Public report — nbb, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 14:21 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Osstotalsoft/nbb

39% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle

Small · 16,175 LoC · 112 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Security (19%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

69/71dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
70findings with an exact file:lineof 201 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
71/107dimensions across the health lenses16175 LoC · 112 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

osstotalsoft/nbb carries serious risk (39%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

The area that most needs attention is Security (19%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Code Health (51%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture).

For scale: Small (~16,175 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 19% · 45% weightCode Health 51% · 25% weightReadiness 54% · 14% weightMaturity 55% · 8% weightPerformance 66% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 74% · 2% weightArchitecture 77% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 82% · 1% weight

Raise Security 19 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 39 → ~55.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 13%Plumbing 52%Tests 33%Generated 2%
New since the last scan (100+)

135 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.

  • D2 · TypeInfo.ParseInternal (cognitive 20) src/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.Abstractions/DefaultMessageTypeRegistry.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.Abstractions/TypeExtensions.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) samples/Orchestration/ProcessManagerSample/OrderProcessManager.cs
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Migrations/Program.cs
  • D5 · Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: NBB.Core.DependencyInjection
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: NBB.Correlation
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: NBB.Domain
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: NBB.Application.MediatR.Effects
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: NBB.MultiTenancy.Abstractions
  • D5 · Off the main sequence: NBB.Core.Effects
  • D12 · Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol
  • D12 · Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators
  • D12 · Vulnerable: AutoMapper
  • D12 · Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Api
  • D12 · Deprecated: STAN.Client
  • D12 · Deprecated: xunit
  • D12 · Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore
  • D12 · Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore
  • D12 · Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.HttpListener
  • D12 · Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.SemanticConventions
  • D16 · dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode samples/Monolith/NBB.Mono/Program.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode test/Benchmarks/EventStoreBenchmarks/Program.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment samples/MultiTenancy/NBB.Todo.Api/Startup.cs
  • D17 · EmptyCatchBlock src/EventStore/NBB.EventStore.AdoNet.Migrations/AdoNetEventStoreDatabaseMigrator.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.Host/Internal/MessagingHost.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment src/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.InProcessMessaging/Internal/InProcessMessagingTransport.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode test/UnitTests/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.InProcessMessaging.Tests/InProcessMessagingTests.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment test/UnitTests/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.Rusi.Tests/SubscriberTests.cs
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Application/NBB.Contracts.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/NBB.Contracts.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Application/NBB.Contracts.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/NBB.Contracts.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Application/NBB.Contracts.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/NBB.Contracts.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Application/NBB.Contracts.Application.csproj
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/NBB.Contracts.Api.csproj
  • D19 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D24 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-drafter.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/Controllers/ContractsController.cs
  • D29 · Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/Controllers/InvoicesController.cs
  • D29 · Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/Controllers/PayablesController.cs
  • D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0
  • D30 · High CVE: AutoMapper 14.0.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators 1.14.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.14.0

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €11,000–€57,000
Cost to rebuild€11,000–€57,000 (0.1–0.4 person-years (191–604 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 39% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 51% boilerplate · 29% straight-line · 20% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€34,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 19% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
+16.7 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection
2
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
+16.7 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls
3
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
+15.6 pts · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 19%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (16,175 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 19%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
42 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Evidence: DM5 setters: 0 · DM4 anemic: 1 · DM2 primitive ids: 41
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch EventStoreBenchmarks EventStoreBenchmarks Application.Effects.Tests Application.Effects.Tests Contracts.Api Contracts.Api ctx:Correlation.Serilog Correlation.Serilog Serilog Contracts.Api->ctx:Correlation.Serilog ctx:Messaging.Nats Messaging.Nats Nats Contracts.Api->ctx:Messaging.Nats Contracts.Migrations Contracts.Migrations Contracts.Worker Contracts.Worker ctx:Contracts Contracts Application · Domain Contracts.Worker->ctx:Contracts Contracts.Worker->ctx:Correlation.Serilog ctx:EventStore EventStore EventStore Contracts.Worker->ctx:EventStore ctx:EventStore.AdoNet EventStore.AdoNet AdoNet Contracts.Worker->ctx:EventStore.AdoNet ctx:Messaging Messaging Host Contracts.Worker->ctx:Messaging Contracts.Worker->ctx:Messaging.Nats Core.Configuration.Tests Core.Configuration.Tests Core.Effects.Tests Core.Effects.Tests Core.Pipeline.Tests Core.Pipeline.Tests Data.EntityFramework.MultiTenancy.Tests Data.EntityFramework.MultiTenancy.Tests Data.EntityFramework.Tests Data.EntityFramework.Tests Data.EventSourcing.Tests Data.EventSourcing.Tests Domain.Tests Domain.Tests EventStore.AdoNet.Migrations EventStore.AdoNet.Migrations EventStore.AdoNet.Migrations->ctx:EventStore.AdoNet EventStore.AdoNet.Tests EventStore.AdoNet.Tests EventStore.InMemory.Tests EventStore.InMemory.Tests EventStore.IntegrationTests EventStore.IntegrationTests EventStore.Tests EventStore.Tests Http.Effects.Tests Http.Effects.Tests Invoices.Api Invoices.Api Invoices.Api->ctx:Messaging Invoices.Api->ctx:Messaging.Nats Invoices.Migrations Invoices.Migrations Invoices.Worker Invoices.Worker Invoices.Worker->ctx:Correlation.Serilog Invoices.Worker->ctx:EventStore Invoices.Worker->ctx:EventStore.AdoNet ctx:Invoices Invoices Application · Domain Invoices.Worker->ctx:Invoices Invoices.Worker->ctx:Messaging Invoices.Worker->ctx:Messaging.Nats Messaging.Abstractions.Tests Messaging.Abstractions.Tests Messaging.DataContracts.Tests Messaging.DataContracts.Tests Messaging.Effects.Tests Messaging.Effects.Tests Messaging.Host.Tests Messaging.Host.Tests Messaging.InProcessMessaging.Tests Messaging.InProcessMessaging.Tests Messaging.MultiTenancy.Tests Messaging.MultiTenancy.Tests Messaging.Rusi.IntegrationTests Messaging.Rusi.IntegrationTests Messaging.Rusi.Tests Messaging.Rusi.Tests MicroServicesOrchestration MicroServicesOrchestration MicroServicesOrchestration->ctx:Correlation.Serilog MicroServicesOrchestration->ctx:EventStore MicroServicesOrchestration->ctx:EventStore.AdoNet MicroServicesOrchestration->ctx:Messaging MicroServicesOrchestration->ctx:Messaging.Nats Mono Mono Mono->ctx:Contracts Mono->ctx:Correlation.Serilog Mono->ctx:EventStore Mono->ctx:EventStore.AdoNet Mono->ctx:Invoices ctx:Payments Payments Application · Domain Mono->ctx:Payments Mono.Migrations Mono.Migrations MultiTenancy.Abstractions.Tests MultiTenancy.Abstractions.Tests MultiTenancy.Identification.Http.Tests MultiTenancy.Identification.Http.Tests MultiTenancy.Identification.Messaging.Tests MultiTenancy.Identification.Messaging.Tests MultiTenancy.Identification.Tests MultiTenancy.Identification.Tests Payments.Api Payments.Api Payments.Api->ctx:Messaging.Nats Payments.Migrations Payments.Migrations Payments.Worker Payments.Worker Payments.Worker->ctx:Correlation.Serilog Payments.Worker->ctx:EventStore Payments.Worker->ctx:EventStore.AdoNet Payments.Worker->ctx:Messaging Payments.Worker->ctx:Messaging.Nats Payments.Worker->ctx:Payments ProcessManager.Tests ProcessManager.Tests ProjectR.Tests ProjectR.Tests Todo.Api Todo.Api Todo.Api->ctx:Correlation.Serilog ctx:Messaging.Abstractions Messaging.Abstractions Abstractions Todo.Api->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions ctx:Messaging.MultiTenancy Messaging.MultiTenancy MultiTenancy Todo.Api->ctx:Messaging.MultiTenancy Todo.Api->ctx:Messaging.Nats Todo.Migrations Todo.Migrations Todo.Worker Todo.Worker ctx:Correlation Correlation Correlation Todo.Worker->ctx:Correlation Todo.Worker->ctx:Correlation.Serilog Todo.Worker->ctx:Messaging Todo.Worker->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions Todo.Worker->ctx:Messaging.MultiTenancy Todo.Worker->ctx:Messaging.Nats Tools.Serilog.Enrichers.ServiceIdentifier.Tests Tools.Serilog.Enrichers.ServiceIdentifier.Tests Tools.Serilog.Enrichers.TenantId.Tests Tools.Serilog.Enrichers.TenantId.Tests ProcessManagerSample ProcessManagerSample ctx:Core.Abstractions Core.Abstractions Abstractions ProcessManagerSample->ctx:Core.Abstractions ProcessManagerSample->ctx:Messaging ProcessManagerSample->ctx:Messaging.Nats ctx:Contracts->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions ctx:Core.Effects Core.Effects Effects ctx:Correlation.Serilog->ctx:Correlation ctx:EventStore->ctx:Correlation ctx:EventStore.AdoNet->ctx:EventStore ctx:Invoices->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions ctx:Messaging->ctx:Core.Abstractions ctx:Messaging->ctx:Core.Effects ctx:Messaging->ctx:Correlation ctx:Messaging->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions ctx:Messaging.Abstractions->ctx:Core.Abstractions ctx:Messaging.Abstractions->ctx:Correlation ctx:Messaging.MultiTenancy->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions ctx:MultiTenancy.Abstractions MultiTenancy.Abstractions Abstractions ctx:Messaging.MultiTenancy->ctx:MultiTenancy.Abstractions ctx:Messaging.Nats->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions ctx:Payments->ctx:Messaging.Abstractions __more__ +51 more contexts

