Public report — ecommerce-backend, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
104findings with an exact file:lineof 109 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
32/113dimensions across the health lenses5380 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
numq/ecommerce-backend carries serious gaps (47%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (27%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (56%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~5,380 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 47% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€5,700 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 27% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 27%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
43 modules, 5 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 72% · Adequate · gated by R10
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
50
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
46
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test on every push or pull request. Next, expand test coverage to include all production modules and implement health checks with immutable image tags to enable reliable rollbacks. Then, integrate ESLint into the build process to enforce code quality. Finally, document significant architectural decisions in a centralized location to preserve context and consequences.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add `*_test.go` files beside the packages they cover — `go test` compiles only those, in-package, so the suffix IS the separation (a tests/ folder is anti-idiomatic in Go) — and run `go test ./...` in CI.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 32 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 32 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 104 of 109 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The README documentation is strong and well-structured for a gRPC microservices project: the main README gives an overview of the ecosystem (authentication, shopping, ordering, promo usage, delivery, shipping tracking) with links to submodule implementation details plus a Protobuf Blueprint plugin link. Each service's README is self-contained, listing technologies, setup/docker commands, and inline media references for each stage of authentication, authorization, and domain-specific services such as profile, category, cart, payment, order, and delivery. The design features section (multilanguage, JWT auth, gRPC-based microservices, gateway) is visible in the main README but not clipped; all listed sections exist per the outline.
The profile README is a stub with only technologies and setup; no description of the service or its role.profile/README.md
What to do
Resolve the 1 The profile README is a stub with only technologies and setup; no… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×39account/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×11account/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 39 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (39). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (39 issue-level).
Resolve the 11 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×17cart/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×11profile/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×14promo/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4promo/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 17 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (14), go.mod (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 issue-level).
Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (8), go.mod (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
Resolve the 11 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (8), go.mod (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 5 of 13 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.8 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
No test surface was found — a `_test.go` file beside the code it tests is where this ecosystem separates tests, and none is present.
What to do
Add `*_test.go` files beside the packages they cover — `go test` compiles only those, in-package, so the suffix IS the separation (a tests/ folder is anti-idiomatic in Go) — and run `go test ./...` in CI.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README omits the delivery project entirely
README omits the gateway project entirely
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the delivery project entirely; README omits the gateway project entirely; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
cart/src/cart/CartService.ts:12 · catalog/src/catalog/CatalogService.ts:15 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — CartService.ts:12
cart/src/store/Store.ts:13 · promo/src/store/Store.ts:13 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — Store.ts:13
cart/src/cart/ItemMapper.ts:6 · profile/src/profile/ProfileMapper.ts:6 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ItemMapper.ts:6
cart/src/response/index.ts:11 · promo/src/response/index.ts:12 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.ts:11
category/src/category/CategoryRepository.ts:35 · order/src/order/OrderRepository.ts:35 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — CategoryRepository.ts:35
cart/src/di/types.ts:1 · category/src/di/types.ts:1 · delivery/src/di/types.ts:1 · order/src/di/types.ts:1 · +2 more site(s) not listed — the 6 copies are spread across 6 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — types.ts:1
cart/src/index.ts:4 · catalog/src/index.ts:6 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.ts:4
catalog/src/catalog/CatalogItemMapper.ts:12 · promo/src/promo/PromoMapper.ts:6 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — CatalogItemMapper.ts:12
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×5) — types.ts:1, types.ts:1, types.ts:1, …
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 143 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓
What to do
Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
20 file(s) (~466 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: cart/src/index.ts imports './generated/cart', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — cart
22 file(s) (~557 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: catalog/src/index.ts imports './generated/catalog', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — catalog
21 file(s) (~473 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: category/src/index.ts imports './generated/category', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — category
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
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Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 81 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~135 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .ts, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (a message-bus package)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High IaC: DS-0002 account/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 account/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 account/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 authentication/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 authentication/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 authentication/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 cart/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 cart/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 cart/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 catalog/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 catalog/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 catalog/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 category/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 category/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 category/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 confirmation/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 confirmation/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 confirmation/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 delivery/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 delivery/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 delivery/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 gateway/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0016 gateway/Dockerfile— Multiple CMD instructions listed The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0025 gateway/Dockerfile— 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.
