Public report — NStore, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 14:56 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Nstoredev/NStore

Regression detected bounded contexts not declared
60% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle

Small · 12,710 LoC · 37 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Code Health (57%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

51/52dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 1 LLM-assisted, advisory
55findings with an exact file:lineof 72 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
52/97dimensions across the health lenses12710 LoC · 37 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

nstoredev/NStore is sound in substance but carries real gaps (60%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (86%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

The area that most needs attention is Code Health (57%) — changes there are slower and more error-prone. Maturity (60%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Interpolated log message defeats structured logging (Structured logging); Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects… (Nullable reference types); Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) (Async correctness).

For scale: Small (~12,710 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (86%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Code Health 57% · 46% weightMaturity 60% · 25% weightPerformance 61% · 14% weightSecurity 68% · 8% weightReadiness 73% · 4% weightArchitecture 86% · 2% weight

No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 15%Plumbing 38%Tests 47%
New since the last scan (73+)

73 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D1 · MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cyclomatic 20) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D2 · MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 50) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D2 · MongoPersistence.InternalPersistAsync (cognitive 31) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D2 · BatchRepository.SaveManyAsync (cognitive 24) src/NStore.Domain/BatchRepository.cs
  • D2 · SampleApp.AddSomeBookings (cognitive 21) src/NStore.Sample/Engine.cs
  • D2 · SqlitePersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 20) src/NStore.Persistence.Sqlite/SqlitePersistence.cs
  • D3 · TooManyMethods: MongoPersistence src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D3 · FileTooLong: NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D3 · ClassTooLong: InMemoryPersistence src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlPersistenceOptions.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: NStore.Core(netstandard2.0)
  • D6 · Low cohesion: MsSqlPersistenceOptions (LCOM4 10) src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlPersistenceOptions.cs
  • D8 · Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • D10 · Skipped test: should_add_many src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs
  • D10 · Skipped test: should_fail_on_adding_many src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs
  • D10 · Skipped test: async_write_jobs src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs
  • D10 · Skipped test: write_with_batcher src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs
  • D10 · Skipped test: should_add_many_with_parallel_batch_extension src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs
  • D13 · Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/NStore.Tutorial/Program.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/NStore.Domain/Experimental/DomainRuntime.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode src/NStore.Tutorial/Program.cs
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj src/Directory.Build.props
  • D19 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D24 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/testreport.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/testreport.yml
  • D29 · High: csharp-sqli src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlContext.cs
  • D29 · High: csharp-sqli src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlContext.cs
  • D30 · High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.6
  • D30 · Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1
  • D35 · Boundary-crossing change coupling: AbstractSqlPersistence.cs ↔ MongoPersistence.cs src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs
  • D35 · Boundary-crossing change coupling: BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs ↔ MongoPersistence.cs src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs
  • D35 · Change coupling clique: InMemoryPersistence.cs, LogDecorator.cs, NullPersistence.cs, ProfileDecorator.cs src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs
  • D36 · Unpinned build actions
  • M1 · README may be stale
  • X1 · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/NStore.Sample/Engine.cs
  • X1 · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/NStore.Sample/Program.cs
  • X1 · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/NStore.Sample/Program.cs
  • X1 · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/NStore.Sample/Program.cs
  • X1 · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/NStore.Sample/Program.cs
  • X1 · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/NStore.Sample/Program.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/NStore.Core/Persistence/NullPersistence.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/NStore.Core/Persistence/NullPersistence.cs
  • PF3 · Sync-over-async blocking
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/NStore.Core/Persistence/NullPersistence.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/NStore.Core/Persistence/NullPersistence.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €8,900–€45,000
Cost to rebuild€8,900–€45,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (149–473 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityLow — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 60% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 43% boilerplate · 29% straight-line · 28% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€27,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Code Health at 57% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×0.9) — library/CLI × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Directory.Build.props.
+3.3 pts · Low effort · Explicit Debt
2
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
+2.5 pts · Low effort · ADR Quality
3
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
+4.0 pts · Medium effort · Structured logging

