Public report — onebeyond-studio-obelisk, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-07-2026 @ 20:22 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Onebeyond/onebeyond-Studio-Obelisk

65% At Risk

Small · 7,690 LoC · 11 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (61%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

64/66dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
56findings with an exact file:lineof 142 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
66/104dimensions across the health lenses7690 LoC · 11 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

onebeyond/onebeyond-studio-obelisk is in a workable but fragile state (65%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

It is strongest in Code Health (94%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (93%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (61%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (62%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Strengthen data-at-rest protection (Data Protection); build/run (quick start) section to the root README (Documentation (README)); Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation).

For scale: Small (~7,690 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (94%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 61% · 46% weightMaturity 62% · 25% weightDomain Modelling 66% · 14% weightReadiness 71% · 8% weightArchitecture 93% · 4% weightCode Health 94% · 2% weight

No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 13%Plumbing 70%Tests 2%Generated 16%
New since the last scan (17+)

17 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D24 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-pr-api.yaml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-pr-api.yaml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-pr-api.yaml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,600–€23,000
Cost to rebuild€4,600–€23,000 (0.1 person-years (76–241 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.9× (at 65% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 51% boilerplate · 33% straight-line · 15% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€14,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 61% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.9) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
+3.5 pts · Low effort · ADR Quality
2
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
+3.2 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness
3
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
+3.9 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 61%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (7,690 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 61%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
6 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Evidence: DM5 setters: 0 · DM4 anemic: 2 · DM2 primitive ids: 4
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Studio.Obelisk.AppHost Studio.Obelisk.AppHost Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests Studio.Obelisk.WebApi Studio.Obelisk.WebApi ctx:Studio.Obelisk Studio.Obelisk Application · Domain · Infrastructure Studio.Obelisk.WebApi->ctx:Studio.Obelisk ctx:Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults ServiceDefaults Studio.Obelisk.WebApi->ctx:Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.Tests Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.Tests Studio.Obelisk.Workers Studio.Obelisk.Workers Studio.Obelisk.Workers->ctx:Studio.Obelisk ctx:Studio.Obelisk.Authentication Studio.Obelisk.Authentication Application · Domain Studio.Obelisk.Workers->ctx:Studio.Obelisk.Authentication Studio.Obelisk.Workers->ctx:Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults ctx:Studio.Obelisk->ctx:Studio.Obelisk.Authentication

At a glance — Code Health · 94% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 62% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 71% · Adequate · gated by D8

At a glance — Security · 61% · Adequate · gated by D29, D30

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 66% · Adequate · gated by DM2

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components27High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration25High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection13High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures3High / Critical

Roadmap

First, strengthen data protection by fully encrypting sensitive columns and centralizing key management to eliminate security gaps. Next, improve onboarding and maintainability by adding a quick-start section to the root README and establishing an Architecture Decision Record (ADR) log to capture key design choices. Finally, address the identified gaps in ADR quality and knowledge freshness to ensure the team's documentation remains accurate and up to date.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+3.5 ptsLowADR Quality
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+3.2 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.+3.9 ptsMediumData Protection
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+1.9 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.+3.6 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+3.6 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+1.5 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.+2.8 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 22 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 9% slop · 59% mixed · 32% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
devops/Terraform/storage.tf2.8SlopIaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: AZU-0012
devops/Terraform/modules/az_flex_function/module.tf3.4SlopIaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: AZU-0012
devops/Terraform/key-vault.tf4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: AZU-0013
.github/workflows/codeql.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/check-pr-api.yaml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/ci.yaml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
devops/Terraform/locals.tf5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: hashicorp-tf-password
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
devops/Terraform/web-api.tf6.7MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: AZU-0003
devops/Terraform/sql.tf6.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: AZU-0022
.github/dependabot.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Workers/Dockerfile7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.csproj7.6MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Templates/account_setup.html7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Templates/reset_password.html7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application/CommandHandlers/SignInViaPasswordHandler.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: ObsoleteWithCallers
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain/Commands/SignInViaPassword.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: ObsoleteWithCallers
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests/Helpers/StringHelpers.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: StringHelpers
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/SignInProviders/SignInProviderFactory.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: SignInProviderFactory
src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/OpenApi/FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.TransformAsync (cognitive 19)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 64 of 66 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 66 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 56 of 142 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faf8a-b421-736b-9f6b-ef26d2843d30.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.TransformAsync at 19.

FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.TransformAsync (cognitive 19)src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/OpenApi/FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.cs:25

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

11 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults · ×3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 15 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 1.0%, branch coverage 0.9%.

What to do

  1. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 test methods: 3 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 3 tests.

Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

42 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 2 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol
Deprecated: xunit · ×2
Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.Azure.Functions · ×42

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 47 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 deducted debt markers + 2 dead symbols across 6960 LoC (0.3/KLoC) → score 9.4.

NoWarnInCsprojsrc/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.csproj:7
ObsoleteWithCallers · ×2src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application/CommandHandlers/SignInViaPasswordHandler.cs:16
Dead code: StringHelpers · ×2src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests/Helpers/StringHelpers.cs:6
ObsoleteWithoutCallerssrc/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/Controllers/AuthController.cs:62

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 projects, 224 source files, 7136 hand-written lines of code (6960 production / 176 test), plus 1462 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 27 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The One Beyond Obelisk project has a single README file and no architecture or design documentation. The README is an introduction with a brief Supported .NET version note, Setup instructions (Docker desktop + Azure Functions Core Tools), and links to license/maintainability/test coverage badges; it also outlines the document outline (Introduction; Supported .NET version:; Setup; Documentation; Contributing) before being clipped mid-Setup. The README is thin but reasonably descriptive for a template project, with no architecture or usage documentation.

XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost · ×9src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The One Beyond Obelisk project has a single README file and no architecture or design documentation. The README is an introduction with a brief Supported .NET version note, Setup instructions (Docker desktop + Azure Functions Core Tools), and links to license/maintainability/test coverage badges; it also outlines the document outline (Introduction; Supported .NET version:; Setup; Documentation; Contributing) before being clipped mid-Setup. The README is thin but reasonably descriptive for a template project, with no architecture or usage documentation.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Typo in class name: 'JwtCleardownServce' is missing the 'r' in 'Service' and has an extra 'd' or typo in 'Cleardown' (likely meant 'Clear' or 'Cleanup'). This is a spelling error, not just a naming convention issue.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 11 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

95 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: hashicorp-tf-password · ×2devops/Terraform/locals.tf:6detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with locals.tf (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×11.github/dependabot.yml:8detected by semgrep finding
Medium: var-in-href · ×2src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Templates/account_setup.html:3detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql.yml (4), check-pr-api.yaml (3), ci.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with account_setup.html, reset_password.html. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

27 vulnerable package(s): 1 critical, 11 high, 13 medium, 2 low.

High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 · ×11detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection 10.0.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 · ×13detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 6.12.1 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 13 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

29 finding(s): 3 critical, 2 high, 8 medium, 16 low.

Critical IaC: AZU-0013 · ×3devops/Terraform/key-vault.tfdetected by trivy finding
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: AZU-0016 · ×8devops/Terraform/key-vault.tfdetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: AZU-0015 · ×12devops/Terraform/key-vault.tfdetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with key-vault.tf, module.tf, storage.tf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 8 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with module.tf (2), sql.tf (2), storage.tf (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

33 of 39 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application/DependencyInjection/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs.

Concentrated knowledge decay

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 430 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `UserCreated.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — UserCreated.cs:21
  • `UserBase.LoginId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — UserBase.cs:45
  • `UserBase.TypeId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — UserBase.cs:52
  • `UserBase.RoleId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — UserBase.cs:53

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `EmailTemplate` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — EmailTemplate.cs:6
  • `UserLoginLog` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — UserLoginLog.cs:7

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — Program.cs:242

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 11 of 11 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 4/9 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 63/70 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×7) — UnhandledExceptionExtension.cs:18, ErrorResultGeneratorMiddleware.cs:29, ExceptionHandlingExtension.cs:19, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~1.5 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health94%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture93%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity62%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness71%Adequate — gated by D8Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security61%Adequate — gated by D29, D30Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling66%Adequate — gated by DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 38 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 4 event handler(s); 35 CQRS handler(s)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — only 1/3 markers (1 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds)
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 32 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×11
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-pr-api.yaml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-pr-api.yaml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check-pr-api.yaml:46 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yaml:46 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:43 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:47 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:61 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:74 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×11
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.6
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.6
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.10
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.10
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.10
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.10
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.10
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.6
  • High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.7.5
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Critical IaC · ×3
  • Critical IaC: AZU-0013 devops/Terraform/key-vault.tf — Key vault should have the network acl block specified
  • Critical IaC: AZU-0012 devops/Terraform/modules/az_flex_function/module.tf — The default action on Storage account network rules should be set to deny
  • Critical IaC: AZU-0012 devops/Terraform/storage.tf — The default action on Storage account network rules should be set to deny
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: hashicorp-tf-password devops/Terraform/locals.tf:6 — matched rule 'hashicorp-tf-password'
  • Secret: hashicorp-tf-password devops/Terraform/locals.tf:10 — matched rule 'hashicorp-tf-password'
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Workers/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×1
  • NoWarnInCsproj src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.csproj:7 — 1591
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection 10.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection 10.0.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.0.7
Warning — 34 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×13
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.301
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.2
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.3
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.3
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.15.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.15.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.15.3
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×8
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0016 devops/Terraform/key-vault.tf — Key vault should have purge protection enabled
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0057 devops/Terraform/modules/az_flex_function/module.tf — Storage account should have logging enabled
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0061 devops/Terraform/modules/az_flex_function/module.tf — Storage account should have infrastructure encryption enabled
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0022 devops/Terraform/sql.tf — Ensure databases are not publicly accessible
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0027 devops/Terraform/sql.tf — Auditing should be enabled on Azure SQL Databases
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0057 devops/Terraform/storage.tf — Storage account should have logging enabled
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0061 devops/Terraform/storage.tf — Storage account should have infrastructure encryption enabled
  • Medium IaC: AZU-0003 devops/Terraform/web-api.tf — App Service authentication is activated
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain: abstractness 0.07, instability 0.00, distance 0.93 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain: abstractness 0.08, instability 0.00, distance 0.92 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: AspNetCore.HealthChecks.AzureStorage — AspNetCore.HealthChecks.AzureStorage 7.0.0 — Legacy
D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithCallers · ×2
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application/CommandHandlers/SignInViaPasswordHandler.cs:16 — [Obsolete] SignInViaPasswordHandler
  • ObsoleteWithCallers src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain/Commands/SignInViaPassword.cs:6 — [Obsolete] SignInViaPassword
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×2
  • Dead code: StringHelpers src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests/Helpers/StringHelpers.cs:6 — NamedType StringHelpers — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: SignInProviderFactory src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/SignInProviders/SignInProviderFactory.cs:6 — NamedType SignInProviderFactory — no references found in solution.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×2
  • Medium: var-in-href src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Templates/account_setup.html:3 — Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: var-in-href src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Templates/reset_password.html:3 — Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. Emit the link through your template layer's URL construction: a helper that percent-encodes the value and rejects any scheme other than http/https, rather than interpolating it raw. Where the template engine is a third-party generator you do not control, validate the value before it reaches the template. You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.TransformAsync (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.TransformAsync (cognitive 19) src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/OpenApi/FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.cs:25 — FromMixedSourceOperationTransformer.TransformAsync has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 982.
Recommendation — 23 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×12
  • Low IaC: AZU-0015 devops/Terraform/key-vault.tf — Key vault Secret should have a content type set
  • Low IaC: AZU-0017 devops/Terraform/key-vault.tf — Key Vault Secret should have an expiration date set
  • Low IaC: AZU-0058 devops/Terraform/modules/az_flex_function/module.tf — Storage account should use geo-redundant replication
  • Low IaC: AZU-0015 devops/Terraform/modules/random_password_in_key_vault/module.tf — Key vault Secret should have a content type set
  • Low IaC: AZU-0017 devops/Terraform/modules/random_password_in_key_vault/module.tf — Key Vault Secret should have an expiration date set
  • Low IaC: AZU-0015 devops/Terraform/storage.tf — Key vault Secret should have a content type set
  • Low IaC: AZU-0017 devops/Terraform/storage.tf — Key Vault Secret should have an expiration date set
  • Low IaC: AZU-0058 devops/Terraform/storage.tf — Storage account should use geo-redundant replication
  • Low IaC: AZU-0001 devops/Terraform/web-api.tf — Web App accepts incoming client certificate
  • Low IaC: AZU-0015 devops/Terraform/web-api.tf — Key vault Secret should have a content type set
  • Low IaC: AZU-0017 devops/Terraform/web-api.tf — Key Vault Secret should have an expiration date set
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×2
  • Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 6.12.1 — NuGet.Packaging 6.12.1 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.12.5
  • Low CVE: NuGet.Protocol 6.12.1 — NuGet.Protocol 6.12.1 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults/Extensions.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 1 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (2 single-owned of 39 analysed files in total).
D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×1
  • ObsoleteWithoutCallers src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/Controllers/AuthController.cs:62 — [Obsolete] BasicSignIn
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 2 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests` with 13 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 85 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.2 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Typo in class name · ×1
  • Typo in class name: 'JwtCleardownServce' is missing the 'r' in 'Service' and has an extra 'd' or typo in 'Cleardown' (likely meant 'Clear' or 'Cleanup'). This is a spelling error, not just a naming convention issue. — Rename to 'JwtCleardownService' or 'JwtCleanupService' to fix the typo. (symbols: OneBeyond.Studio.Application.Services.JwtAuthentication.JwtCleardownServce, OneBeyond.Studio.Authentication.Application.Services.JwtAuthentication.JwtTokenService)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 7k LoC across 11 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Concentrated knowledge decay · ×1
  • Concentrated knowledge decay — 33 of 39 significant files have no living knowledge, while the repository is still being changed at a low rate (1 commit(s) in the last 90 days) — so this is one repo-wide knowledge-decay state, not 33 separate risks. The code moved on without the people who understood these files: document them or schedule a read-through before the next change lands in them.
Info — 53 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×42
  • Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.Azure.Functions — Aspire.Hosting.Azure.Functions 13.1.0 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost).
  • Outdated: OneBeyond.Studio.Application.SharedKernel — OneBeyond.Studio.Application.SharedKernel 10.0.0.7 → 10.0.0.11 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application).
  • Outdated: OneBeyond.Studio.EmailProviders.Domain — OneBeyond.Studio.EmailProviders.Domain 10.0.0.2 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application).
  • Outdated: OneBeyond.Studio.TemplateRendering — OneBeyond.Studio.TemplateRendering 10.0.0.1 → 10.0.0.2 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application).
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.4 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 18.0.1 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain.Tests).
  • Outdated: OneBeyond.Studio.Domain.SharedKernel — OneBeyond.Studio.Domain.SharedKernel 10.0.0.7 → 10.0.0.11 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain).
  • Outdated: OneBeyond.Studio.FileStorage.Domain — OneBeyond.Studio.FileStorage.Domain 10.0.0.2 → 10.0.0.3 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: OneBeyond.Studio.DataAccess.EFCore — OneBeyond.Studio.DataAccess.EFCore 10.0.0.7 → 10.0.0.11 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Infrastructure).
  • Outdated: Azure.Monitor.OpenTelemetry.AspNetCore — Azure.Monitor.OpenTelemetry.AspNetCore 1.4.0 → 1.6.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience — Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience 10.2.0 → 10.8.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.ServiceDiscovery — Microsoft.Extensions.ServiceDiscovery 10.2.0 → 10.8.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.15.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting 1.15.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.15.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.15.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime 1.15.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: AwesomeAssertions — AwesomeAssertions 9.3.0 → 9.5.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.Tests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.Tests).
  • Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer — Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer 8.1.1 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi).
  • Outdated: Autofac.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Autofac.Extensions.DependencyInjection 10.0.0 → 11.0.2 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 10.0.2 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi).
  • + 17 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×9
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.AppHost: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/79).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain: 5 % XML-doc coverage (3/66).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Infrastructure src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Infrastructure/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Infrastructure.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Infrastructure: 12 % XML-doc coverage (9/72).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.ServiceDefaults: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/5).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi: 19 % XML-doc coverage (32/171).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Workers src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Workers/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Workers.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Workers: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/7).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Application: 5 % XML-doc coverage (5/98).
  • XML-doc coverage: OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain.csproj — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain: 2 % XML-doc coverage (3/185).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi.Tests references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .13artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json27artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .29artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019faf8a-b421-736b-9f6b-ef26d2843d30 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 16 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 16 field(s)
  • SendResetPasswordEmailHandler._emailTemplateLoader src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application/Features/Users/CommandHandlers/SendResetPasswordEmailHandler.cs:29
  • NewUserPasswordEmailSender._emailTemplateLoader src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application/Features/Users/DomainEventHandlers/NewUserPasswordEmailSender.cs:25
  • CreateUserDto.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application/Features/Users/Dto/CreateUserDto.cs:5
  • GetUserDto.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application/Features/Users/Dto/GetUserDto.cs:9
  • ListUsersDto.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Application/Features/Users/Dto/ListUsersDto.cs:9
  • CreateLogin.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain/Commands/CreateLogin.cs:24
  • GenerateResetPasswordTokenByEmail.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain/Commands/GenerateResetPasswordTokenByEmail.cs:15
  • UpdateLogin.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain/Commands/UpdateLogin.cs:26
  • TfaKey.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Authentication.Domain/TfaAuthentication/TfaKey.cs:25
  • PredefinedEmailTemplates.DefaultEmailLayoutTemplate src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Entities/PredefinedEmailTemplates.cs:75
  • PredefinedEmailTemplates.DefaultAccountSetupEmailTemplate src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Entities/PredefinedEmailTemplates.cs:85
  • PredefinedEmailTemplates.DefaultPasswordResetEmailTemplate src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/EmailTemplates/Entities/PredefinedEmailTemplates.cs:94
  • CreateUser.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/Users/Commands/CreateUser.cs:28
  • UpdateUser.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/Users/Commands/UpdateUser.cs:28
  • UserBase.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.Domain/Features/Users/Entities/UserBase.cs:48
  • ForgotPasswordRequest.Email src/OneBeyond.Studio.Obelisk.WebApi/Requests/Auth/ForgotPasswordRequest.cs:5

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md