Public report — neon, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 12:58 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Neondatabase/neon

No baseline yet — first run coverage not measuredno automated tests
38% At Risk
Code Health 100% Exemplary Maturity 82% Strong Architecture 69% Adequate Readiness 27% Weak Security 21% Critical

Hobby · 15 LoC · 1 projects · weakest lens: Security (21%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

41/44dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
175findings with an exact file:lineof 185 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
44/91dimensions across the health lenses15 LoC · 1 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

neondatabase/neon carries serious gaps (38%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Code Health (100%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Maturity (82%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (21%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (27%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling).

For scale: Hobby (~15 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 100% ★ Exemplary Architecture 69% Adequate Maturity 82% Strong Readiness 27% Weak · gated by D9, D13, P2, P3 Security 21% ⚠ Critical · gated by D28, D29, D31, D36, D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 21% · 47% weightReadiness 27% · 26% weightArchitecture 69% · 14% weightMaturity 82% · 8% weightCode Health 100% · 4% weight

Raise Security 21 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 38 → ~52.

Code composition — where the lines go
Plumbing 44%Tests 56%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6–€32
Cost to rebuild€6–€32 (0.1 person-years (0–0 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityLow — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 38% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeHobby · 100% boilerplate · 0% straight-line · 0% branching logic

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×0.9) — library/CLI × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+14.2 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with basic_functions.sql, private-key.pem.
+12.1 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+14.2 pts · Medium effort · Observability

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 10.0

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Adequate

The Good
D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9

At a glance — Maturity · 82% · Strong

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 10.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 8.1 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D25 · .NET / C# ADR Conformance 8.3 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0

At a glance — Readiness · 27% · Weak · gated by D9, D13, P2, P3

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 10.0
The Ugly
D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 21% · Critical · gated by D28, D29, D31, D36, D38

The Good
D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 2.5 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration50High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures22High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by addressing the single missing test case in the Test Distribution dimension to ensure adequate coverage. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to improve observability and enable effective debugging. Simultaneously, introduce a static application security testing step, such as CodeQL, to proactively identify vulnerabilities. Finally, resolve the two leaked secrets found in basic_functions.sql and private-key.pem, and configure readiness and liveness probes to enable automatic rollback of bad releases.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+14.2 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with basic_functions.sql, private-key.pem.+12.1 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+14.2 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+14.2 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+7.8 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build_and_test.yml (15), action.yml (11), pre-merge-checks.yml (3).+5.7 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 19 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with auth.rs (7), app.rs (2), basic_functions.out (2).+5.5 ptsMediumSecrets (history)
Resolve the 47 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (34), poetry.lock (10), Cargo.lock (3).+5.5 ptsMediumOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 51 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 4% slop · 88% mixed · 8% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
compute/compute-node.Dockerfile1.6SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0029
docker-compose/ext-src/pg_session_jwt-src/sql/basic_functions.sql3.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: jwt
docker-compose/compute_wrapper/private-key.pem4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
.github/workflows/build_and_test.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
build-tools/package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
poetry.lock4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
libs/utils/src/auth.rs4.4MixedSecrets (history): Secret: jwt
.github/actions/allure-report-generate/action.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/actions/run-python-test-set/action.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/pre-merge-checks.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
Cargo.lock5.1MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
docker-compose/ext-src/pg_session_jwt-src/expected/basic_functions.out5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: jwt
.github/workflows/_push-to-container-registry.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: run-shell-injection
.github/workflows/approved-for-ci-run.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: gha-workflow-env-secret
.github/workflows/build_and_run_selected_test.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
.github/workflows/build_and_test_fully.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
.github/workflows/build_and_test_with_sanitizers.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
.github/workflows/neon_extra_builds.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: secrets-inherit
.github/workflows/proxy-benchmark.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
test_runner/pg_clients/swift/PostgresClientKitExample/Dockerfile5.8MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 41 of 44 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 44 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D7D9D12D13D14D15D16D17D20D21D25D26D27D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AX10AX3AX4AX5GD1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5X1X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 175 of 185 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdc4d-d089-7a35-afea-e60f8c2d6b40.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Improve Coupling — currently 6.9/10. — 1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 36 mechanizable ADRs, 24 are prevented by analyzers, 12 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: private-key · ×2docker-compose/compute_wrapper/private-key.pem:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with basic_functions.sql, private-key.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 1 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 15 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 58 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.1/10 (consistently complete and clear). 3 flagged with a specific gap.