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Code Health at 57%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (12,710 LoC) · weakest lens: Code Health 57%
→ Direct remediation budget at Code Health first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Interpolated log message defeats structured logging The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch NStore.BaseSqlPersistence BaseSqlPersistence NStore.Core Core NStore.BaseSqlPersistence->NStore.Core NStore.Domain Domain NStore.Domain->NStore.Core NStore.Persistence.Mongo Mongo NStore.Persistence.Mongo->NStore.Core NStore.Persistence.MsSql MsSql NStore.Persistence.MsSql->NStore.BaseSqlPersistence NStore.Persistence.MsSql->NStore.Core NStore.Persistence.Sqlite Sqlite NStore.Persistence.Sqlite->NStore.BaseSqlPersistence NStore.Persistence.Sqlite->NStore.Core NStore.Quickstart Quickstart NStore.Quickstart->NStore.Core NStore.Tpl Tpl NStore.Tpl->NStore.Core NStore.Tpl->NStore.Domain NStore.Tutorial Tutorial NStore.Tutorial->NStore.Core NStore.Tutorial->NStore.Domain NStore.Tutorial->NStore.Persistence.MsSql

Architecture — module dependency matrix

21 modules, 44 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

NStore.CoreNStore.Core.LoggingNStore.Quickstart…time.CompilerServicesNStore.Core.Streams…tore.Core.Persistence…re.BaseSqlPersistenceNStore.Core.InMemoryNStore.Core.Snapshots…ore.Persistence.MongoNStore.TplNStore.Core.Processing…ore.Persistence.MsSql…re.Persistence.SqliteNStore.Domain…tore.Tutorial.SupportNStore.Domain.PocoNStore.Tutorial…e.Tutorial.CartDomain…e.Domain.Experimental…re.Tutorial.TutorialsNStore.Core1NStore.Core.Logging2NStore.Quickstart3…time.CompilerServices4NStore.Core.Streams5…tore.Core.Persistence6…re.BaseSqlPersistence7NStore.Core.InMemory8NStore.Core.Snapshots9…ore.Persistence.Mongo10NStore.Tpl11NStore.Core.Processing12…ore.Persistence.MsSql13…re.Persistence.Sqlite14NStore.Domain15…tore.Tutorial.Support16NStore.Domain.Poco17NStore.Tutorial18…e.Tutorial.CartDomain19…e.Domain.Experimental20…re.Tutorial.Tutorials211751251121121922234726522743411112112325241111

At a glance — Code Health · 57% · Adequate · gated by X5

At a glance — Architecture · 86% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 60% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 73% · Strong

At a glance — Security · 68% · Adequate · gated by D29

At a glance — Performance · 61% · Adequate

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection22High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components3High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1High / Critical

Roadmap

First, replace all interpolated log messages with structured logging to ensure proper data extraction. Next, enable nullable reference types across all projects and resolve the resulting warnings instead of suppressing them. Then, address sync-over-async patterns to eliminate potential deadlocks. After that, finish or remove all unfinished stubs and dead code to prevent confusion about the codebase's state. Finally, resolve the explicit debt by addressing the NoWarnInCsproj finding, starting with Directory.Build.props.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Directory.Build.props.+3.3 ptsLowExplicit Debt
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+2.5 ptsLowADR Quality
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging+4.0 ptsMediumStructured logging
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.+4.0 ptsMediumNullable reference types
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)+3.8 ptsMediumAsync correctness
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.+3.5 ptsMediumIncompleteness & stubs
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.+2.8 ptsMediumCancellation propagation
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.+2.5 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 18 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 72% mixed · 28% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml4.5MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/NStore.Tutorial/Program.cs5.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
.github/workflows/testreport.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlContext.cs5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: csharp-sqli
src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs6.3MixedGod Classes: ClassTooLong: InMemoryPersistence
src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs6.5MixedChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: AbstractSqlPersistence.cs ↔ MongoPersistence.cs
src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs6.5MixedChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs ↔ MongoPersistence.cs
src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs7.0MixedCyclomatic Complexity: MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cyclomatic 20)
src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlPersistenceOptions.cs7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)
src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs7.1MixedTest Quality: Skipped test: should_add_many
src/Directory.Build.props7.6MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/NStore.Domain/Experimental/DomainRuntime.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/NStore.Domain/BatchRepository.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: BatchRepository.SaveManyAsync (cognitive 24)
src/NStore.Sample/Engine.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: SampleApp.AddSomeBookings (cognitive 21)
src/NStore.Persistence.Sqlite/SqlitePersistence.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: SqlitePersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 20)
src/NStore.Core/Processing/StreamProcessorExtensions.cs9.4Near-cleanExplicit Debt: ObsoleteWithoutCallers

