Public report — clean-architecture-docker-dotnet-angular, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Small · 3,525 LoC · 7 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (31%)
Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
80findings with an exact file:lineof 146 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
63/108dimensions across the health lenses3525 LoC · 7 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
nitin27may/clean-architecture-docker-dotnet-angular carries serious risk (49%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Architecture (85%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (31%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (58%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them… (Tooling).
For scale: Small (~3,525 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (85%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
150 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-30) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
~193 LoC unreachable (5 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€4,700 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 31% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.5) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 31%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
31 modules, 34 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
58
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
22
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
10
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, integrate a security scanning step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure as code, explicitly documenting recovery time and objectives. Then, add linting and type-checking scripts to the project and enforce them in CI. After that, resolve the six deprecated dependency findings to improve hygiene. Finally, add a health check to the deployed service and ensure the rollback process relies on immutable image tags rather than rebuilding.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 61 of 63 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 63 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 80 of 146 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace did not read this repository's production source, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 6 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
5 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Inconsistent naming for User-related Use Cases: 'RegisterUser' and 'UpdateUser' use the action verb (Register/Update) while 'AuthenticateRequest' and 'ResetPassword' use the noun/gerund form (Authenticate/Reset). This breaks the pattern of using the entity name as the base (e.g., User) with the action as a suffix or prefix.
Inconsistent naming for RolePermission related types: 'RolePermissionMappingResponse' vs 'RolePermissionResponse' (with/without 'Mapping'). Also, 'CreateRolePermission' and 'UpdateRolePermission' lack the 'RolePermission' prefix consistency seen in other use cases.
Inconsistent naming for Permission related Use Cases: 'PermissionResponse' uses the entity name, while 'CreatePermission' and 'UpdatePermission' use the action verb. This is inconsistent with the 'User' and 'Role' use cases which use the entity name as the base.
Inconsistent naming for ContactPerson related Use Cases: 'CreateContactPerson' and 'UpdateContactPerson' use the action verb, while other use cases (e.g., 'RegisterUser') also use the action verb, but 'ContactPerson' is a compound noun and the naming is less consistent with the 'User' pattern.
Inconsistent naming for Role related Use Cases: 'UpdateRole' uses the action verb, while other use cases (e.g., 'RegisterUser') also use the action verb, but 'Role' is a simple noun and the naming is less consistent with the 'User' pattern.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for User-related Use Cases finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for RolePermission related types finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for Permission related Use Cases finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: jwt · ×3backend/ApiCollection/environments/Local.bru:3detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with Local.bru, appsettings.Development.json, appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×21.github/workflows/angular-build.yml:25detected by semgrep finding
Low: insecure-redirectfrontend/nginx.conf:22detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 21 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with api-build.yml (5), jekyll-gh-pages.yml (5), loadbalancer.build.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nginx.conf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2frontend/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×5loadbalancer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×3Dockerfile.apidetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4), Dockerfile.api. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), Dockerfile.api. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
12 of 12 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is backend/Contact.Application/Services/UserService.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×30frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 30 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (30). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (30 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
0 of 268 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×15) — activity-log.component.html:25, activity-log.component.html:31, activity-log.component.html:73, …
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×10) — contact-form.component.html:21, contact-form.component.html:27, contact-form.component.html:33, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add @angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IUserService` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IUserService.cs:10
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
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C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A placeholder string ("unknown@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ActivityLoggingMiddleware.cs:28
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`GetUserRolesAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — UserService.cs:214
`GenerateLink` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — UserService.cs:375
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×5) — PermissionService.cs:30, PermissionService.cs:31, PermissionService.cs:36, …
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a README to the 7 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
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P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Only 4/6 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 6, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
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R1 · Type Safety9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
frontend/src/app/feature/admin/roles/roles.component.ts:24 · frontend/src/app/feature/admin/user-roles/user-roles.component.ts:24 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — roles.component.ts:24
frontend/src/app/feature/admin/operations/operations.component.ts:20 · frontend/src/app/feature/admin/pages/pages.component.ts:20 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — operations.component.ts:20
frontend/src/app/feature/admin/role-permission-mapping/role-permission-mapping.component.ts:39 · frontend/src/app/feature/admin/users/users.component.ts:29 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — role-permission-mapping.component.ts:39
frontend/src/app/@core/models/permission.interface.ts:36 · frontend/src/app/@core/models/role-permission-mapping.model.ts:11 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — permission.interface.ts:36
frontend/src/app/@core/layout/custom-sidenav/menu-items.ts:187 · frontend/src/app/@core/layout/custom-sidenav/menu-items.ts:230 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — menu-items.ts:187
frontend/src/app/feature/admin/user-roles/user-roles.component.ts:37 · frontend/src/app/feature/user/login/login.component.ts:30 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — user-roles.component.ts:37
frontend/src/app/@core/services/theme.service.ts:71 · frontend/src/app/@core/services/theme.service.ts:90 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — theme.service.ts:71
frontend/src/app/@core/layout/layout.component.ts:104 · frontend/src/app/feature/user/home/home.component.ts:87 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — layout.component.ts:104
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — control-error.directive.ts:81
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
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R4 · Test Coverage9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×4) — server.ts, sidenav-header.component.ts, admin.module.ts, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 3 application, 4 tooling and 6 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (3 application, 4 tooling, 6 test roots considered) (×5) — server.ts, sidenav-header.component.ts, admin.module.ts, …
Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in frontend/src/app/@core/guards/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in frontend/src/app/@core/guards/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. (×2) — auth.guard.ts:94, ensure-module-loaded-once.guard.ts:1
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — Program.cs:23