No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a runnable CLI reference with no rationale for why Neon introduces repositories or compute nodesdocs/rfcs/006-laptop-cli-v2-CLI.md
The body is a directory-structure breakdown plus a Version 2 rationale and a TODO for snapshots format; there are no context/problem or consequences sectionsdocs/rfcs/006-laptop-cli-v2-repository-structure.md
All five are named 'Eviction' variants but the visible text is a repetitive decision list with no context/problem and no trade-offs for each variantdocs/rfcs/012-background-tasks.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 006-laptop-cli-v2-CLI.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The body is a directory-structure breakdown plus a Version 2 rationale… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 006-laptop-cli-v2-repository-structure.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 All five are named 'Eviction' variants but the visible text is a… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 012-background-tasks.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 conform / 1 violate across 58 ADRs.

ADR not followed: Splitting cloud consoledocs/rfcs/017-console-split.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 ADR not followed finding(s) in ADR Conformance — start with 017-console-split.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce ADR Conformance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 finding(s): 0 critical, 22 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: private-key · ×19compute_tools/src/tls.rs:175detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 19 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with auth.rs (7), app.rs (2), basic_functions.out (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

81 finding(s): 0 critical, 56 high, 7 medium, 18 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×50.github/actions/allure-report-generate/action.yml:66detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build_and_test.yml (15), action.yml (11), pre-merge-checks.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

129 finding(s): 0 critical, 13 high, 60 medium, 56 low.

High IaC: DS-0029 · ×13compute/compute-node.Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0013 · ×37build-tools/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 37 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with compute-node.Dockerfile (33), Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (37 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 13 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (11), compute-node.Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

280 finding(s): 3 critical, 57 high, 186 medium, 34 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×47Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3build-tools/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 47 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (34), poetry.lock (10), Cargo.lock (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (47 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P5 · DR & Backup10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture69%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Maturity82%StrongSolid.
Readiness27%Weak — gated by D9, D13, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security21%Critical — gated by D28, D29, D31, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 48 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~19 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 15 LoC the codebase is trivially small and single-purpose, so explicit bounded contexts are unnecessary.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 136 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×50
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/allure-report-generate/action.yml:66 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/allure-report-generate/action.yml:87 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/allure-report-generate/action.yml:195 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/allure-report-generate/action.yml:230 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/allure-report-store/action.yml:38 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/download/action.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/run-python-test-set/action.yml:94 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/run-python-test-set/action.yml:99 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/actions/run-python-test-set/action.yml:120 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/run-python-test-set/action.yml:239 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/actions/upload/action.yml:61 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/_push-to-container-registry.yml:63 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/_push-to-container-registry.yml:89 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: gha-workflow-env-secret .github/workflows/approved-for-ci-run.yml:24 — A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
  • High: pull-request-target-code-checkout .github/workflows/approved-for-ci-run.yml:78 — This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `pull_request_target` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `pull_request_target`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/benchmarking.yml:595 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_run_selected_test.yml:62 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build_and_run_selected_test.yml:101 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_test.yml:88 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_test.yml:120 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_test.yml:214 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_test.yml:223 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_test.yml:253 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_test.yml:577 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/build_and_test.yml:1100 — This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×47
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — diesel 2.2.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.8
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — rustls-webpki 0.101.7: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.103.13
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — tokio-tar: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger 1.26.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.9.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-xml-parser 4.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.5.5
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-xml-parser 4.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.5.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — form-data 4.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.6
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — handlebars 4.7.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.9
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — handlebars 4.7.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.9
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — handlebars 4.7.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.9
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — handlebars 4.7.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.9
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.3.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2
  • + 22 more in this group — see findings.md.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×19
  • Secret: private-key compute_tools/src/tls.rs:175 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key pageserver/src/tenant/remote_timeline_client/index.rs:1423 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: private-key docker-compose/compute_wrapper/private-key.pem:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: jwt docker-compose/ext-src/pg_session_jwt-src/expected/basic_functions.out:13 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt docker-compose/ext-src/pg_session_jwt-src/expected/basic_functions.out:17 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt docker-compose/ext-src/pg_session_jwt-src/sql/basic_functions.sql:10 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt docker-compose/ext-src/pg_session_jwt-src/sql/basic_functions.sql:13 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: private-key object_storage/src/app.rs:271 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: jwt proxy/src/serverless/local_conn_pool.rs:383 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: private-key proxy/src/auth/backend/jwt.rs:942 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: jwt libs/utils/src/auth.rs:261 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt libs/utils/src/auth.rs:132 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt libs/utils/src/auth.rs:179 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt libs/utils/src/auth.rs:181 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt libs/utils/src/auth.rs:183 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: private-key libs/utils/src/auth.rs:127 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key proxy/src/scram/secret.rs:90 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: private-key endpoint_storage/src/app.rs:273 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key libs/utils/src/auth.rs:237 — matched rule 'private-key'
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×13
  • High IaC: DS-0029 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 docker-compose/compute_wrapper/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/csharp/npgsql/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/java/jdbc/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/python/asyncpg/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/python/pg8000/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/rust/tokio-postgres/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/swift/PostgresClientKitExample/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 test_runner/pg_clients/swift/PostgresClientKitExample/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/swift/PostgresNIOExample/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/typescript/postgresql-client/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 test_runner/pg_clients/typescript/serverless-driver/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×3
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — fast-xml-parser 4.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.5.4
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — handlebars 4.7.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.9
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] build-tools/package-lock.json — protobufjs 7.5.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.5
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×2
  • Leaked secret: private-key docker-compose/compute_wrapper/private-key.pem:1 — private-key detected.
  • Leaked secret: jwt docker-compose/ext-src/pg_session_jwt-src/sql/basic_functions.sql:10 — jwt detected.
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
D25 · ADR Conformance · ADR not followed · ×1
  • ADR not followed: Splitting cloud console docs/rfcs/017-console-split.md — The cloud repository still contains the storage and internal infrastructure code, contradicting the decision to split everything user-related from storage.' (docs/rfcs/017-console-split.md)
Warning — 43 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×37
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 build-tools/Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 build-tools/Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 build-tools/Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 build-tools/Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • Medium IaC: DS-0013 compute/compute-node.Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
  • + 12 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1122.
D20 · ADR Quality · No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a runnable CLI reference with no rationale for why Neon introduces repositories or compute nodes · ×1
  • No context/problem and no consequences/trade-offs; the body is a runnable CLI reference with no rationale for why Neon introduces repositories or compute nodes docs/rfcs/006-laptop-cli-v2-CLI.md — Add a Context section explaining why a repository model (init/clone) plus compute-node orchestration is needed over existing alternatives, and a Consequences section covering trade-offs like cloud cost and branching complexity
D20 · ADR Quality · The body is a directory-structure breakdown plus a Version 2 rationale and a TODO for snapshots format; there are no context/problem or consequences sections · ×1
  • The body is a directory-structure breakdown plus a Version 2 rationale and a TODO for snapshots format; there are no context/problem or consequences sections docs/rfcs/006-laptop-cli-v2-repository-structure.md — Add a Context/Problem section explaining why the repository format matters (e.g. avoiding full-copy restores, managing incremental WAL) and a Consequences section on trade-offs such as the need to slice WAL into per-relation files
D20 · ADR Quality · All five are named 'Eviction' variants but the visible text is a repetitive decision list with no context/problem and no trade-offs for each variant · ×1
  • All five are named 'Eviction' variants but the visible text is a repetitive decision list with no context/problem and no trade-offs for each variant docs/rfcs/012-background-tasks.md — Give each Eviction entry its own title (e.g. 'In-Memory to Disk Delta') and add a Context section explaining when memory pressure or LSN advancement triggers which eviction, plus a Consequences section noting the operational cost of disk I/O vs replaying WAL.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .22artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .81artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .129artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .280artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fdc4d-d089-7a35-afea-e60f8c2d6b40 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 136 · Warnings: 43 · Recommendations: 5 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 12:58 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md