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D20D21D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6PF1PF2PF3X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 55 of 72 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc820-b9e7-76fc-a014-dcdde355545b.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync at 20.

MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cyclomatic 20)src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1279

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync at 50.

MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 50)src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1279
MongoPersistence.InternalPersistAsync (cognitive 31)src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:941
BatchRepository.SaveManyAsync (cognitive 24)src/NStore.Domain/BatchRepository.cs:217
SampleApp.AddSomeBookings (cognitive 21)src/NStore.Sample/Engine.cs:286
SqlitePersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 20)src/NStore.Persistence.Sqlite/SqlitePersistence.cs:274

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 50) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with MongoPersistence.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 MongoPersistence.InternalPersistAsync (cognitive 31) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with MongoPersistence.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 BatchRepository.SaveManyAsync (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with BatchRepository.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: MongoPersistencesrc/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:0
FileTooLong: NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cssrc/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:0
ClassTooLong: InMemoryPersistencesrc/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

9 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×2src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs:169
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2)src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs:541
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:291
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:156
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:212

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

37 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: NStore.Core(netstandard2.0)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 47 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: MsSqlPersistenceOptions (LCOM4 10)src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:14

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1540 test methods: 1540 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 skipped (1 with a documented reason), 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 394 tests.

Skipped test: should_add_many · ×5src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs:22
Skipped (documented): Verify_that_index_is_always_equal_to_id_when_Append_chunk_without_explicit_indexsrc/NStore.Persistence.Tests/ConcurrencyTests.cs:31
Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialsrc/NStore.Tutorial/Program.cs:11

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 26 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 12710 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8.

NoWarnInCsprojsrc/Directory.Build.props:3
TodoCommentsrc/NStore.Domain/Experimental/DomainRuntime.cs:34
CommentedOutCodesrc/NStore.Tutorial/Program.cs:10
ObsoleteWithoutCallerssrc/NStore.Core/Processing/StreamProcessorExtensions.cs:16

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

37 projects, 642 source files, 23884 hand-written lines of code (12710 production / 11174 test), 85 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 17 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

72 % of calls cross a namespace and 24 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 7.6/10. — 72 % of calls cross a namespace and 24 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 finding(s): 0 critical, 22 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×22.github/workflows/ci.yml:26detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 22 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with sonarcloud.yml (8), ci.yml (6), codeql-analysis.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

trivy found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: NullPersistence.cs↔ProfileDecorator.cs 85%; InMemoryPersistence.cs↔NullPersistence.cs 85%; InMemoryPersistence.cs↔ProfileDecorator.cs 66%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: AbstractSqlPersistence.cs ↔ MongoPersistence.cs · ×2src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs
Change coupling clique: InMemoryPersistence.cs, LogDecorator.cs, NullPersistence.cs, ProfileDecorator.cssrc/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — NullPersistence.cs:91, NullPersistence.cs:98

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `ReadForwardMultiplePartitionsWithRangesAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — NullPersistence.cs:86, NullPersistence.cs:94
  • A test is skipped ("probably not useful by refactor. Automatic index proposition was moved to Stream") — coverage that looks present but never runs in any gate. If it's an opt-in suite, document how it runs; otherwise re-enable or delete it. — ConcurrencyTests.cs:31
  • A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×3) — batch_writes_test.cs:22, batch_writes_test.cs:40, batch_writes_test.cs:80

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • 22 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 15 of 17 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
  • Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 17 use(s) across 13,259 production line(s) (~1.3/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 15 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
X1 · Async correctness6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` wastes a thread and, if the task needs a context this one is holding, deadlocks. `Dispose()` returns void by contract, so it cannot simply `await`: signal the work to stop first (cancel its token, set its stop flag) so the wait is short, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task cannot hang shutdown, and — where callers can use it — add an awaitable teardown (`DisposeAsync`/`StopAsync`) beside the synchronous one and let `Dispose()` remain the bounded fallback. — Engine.cs:267
  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×5) — Program.cs:32, Program.cs:41, Program.cs:46, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 122/152 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×23) — AsyncParallelExtensions.cs:85, ReliableNetworkSimulator.cs:32, PollingClient.cs:143, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×2) — PollingClient.cs:196, DefaultSnapshotBatchStore.cs:206

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×25) — PollingClient.cs:190, PollingClient.cs:249, PollingClient.cs:250, …