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/54 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — ContactPersonController.cs:14, ContactPersonController.cs:23, ContactPersonController.cs:35, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 45 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~115 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .ts, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by navigability analysis, so tracing effort was not assessed — whatever else resolved (another language's projects) is not this repository's navigability. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .ts, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 64 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×30
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @angular/common 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @angular/common ^21.0.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 21.2.17, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @angular/common moves onto 21.2.17 or later; if the flagged 21.0.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @angular/common with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/common 21.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 21.2.19 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 21.2.19 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/common 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @angular/compiler 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @angular/compiler ^21.0.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 21.2.4, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @angular/compiler moves onto 21.2.4 or later; if the flagged 21.0.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @angular/compiler with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/compiler 21.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 21.2.19 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 21.2.19 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against @angular/compiler 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @angular/core 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @angular/core ^21.0.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 21.2.4, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @angular/core moves onto 21.2.4 or later; if the flagged 21.0.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @angular/core with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/core 21.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 21.2.19 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 21.2.19 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against @angular/core 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @angular/platform-server 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @angular/platform-server ^21.0.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 21.2.9, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @angular/platform-server moves onto 21.2.9 or later; if the flagged 21.0.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @angular/platform-server with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/platform-server 21.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 21.2.19 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 21.2.19 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against @angular/platform-server 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @isaacs/brace-expansion 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @isaacs/brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @isaacs/brace-expansion to 5.0.1 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — @modelcontextprotocol/sdk is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to 1.26.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.20.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.26.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.26.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— engine.io 6.6.4: [GHSA redacted] — engine.io is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin engine.io to 6.6.7 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— immutable 5.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against immutable 5.1.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.1.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.1.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against immutable 5.1.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— ip-address 10.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — ip-address is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ip-address to 10.3.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ip-address 10.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 10.3.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 10.3.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ip-address 10.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— minimatch 10.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 10.2.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 10.1.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 10.2.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 10.2.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 10.1.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— minimatch 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 9.0.7 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— path-to-regexp 0.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— path-to-regexp 8.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 8.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 8.3.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— piscina 5.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — piscina is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin piscina to 5.2.0 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares postcss ^8.5.3, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 8.5.12, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so postcss moves onto 8.5.12 or later; if the flagged 8.5.6 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin postcss with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— rollup 4.53.3: [GHSA redacted] — rollup is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin rollup to 4.59.0 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— sigstore 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — sigstore is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sigstore to 4.1.1 with an `overrides` entry).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/angular-build.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/angular-build.yml:28— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/angular-build.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/api-build.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/api-build.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/api-build.yml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/api-build.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/api-build.yml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jekyll-gh-pages.yml:33— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jekyll-gh-pages.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/configure-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/configure-pages@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/configure-pages/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jekyll-gh-pages.yml:45— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/jekyll-build-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/jekyll-build-pages@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/jekyll-build-pages/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jekyll-gh-pages.yml:50— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jekyll-gh-pages.yml:64— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/loadbalancer.build.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/loadbalancer.build.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/loadbalancer.build.yml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/loadbalancer.build.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/loadbalancer.build.yml:41— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/main.yml:28— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/main.yml:35— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/main.yml:42— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High CVE: AutoMapper 15.1.0 — AutoMapper 15.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High IaC: DS-0002 frontend/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 loadbalancer/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @angular/ssr 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @angular/ssr ^21.0.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 21.1.5, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @angular/ssr moves onto 21.1.5 or later; if the flagged 21.0.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @angular/ssr with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/ssr 21.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 21.2.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 21.2.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against @angular/ssr 21.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— tar 7.5.2: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tar to 7.5.19 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tar 7.5.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.21 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.5.21 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against tar 7.5.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 37 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×13
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.14.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Deprecated: Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.linux-x64 — Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.linux-x64 [9.5.0, — ) — the publisher's replacement is `9.5.0` Other,Legacy; migrate the reference to it.
