookLibrary.Consumers->BookLibrary.Kafka BookLibrary.Host Host BookLibrary.Host->BookLibrary.Api BookLibrary.Host->BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs BookLibrary.Host->BookLibrary.Consumers BookLibrary.Infrastructure->BookLibrary.Application BookLibrary.Kafka->BookLibrary.Infrastructure SeedWork SeedWork

At a glance — Code Health · 90% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 84% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 82% · Exemplary

At a glance — Readiness · 60% · Adequate · gated by P7

At a glance — Security · 69% · Adequate · gated by D36

At a glance — Performance · 75% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection4High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down; Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`yarn test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it; Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.+7.1 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`yarn test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.+6.9 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+6.9 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with deploy-docs.yml (4).+2.1 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+3.2 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.+3.0 ptsMediumAudit Trail
Review the [AllowAnonymous] surface — keep anonymous endpoints deliberate and documented so the open surface stays intentional.+2.9 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+1.3 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 17 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 12% mixed · 88% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
Directory.Build.props5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/Book.cs7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
tests/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit.csproj7.6Near-cleanExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
BookLibrary.Application/Infrastructure/LoggingScope.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/ValueObjects/AbonentId.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/BookId.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
SeedWork/IDomainEvent.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/Abonent.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/ValueObjects/AbonentName.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/Author.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/BorrowInfo.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
tests/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit/Features/Books/BorrowBook/BorrowBookTests.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
BookLibrary.sln8.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Solution references a project that does not exist
BookLibrary.Kafka/BookLibrary.Kafka.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: BookLibrary.Kafka
BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs/BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs
BookLibrary.Consumers/BookLibrary.Consumers.csproj9.5Near-cleanSolution Shape: Shell project: BookLibrary.Consumers

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 52 of 55 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 55 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D24D26D28D29D33D35D36D38AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX8C2C3GD1IC1M1M3M4P1P2P3P4P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 33 of 50 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faf60-ae14-7372-a355-f75e736b9270.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: BookLibrary.Domain · ×2

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 14 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

39 test methods: 33 unit, 6 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 39 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 50 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 5569 LoC (1.3/KLoC) → score 7.4.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×5tests/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit.csproj:6
BarePragmaDisable · ×5BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/Abonent.cs:60
BareSuppressMessage · ×4BookLibrary.Application/Infrastructure/LoggingScope.cs:8
TodoComment · ×2BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/Book.cs:162

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Directory.Build.props (4), BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 BarePragmaDisable finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Abonent.cs, AbonentName.cs, Book.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 BareSuppressMessage finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with LoggingScope.cs, AbonentId.cs, BookId.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 projects, 136 source files, 7068 hand-written lines of code (5569 production / 1499 test), plus 1163 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 17 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).

Solution references a project that does not existBookLibrary.sln
Shell project: BookLibrary.Kafka · ×3BookLibrary.Kafka/BookLibrary.Kafka.csproj
Thin analysable surface across projects
Build status unknown

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with BookLibrary.Kafka.csproj, BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs.csproj, BookLibrary.Consumers.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Solution references a project that does not exist finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with BookLibrary.sln. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The BookLibrary project has strong documentation: a README with domain description and development instructions plus a Docusaurus website (installation, local dev, build, deployment), and two architecture docs covering the domain model and an ERD. XML coverage is moderate at 57% for the API layer but complete for SeedWork, Application, Infrastructure, Kafka, Consumers, and Host; the Kafka/Consumers paths are empty in the visible text, so those gaps must be filled by the visible content rather than penalized.

XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Domain · ×9BookLibrary.Domain/BookLibrary.Domain.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — The BookLibrary project has strong documentation: a README with domain description and development instructions plus a Docusaurus website (installation, local dev, build, deployment), and two architecture docs covering the domain model and an ERD. XML coverage is moderate at 57% for the API layer but complete for SeedWork, Application, Infrastructure, Kafka, Consumers, and Host; the Kafka/Consumers paths are empty in the visible text, so those gaps must be filled by the visible content rather than penalized.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

The term 'Abonent' is used for the entity, but the event is misspelled as 'AbonentRegistredEvent' (missing 'e' in Registered). Additionally, the namespace uses 'Abonents' (plural) while the type is 'Abonent' (singular).
The method 'GetAbonenementAsync' contains a typo ('Abonenement' instead of 'Abonent' or 'Abonnement').
Inconsistency in the term for 'Abonent'/'Abonnement'. The domain aggregate is 'Abonent', but a related concept is 'Abonement'. This suggests a potential confusion between the person (Abonent) and the subscription/contract (Abonnement/Abonement).