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/3 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health57%Adequate — gated by X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture86%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity60%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness73%StrongSolid.
Security68%Adequate — gated by D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance61%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 45 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 12 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (3 projection(s))
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 28 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×22
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:26 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:62 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/attest-build-provenance@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/attest-build-provenance/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:67 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:81 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:43 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:54 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:79 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:44 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:49 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:54 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:59 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:65 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml:73 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/testreport.yml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/testreport.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: csharp-sqli src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlContext.cs:25 — Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: csharp-sqli src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlContext.cs:32 — Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Bind every value as a parameter instead of building the statement text: add a `DbParameter` to `DbCommand.Parameters` for each value and reference it by name in the SQL. This works the same way for every ADO.NET provider. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 — Snappier 1.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.6 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.6 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×2
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: AbstractSqlPersistence.cs ↔ MongoPersistence.cs src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs — `src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs` (context NStore.BaseSqlPersistence) and `src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs` (context NStore.Persistence.Mongo) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs ↔ MongoPersistence.cs src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs — `src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs` (context NStore.BaseSqlPersistence) and `src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs` (context NStore.Persistence.Mongo) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/NStore.Tutorial/Program.cs:11 — hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×1
  • NoWarnInCsproj src/Directory.Build.props:3 — xUnit1030 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
Warning — 33 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped test · ×5
  • Skipped test: should_add_many src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs:22 — Skipped — BatcherSkipReason
  • Skipped test: should_fail_on_adding_many src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs:40 — Skipped — BatcherSkipReason
  • Skipped test: async_write_jobs src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs:80 — Skipped — BatcherSkipReason
  • Skipped test: write_with_batcher src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs:108 — Skipped — BatcherSkipReason
  • Skipped test: should_add_many_with_parallel_batch_extension src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/batch_writes_test.cs:123 — Skipped — BatcherSkipReason
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs:169 — src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs:169-186 | src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs:268-285 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs:169` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:334 — src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:334-351 | src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:424-441 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:334` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cyclomatic 20) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1279 — MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment src/NStore.Domain/Experimental/DomainRuntime.cs:34 — // <----- TODO: read from state? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×1
  • CommentedOutCode src/NStore.Tutorial/Program.cs:10 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].docPath | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1194.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 50) · ×1
  • MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 50) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1279 — MongoPersistence.AppendBatchAsync has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MongoPersistence.InternalPersistAsync (cognitive 31) · ×1
  • MongoPersistence.InternalPersistAsync (cognitive 31) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:941 — MongoPersistence.InternalPersistAsync has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BatchRepository.SaveManyAsync (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • BatchRepository.SaveManyAsync (cognitive 24) src/NStore.Domain/BatchRepository.cs:217 — BatchRepository.SaveManyAsync has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SampleApp.AddSomeBookings (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • SampleApp.AddSomeBookings (cognitive 21) src/NStore.Sample/Engine.cs:286 — SampleApp.AddSomeBookings has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SqlitePersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • SqlitePersistence.AppendBatchAsync (cognitive 20) src/NStore.Persistence.Sqlite/SqlitePersistence.cs:274 — SqlitePersistence.AppendBatchAsync has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 964.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: MongoPersistence src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 740 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1
  • FileTooLong: NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:0 — FileTooLong — 757 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×1
  • ClassTooLong: InMemoryPersistence src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs:0 — ClassTooLong — 410 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 26 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1
  • Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1 — SharpCompress 0.30.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling clique · ×1
  • Change coupling clique: InMemoryPersistence.cs, LogDecorator.cs, NullPersistence.cs, ProfileDecorator.cs src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs — 4 files — `src/NStore.Core/InMemory/InMemoryPersistence.cs`, `src/NStore.Core/Persistence/LogDecorator.cs`, `src/NStore.Core/Persistence/NullPersistence.cs`, `src/NStore.Core/Persistence/ProfileDecorator.cs` — all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 6 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once — you do not need to break each pair individually.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 20 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs:541 — src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs:541-565 | src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs:628-652 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/AbstractSqlPersistence.cs:541` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:291 — src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:291-310 | src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:380-399 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:291` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:156 — src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:156-172 | src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:203-219 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:156` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:212 — src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:212-227 | src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:691-707 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:212` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:132 — src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:132-146 | src/NStore.Persistence.Sqlite/SqlitePersistenceOptions.cs:90-104 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1491 — src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1491-1504 | src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1520-1533 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:1491` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:474 — src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:474-483 | src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:602-613 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs:474` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: NStore.Core(netstandard2.0) — NStore.Core(netstandard2.0): abstractness 0.27, instability 0.00, distance 0.73 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 6 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1
  • Low cohesion: MsSqlPersistenceOptions (LCOM4 10) src/NStore.Persistence.MsSql/MsSqlPersistenceOptions.cs:14 — MsSqlPersistenceOptions's methods form 10 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read.
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test reliability not included — no test tier completed within its budget.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 7 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/NStore.Persistence.Mongo/MongoPersistence.cs, src/NStore.Core/Persistence/LogDecorator.cs, src/NStore.Core/Persistence/IMultiPartitionPersistenceReader.cs, src/NStore.Tpl/PersistenceBatchAppendDecorator.cs, src/NStore.BaseSqlPersistence/BaseSqlPersistenceOptions.cs, src/NStore.Core/Persistence/ProfileDecorator.cs, src/NStore.Core/Persistence/NullPersistence.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 1 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (9 single-owned of 38 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #2 (2 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×1
  • ObsoleteWithoutCallers src/NStore.Core/Processing/StreamProcessorExtensions.cs:16 — [Obsolete] Fold
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `NStore.Quickstart` with 37 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 98 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.16 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 12710 LoC across 37 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so its structure warrants explicit bounded-context boundaries. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Your CI already runs an attestation step, so the cheapest route is to emit the SBOM there and attach it as a subject rather than adding a separate pipeline.
Info — 3 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped (documented) · ×1
  • Skipped (documented): Verify_that_index_is_always_equal_to_id_when_Append_chunk_without_explicit_index src/NStore.Persistence.Tests/ConcurrencyTests.cs:31 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: probably not useful by refactor. Automatic index proposition was moved to Stream
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — NStore.Core.Tests(net6.0) references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .22artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list src/NStore.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json3artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .0artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc820-b9e7-76fc-a014-dcdde355545b · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md