Public report — ts2ocaml, published 6 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 06-08-2026 @ 04:30 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Ocsigen/ts2ocaml

57% At Risk

Medium · 23,773 LoC · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Maturity (51%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

18/20dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
98findings with an exact file:lineof 109 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
20/95dimensions across the health lenses23773 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

ocsigen/ts2ocaml is sound in substance but carries real gaps (57%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (87%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Maturity (51%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Security (53%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) (Knowledge Freshness); 'Testing' section to the root README (Documentation (README)).

For scale: Medium (~23,773 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Maturity 51% · 47% weightSecurity 53% · 26% weightReadiness 56% · 14% weightCode Health 87% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight

No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €8,200–€41,000
Cost to rebuild€8,200–€41,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (136–432 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 57% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€25,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 51% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with TypeScript.fs, Typer.fs, Writer.fs.
+5.8 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness
2
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
+7.0 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation
3
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
+5.6 pts · Medium effort · Documentation (README)

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Maturity at 51%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (23,773 LoC) · weakest lens: Maturity 51%
→ Direct remediation budget at Maturity first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

Architecture — module dependency matrix

29 modules, 35 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

BindingUpdaterBuildChalkCodeframeExtensionsTargetTs2Ml.CommonTs2Ml.ExtensionsTs2Ml.JsHelperTs2Ml.NamingTs2Ml.TypeScriptHelperTs2Ml.TyperYargsYargsParserCommonDataTypesTs2Ml.SyntaxMain…gets.JsOfOCaml.Common…gets.JsOfOCaml.TargetTargets.ParserTest…rgets.ReScript.Common…rgets.ReScript.Target…rgets.ReScript.WriterTs2Ml.ParserTypeScript…JsOfOCaml.OCamlHelper…gets.JsOfOCaml.Writer…Script.ReScriptHelperBindingUpdater1Build2Chalk3Codeframe4Extensions5Target6Ts2Ml.Common7Ts2Ml.Extensions8Ts2Ml.JsHelper9Ts2Ml.Naming10Ts2Ml.TypeScriptHelper11Ts2Ml.Typer12Yargs13YargsParser14Common15DataTypes16Ts2Ml.Syntax17Main18…gets.JsOfOCaml.Common19…gets.JsOfOCaml.Target20Targets.ParserTest21…rgets.ReScript.Common22…rgets.ReScript.Target23…rgets.ReScript.Writer24Ts2Ml.Parser25TypeScript26…JsOfOCaml.OCamlHelper27…gets.JsOfOCaml.Writer28…Script.ReScriptHelper291291111111111111451148221115513181211

At a glance — Code Health · 87% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 51% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 56% · Adequate · gated by P3

At a glance — Security · 53% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection16High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components10High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by establishing an Architecture Decision Record (ADR) system to document significant design choices and their consequences. Next, address knowledge freshness by resolving the three largest orphaned files, specifically TypeScript.fs, Typer.fs, and Writer.fs. Then, update the root README to include a testing section that explains how to run the test suite. Finally, improve deployment safety by gating releases to prevent bad builds from reaching users, and ensure all releases are traceable by stamping a version number in the build manifest.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with TypeScript.fs, Typer.fs, Writer.fs.+5.8 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+7.0 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.+5.6 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+5.5 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+5.5 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims an in-browser version exists but the evidence shows no such feature.+5.2 ptsMediumDocumentation accuracy
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+2.5 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 16 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (8), publish.yml (7), dependabot.yml.+3.0 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 16 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 6% slop · 56% mixed · 38% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
yarn.lock0.0SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/ci.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/publish.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (21 lines × 2)
src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs7.0MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
lib/Typer.fs7.1MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs7.2MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)
.github/dependabot.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs7.4MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)
lib/Parser.fs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)
lib/DataTypes/Trie.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
src/Targets/ReScript/Target.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)
src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)
src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/OCamlHelper.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
src/Extensions.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 3)
lib/DataTypes/Graph.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 18 of 20 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 20 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D13D16D19D21D28D29D33D34D35D36D38M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 98 of 109 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd556-4e31-77ee-9206-1f0f91391473.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D4 · Code Duplication8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

69 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×15lib/Typer.fs:1077
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×12src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:926
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×11lib/Typer.fs:2007
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×7lib/DataTypes/Trie.fs:129
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×4src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:889

+ 11 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with TypeScript.fs (7), Typer.fs (3), Parser.fs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 12 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Writer.fs (9), ReScriptHelper.fs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 11 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Writer.fs (8), Typer.fs, TypeScript.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for a tool that generates OCaml bindings from TypeScript. The README gives an installation walkthrough, an overview of the two main non-goals (perfectly replicating TS type systems in OCaml vs translating TS concepts to OCaml idioms), and links to detailed docs for ReScript support, modeling subtyping, and the js_of_ocaml target. A dedicated development guide explains the project structure, a targets directory layout, and how to update the TypeScript SDK, with preparation steps for publishing the standard library and the tool itself.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 16 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×16.github/dependabot.yml:3detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (8), publish.yml (7), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 of 24 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs.

Largest orphaned file · ×3lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs
Concentrated knowledge decay

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with TypeScript.fs, Typer.fs, Writer.fs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 1 critical, 3 high, 5 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README claims an in-browser version exists but the evidence shows no such feature

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README claims an in-browser version exists but the evidence shows no such feature.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: `semgrep --config=auto` plus gitleaks for committed secrets (F# is not a CodeQL language and has no language-specific SAST engine) — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health87%StrongSolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity51%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness56%Adequate — gated by P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security53%Adequate — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 75 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.fs) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~89 lines of test source are present (.fs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's projects are MSBuild/NuGet projects, whose package licenses are exactly what this dimension reads, but no license could be resolved for them (the .NET license collector did not run, or restore failed). A gap in the analysis run, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .fs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution; this repository's .NET projects are all F# (.fsproj), which the C#/VB workspace does not load, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.fs) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.fs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.fs) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .fs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.fs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 39 value object(s); 3 domain event(s)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 20 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×16
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 2 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:34 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:42 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: ocaml/setup-ocaml@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `ocaml/setup-ocaml@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/ocaml/setup-ocaml/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:69 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:72 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:77 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:100 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: fastify/github-action-merge-dependabot@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `fastify/github-action-merge-dependabot@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/fastify/github-action-merge-dependabot/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: ocaml/setup-ocaml@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `ocaml/setup-ocaml@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/ocaml/setup-ocaml/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:46 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: s0/git-publish-subdir-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `s0/git-publish-subdir-action@develop`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/s0/git-publish-subdir-action/commits/develop --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:57 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: JS-DevTools/npm-publish@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `JS-DevTools/npm-publish@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/JS-DevTools/npm-publish/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish.yml:64 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: JS-DevTools/npm-publish@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `JS-DevTools/npm-publish@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/JS-DevTools/npm-publish/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @angular/common 20.3.14: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @angular/common ^20.2.4, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 20.3.25, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @angular/common moves onto 20.3.25 or later; if the flagged 20.3.14 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @angular/common with a `resolutions` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @angular/common 20.3.14, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.27 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.27 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/common 20.3.14: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — adm-zip 0.5.10: [GHSA redacted] — adm-zip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin adm-zip to 0.6.0 with a `resolutions` entry).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with a `resolutions` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.2, so a `resolutions` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 75 finding(s)
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×15
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Typer.fs:1077 — lib/Typer.fs:1077-1082 | lib/Typer.fs:1119-1124 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Typer.fs:1446 — lib/Typer.fs:1446-1451 | lib/Typer.fs:1477-1482 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Typer.fs:1519 — lib/Typer.fs:1519-1524 | lib/Typer.fs:1575-1580 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `lib/Typer.fs:1519` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Parser.fs:602 — lib/Parser.fs:602-608 | lib/Parser.fs:620-625 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Parser.fs:1080 — lib/Parser.fs:1080-1085 | lib/Parser.fs:1125-1130 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/DataTypes/Graph.fs:37 — lib/DataTypes/Graph.fs:37-42 | lib/DataTypes/Graph.fs:43-48 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3590 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3590-3595 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3633-3638 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3614 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3614-3619 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9631-9636 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:4237 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:4237-4242 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:4349-4354 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:5183 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:5183-5188 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:5912-5917 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:5682 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:5682-5687 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:5715-5720 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:6813 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:6813-6818 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:6853-6858 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:7651 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:7651-7656 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:7697-7702 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1608 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1608-1613 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1416-1422 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2134 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2134-2139 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:2057-2062 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×12
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:926 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:926-933 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:849-856 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:991 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:991-998 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:926-933 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1185 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1185-1192 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1187-1194 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1185` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1207 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1207-1214 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1236-1243 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1207` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1548 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1548-1555 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1374-1381 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1599 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1599-1606 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1407-1414 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1632 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1632-1639 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1463-1470 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1960 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1960-1967 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1686-1693 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs:189 — src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs:189-196 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/OCamlHelper.fs:399-406 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs:420 — src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs:420-427 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/OCamlHelper.fs:210-217 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs:531 — src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs:531-538 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1582-1589 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1262 — src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1262-1269 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1279-1286 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×11
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/Typer.fs:2007 — lib/Typer.fs:2007-2013 | lib/Typer.fs:2080-2087 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `lib/Typer.fs:2007` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3574 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3574-3580 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9572-9578 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:119 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:119-125 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:90-96 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:228 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:228-234 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:284-290 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:280 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:280-286 | src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:295-301 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:496 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:496-503 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:498-504 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:608 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:608-614 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:588-594 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:608` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:946 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:946-952 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:878-884 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1534 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1534-1540 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1358-1364 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1690 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1690-1696 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1524-1530 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/OCamlHelper.fs:336 — src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/OCamlHelper.fs:336-342 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/OCamlHelper.fs:346-352 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×7
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/DataTypes/Trie.fs:129 — lib/DataTypes/Trie.fs:129-138 | lib/DataTypes/Trie.fs:140-149 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `lib/DataTypes/Trie.fs:129` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9215 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9215-9224 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:10895-10904 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:21 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:21-30 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:13-24 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:166 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:166-175 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:200-209 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:166` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:975 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:975-984 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:907-916 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2018 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2018-2027 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1969-1978 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2018` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2069 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2069-2078 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:2014-2023 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ajv 8.10.0: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with a `resolutions` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ajv 8.12.0: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with a `resolutions` entry).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — dompurify 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — dompurify is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin dompurify to 3.4.0 with a `resolutions` entry). This is 1 of 16 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against dompurify 3.2.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.12 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.12 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 17 advisories this scan raises against dompurify 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.3.2, so a `resolutions` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — yaml 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin yaml to 2.8.3 with a `resolutions` entry).
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:889 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:889-900 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:767-778 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:889` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1155 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1155-1166 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1142-1153 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:20 — src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:20-31 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Common.fs:31-42 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:20` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:91 — src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:91-102 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Common.fs:99-110 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3367 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3367-3375 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:11742-11750 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1236 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1236-1244 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:106-114 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1710 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1710-1718 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1544-1552 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Target.fs:14 — src/Targets/ReScript/Target.fs:14-22 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Target.fs:13-21 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×4
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/Typer.fs:1565 — lib/Typer.fs:1565-1569 | lib/Typer.fs:1574-1578 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `lib/Typer.fs:1565` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:222 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:222-226 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:273-278 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:941 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:941-945 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:872-877 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1617 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1617-1621 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1430-1434 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:2468 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:2468-2480 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:11620-11632 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1044 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:1044-1056 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1007-1019 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2003 — src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs:2003-2013 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs:1954-1964 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:217 — src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:217-227 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Common.fs:224-234 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:217` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 4) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 4) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3621 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3621-3626 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3629-3634 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9585-9590 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9654-9659 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 4) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3627 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3627-3632 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9583-9588 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9606-9611 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9652-9657 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 15 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s), 1 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3740 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3740-3760 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:12564-12584 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:180 — src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:180-196 | src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Common.fs:179-195 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Targets/ReScript/Common.fs:180` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3696 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3696-3711 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:12431-12446 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 6) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 6) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:217 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:217-224 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:238-245 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:252-259 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:266-273 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:279-286 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:365-372 — all 6 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 10) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 10) lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3430 — lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3430-3436 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3576-3581 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3604-3609 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:3630-3635 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9574-9579 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9586-9591 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9617-9622 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9638-9643 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:9655-9660 | lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs:11245-11250 — all 10 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) src/Extensions.fs:31 — src/Extensions.fs:31-36 | src/Extensions.fs:39-44 | src/Extensions.fs:47-52 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Extensions.fs:31` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×3
  • Largest orphaned file lib/Bindings/TypeScript.fs — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file lib/Typer.fs — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file src/Targets/JsOfOCaml/Writer.fs — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.fs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .fs · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .fs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (24 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .fs, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 2 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/Targets/ReScript/Writer.fs, src/Targets/ReScript/ReScriptHelper.fs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Concentrated knowledge decay · ×1
  • Concentrated knowledge decay — 22 of 24 significant files have no living knowledge, while the repository is still being changed at a low rate (12 commit(s) in the last 90 days) — so this is one repo-wide knowledge-decay state, not 22 separate risks. The code moved on without the people who understood these files: document them or schedule a read-through before the next change lands in them.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, `npm publish --provenance` under GitHub OIDC for npm packages, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `cdxgen -t yarn` (or `syft` below) over the yarn workspace — `npm sbom` cannot read `yarn.lock`, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @babel/core 7.28.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.29.6
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.fs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read — This repository's projects (.fs) are MSBuild/NuGet projects and their `<PackageReference>` dependencies are exactly what this dimension assesses — but `dotnet list package` returned no packages for them, so there was nothing to assess. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED. This is a gap in the analysis run (restore or project-load failed for these projects), not a verdict about this repository.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .16artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .10artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fd556-4e31-77ee-9206-1f0f91391473 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md