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The term 'Abonent' is used for the entity, but the event is misspelled… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The method 'GetAbonenementAsync' contains a typo ('Abonenement' instead… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistency in the term for 'Abonent'/'Abonnement'. The domain… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

21 valuable / 0 redundant across 58 sampled comments.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 14 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×4.github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:34detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with deploy-docs.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies (OSV).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C2 · Access Controls8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • [AllowAnonymous] (2) outweighs [Authorize] (1) — review whether the open surface is intended.

What to do

  • Review the [AllowAnonymous] surface — keep anonymous endpoints deliberate and documented so the open surface stays intentional.
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:52

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 14 of 14 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists but no test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was found — changes may merge without the suite running.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`yarn test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 4/5 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 22 use(s) across 6,931 production line(s) (~3.2/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 23/25 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×2) — AccountController.cs:39, AccountController.cs:69

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~1.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health90%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture84%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity82%ExemplarySolid.
Readiness60%Adequate — gated by P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security69%Adequate — gated by D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance75%StrongSolid.
Not included — 42 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — This is a dotnet-new template — at-rest encryption and key-vaulting are deferred to the application you build from it. Add ASP.NET Data Protection / column encryption + a key vault for your real data store when you productionise.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — test suite did not build
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 4 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — only 1/3 markers (4 event handler(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 9 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×5
  • NoWarnInCsproj tests/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit.csproj:6 — CS1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:17 — 1701
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:17 — 1702
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:17 — 1591
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:17 — IDE0040
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×4
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:34 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:56 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
Warning — 17 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×5
  • BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/Abonent.cs:60 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field is uninitialized. Consider declaring as nullable.
  • BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/ValueObjects/AbonentName.cs:50 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field is uninitialized. Consider declaring as nullable.
  • BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/Book.cs:172 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field is uninitialized. Consider declaring as nullable.
  • BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/Author.cs:66 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field is uninitialized. Consider declaring as nullable.
  • BarePragmaDisable BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/BorrowInfo.cs:52 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 // Non-nullable field is uninitialized. Consider declaring as nullable.
D17 · Explicit Debt · BareSuppressMessage · ×4
  • BareSuppressMessage BookLibrary.Application/Infrastructure/LoggingScope.cs:8 — SuppressMessage
  • BareSuppressMessage BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/ValueObjects/AbonentId.cs:9 — SuppressMessage
  • BareSuppressMessage BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/BookId.cs:6 — SuppressMessage
  • BareSuppressMessage SeedWork/IDomainEvent.cs:9 — SuppressMessage
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×2
  • TodoComment BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/Book.cs:162 — // TODO: we need history of borrowed books (like activity) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment tests/BookLibrary.IntegrationTests.NUnit/Features/Books/BorrowBook/BorrowBookTests.cs:66 — // TODO: other test cases such as: — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2
  • Off the main sequence: BookLibrary.Domain — BookLibrary.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: BookLibrary.Infrastructure — BookLibrary.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.02, instability 0.25, distance 0.73 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not measured · ×1
  • Test reliability not measured — test suite did not build — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a defect. Fix the test build and reliability will be measured.
D18 · Solution Shape · Solution references a project that does not exist · ×1
  • Solution references a project that does not exist BookLibrary.sln — `BookLibrary.sln` declares 1 project file(s) that are missing from the tree (`Seedwork/SeedWork.csproj`). A solution-level restore or build fails on a dangling reference, so anyone building the solution rather than an individual project is blocked. Delete the stale entry from the solution, or restore the missing project file.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 4 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s): `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:34), `actions/setup-node@v4` (.github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:37), `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3` (.github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:50), `actions/deploy-pages@v4` (.github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:56)
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 13 finding(s)
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×3
  • Shell project: BookLibrary.Kafka BookLibrary.Kafka/BookLibrary.Kafka.csproj — `BookLibrary.Kafka` contributes only 4 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs/BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs.csproj — `BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs` contributes only 9 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: BookLibrary.Consumers BookLibrary.Consumers/BookLibrary.Consumers.csproj — `BookLibrary.Consumers` contributes only 9 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 39 commit(s) sampled).
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `BookLibrary.Host` with 46 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 78 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.8 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D21 · Naming Consistency · The term 'Abonent' is used for the entity, but the event is misspelled as 'AbonentRegistredEvent' (missing 'e' in Registered). Additionally, the namespace uses 'Abonents' (plural) while the type is 'Abonent' (singular). · ×1
  • The term 'Abonent' is used for the entity, but the event is misspelled as 'AbonentRegistredEvent' (missing 'e' in Registered). Additionally, the namespace uses 'Abonents' (plural) while the type is 'Abonent' (singular). — Correct the spelling in the event name to 'AbonentRegisteredEvent' and ensure consistent singular/plural usage in namespaces vs types. (symbols: BookLibrary.Domain.Aggregates.Abonents.Abonent, BookLibrary.Domain.Aggregates.Abonents.AbonentName, BookLibrary.Domain.Aggregates.Abonents.Events.AbonentRegistredEvent, BookLibrary.Application.Features.Abonents.RegisterAbonent.RegisterAbonentUseCase, BookLibrary.Api.Features.Abonents.RegisterAbonentController.RegisterAbonentAsync)
D21 · Naming Consistency · The method 'GetAbonenementAsync' contains a typo ('Abonenement' instead of 'Abonent' or 'Abonnement'). · ×1
  • The method 'GetAbonenementAsync' contains a typo ('Abonenement' instead of 'Abonent' or 'Abonnement'). — Rename to 'GetAbonentAsync' or 'GetAbonnementAsync' depending on the intended meaning, ensuring correct spelling. (symbols: BookLibrary.Domain.Aggregates.Abonents.Abonent, BookLibrary.Application.Features.Books.BorrowBook.BorrowBookUseCase.GetAbonenementAsync)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistency in the term for 'Abonent'/'Abonnement'. The domain aggregate is 'Abonent', but a related concept is 'Abonement'. This suggests a potential confusion between the person (Abonent) and the subscription/contract (Abonnement/Abonement). · ×1
  • Inconsistency in the term for 'Abonent'/'Abonnement'. The domain aggregate is 'Abonent', but a related concept is 'Abonement'. This suggests a potential confusion between the person (Abonent) and the subscription/contract (Abonnement/Abonement). — Ensure 'Abonent' is used for the person/entity and 'Abonnement' (or 'Subscription') is used for the contract/record, avoiding the mixed 'Abonement' if it's a typo or inconsistent term. (symbols: BookLibrary.Domain.Aggregates.Books.Abonement, BookLibrary.Domain.Aggregates.Abonents.Abonent)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 5569 LoC across 14 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (39 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`dotnet sbom-tool generate` (or the CycloneDX .NET tool) over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Info — 11 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×9
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Domain BookLibrary.Domain/BookLibrary.Domain.csproj — BookLibrary.Domain: 72 % XML-doc coverage (57/79).
  • XML-doc coverage: SeedWork SeedWork/SeedWork.csproj — SeedWork: 100 % XML-doc coverage (12/12).
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Api BookLibrary.Api/BookLibrary.Api.csproj — BookLibrary.Api: 56 % XML-doc coverage (36/64).
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Application BookLibrary.Application/BookLibrary.Application.csproj — BookLibrary.Application: 70 % XML-doc coverage (86/122).
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Infrastructure BookLibrary.Infrastructure/BookLibrary.Infrastructure.csproj — BookLibrary.Infrastructure: 57 % XML-doc coverage (59/103).
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Kafka BookLibrary.Kafka/BookLibrary.Kafka.csproj — BookLibrary.Kafka: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/1).
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs/BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs.csproj — BookLibrary.BackgroundJobs: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Consumers BookLibrary.Consumers/BookLibrary.Consumers.csproj — BookLibrary.Consumers: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
  • XML-doc coverage: BookLibrary.Host BookLibrary.Host/BookLibrary.Host.csproj — BookLibrary.Host: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/1).
D18 · Solution Shape · Build status unknown · ×1
  • Build status unknown — The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .4artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019faf60-ae14-7372-a355-f75e736b9270 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 11 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 8 field(s)
  • RegisterAbonentModel.Surname BookLibrary.Api/Features/Abonents/RegisterAbonent.cs:66
  • AddNewBookAuthorModel.Surname BookLibrary.Api/Features/Books/AddNewBook.cs:80
  • RegisterAbonentCommand.Surname BookLibrary.Application/Features/Abonents/RegisterAbonent/RegisterAbonentUseCase.cs:19
  • BookAuthor.Surname BookLibrary.Application/Features/Books/AddNewBook/AddNewBookUseCase.cs:28
  • AuthorDto.Surname BookLibrary.Application/Features/Books/GetBook/GetBookUseCase.cs:179
  • BookPageItemAuthorDto.Surname BookLibrary.Application/Features/Books/GetPagedBooks/GetPagedBooksUseCase.cs:191
  • AbonentName.Surname BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/ValueObjects/AbonentName.cs:21
  • Author.Surname BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Books/ValueObjects/Author.cs:21
Email — 3 field(s)
  • RegisterAbonentModel.Email BookLibrary.Api/Features/Abonents/RegisterAbonent.cs:65
  • RegisterAbonentCommand.Email BookLibrary.Application/Features/Abonents/RegisterAbonent/RegisterAbonentUseCase.cs:18
  • Abonent.Email BookLibrary.Domain/Aggregates/Abonents/Abonent.cs:28

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md