Deprecated: Aspire.Hosting.NodeJs — Aspire.Hosting.NodeJs 9.5.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `Aspire.Hosting.JavaScript`; migrate the reference to it.
Deprecated: Aspire.Hosting.Orchestration.linux-x64 — Aspire.Hosting.Orchestration.linux-x64 [9.5.0, — ) — the publisher's replacement is `9.5.0` Other,Legacy; migrate the reference to it.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×6
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @sigstore/core 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @sigstore/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @sigstore/core to 3.2.1 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— ajv 8.17.1: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— follow-redirects 1.15.11: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— qs 6.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against qs 6.13.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.15.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.15.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.13.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— qs 6.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against qs 6.14.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.15.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.15.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.14.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium IaC: DS-0001 loadbalancer/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 frontend/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 loadbalancer/Dockerfile:2— Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 loadbalancer/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 Dockerfile.api:1— Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1234.
Change coupling: UsersController.cs ↔ admin.routes.ts backend/Contact.Api/Controllers/UsersController.cs— `backend/Contact.Api/Controllers/UsersController.cs` and `frontend/src/app/feature/admin/admin.routes.ts` change together 50% of the time (7 of the 14 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 21 floating ref(s) across 5 workflow file(s), 3 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. The reusable-workflow ref(s) below are the SAST lens's blind spot — pin these first: `nitin27may/clean-architecture-docker-dotnet-angular/.github/workflows/api-build.yml@main` (.github/workflows/main.yml:25), `nitin27may/clean-architecture-docker-dotnet-angular/.github/workflows/angular-build.yml@main` (.github/workflows/main.yml:32), `nitin27may/clean-architecture-docker-dotnet-angular/.github/workflows/loadbalancer.build.yml@main` (.github/workflows/main.yml:39)
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Helper/DapperHelper.cs:59— backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Helper/DapperHelper.cs:59-70 | backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Helper/DapperHelper.cs:102-113 | backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Helper/DapperHelper.cs:126-137 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Helper/DapperHelper.cs:59` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Repositories/UserRepository.cs:18— backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Repositories/UserRepository.cs:18-22 | backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Repositories/UserRepository.cs:78-82 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Off the main sequence: Contact.ServiceDefaults — Contact.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile.api— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8000`, so a request to `localhost:8000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 frontend/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 loadbalancer/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— @babel/core 7.28.4: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/core to 7.29.6 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— body-parser 1.20.3: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.6 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/package-lock.json— body-parser 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 2.3.0 with an `overrides` entry).
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent naming for User-related Use Cases · ×1
Inconsistent naming for User-related Use Cases: 'RegisterUser' and 'UpdateUser' use the action verb (Register/Update) while 'AuthenticateRequest' and 'ResetPassword' use the noun/gerund form (Authenticate/Reset). This breaks the pattern of using the entity name as the base (e.g., User) with the action as a suffix or prefix. — Standardize to use the entity name as the base, e.g., 'UserRegistrationRequest', 'UserUpdateRequest', 'UserAuthenticationRequest', 'UserPasswordResetRequest'. (symbols: Contact.Application.UseCases.Users.RegisterUser, Contact.Application.UseCases.Users.AuthenticateRequest, Contact.Application.UseCases.Users.UpdateUser, Contact.Application.UseCases.Users.ChangePassword, Contact.Application.UseCases.Users.ResetPassword)
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent naming for RolePermission related types · ×1
Inconsistent naming for RolePermission related types: 'RolePermissionMappingResponse' vs 'RolePermissionResponse' (with/without 'Mapping'). Also, 'CreateRolePermission' and 'UpdateRolePermission' lack the 'RolePermission' prefix consistency seen in other use cases. — Use 'RolePermission' consistently, e.g., 'RolePermissionMappingResponse', 'RolePermissionRequest', 'CreateRolePermissionRequest'. (symbols: Contact.Application.UseCases.RolePermissions.RolePermissionMappingResponse, Contact.Application.UseCases.RolePermissions.RolePermissionResponse, Contact.Application.UseCases.RolePermissions.CreateRolePermission, Contact.Application.UseCases.RolePermissions.UpdateRolePermission)
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent naming for Permission related Use Cases · ×1
Inconsistent naming for Permission related Use Cases: 'PermissionResponse' uses the entity name, while 'CreatePermission' and 'UpdatePermission' use the action verb. This is inconsistent with the 'User' and 'Role' use cases which use the entity name as the base. — Standardize to use the entity name as the base, e.g., 'PermissionRequest', 'PermissionResponse', 'CreatePermissionRequest'. (symbols: Contact.Application.UseCases.Permissions.PermissionResponse, Contact.Application.UseCases.Permissions.CreatePermission, Contact.Application.UseCases.Permissions.UpdatePermission)
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent naming for ContactPerson related Use Cases · ×1
Inconsistent naming for ContactPerson related Use Cases: 'CreateContactPerson' and 'UpdateContactPerson' use the action verb, while other use cases (e.g., 'RegisterUser') also use the action verb, but 'ContactPerson' is a compound noun and the naming is less consistent with the 'User' pattern. — Standardize to use the entity name as the base, e.g., 'ContactPersonRequest', 'ContactPersonResponse', 'CreateContactPersonRequest'. (symbols: Contact.Application.UseCases.ContactPerson.CreateContactPerson, Contact.Application.UseCases.ContactPerson.UpdateContactPerson)
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent naming for Role related Use Cases · ×1
Inconsistent naming for Role related Use Cases: 'UpdateRole' uses the action verb, while other use cases (e.g., 'RegisterUser') also use the action verb, but 'Role' is a simple noun and the naming is less consistent with the 'User' pattern. — Standardize to use the entity name as the base, e.g., 'RoleRequest', 'RoleResponse', 'UpdateRoleRequest'. (symbols: Contact.Application.UseCases.Roles.UpdateRole)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 3525 LoC across 7 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
redundant comment backend/Contact.Api/Program.cs:15— "Add services to the container." — delete - Configure OpenAPI already says this
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Low: insecure-redirect frontend/nginx.conf:22— Detected an insecure redirect in this nginx configuration. If no scheme is specified, nginx will forward the request with the incoming scheme. This could result in unencrypted communications. To fix this, include the 'https' scheme. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 12 of 12 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: backend/Contact.Application/Services/UserService.cs, backend/Contact.Infrastructure/Persistence/Repositories/RolePermissionRepository.cs, backend/Contact.Application/Services/RolePermissionService.cs (and 9 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (`cosign sign` over the image digest your pipeline pushes, so a consumer can `cosign verify` what they pull, cosign/sigstore for container images, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Contact.Api).
Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Azure.Containers.Tools.Targets 1.22.1 → 1.23.0 available (referenced by Contact.Api).
Outdated: Scalar.AspNetCore — Scalar.AspNetCore 2.1.10 → 2.16.17 available (referenced by Contact.Api).
Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.66 → 2.1.79 available (referenced by Contact.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Contact.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Contact.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Contact.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options — Microsoft.Extensions.Options 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Contact.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Npgsql — Npgsql 10.0.0 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by Contact.Infrastructure).
Outdated: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 15.1.0 → 16.2.0 available (referenced by Contact.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 8.15.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Contact.Application).
Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 8.15.0 → 8.22.0 available (referenced by Contact.Application).
Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.AppHost — Aspire.Hosting.AppHost 9.5.0 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by Contact.AppHost).
Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.NodeJs — Aspire.Hosting.NodeJs 9.5.0 → 9.5.2 available (referenced by Contact.AppHost).
Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.PostgreSQL — Aspire.Hosting.PostgreSQL 9.5.0 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by Contact.AppHost).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience — Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience 10.0.0 → 10.8.0 available (referenced by Contact.ServiceDefaults).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.ServiceDiscovery — Microsoft.Extensions.ServiceDiscovery 10.0.0 → 10.8.0 available (referenced by Contact.ServiceDefaults).
Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by Contact.ServiceDefaults).
Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by Contact.ServiceDefaults).
Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by Contact.ServiceDefaults).
Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by Contact.ServiceDefaults).
Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by Contact.ServiceDefaults).
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fcad6-cc4a-739c-9b51-3ee45ee042dc · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 54 field(s) across 5 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 64 · Warnings: 37 · Recommendations: 22 · Info: 23 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 03:35 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.