High IaC: DS-0002 order/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
+ 14 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×17
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— @grpc/grpc-js 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @grpc/grpc-js ^1.7.3, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 1.9.16, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @grpc/grpc-js moves onto 1.9.16 or later; if the flagged 1.7.3 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @grpc/grpc-js with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.7.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] catalog/package-lock.json— @grpc/grpc-js 1.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @grpc/grpc-js ^1.7.3, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 1.9.16, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @grpc/grpc-js moves onto 1.9.16 or later; if the flagged 1.8.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @grpc/grpc-js with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.8.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 5 dependency files) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.8.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] promo/package-lock.json— @grpc/grpc-js 1.8.7: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @grpc/grpc-js ^1.7.3, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 1.9.16, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @grpc/grpc-js moves onto 1.9.16 or later; if the flagged 1.8.7 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @grpc/grpc-js with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.8.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.8.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 7 dependency files) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— fast-xml-parser 4.0.11: [GHSA redacted] — fast-xml-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-xml-parser to 4.5.5 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-xml-parser 4.0.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.5.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.5.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 6 dependency files) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against fast-xml-parser 4.0.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] token/go.mod— github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 4.4.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.5.2. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 4.4.3: [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3250.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] gateway/go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.0.0-20221014081412-f15817d10f9b: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C gateway get golang.org/x/net@v0.17.0`, which updates the require line gateway/go.mod already holds for it). (in 2 dependency files: gateway/go.mod, search/go.mod) This one row stands for the 20 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.0.0-20221014081412-f15817d10f9b: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] account/go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C account get golang.org/x/net@v0.17.0`, which updates the require line account/go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 dependency files) This one row stands for the 19 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— ip 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; ip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent. (in 6 dependency files) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ip 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 7 dependency files) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— json5 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 2.2.2 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 7 dependency files) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— semver 6.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — semver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin semver to 6.3.1 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— semver 7.3.8: [GHSA redacted] — semver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin semver to 7.5.2 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files)
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] profile/package-lock.json— @babel/traverse 7.20.10: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] promo/package-lock.json— @babel/traverse 7.20.13: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— @babel/traverse 7.20.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry). (in 5 dependency files)
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] account/go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.0.0-20220622213112-05595931fe9d: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C account get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line account/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 20 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.0.0-20220622213112-05595931fe9d: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] authentication/go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.50.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.79.3 (in 2 dependency files: authentication/go.mod, token/go.mod) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against google.golang.org/grpc 1.50.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] account/go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.51.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.79.3 (in 4 dependency files) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against google.golang.org/grpc 1.51.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— protobufjs 6.11.3: [GHSA redacted] — protobufjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin protobufjs to 6.11.4 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files) This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against protobufjs 6.11.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— protobufjs 7.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — protobufjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin protobufjs to 7.2.5 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against protobufjs 7.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.6.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.6.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 6 dependency files) This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against protobufjs 7.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] promo/package-lock.json— protobufjs 7.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — protobufjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin protobufjs to 7.2.5 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against protobufjs 7.2.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.6.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.6.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against protobufjs 7.2.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— tar 6.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.1.12, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.1.12; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.1.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] catalog/package-lock.json— tar 6.1.13: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.1.13, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.1.13; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 6 dependency files) This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.1.13: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 33 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×14
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] promo/package-lock.json— @babel/helpers 7.20.13: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— @babel/helpers 7.20.6: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry). (in 5 dependency files)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] profile/package-lock.json— @babel/helpers 7.20.7: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— @protobufjs/utf8 1.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — @protobufjs/utf8 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @protobufjs/utf8 to 1.1.1 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] account/go.mod— go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver 1.11.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.17.7
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 gateway/go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.0.0-20220908164124-27713097b956 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C gateway get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line gateway/go.mod already holds for it). (in 2 dependency files: gateway/go.mod, search/go.mod)
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 account/go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.2.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C account get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line account/go.mod already holds for it). (in 4 dependency files)
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 account/go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.4.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C account get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line account/go.mod already holds for it). (in 6 dependency files)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] account/go.mod— google.golang.org/protobuf 1.28.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.33.0 (in 6 dependency files)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— micromatch 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin micromatch to 4.0.8 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— mongodb 4.12.1: [GHSA redacted] — mongodb is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^4.11.0 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin mongodb to 4.17.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] catalog/package-lock.json— mongodb 4.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares mongodb ^4.11.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 4.17.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so mongodb moves onto 4.17.0 or later; if the flagged 4.13.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin mongodb with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. (in 5 dependency files)
Medium CVE: GO-2023-2041 account/go.mod— stdlib 1.19.99 (html/template): GO-2023-2041 — fixed in Go 1.20.8; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. (in 6 dependency files) This one row stands for the 67 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.19.99: GO-2023-2041, GO-2023-2043, GO-2023-2102, GO-2023-2185, GO-2023-2186, GO-2023-2375, GO-2023-2382, GO-2024-2598, GO-2024-2599, GO-2024-2600, GO-2024-2609, GO-2024-2610, GO-2024-2687, GO-2024-2887, GO-2024-2888, GO-2024-2963, GO-2024-3105, GO-2024-3106, GO-2024-3107, GO-2025-3373, GO-2025-3420, GO-2025-3447, GO-2025-3503, GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 6 dependency files)
Medium IaC: DS-0001 account/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 authentication/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 confirmation/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 gateway/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 search/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 token/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 cart/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 token/Dockerfile:11— Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 token/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 promo/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 order/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Duplicated block (14 lines × 6) account/main/main.go:19— account/main/main.go:19-32 | authentication/main/main.go:18-31 | confirmation/main/main.go:19-32 | gateway/main/main.go:25-38 | search/main/main.go:17-30 | token/main/main.go:19-32 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 6 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 6 times. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) account/account/repository.go:66— account/account/repository.go:66-77 | account/account/repository.go:81-92 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `account/account/repository.go:66` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 6) account/config/config.go:21— account/config/config.go:21-30 | authentication/config/config.go:26-35 | confirmation/config/config.go:20-29 | gateway/config/config.go:25-34 | search/config/config.go:21-30 | token/config/config.go:20-29 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 6 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 6 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `account/config/config.go:21` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) search/search/dispatcher.go:22— search/search/dispatcher.go:22-31 | search/search/dispatcher.go:39-48 | search/search/dispatcher.go:56-65 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 6) account/server/server.go:14— account/server/server.go:14-22 | authentication/server/server.go:14-22 | confirmation/server/server.go:14-22 | gateway/server/server.go:14-22 | search/server/server.go:14-22 | token/server/server.go:14-22 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 6 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 6 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `account/server/server.go:14` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) account/server/interceptor.go:13— account/server/interceptor.go:13-21 | confirmation/server/interceptor.go:13-21 | gateway/server/interceptor.go:13-21 | token/server/interceptor.go:13-21 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 4 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 4 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `account/server/interceptor.go:13` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) account/main/main.go:38— account/main/main.go:38-46 | confirmation/main/main.go:38-46 | token/main/main.go:39-47 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `account/main/main.go:38` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] promo/package-lock.json— @babel/core 7.20.12: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/core to 7.29.6 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— @babel/core 7.20.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/core to 7.29.6 with an `overrides` entry). (in 5 dependency files)
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] profile/package-lock.json— @babel/core 7.20.7: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/core is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/core to 7.29.6 with an `overrides` entry).
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] cart/package-lock.json— diff 4.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — diff is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin diff to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry). (in 7 dependency files)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The profile README is a stub with only technologies and setup; no description of the service or its role. · ×1
The profile README is a stub with only technologies and setup; no description of the service or its role. profile/README.md— Add a brief一句话 line explaining what the profile microservice does (e.g. user personal information) so it matches the other domain services.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.go) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fcadb-90b9-7d3e-a226-541bfac90d39 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 67 · Warnings: 33 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 03:40 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.