Architecture — module dependency matrix

99 modules, 117 dependencies — 5 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

NBB.Core.Abstractions…e.Abstractions.PagingNBB.Core.EffectsNBB.Core.Pipeline…Store.AdoNet.Internal….Abstractions.Options…ntification.Resolvers…ation.Mediator.FSharp…B.Core.Evented.FSharpNBB.Data.Abstractions…B.Domain.Abstractions…entStore.Abstractions…essaging.Abstractions…iTenancy.Abstractions…essManager.Definition…me.SideEffectHandlers(global)….Data.EntityFrameworkNBB.Data.EventSourcingNBB.EventStoreNBB.EventStore.EffectsNBB.Messaging.Host…B.Messaging.JetStream…ssaging.Nats.Internal….Abstractions.Context…ractions.Repositories…r.Runtime.Persistence….Evented.FSharp.TestsNBB.EventStore.AdoNet…nvoices.FSharp.Domain…ssaging.Host.InternalNBB.Messaging.Nats…actions.Configuration…ification.Identifiers…rocessManager.Runtime…e.AdoNet.Multitenancy…enancy.Identification…entification.Services…essaging.MultiTenancy…B.MultiTenancy.AspNetNBB.Core.Abstractions1…e.Abstractions.Paging2NBB.Core.Effects3NBB.Core.Pipeline4…Store.AdoNet.Internal5….Abstractions.Options6…ntification.Resolvers7…ation.Mediator.FSharp8…B.Core.Evented.FSharp9NBB.Data.Abstractions10…B.Domain.Abstractions11…entStore.Abstractions12…essaging.Abstractions13…iTenancy.Abstractions14…essManager.Definition15…me.SideEffectHandlers16(global)17….Data.EntityFramework18NBB.Data.EventSourcing19NBB.EventStore20NBB.EventStore.Effects21NBB.Messaging.Host22…B.Messaging.JetStream23…ssaging.Nats.Internal24….Abstractions.Context25…ractions.Repositories26…r.Runtime.Persistence27….Evented.FSharp.Tests28NBB.EventStore.AdoNet29…nvoices.FSharp.Domain30…ssaging.Host.Internal31NBB.Messaging.Nats32…actions.Configuration33…ification.Identifiers34…rocessManager.Runtime35…e.AdoNet.Multitenancy36…enancy.Identification37…entification.Services38…essaging.MultiTenancy39…B.MultiTenancy.AspNet4011123211441812421235129176212131122242412293411211213122411122412111111+59 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 51% · Adequate · gated by X5

At a glance — Architecture · 77% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 55% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 54% · Adequate · gated by D12

At a glance — Security · 19% · Critical · gated by D29, D30, D36, C1, C2

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 74% · Adequate · gated by DM2

At a glance — Event-Driven · 82% · Strong

At a glance — Performance · 66% · Adequate

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components15High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection12High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by encrypting sensitive data at rest and managing keys in a vault, then enforce strict access controls by applying default-deny authorization to all endpoints. Next, harden the web security posture by adding essential security headers to every response. Finally, address the nine high-priority static analysis findings and the ten high-severity dependency vulnerabilities to complete the security remediation.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+16.7 ptsMediumData Protection
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.+16.7 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+15.6 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Resolve the 9 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql-analysis.yml (4), ci.yml (2), release.yml (2).+5.6 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 10 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.+4.3 ptsMediumDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.+2.2 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 1 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AdoNetEventStoreDatabaseMigrator.cs.+2.0 ptsLowExplicit Debt
Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ContractsController.cs, InvoicesController.cs, PayablesController.cs.+1.9 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 32 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 56% mixed · 44% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Application/NBB.Contracts.Application.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/NBB.Contracts.Api.csproj5.5MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
.github/workflows/ci.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/release.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
.github/workflows/release-drafter.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/EventStore/NBB.EventStore.AdoNet.Migrations/AdoNetEventStoreDatabaseMigrator.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/Controllers/ContractsController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/Controllers/InvoicesController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/Controllers/PayablesController.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization
samples/Monolith/NBB.Mono/Program.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
test/Benchmarks/EventStoreBenchmarks/Program.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 69 of 71 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 71 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D15D17D18D20D21D22D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 70 of 201 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc800-6398-709d-9f74-c6e7f9a785f4.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D20, D21, D22, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was TypeInfo.ParseInternal at 20.

TypeInfo.ParseInternal (cognitive 20)src/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.Abstractions/DefaultMessageTypeRegistry.cs:228

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×3src/Core/NBB.Core.Abstractions/TypeExtensions.cs:26
Duplicated block (23 lines × 2)src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:116
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:17
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)samples/Orchestration/ProcessManagerSample/OrderProcessManager.cs:45
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3)samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Migrations/Program.cs:13

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

112 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure
Off the main sequence: NBB.Core.DependencyInjection · ×6

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 79 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 100.0%, branch coverage 83.3%.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

253 test methods: 253 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 27 mock references across 253 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×27

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene0.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

60 outdated, 4 vulnerable, 2 deprecated, 4 prerelease packages.

Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol · ×4
Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore · ×4
Deprecated: STAN.Client · ×2
Outdated: MediatR · ×60

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

48 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 15868 LoC (2.2/KLoC) → score 5.6.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×36samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj:17
EmptyCatchBlocksrc/EventStore/NBB.EventStore.AdoNet.Migrations/AdoNetEventStoreDatabaseMigrator.cs:55
CommentedOutCode · ×4samples/Monolith/NBB.Mono/Program.cs:36
TodoComment · ×4samples/MultiTenancy/NBB.Todo.Api/Startup.cs:136
ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×3src/Application/NBB.Application.DataContracts/Command.cs:9

What to do

  1. Resolve the 36 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj (4), NBB.Payments.Application.csproj (4), NBB.Payments.Api.csproj (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (36 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AdoNetEventStoreDatabaseMigrator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Program.cs (2), ReflectionExtensions.cs, InProcessMessagingTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

112 projects, 487 source files, 23216 hand-written lines of code (15868 production / 7348 test), plus 497 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 754 inter-project edges.

Shell project: NBB.Todo.PublishedLanguagesamples/MultiTenancy/NBB.Todo.PublishedLanguage/NBB.Todo.PublishedLanguage.csproj
Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 API inconsistencies across 30 exposed types.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 112 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

98 % of calls cross a namespace and 10 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.9/10. — 98 % of calls cross a namespace and 10 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×9.github/workflows/ci.yml:17detected by semgrep finding
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization · ×3samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/Controllers/ContractsController.cs:17detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql-analysis.yml (4), ci.yml (2), release.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ContractsController.cs, InvoicesController.cs, PayablesController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities2.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 10 high, 5 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 · ×10detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 · ×5detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

trivy found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

69 of 69 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs.

Dormant codebase
Largest orphaned filesrc/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ServiceCollectionExtension.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 1348 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `MessagingHost` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_subscriptions, _subscriberStopSource, _stoppingSource; e.g. `_subscriptions` at line 116). — MessagingHost.cs:21
  • `Storage` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_subscriptions; e.g. `_subscriptions` at line 65). — Storage.cs:12
  • `StanConnectionProvider` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_connection, _lazyConnection; e.g. `_connection` at line 68). — StanConnectionManager.cs:15
  • `NoopTransportMonitor` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (disposedValue; e.g. `disposedValue` at line 22). — NoopTransportMonitor.cs:9
  • `TimeoutsManager` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_startSlice, _disposedValue; e.g. `_startSlice` at line 78). — TimeoutsManager.cs:13
  • `InMemoryTimeoutRepository` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_storage, disposedValue; e.g. `_storage` at line 30). — InMemoryTimeoutRepository.cs:12

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `PayableExpired.PayableId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — InvoicingProcessManager.cs:29
  • `PayableExpired.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — InvoicingProcessManager.cs:29
  • `Contract.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Contract.cs:14
  • `Contract.ClientId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Contract.cs:17
  • `ContractAmountUpdated.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:9
  • `ContractCreated.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:11
  • `ContractCreated.ClientId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:11
  • `ContractLineAdded.ContractLineId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:13
  • `ContractLineAdded.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:13
  • `ContractValidated.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. (×2) — DomainEvents.cs:15, IntegrationEvents.cs:9
  • `ContractValidated.ClientId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. (×2) — DomainEvents.cs:15, IntegrationEvents.cs:9
  • `InvoiceCreated.InvoiceId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. (×2) — DomainEvents.cs:9, IntegrationEvents.cs:9
  • `InvoiceCreated.ClientId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. (×2) — DomainEvents.cs:9, IntegrationEvents.cs:9
  • `InvoiceCreated.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. (×2) — DomainEvents.cs:9, IntegrationEvents.cs:9
  • `InvoicePayed.InvoiceId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:11
  • `InvoicePayed.PaymentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:11
  • `InvoicePayed.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:11
  • `Invoice.InvoiceId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Invoice.cs:12
  • `Invoice.ClientId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Invoice.cs:14
  • `Invoice.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Invoice.cs:16
  • `Invoice.PaymentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Invoice.cs:22
  • `InvoiceLock.InvoicetId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — InvoiceLock.cs:25
  • `InvoiceMarkedAsPayed.InvoiceId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — IntegrationEvents.cs:10
  • `InvoiceMarkedAsPayed.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — IntegrationEvents.cs:10
  • `PayableCreated.PayableId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:9
  • `PayableCreated.InvoiceId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:9
  • `PayableCreated.ClientId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:9
  • `PayableCreated.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:9
  • `PaymentReceived.PaymentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:12
  • `PaymentReceived.PayableId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:12
  • `PaymentReceived.InvoiceId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:12
  • `PaymentReceived.ContractId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — DomainEvents.cs:12
  • `Payable.PayableId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payable.cs:11
  • `Payable.ClientId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payable.cs:12
  • `Payable.InvoiceId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Payable.cs:14
  • 29 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 69.

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `IEventSourcedAggregateRoot` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — IEventSourcedAggregateRoot.cs:8

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED3 · Event naming9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `InvoiceEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — InvoiceAggregate.fs:20
  • `DomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. (×3) — Tests.fs:12, Sample2.fs:15, Sample.fs:11

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `ReadModelGenerator.Handle` writes to the database while `ContractDomainEventHandlers.Handle` publishes to the message bus in the same command-handling flow, with no outbox referenced on either path. Splitting the persist and the publish across sibling methods (or two collaborating actors) doesn't make them atomic — a crash between the two either loses the message or emits a phantom event. Use the transactional outbox pattern so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — ReadModelGenerator.cs:27

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency3.3 / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `CommandHandlers.ContractCommandHandlers.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (×3) — ContractCommandHandlers.cs:30, ContractCommandHandlers.cs:37, ContractCommandHandlers.cs:44
  • `DomainEventHandlers.ContractDomainEventHandlers.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — ContractDomainEventHandlers.cs:22
  • `DomainEventHandlers.ReadModelGenerator.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (×4) — ReadModelGenerator.cs:27, ReadModelGenerator.cs:38, ReadModelGenerator.cs:54, …
  • `CommandHandlers.CreateInvoiceCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateInvoiceCommandHandler.cs:21
  • `CommandHandlers.ProcessInvoiceCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — ProcessInvoiceCommandHandler.cs:25
  • `DomainEventHandlers.InvoiceDomainEventHandlers.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (×2) — InvoiceDomainEventHandlers.cs:24, InvoiceDomainEventHandlers.cs:32
  • `CommandHandlers.CreatePayableCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreatePayableCommandHandler.cs:23
  • `CommandHandlers.PayPayableCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — PayPayableCommandHandler.cs:23
  • `DomainEventHandlers.PaymentDomainEventHandlers.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (×2) — PaymentDomainEventHandlers.cs:23, PaymentDomainEventHandlers.cs:33
  • `Application.CreateTodoTaskHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateTodoTaskHandler.cs:22
  • `Effects.Handler.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (×2) — Mediator.cs:91, PublishMessage.cs:24
  • `Runtime.TimeoutOccuredHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — TimeoutOccuredHandler.cs:21
  • `SideEffectHandlers.RequestTimeoutHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — RequestTimeoutHandler.cs:27

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — TenantConfiguration.cs:23, ConfigurationTenantRepository.cs:58

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `GetByHost` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — ConfigurationTenantRepository.cs:56
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×6) — InProcessMessagingTransport.cs:49, JetStreamConnectionProvider.cs:50, JetStreamConnectionProvider.cs:51, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 72 of 112 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.3 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 29/58 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 58, 15 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • A BenchmarkDotNet suite exists but no [MemoryDiagnoser] — allocations (the main way a library pressures its host's GC) aren't being measured.

What to do

  • Add [MemoryDiagnoser] to the benchmarks so allocation regressions are visible, not just time.
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 6 use(s) across 20,273 production line(s) (~0.3/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 17 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×17) — Program.cs:14, Program.cs:16, Program.cs:19, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 109/121 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×8) — ContractsController.cs:33, ProcessInvoiceCommandHandler.cs:35, PayablesController.cs:29, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×4) — ContractsController.cs:41, DefaultDeadLetterQueue.cs:132, IMessagingHost.cs:28, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — AdoNetEventStoreDatabaseMigrator.cs:55

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X4 · Structured logging5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×7) — MessagingHost.cs:62, MessagingHost.cs:94, JetStreamConnectionProvider.cs:52, …

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types1.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 1/82 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~1.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 1 suppression(s) across the 546 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health51%Adequate — gated by X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture77%StrongSolid.
Maturity55%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness54%Adequate — gated by D12Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security19%Critical — gated by D29, D30, D36, C1, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling74%Adequate — gated by DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven82%StrongStrongest area.
Performance66%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 36 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 3 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds; an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events)
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 61 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×36
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj:17 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj:15 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj:17 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj:17 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj:15 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj:17 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj:19 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Application/NBB.Contracts.Application.csproj:15 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/NBB.Contracts.Api.csproj:19 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj:17 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj:15 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj:17 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj:17 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj:15 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj:17 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj:19 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Application/NBB.Contracts.Application.csproj:15 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/NBB.Contracts.Api.csproj:19 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Worker/NBB.Payments.Worker.csproj:17 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Application/NBB.Payments.Application.csproj:15 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/NBB.Payments.Api.csproj:17 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Worker/NBB.Invoices.Worker.csproj:17 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Application/NBB.Invoices.Application.csproj:15 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/NBB.Invoices.Api.csproj:17 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Worker/NBB.Contracts.Worker.csproj:19 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • + 11 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×10
  • High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 14.0.0 — AutoMapper 14.0.0 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×9
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:43 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:63 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:71 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-drafter.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: release-drafter/release-drafter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `release-drafter/release-drafter@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:13 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×4
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators 1.14.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 14.0.0 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Api — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.14.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · EmptyCatchBlock · ×1
  • EmptyCatchBlock src/EventStore/NBB.EventStore.AdoNet.Migrations/AdoNetEventStoreDatabaseMigrator.cs:55 — empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×1
  • Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure — NBB.Payments.Application (Application) references NBB.Payments.Data (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
Warning — 41 finding(s)
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×6
  • Off the main sequence: NBB.Core.DependencyInjection — NBB.Core.DependencyInjection: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 10 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: NBB.Correlation — NBB.Correlation: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 24 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: NBB.Domain — NBB.Domain: abstractness 0.82, instability 1.00, distance 0.82 — zone of uselessness — abstract and unstable, so it's likely unused.
  • Off the main sequence: NBB.Application.MediatR.Effects — NBB.Application.MediatR.Effects: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.20, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 4 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: NBB.MultiTenancy.Abstractions — NBB.MultiTenancy.Abstractions: abstractness 0.14, instability 0.10, distance 0.76 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
  • Off the main sequence: NBB.Core.Effects — NBB.Core.Effects: abstractness 0.25, instability 0.00, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 8 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators 1.14.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.14.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.14.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency · ×4
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore resolves to 1.14.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore resolves to 1.14.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.HttpListener — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.HttpListener resolves to 1.14.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.SemanticConventions — OpenTelemetry.SemanticConventions resolves to 1.0.0-rc9.9, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×4
  • CommentedOutCode samples/Monolith/NBB.Mono/Program.cs:36 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:231 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode test/Benchmarks/EventStoreBenchmarks/Program.cs:14 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode test/UnitTests/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.InProcessMessaging.Tests/InProcessMessagingTests.cs:41 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×4
  • TodoComment samples/MultiTenancy/NBB.Todo.Api/Startup.cs:136 — //TODO refactor ProblemDetails with AspNet.Core implementations — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.Host/Internal/MessagingHost.cs:64 — // TODO: when upgrading to .NET 8 remove the "suppressed" check since it doesn't throw any more
  • TodoComment src/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.InProcessMessaging/Internal/InProcessMessagingTransport.cs:45 — //TODO: push to DLQ — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment test/UnitTests/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.Rusi.Tests/SubscriberTests.cs:52 — //TODO: use more reliable awaiting — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×3
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Api/Controllers/ContractsController.cs:17 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Api/Controllers/InvoicesController.cs:17 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Api/Controllers/PayablesController.cs:16 — Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×3
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.Abstractions/TypeExtensions.cs:26 — src/Core/NBB.Core.Abstractions/TypeExtensions.cs:26-44 | src/Core/NBB.Core.Abstractions/TypeExtensions.cs:64-82 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Core/NBB.Core.Abstractions/TypeExtensions.cs:26` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:38 — src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:38-56 | src/Orchestration/NBB.ProcessManager.Definition/ReflectionExtensions.cs:35-53 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:60 — src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:60-78 | src/Orchestration/NBB.ProcessManager.Definition/ReflectionExtensions.cs:57-75 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:60` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2
  • Deprecated: STAN.Client — STAN.Client 0.3.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `NATS.Client.JetStream`; migrate the reference to it.
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 58 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1149.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · TypeInfo.ParseInternal (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • TypeInfo.ParseInternal (cognitive 20) src/Messaging/NBB.Messaging.Abstractions/DefaultMessageTypeRegistry.cs:228 — TypeInfo.ParseInternal has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 958.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 9 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
  • PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 1 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (ci.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 1 sibling workflow in the same repository is already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:116 — src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:116-138 | src/Orchestration/NBB.ProcessManager.Definition/ReflectionExtensions.cs:118-140 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:116` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:17 — src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:17-35 | src/Orchestration/NBB.ProcessManager.Definition/ReflectionExtensions.cs:16-32 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ReflectionExtensions.cs:17` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) samples/Orchestration/ProcessManagerSample/OrderProcessManager.cs:45 — samples/Orchestration/ProcessManagerSample/OrderProcessManager.cs:45-56 | samples/Orchestration/ProcessManagerSample/OrderProcessManager.cs:108-119 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `samples/Orchestration/ProcessManagerSample/OrderProcessManager.cs:45` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Migrations/Program.cs:13 — samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Migrations/Program.cs:13-21 | samples/MicroServices/NBB.Invoices/NBB.Invoices.Migrations/Program.cs:13-22 | samples/MicroServices/NBB.Payments/NBB.Payments.Migrations/Program.cs:13-21 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `samples/MicroServices/NBB.Contracts/NBB.Contracts.Migrations/Program.cs:13` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×3
  • ObsoleteWithoutCallers src/Application/NBB.Application.DataContracts/Command.cs:9 — [Obsolete] Command
  • ObsoleteWithoutCallers src/Application/NBB.Application.DataContracts/Command.cs:20 — [Obsolete] Command
  • ObsoleteWithoutCallers src/Application/NBB.Application.DataContracts/Event.cs:9 — [Obsolete] Event
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: NBB.Todo.PublishedLanguage samples/MultiTenancy/NBB.Todo.PublishedLanguage/NBB.Todo.PublishedLanguage.csproj — `NBB.Todo.PublishedLanguage` contributes only 7 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 21 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `NBB.Correlation.Serilog` with 12 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 90 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.82 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 15868 LoC spread over 112 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so its structure warrants explicit bounded-context boundaries. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 69 of 69 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 69 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×1
  • Largest orphaned file src/Core/NBB.Core.DependencyInjection/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Info — 87 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×60
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.5.0 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.EnvironmentVariables — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.EnvironmentVariables 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Console — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Console 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.SourceLink.GitHub — Microsoft.SourceLink.GitHub 8.0.0 → 10.0.301 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: MinVer — MinVer 6.0.0 → 7.0.0 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 4.3.0 → 4.4.0 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.MSSqlServer — Serilog.Sinks.MSSqlServer 9.0.2 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by NBB.MicroServicesOrchestration).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Console — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Console 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Propagators 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime 1.14.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 10.0.1 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Api).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.Migrations).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.ReadModel.Data).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.Contracts.ReadModel.Data).
  • Outdated: Giraffe — Giraffe 8.2.0 → 8.3.0 available (referenced by NBB.Invoices.FSharp.Api).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 10.0.1 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by NBB.Payments.Data).
  • + 35 more in this group — see findings.md.
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×27
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.EventStore.IntegrationTests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.Rusi.IntegrationTests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Application.Effects.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Core.Effects.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Core.Pipeline.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Data.EntityFramework.MultiTenancy.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Data.EntityFramework.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Data.EventSourcing.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Domain.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.EventStore.InMemory.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.EventStore.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Http.Effects.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.Abstractions.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.DataContracts.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.Effects.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.Host.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.InProcessMessaging.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.MultiTenancy.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.Messaging.Rusi.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.MultiTenancy.Abstractions.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.MultiTenancy.Identification.Http.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.MultiTenancy.Identification.Messaging.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.MultiTenancy.Identification.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.ProcessManager.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — NBB.ProjectR.Tests references Moq.
  • + 2 more in this group — see findings.md.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .12artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list NBB.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json15artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .0artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc800-6398-709d-9f74-c6e7f9a785f4 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 1 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 1 field(s)
  • SchemaDefinition.FullName src/Application/NBB.Application.DataContracts.Schema/SchemaDefinition.cs:9

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md