golang-clean-web-api — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

naeemaei/golang-clean-web-api carries serious gaps (40%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (97%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (22%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Domain Modelling (37%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).

For scale: Small (~13,932 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 97% ★ Exemplary Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 57% Adequate · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 22% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, D9, P3, P5 Security 78% Strong Domain Modelling 37% Weak · gated by DM4, DM5, DM7

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 22% · 46% weightDomain Modelling 37% · 25% weightMaturity 57% · 14% weightSecurity 78% · 8% weightCode Health 97% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 22 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 40 → ~54.

New since the last scan (12+)

12 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go
D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/usecase/user_usecase.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) src/api/handler/user.go
D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/api/handler/property_simple.go
D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/api/handler/file.go
D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/infra/persistence/migration/1_Init.go
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/elk/filebeat/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 docker/elk/setup/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/elk/kibana/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/elk/elasticsearch/Dockerfile
D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 src/go.mod

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €5,300–€27,000

Cost to rebuild	€5,300–€27,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (89–281 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 40% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€16,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 22% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — DDD/clean architecture, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.

+14.1 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

+14.1 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+16.6 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 22%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (13,932 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 22%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause

21 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.

Evidence: DM5 setters: 1 · DM4 anemic: 20 · DM2 primitive ids: 0

→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

26 modules, 34 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 97% · Exemplary

The Good

D4 · Go Code Duplication 9.7

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

D35 · Go Change Coupling 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 57% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

The Good

D16 · Go Bus Factor 10.0 D21 · Go Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Bad

D19 · Go Documentation Quality 6.0

The Ugly

D34 · Go Knowledge Freshness 0.2 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 22% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, P3, P5

The Good

D13 · Go Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.5

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

D8 · Go Code Coverage 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 78% · Strong

The Good

D28 · Go Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · Go IaC & Container Security 8.4

The Bad

D29 · Go Static Analysis (SAST) 6.7 D38 · Go OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 5.9

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 37% · Weak · gated by DM4, DM5, DM7

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0

The Bad

DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 6.6

The Ugly

DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 1.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 3.6

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	10	High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	8	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	3	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate static security scanning into the CI pipeline to fail the build on vulnerabilities. Next, codify backup and disaster recovery procedures in infrastructure-as-code, ensuring clear recovery time and point objectives. Then, address the single missing automated test and the one instance of undetected tests. Finally, add a health check to the compose service and ensure image tags are immutable to simplify rollback processes.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.	+14.1 pts	Low	Code Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.	+14.1 pts	Low	Test Distribution
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+16.6 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+16.6 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.	+14.1 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.	+9.6 pts	Medium	Rich vs anemic model
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).	+9.6 pts	Medium	Encapsulated state
Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.	+9.6 pts	Medium	Repository granularity

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 15 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 13% slop · 47% mixed · 40% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
src/go.mod	1.0	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/Dockerfile	3.7	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
docker/elk/elasticsearch/Dockerfile	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.github/workflows/go.yml	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
docker/elk/setup/Dockerfile	7.2	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2
src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go	7.8	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
src/common/strings.go	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used
docker/elk/filebeat/Dockerfile	7.9	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3
docker/elk/kibana/Dockerfile	7.9	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3
src/usecase/user_usecase.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)
src/api/handler/user.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 3)
src/api/handler/property_simple.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
src/api/handler/file.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)
src/usecase/token_usecase.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)
src/infra/persistence/migration/1_Init.go	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 28 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 28 dimensions across the health lenses

D4D8D9D13D16D19D21D28D29D31D34D35D38AX5DM1DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 29 of 36 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc955-9a6e-73a8-8b8a-16989033cbd8.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

8 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×2src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:89

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×2src/api/handler/file.go:103

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:35

Duplicated block (10 lines × 3)src/api/handler/user.go:49

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)src/api/handler/property_simple.go:88

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a solid project description with two diagrams (system and database design), a 'Give a Star!' footer, an exhaustive used-tools list, and a run-on-local system guide. It begins to grow into a full documentation set but is clipped mid-run-on-local section, so the remaining content cannot be confirmed.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The single README is a solid project description with two diagrams (system and database design), a 'Give a Star!' footer, an exhaustive used-tools list, and a run-on-local system guide. It begins to grow into a full documentation set but is clipped mid-run-on-local section, so the remaining content cannot be confirmed.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×2.github/workflows/go.yml:17detected by semgrep finding

Medium: math-random-usedsrc/common/strings.go:5detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with go.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with strings.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 5 medium, 2 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×3docker/elk/elasticsearch/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×5docker/elk/filebeat/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×2docker/elk/elasticsearch/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

39 of 40 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/api/dto/car.go.

Dormant codebase

What to do

Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 2 critical, 1 high, 5 medium, 0 low.

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2src/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

High CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5src/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`Country` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — base.go:5
`City` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — base.go:12
`PersianYear` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — base.go:19
`Color` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — base.go:28
`File` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — base.go:35
`Gearbox` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:5
`CarType` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:11
`Company` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:17
`CarModel` is an aggregate/entity with 12 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:25
`CarModelColor` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:41
`CarModelYear` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:49
`CarModelImage` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:58
`CarModelPriceHistory` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:67
`CarModelProperty` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:75
`CarModelComment` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — car.go:84
`PropertyCategory` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — property.go:3
`Property` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — property.go:10
`User` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — user.go:3
`Role` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — user.go:15
`UserRole` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — user.go:21

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

`User` exposes publicly writable state (Username, FirstName, LastName, MobileNumber, Email, Password, …). — user.go:3

What to do

Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

The domain package `github.com/naeemaei/golang-clean-web-api/domain/model` imports `database/sql` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — base_model.go:4
The domain package `github.com/naeemaei/golang-clean-web-api/domain/model` imports `gorm.io/gorm` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — base_model.go:7

What to do

Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).

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DM7 · Repository granularity3.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

`CountryRepository` is a repository over `Country`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Country` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:17
`CityRepository` is a repository over `City`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `City` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:21
`PersianYearRepository` is a repository over `PersianYear`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `PersianYear` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:30
`ColorRepository` is a repository over `Color`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Color` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:34
`FileRepository` is a repository over `File`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `File` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:38
`GearboxRepository` is a repository over `Gearbox`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Gearbox` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:42
`CarTypeRepository` is a repository over `CarType`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarType` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:46
`CompanyRepository` is a repository over `Company`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Company` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:50
`CarModelRepository` is a repository over `CarModel`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarModel` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:54
`CarModelColorRepository` is a repository over `CarModelColor`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarModelColor` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:58
`CarModelYearRepository` is a repository over `CarModelYear`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarModelYear` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:62
`CarModelImageRepository` is a repository over `CarModelImage`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarModelImage` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:66
`CarModelPriceHistoryRepository` is a repository over `CarModelPriceHistory`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarModelPriceHistory` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:70
`CarModelPropertyRepository` is a repository over `CarModelProperty`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarModelProperty` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:74
`CarModelCommentRepository` is a repository over `CarModelComment`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `CarModelComment` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:78
`PropertyCategoryRepository` is a repository over `PropertyCategory`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `PropertyCategory` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:82
`PropertyRepository` is a repository over `Property`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Property` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:86
`RoleRepository` is a repository over `Role`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Role` through its owning aggregate instead. — repository.go:99

What to do

Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`go test ./...` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	97%	Exemplary	Solid.
Architecture	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	57%	Adequate — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	22%	Critical — gated by D8, D9, P3, P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	78%	Strong	Solid.
Domain Modelling	37%	Weak — gated by DM4, DM5, DM7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.go) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 9 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3

High IaC: DS-0002 docker/elk/elasticsearch/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 src/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×2

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/go.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/go.mod — github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.4.3: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C src get github.com/jackc/pgx/v5@v5.9.0`, which updates the require line src/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.4.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5004.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto 0.22.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.52.0. This one row stands for the 19 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.22.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/go.mod — github.com/golang-jwt/jwt 3.2.2+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/golang-jwt/jwt if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.

D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1

No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.

Warning — 19 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×5

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/elk/filebeat/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 docker/elk/setup/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/elk/kibana/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 src/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/elk/elasticsearch/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/go.mod — golang.org/x/net 0.21.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C src get golang.org/x/net@v0.23.0`, which updates the require line src/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.21.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 src/go.mod — golang.org/x/sys 0.19.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C src get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line src/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 src/go.mod — golang.org/x/text 0.14.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C src get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line src/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/go.mod — google.golang.org/protobuf 1.32.0: [GHSA redacted] — google.golang.org/protobuf is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C src get google.golang.org/protobuf@v1.33.0`, which updates the require line src/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2025-3503 src/go.mod — stdlib 1.22.99 (net/http): GO-2025-3503 — fixed in Go 1.23.7; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 45 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.22.99: GO-2025-3503, GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:89 — src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:89-99 | src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:135-145 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:89` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/usecase/user_usecase.go:46 — src/usecase/user_usecase.go:46-58 | src/usecase/user_usecase.go:135-145 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/usecase/user_usecase.go:46` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/api/handler/file.go:103 — src/api/handler/file.go:103-110 | src/api/handler/property_simple.go:142-151 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/api/handler/file.go:103` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/usecase/token_usecase.go:43 — src/usecase/token_usecase.go:43-50 | src/usecase/token_usecase.go:63-70 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1

Medium: math-random-used src/common/strings.go:5 — `math/rand` is not cryptographically secure — its stream is reproducible from its seed and predictable from observed output — so any value that must be unguessable (a token, nonce, key, salt, session id, password-reset or MFA code) has to come from `crypto/rand`. Where non-cryptographic randomness IS the intent — jitter, backoff, sampling, load spreading, simulation, test fixtures, or output that is deliberately reproducible from a seed — `math/rand` is the correct choice and no change is needed; a package that deliberately offers both should keep its security-sensitive callers on the `crypto/rand` path rather than drop the other one. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:35 — src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:35-47 | src/api/handler/base_generic_crud.go:76-88 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) src/api/handler/user.go:49 — src/api/handler/user.go:49-59 | src/api/handler/user.go:119-129 | src/api/handler/user.go:181-190 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/api/handler/user.go:49` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/api/handler/property_simple.go:88 — src/api/handler/property_simple.go:88-97 | src/api/handler/property_simple.go:151-160 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/infra/persistence/migration/1_Init.go:360 — src/infra/persistence/migration/1_Init.go:360-366 | src/infra/persistence/migration/1_Init.go:367-373 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infra/persistence/migration/1_Init.go:360` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

Recommendation — 6 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2

Low IaC: DS-0026 docker/elk/elasticsearch/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — a request to its own listening endpoint, exiting non-zero when it does not answer — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 docker/elk/setup/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — a request to its own listening endpoint, exiting non-zero when it does not answer — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .go · ×1

complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (0 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .go, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1

Dormant codebase — 39 of 40 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 39 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.

D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1

No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (Go's `testing` package (`go test ./...`)), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	3	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	10	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	8	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc955-9a6e-73a8-8b8a-16989033cbd8 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Naeemaei/golang-Clean-Web-Api

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 97% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 57% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 22% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, P3, P5

At a glance — Security · 78% · Strong

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 37% · Weak · gated by DM4, DM5, DM7

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts