Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
osoykan-archive/ProductContext-EventSourcing carries serious risk (43%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (91%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Security (27%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (50%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture); 20 Low IaC finding(s) (IaC & Container Security).
For scale: Small (~11,549 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
51%
Adequate · gated by X5
Architecture
91% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
50%
Adequate · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
58%
Adequate · gated by P3
Security
27%
Weak · gated by D31, C2, S1
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 27% · 46% weightMaturity 50% · 25% weightCode Health 51% · 14% weightReadiness 58% · 8% weightArchitecture 91% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight
Raise Security 27 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 43 → ~56.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 5%Plumbing 28%Tests 67%Generated 0%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €13,000–€64,000
| Cost to rebuild | €13,000–€64,000 |
| Domain complexity | High |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 43% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 60% boilerplate · 24% straight-line · 16% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€38,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 27% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
2
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
3
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 27%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. The rest can wait behind it.
Improving trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+9.4 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Trajectory
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityDomain Modelling
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
9.7
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
9.8
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
8.1
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
10.0
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
9.1
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX10 · Repo
Code composition
9.7
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
AX8 · Repo
Test isolation
7.5
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Security
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 50 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, enforce strict access controls by implementing default-deny authorization and imperative guards across all handlers. Second, harden the web-security posture by adding critical response headers and ensuring secure cookie configurations. Third, address the 20 low-severity findings in infrastructure-as-code and container security, prioritizing deployment and Dockerfile updates. Fourth, begin documenting significant architectural decisions in an ADR log to improve transparency. Finally, ensure all async methods propagate cancellation tokens to allow for prompt task termination.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. | +14.9 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. | +14.9 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +3.2 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +3.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with DictionaryByValue.cs (2). | +2.4 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Resolve the 20 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (19), Dockerfile. | +4.2 pts | Medium | IaC & Container Security |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +4.1 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation. | +3.9 pts | Medium | Cancellation propagation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml | 0.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml | 0.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml | 1.2 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| Dockerfile | 3.4 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| docker/couchbase/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/couchbaseintegration/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/ProductContext.Framework/App_Packages/LibLog.4.2/LibLog.cs | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| lib/AggregateSource/src/Core/AggregateSource/AggregateNotFoundException.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage repeated across 14 files |
| src/ProductContext.Framework/ProjectionManager.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/AggregateSource/src/Core/AggregateSource/Optional.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: Optional.Equals (cognitive 19) |
| lib/AggregateSource/src/EventStore.NetCore/AggregateSource.EventStore/AsyncRepository.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs | 9.0 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No direct assertions: Should_consider_two_sets_with_same_items_equals |
| lib/Value/Value.Tests/ListByValueTests.cs | 9.0 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No direct assertions: Should_accept_list_as_constructor_argument |
| lib/Value/Value.Tests/DictionaryByValueTests.cs | 9.0 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No direct assertions: Should_consider_two_instances_with_same_elements_inserted_in_same_order_Equals |
| lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs | 9.0 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No direct assertions: Should_distinguish_properly_implemented_derived_value_type_instances |
| test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/ProductIntegrationTests.cs | 9.1 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No direct assertions: AddProductContent_Should_Append_A_Content_To_Existing_Product |
| lib/Value/Value/DictionaryByValue.cs | 9.3 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| lib/Value/Value.Tests/AmountTests.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No direct assertions: Should_Add_Amount_instances_in_a_Closure_of_operations_style |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 50 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D31D34D35AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX8C2DM5DM6DM8ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 110 of 118 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Optional.Equals at 19.
Optional.Equals (cognitive 19)lib/AggregateSource/src/Core/AggregateSource/Optional.cs:83
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
4 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/ProductContext.Framework/App_Packages/LibLog.4.2/LibLog.cs:984
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/ProductContext.Framework/App_Packages/LibLog.4.2/LibLog.cs:1006
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D5 · Coupling
12 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 16 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D9 · Test Distribution
44 test methods: 39 unit, 5 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
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D10 · Test Quality
1 skipped (1 with a documented reason), 50 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 1083 tests (2 harness-style project(s) excluded from the assertion penalty).
No direct assertions: AddProductContent_Should_Append_A_Content_To_Existing_Product test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/ProductIntegrationTests.cs:34
Skipped (documented): UsingCtorReturnsInstanceWithExpectedPropertieslib/AggregateSource/src/EventStore/AggregateSource.EventStore.IntegratedTests/AsyncRepositoryTests.cs:54
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 35 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
17 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 6457 LoC (1.0/KLoC) → score 8.1.
BareSuppressMessage repeated across 14 fileslib/AggregateSource/src/Core/AggregateSource/AggregateNotFoundException.cs:11
TodoCommentsrc/ProductContext.Framework/ProjectionManager.cs:111
What to do
- Resolve the 1 BareSuppressMessage repeated across 14 files finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AggregateNotFoundException.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with ProjectionManager.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D18 · Solution Shape
12 projects, 254 .cs files, 15536 hand-written lines of code (6457 production / 9079 test), plus 62 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 28 inter-project edges.
Monorepo: only 1 of 11 solutions was scored
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D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
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D24 · Comment Value
12 valuable / 2 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.
redundant comment lib/Value/Value/DictionaryByValue.cs:5
What to do
- Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with DictionaryByValue.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 12 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
76 % of calls cross a namespace and 18 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
66 finding(s): 0 critical, 12 high, 18 medium, 36 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0001 Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 20 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (19), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 18 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (14), Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 warning-level).
- Resolve the 12 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (9), Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
1 of 1 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/ProductContext.WebApi/Startup.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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AX8 · Test isolation
- `SampleSource` (production) references the test project `AggregateSource.Testing.NUnit`. Production must never depend on test code — it pulls a unit-test framework and test fixtures into the shipped product and inverts the only correct direction (tests depend on production, never the reverse). Move any shared helper into a production support library, or invert the reference.
What to do
- Remove every production → test project reference: extract any shared test helper into a production support library (which the tests reference), or invert the dependency so the test project depends on production — not the reverse.
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C2 · Access Controls
- No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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ED5 · Idempotency
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
Do you agree with this assessment?
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `GetHashCode`'s body only throws NotSupportedException — sometimes a deliberate contract, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. — WrappedEventComparerEqualityComparer.cs:30
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×2) — ProjectionManager.cs:82, ProjectionManager.cs:91
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 12 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Only 6/12 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
- Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (dotnet test / npm test / pytest / a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability
- Only 2/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
- Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
- Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×2) — Startup.cs:54, Startup.cs:79
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
Do you agree with this assessment?
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 0/18 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×18) — ProductCommandsApi.cs:31, Startup.cs:57, Startup.cs:139, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
- An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — LibLog.cs:1076
What to do
- Swallowed exception (empty catch)
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/7 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 51% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 50% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 58% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 27% | Weak — gated by D31, C2, S1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 49 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): a message-bus package; 3 CQRS handler(s)
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — only 1/3 markers (an event-store package (Marten/EventStore))
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 12 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
- High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: DS-0002 docker/couchbase/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/couchbaseintegration/Dockerfile
Warning — 28 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0117 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0117 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deployments/productcontext/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 docker/couchbase/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/couchbaseintegration/Dockerfile
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/ProductContext.Framework/App_Packages/LibLog.4.2/LibLog.cs:984
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/AggregateSource/src/EventStore.NetCore/AggregateSource.EventStore/AsyncRepository.cs:112
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/ProductContext.Framework/App_Packages/LibLog.4.2/LibLog.cs:1006
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/ProductContext.Framework/App_Packages/LibLog.4.2/LibLog.cs:1044
D17 · Explicit Debt
- BareSuppressMessage repeated across 14 files lib/AggregateSource/src/Core/AggregateSource/AggregateNotFoundException.cs:11
D17 · Explicit Debt
- TodoComment src/ProductContext.Framework/ProjectionManager.cs:111
D18 · Solution Shape
- Monorepo: only 1 of 11 solutions was scored
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Optional.Equals (cognitive 19) lib/AggregateSource/src/Core/AggregateSource/Optional.cs:83
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured
Recommendation — 76 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality
- No direct assertions: AddProductContent_Should_Append_A_Content_To_Existing_Product test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/ProductIntegrationTests.cs:34
- No direct assertions: CreateProductCommand_Should_Create_Product test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/ProductIntegrationTests.cs:71
- No direct assertions: AddProductVariant_Should_Add_New_Variant_To_Existing_Product test/ProductContext.Integration.Tests/ProductIntegrationTests.cs:98
- No direct assertions: Should_distinguish_properly_implemented_derived_value_type_instances lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs:66
- No direct assertions: Should_find_equals_2_different_instances_of_ValueType_with_different_values_when_equality_is_badly_implemented lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs:77
- No direct assertions: Should_find_equals_2_different_instances_of_ValueType_with_same_values lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs:86
- No direct assertions: Should_retrieve_properly_implemented_derived_value_type_with_same_values_in_a_set lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs:95
- No direct assertions: Should_retrieve_value_type_with_same_values_in_a_set lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs:106
- No direct assertions: Should_retrieve_wrong_instances_from_a_set_when_unicity_is_badly_implemented_on_a_derived_value_type lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs:117
- No direct assertions: Should_work_with_null_when_using_equality_operator lib/Value/Value.Tests/ValueTypeTests.cs:128
- No direct assertions: Should_consider_two_sets_with_same_items_equals lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:25
- No direct assertions: Should_consider_two_sets_with_same_items_in_different_order_equals lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:34
- No direct assertions: Should_not_consider_a_classic_hashSet_and_a_HashSetByValue_Equals lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:43
- No direct assertions: Should_consider_equals_two_ValueType_instances_that_aggregates_equivalent_SetByValue lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:52
- No direct assertions: Should_consider_Not_equals_two_badly_implemented_ValueType_instances_that_aggregates_equivalent_HashSet lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:61
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_Contains lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:118
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_CopyTo lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:127
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_Count lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:141
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_IsProperSubsetOf lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:150
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_IsProperSupersetOf lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:159
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_IsReadOnly lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:170
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_IsSubsetOf lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:179
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_IsSupersetOf lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:188
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_Overlaps lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:197
- No direct assertions: Should_properly_expose_SetEquals lib/Value/Value.Tests/SetByValueTests.cs:206
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0004 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0018 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0030 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0106 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0110 deployments/couchbase/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0004 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0018 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 deployments/eventstore/templates/deployment.yaml
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment lib/Value/Value/DictionaryByValue.cs:5
- redundant comment lib/Value/Value/DictionaryByValue.cs:6
D11 · Test Reliability
- No tests discovered
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
Info — 2 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality
- Skipped (documented): UsingCtorReturnsInstanceWithExpectedProperties lib/AggregateSource/src/EventStore/AggregateSource.EventStore.IntegratedTests/AsyncRepositoryTests.cs:54
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 66 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |