rust-microservice-template

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

nkz-soft/rust-microservice-template is in good overall health (63%), but at least one category below sits in Adequate-or-worse territory — most items are improvements, and the weakest category contains work to schedule, not shelve.

It is strongest in Code Health (100%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (100%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (53%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (56%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation); 14 High finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)).

For scale: Small (~2,865 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 100% ★ Exemplary Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 66% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 56% Adequate · gated by P5 Security 53% Adequate · gated by D29, D36 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Security 53% · 46% weightReadiness 56% · 25% weightMaturity 66% · 14% weightCode Health 100% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight

Raise Security 53 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 63 → ~67.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (29+)

29 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml
D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml
D36 · Build action pinned to a mutable branch
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2021-0141 Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0436 Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2026-0173 Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,800–€9,200

Cost to rebuild	€1,800–€9,200 (0.1 person-years (30–97 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.9× (at 63% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€5,500 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 53% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

+7.2 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.

+4.8 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation

Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-by-branch.yaml (7), build-by-tag.yaml (6), dependabot.yml.

+4.5 pts · Medium effort · Static Analysis (SAST)

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 53%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,865 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 53%

→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

D1 · Rust Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · Rust Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · Rust God Classes 10.0 D4 · Rust Code Duplication 10.0

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

D35 · Rust Change Coupling 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 66% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good

D15 · Rust Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · Rust Bus Factor 7.7 D19 · Rust Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · Rust Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · Rust Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 56% · Adequate · gated by P5

The Good

D13 · Rust Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 7.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0

The Ugly

P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 53% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

The Good

D28 · Rust Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · Rust IaC & Container Security 10.0

The Bad

D38 · Rust OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 5.9

The Ugly

D29 · Rust Static Analysis (SAST) 0.9 D36 · Rust Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic domain model 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	15	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	14	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	1	Medium

Roadmap

First, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure as code, while documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures to ensure true disaster recovery. Next, resolve the 14 high-priority static analysis findings, focusing on the build and dependency configuration files. Then, establish an approval gate for production promotions to enforce required reviews. Finally, document the architecture decisions in an ADR log and add a testing section to the root README to clarify how to run the test suite.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+7.2 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.	+4.8 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-by-branch.yaml (7), build-by-tag.yaml (6), dependabot.yml.	+4.5 pts	Medium	Static Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 The Prerequisites section lists Docker and Docker Compose but does not… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md.	+2.1 pts	Low	Documentation Quality
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.	+3.9 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.	+3.8 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)
Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.	+1.6 pts	Low	Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.	+1.6 pts	Low	Supply-chain Provenance & Signing

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 6 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 17% slop · 33% mixed · 50% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
Cargo.lock	0.9	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml	4.4	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml	4.5	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/dependabot.yml	7.2	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
Dockerfile	9.3	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026
README.md	9.5	Near-clean	Documentation Quality: The Prerequisites section lists Docker and Docker Compose but does not mention Rust version requirements or Cargo.toml dependencies needed to build/run the project.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 28 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 28 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D31D34D35D36D38AX9DM4DM5DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 31 of 41 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fb09a-8ff9-783d-98d3-9ef0ed4e873a.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

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D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D16 · Bus Factor7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/application/src/services.rs.

Small-team knowledge concentration

What to do

Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a solid project description with an explicit purpose statement, prerequisites, installation steps, and a table of contents that lists every visible section (Installation, Spec-Driven Workflow, Architecture, Implementation Details, API Validation, Configuration, Coverage, Deployment, Plan, Technologies - Libraries). It begins strongly with the ⭐ Give a star prompt to encourage contribution, then dives into usage/prerequisites before clipping. The outline is complete for each named doc path; coverage is strong given the single file.

The Prerequisites section lists Docker and Docker Compose but does not mention Rust version requirements or Cargo.toml dependencies needed to build/run the project.README.md

What to do

Resolve the 1 The Prerequisites section lists Docker and Docker Compose but does not… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×14.github/dependabot.yml:8detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build-by-branch.yaml (7), build-by-tag.yaml (6), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

Low IaC: DS-0026Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Build action pinned to a mutable branch

Unpinned build actions

No build provenance

No artifact signing

No SBOM

What to do

Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 12 medium, 0 low.

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

High CVE: [GHSA redacted]Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×5Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2021-0141 · ×3Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 · ×2Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain entities own their behaviour (invariant-enforcing commands) rather than being data-only structs driven by a foreign service.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a domain type's identity-bearing field stays immutable — a `pub` mutable field under a hand-rolled Hash/PartialEq breaks the value-identity invariant.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (diesel/sea-orm/sqlx) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Architecture	100%	Exemplary	Solid.
Maturity	66%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	56%	Adequate — gated by P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	53%	Adequate — gated by D29, D36	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	100%	Exemplary	Solid.

Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~1402 lines of test source are present (.rs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Cargo manifest), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.rs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .rs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.rs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for Rust: aggregate-vs-value-object classification cannot be told apart in source (every struct-holding-struct reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable — advisory (the Swift/Dart parity)
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no in-repo typed-id idiom — primitive-obsession recorded as advisory DM8, DM2 not gated
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for Rust: a cross-crate domain leak cannot be told apart in source from a legitimate shared-kernel crate, and most repositories ship a single crate — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for Rust: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Rust source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph the source-only frontend cannot resolve (inferred/generic call owners decline) — advisory
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 18 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×14

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 3 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:27 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:35 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dtolnay/rust-toolchain/commits/stable --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: taiki-e/install-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `taiki-e/install-action@cargo-llvm-cov`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/taiki-e/install-action/commits/cargo-llvm-cov --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:58 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Action@5.5.10`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Action/commits/5.5.10 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:69 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:76 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dtolnay/rust-toolchain/commits/stable --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:31 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:35 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — aws-lc-sys 0.37.1: [GHSA redacted] — aws-lc-sys is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by aws-lc-rs 1.16.0, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for aws-lc-sys — 0.39.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.37.1, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against aws-lc-sys 0.37.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.39.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.39.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of aws-lc-sys 0.37.1 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — rustls-webpki 0.103.9: [GHSA redacted] — rustls-webpki is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by rustls 0.23.37 and rustls-platform-verifier 0.6.2, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p rustls-webpki@0.103.9 --precise 0.103.13`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against rustls-webpki 0.103.9, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.103.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.103.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of rustls-webpki 0.103.9 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], RUSTSEC-2026-0098, RUSTSEC-2026-0099.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Build action pinned to a mutable branch · ×1

Build action pinned to a mutable branch — 3 CI action reference(s) point at a mutable BRANCH rather than a version tag or a commit SHA, 3 of them on a THIRD-PARTY action: `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable` (.github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:24), `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable` (.github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:35), `taiki-e/install-action@cargo-llvm-cov` (.github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:41). A branch re-points on every upstream push, so whatever its tip holds when the job runs executes inside your pipeline with that job's secrets — a version tag at least moves only when the publisher cuts a release. Pin these to a full commit SHA first; the remaining tag refs are the same control at a lower blast radius.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — quinn-proto 0.11.13: [GHSA redacted] — quinn-proto is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by quinn 0.11.9, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p quinn-proto@0.11.13 --precise 0.11.15`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against quinn-proto 0.11.13, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.11.15 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.11.15 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of quinn-proto 0.11.13 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

Warning — 13 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×5

Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — actix-http 3.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — actix-http is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by actix-web 4.13.0, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p actix-http@3.12.0 --precise 3.12.1`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — astral-tokio-tar 0.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — astral-tokio-tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by testcontainers 0.27.2, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p astral-tokio-tar@0.6.0 --precise 0.6.2`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against astral-tokio-tar 0.6.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.6.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.6.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of astral-tokio-tar 0.6.0 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], RUSTSEC-2026-0113.
Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 Cargo.lock — crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 — crossbeam-epoch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by metrics-util 0.20.1, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p crossbeam-epoch@0.9.18 --precise 0.9.20`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — diesel 2.3.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.10
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — serde_with 3.8.1: [GHSA redacted] — serde_with is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by testcontainers 0.27.2, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p serde_with@3.8.1 --precise 3.21.0`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×3

Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2021-0141 Cargo.lock — dotenv 0.15.0: RUSTSEC-2021-0141 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. Replace dotenv with a maintained alternative, or vendor and maintain a fork.
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0436 Cargo.lock — paste 1.0.15: RUSTSEC-2024-0436 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. paste is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by actix-service 2.0.2, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2026-0173 Cargo.lock — proc-macro-error2 2.0.1: RUSTSEC-2026-0173 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. proc-macro-error2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by validator_derive 0.20.0, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unsound) · ×2

Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock — anyhow 1.0.102: RUSTSEC-2026-0190 — upgrade to 1.0.103
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Cargo.lock — rand 0.10.0: RUSTSEC-2026-0097 — rand is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by postgres-protocol 0.6.12 and tokio-postgres 0.7.18, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p rand@0.10.0 --precise 0.10.1`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — ring 0.17.8: [GHSA redacted] — ring is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by quinn-proto 0.11.13 and rustls 0.23.37 and 1 other, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p ring@0.17.8 --precise 0.17.12`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — time 0.3.36: [GHSA redacted] — time is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by actix-web 4.13.0 and bollard 0.20.1 and 3 others, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p time@0.3.36 --precise 0.3.47`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1

Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 13 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s), 3 of them mutable BRANCH refs (reported separately, pin those first): `actions/checkout@v6` (.github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:14), `actions/cache@v5` (.github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:16), `docker/metadata-action@v6` (.github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:31), `docker/login-action@v4` (.github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:35), `docker/build-push-action@v7` (.github/workflows/build-by-tag.yaml:41), `actions/checkout@v6` (.github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:25), `actions/cache@v5` (.github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:27), `danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Action@5.5.10` (.github/workflows/build-by-branch.yaml:58), … (+2 more)

Recommendation — 8 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.rs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1

Small-team knowledge concentration — 12 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 12 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The Prerequisites section lists Docker and Docker Compose but does not mention Rust version requirements or Cargo.toml dependencies needed to build/run the project. · ×1

The Prerequisites section lists Docker and Docker Compose but does not mention Rust version requirements or Cargo.toml dependencies needed to build/run the project. README.md — Add a line stating the minimum supported Rust version (e.g. 1.57) and any Cargo dependency versions required.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1

No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1

No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images, `cargo publish` from CI under crates.io trusted publishing (OIDC) rather than a long-lived token for crates) so consumers can verify what you built.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1

No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cargo sbom` or `cargo cyclonedx` for the Cargo dependency graph — or `cargo auditable build`, which embeds it in the shipped binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`cargo llvm-cov`) show(s) coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.rs), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Cargo manifest) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	14	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	1	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	15	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fb09a-8ff9-783d-98d3-9ef0ed4e873a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Nkz-Soft/rust-Microservice-Template

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 66% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 56% · Adequate · gated by P5

At a glance — Security · 53% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts