Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
nwjs/nw.js carries serious gaps (37%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (92%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Security (76%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (9%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (53%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability).
For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (92%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
53%
Adequate · gated by R1
Architecture
92% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
59%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
9% ⚠
Critical · gated by D9, R6, R8, P1, P2, P3
Security
76%
Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 9% · 47% weightCode Health 53% · 26% weightMaturity 59% · 14% weightSecurity 76% · 8% weightArchitecture 92% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 9 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 37 → ~61.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
2
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with private_key.pem.
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 12 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 10 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by establishing a continuous integration workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push or pull request. Simultaneously, address the lack of automated testing by resolving the missing test distribution findings. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all service-like projects to improve observability. Finally, enhance security and dependency hygiene by adding a static application security testing step, removing unused dependencies, and explicitly declaring all imports.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +26.4 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with private_key.pem. | +22.4 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +26.4 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +26.4 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package. | +26.4 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +26.4 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +24.7 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +22.4 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| requirements.txt | 2.0 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| tools/sign/private_key.pem | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key |
| tools/dump_win_syms.py | 6.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args |
| tools/package_binaries.py | 6.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-file-permissions |
| src/resources/api_nw_menuitem.js | 6.3 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: MenuItem (cyclomatic 26) |
| src/api/menuitem/menuitem.js | 6.3 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: MenuItem (cyclomatic 24) |
| tools/build_native_modules.py | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args |
| src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31) |
| src/resources/api_nw_window.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27) |
| DEPS | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| tools/file_util.py | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: eval-detected |
| tools/patcher.py | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: exec-detected |
| src/resources/api_nw_tray.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Tray (cyclomatic 17) |
| src/api/tray/tray.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Tray (cyclomatic 16) |
| src/resources/api_nw_menu.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: api_nw_menu.js ↔ api_nw_object.js |
| src/resources/api_nw_app.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: api_nw_app.js ↔ api_nw_shortcut.js |
| src/api/menu/menu.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: menu.js ↔ menuitem.js |
| tools/commit_id.py | 9.3 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Low: subprocess-shell-true |
| docs/References/webview Tag.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The <webview> tag reference is thorough but the body ends before covering the main features (e.g., security model, separate-process execution) that distinguish it from an iframe and are critical for a new runtime. |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 38 of 40 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 40 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D9D12D13D15D16D19D21D26D27D28D29D33D34D35D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P6R1R10R2R3R6R7R8R9X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 51 of 57 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
11 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 31.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 31)src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:768
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 27)src/resources/api_nw_window.js:661
MenuItem (cyclomatic 26)src/resources/api_nw_menuitem.js:17
MenuItem (cyclomatic 24)src/api/menuitem/menuitem.js:23
removeListener (cyclomatic 19)src/resources/api_nw_window.js:274
What to do
- Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with api_nw_newwin.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with api_nw_window.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 MenuItem (cyclomatic 26) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with api_nw_menuitem.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
19 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was package_binaries.make_packages at 68.
MenuItem (cognitive 38) src/resources/api_nw_menuitem.js:17
removeListener (cognitive 28) src/resources/api_nw_window.js:274
(anonymous) (cognitive 57)src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:768
(anonymous) (cognitive 51)src/resources/api_nw_window.js:661
Tray (cognitive 21)src/resources/api_nw_tray.js:19
What to do
- Resolve the 2 MenuItem (cognitive 38) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with api_nw_menuitem.js, menuitem.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 removeListener (cognitive 28) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with api_nw_newwin.js, api_nw_window.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cognitive 57) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with api_nw_newwin.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
2 god class(es) detected.
FileTooLong: resources/api_nw_window.js src/resources/api_nw_window.js:0
What to do
- Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with api_nw_newwin.js, api_nw_window.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: private-keytools/sign/private_key.pem:1
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with private_key.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
The documentation is clear and complete for a desktop app runtime project: an official README with an Introduction, Features, Downloads, and links to cross-platform guides plus a dedicated architecture doc that lists three major parts (For Users, For Developers, References) and the full outline. The main content is well structured around the webview tag reference, covering showDevTools, inspectElementAt, loading local files in webviews, Node.js support, and an addtional-manifest example for trusted partitions. There are no visible gaps or errors.
The <webview> tag reference is thorough but the body ends before covering the main features (e.g., security model, separate-process execution) that distinguish it from an iframe and are critical for a new runtime.docs/References/webview Tag.md
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
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D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key DEPS:502
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with DEPS, private_key.pem. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
12 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 8 medium, 2 low.
High: eval-detected tools/file_util.py:135
Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args tools/build_native_modules.py:70
Low: subprocess-shell-true tools/commit_id.py:10
What to do
- Resolve the 8 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dump_win_syms.py (4), build_native_modules.py (2), package_binaries.py (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with file_util.py, patcher.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with commit_id.py, package_binaries.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: api_nw_menu.js↔api_nw_object.js 73%; menuitem.js↔tray.js 71%; api_nw_app.js↔api_nw_shortcut.js 58%
Change coupling: api_nw_menu.js ↔ api_nw_object.js src/resources/api_nw_menu.js
What to do
- Resolve the 6 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with api_nw_menu.js (2), api_nw_app.js, api_nw_menuitem.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
10 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 7 medium, 2 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted]requirements.txt
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
What to do
- Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with requirements.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with requirements.txt (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with requirements.txt (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 103 plain JS
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:18469 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:18583 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:18469
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:29967 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:36434 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:29967
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:14808 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:20244 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:36461 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:14808
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:20245 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:36462 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:20245
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:11293 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:14117 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:11293
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:44468 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:44526 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:44468
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:23387 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:24034 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:23387
- test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:12145 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:13071 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:13282 · test/sanity/issue7197-load/js/chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:14475 — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:12145
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:44452, chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:797, chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:18011, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
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R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
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R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
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R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 29 application, 0 tooling and 78 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (29 application, 0 tooling, 78 test roots considered) (×7) — api_nw_newwin.js, api_nw_window.js, api_nw_shortcut.js, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:671, chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:293, chunk-vendors.6e82bc79.js:42122
- Declared in test/data/platform_apps/local_flash/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×2)
- Declared in test/data/platform_apps/local_pdf/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
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R9 · Circular Imports
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X1 · Async correctness
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 53% | Adequate — gated by R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 92% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 59% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 9% | Critical — gated by D9, R6, R8, P1, P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 76% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 63 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — ~8129 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — 78 test file(s) reach none of 24 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 7 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key DEPS:502
- Secret: private-key tools/sign/private_key.pem:1
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: eval-detected tools/file_util.py:135
- High: exec-detected tools/patcher.py:62
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: private-key tools/sign/private_key.pem:1
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
Warning — 41 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args tools/build_native_modules.py:70
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args tools/build_native_modules.py:81
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args tools/dump_win_syms.py:12
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args tools/dump_win_syms.py:13
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args tools/dump_win_syms.py:14
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args tools/dump_win_syms.py:16
- Medium: insecure-file-permissions tools/package_binaries.py:486
- Medium: insecure-file-permissions tools/package_binaries.py:491
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2023-117 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2987 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1824 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1825 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3609 requirements.txt
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: api_nw_menu.js ↔ api_nw_object.js src/resources/api_nw_menu.js
- Change coupling: menuitem.js ↔ tray.js src/api/menuitem/menuitem.js
- Change coupling: api_nw_app.js ↔ api_nw_shortcut.js src/resources/api_nw_app.js
- Change coupling: api_nw_menuitem.js ↔ api_nw_object.js src/resources/api_nw_menuitem.js
- Change coupling: menu.js ↔ menuitem.js src/api/menu/menu.js
- Change coupling: api_nw_menu.js ↔ api_nw_tray.js src/resources/api_nw_menu.js
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- MenuItem (cognitive 38) src/resources/api_nw_menuitem.js:17
- MenuItem (cognitive 38) src/api/menuitem/menuitem.js:23
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- removeListener (cognitive 28) src/resources/api_nw_window.js:274
- removeListener (cognitive 28) src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:272
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: resources/api_nw_window.js src/resources/api_nw_window.js:0
- FileTooLong: resources/api_nw_newwin.js src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:0
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31) src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:768
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 27) src/resources/api_nw_window.js:661
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- MenuItem (cyclomatic 26) src/resources/api_nw_menuitem.js:17
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- MenuItem (cyclomatic 24) src/api/menuitem/menuitem.js:23
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- removeListener (cyclomatic 19) src/resources/api_nw_window.js:274
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Tray (cyclomatic 17) src/resources/api_nw_tray.js:19
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- removeListener (cyclomatic 17) src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:272
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Tray (cyclomatic 16) src/api/tray/tray.js:23
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- (anonymous) (cognitive 57) src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:768
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- (anonymous) (cognitive 51) src/resources/api_nw_window.js:661
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Tray (cognitive 21) src/resources/api_nw_tray.js:19
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- removeAllListeners (cognitive 21) src/resources/api_nw_newwin.js:308
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Tray (cognitive 20) src/api/tray/tray.js:23
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: subprocess-shell-true tools/commit_id.py:10
- Low: subprocess-shell-true tools/package_binaries.py:285
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The <webview> tag reference is thorough but the body ends before covering the main features (e.g., security model, separate-process execution) that distinguish it from an iframe and are critical for a new runtime. docs/References/webview Tag.md
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 2 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 12 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 10 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |