Public report — ForexTradingBot, published 29 Jun 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
285findings with an exact file:lineof 371 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
75/96dimensions across the health lenses58263 LoC · 8 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
papiedris9/ForexTradingBot carries serious risk (42%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (46%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates (Domain vs controller coverage); Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Medium (~58,263 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.6 person-years (~1–4 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
This codebase represents roughly ~1.6 person-years of build effort (about ~€230,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, event-driven integration, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with CloudflareRadarService.cs, FmpApiClient.cs.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~1.6 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+1.8 pts/run over 9 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +1.8 pts/run over 9 runs
Trajectory
Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 42 ▲ 1 over 9 runs.
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
At a glance — Code Health · 67% · Adequate · gated by IC1
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
6
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
4
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
1
Medium
Roadmap
First, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure-as-code while documenting recovery time and data loss objectives to ensure true disaster resilience. Next, raise unit-test coverage for the domain layer to guarantee core business logic correctness. Then, enable automated dependency and secret scanning tools to maintain security and performance hygiene. Finally, address the two deprecated dependencies and resolve the two leaked secrets in the identified service files.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with CloudflareRadarService.cs, FmpApiClient.cs.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 72 of 75 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 75 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 285 of 371 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
+ 33 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 TelegramUserApiClient.ResolvePeerAsync (cyclomatic 55) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with TelegramUserApiClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CloudflareRadarCallbackHandler.FormatCountryReportMessage (cyclomatic… finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with CloudflareRadarCallbackHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ForwardingJobActions.ApplyEditOptions (cyclomatic 41) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ForwardingJobActions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 57 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 ForwardingJobActions.ApplyEditOptions (cognitive 81) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ForwardingJobActions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 TelegramUserApiClient.ResolvePeerAsync (cognitive 77) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with TelegramUserApiClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CloudflareRadarCallbackHandler.FormatCountryReportMessage (cognitive 72) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with CloudflareRadarCallbackHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 10 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with AdviceService.cs, EmbeddedRedisService.cs, ForwardingJobActions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 9 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with AdviceService.cs, EducationalContentHandler.cs, ForwardingJobActions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with EmbeddedRedisService.cs (2), RssReaderService.cs, TelegramUserApiClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 12 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 53 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs (2), AiApiConfiguration.cs, AppException.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (53 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CRAP 1722 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with ForwardingJobActions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CRAP 930 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with CryptoDataOrchestrator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
1 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Tests co-located / outside the solution
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 1 tests.
No assertions (empty test): Test1Tests.Application/UnitTest1.cs:5
Mock framework: Moq
What to do
Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with CloudflareRadarService.cs, FmpApiClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
170 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is Infrastructure/Services/AdviceService.cs.
Small-team knowledge concentration
What to do
Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
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D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
3 of 8 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split Application
Split Infrastructure
Split TelegramPanel
What to do
Resolve the 1 Split Application finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Split Infrastructure finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Split TelegramPanel finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D27 · Navigability3.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
90 % of calls cross a namespace and 13 % go through an interface, but 68 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: large — vertical-slice locality expected.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 3.7/10. — 90 % of calls cross a namespace and 13 % go through an interface, but 68 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: large — vertical-slice locality expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×3TelegramPanel/Infrastructure/Services/CloudflareRadarService.cs:17detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with CloudflareRadarService.cs, FmpApiClient.cs, FredApiClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
167 of 221 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Infrastructure/Services/EmbeddedRedisService.cs.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).
Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
D39 · IL Efficiency9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
41 of 2004 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
IL efficiency: 41 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetInfrastructure/Services/AdviceService.cs:15
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. (×2) — indexapp.html:706, status.html:648
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
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AC2 · Forms & labels3.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×21) — config.html:585, config.html:586, config.html:587, …
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×4) — indexapp.html:667, info.html:671, login.html:558, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — login.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
This stylesheet animates but never checks prefers-reduced-motion, so motion-sensitive users can't opt out. Wrap motion in @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference). (×7) — config.html:22, indexapp.html:19, info.html:22, …
A CSS rule's foreground/background colour pair falls below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×8) — config.html:22, indexapp.html:19, info.html:22, …
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`TelegramUserApiClient` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_channelConsumerTask, _internalWtcUserCache, _internalWtcChatCache, _cacheCleanupTimer, _client; e.g. `_channelConsumerTask` at line 324). (×2) — TelegramUserApiClient.cs:26, TelegramUserApiClient.cs:26
`DynamicConfigurationService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_definedSettings; e.g. `_definedSettings` at line 160). — DynamicConfigurationService.cs:24
`ConsoleQueueMetricsService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_concurrency, _lastReportTime, _lastProcessedCount; e.g. `_concurrency` at line 64). — ConsoleQueueMetricsService.cs:15
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IAppDbContext` declares 25 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IAppDbContext.cs:11
`IDynamicSetting` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IDynamicConfigurationService.cs:7
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
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AX7 · Slice cohesion4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.
Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.
`ForwardingRule` (slice 'Forwarding') depends on `MessageFilterOptions` from slice 'Fowarding'. — ForwardingRule.cs:7
`CryptoDataOrchestrator` (slice 'Crypto') depends on `IFmpService` from slice 'Fmp'. — CryptoDataOrchestrator.cs:12
`CryptoCallbackHandler` (slice 'CoinGecko') depends on `ICryptoDataOrchestrator` from slice 'Crypto'. — CryptoCallbackHandler.cs:22
What to do
Keep slices independent: share cross-slice needs via an explicit contract/shared-kernel, not direct references between slices.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
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C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
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C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent write-side hook), [Audited] per-entity coverage.
What to do
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob).
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: a TTL/index expiry, a scheduled purge/cleanup job, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A placeholder string ("Job:{JobId}: ApplyEditOptions: Skipping …") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingJobActions.cs:842
A placeholder string ("Job:{JobId}: ApplyEditOptions: Text repl…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingJobActions.cs:853
A placeholder string ("Job:{JobId}: ApplyEditOptions: Entity se…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingJobActions.cs:896
A placeholder string ("Job:{JobId}: ApplyEditOptions: Remapped …") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingJobActions.cs:902
A placeholder string ("
SELECT * FROM public."F…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. (×4) — ForwardingRuleRepository.cs:227, ForwardingRuleRepository.cs:261, ForwardingRuleRepository.cs:289, …
A placeholder string ("
INSERT INTO public."For…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingRuleRepository.cs:394
A placeholder string ("DELETE FROM public."ForwardingRuleTextRe…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingRuleRepository.cs:450
A placeholder string ("INSERT INTO public."ForwardingRuleTextRe…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingRuleRepository.cs:451
A placeholder string ("ForwardingRuleTextReplacements") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ForwardingRuleConfiguration.cs:41
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×13) — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:284, EmbeddedRedisService.cs:289, EmbeddedRedisService.cs:294, …
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`EnhanceMessageAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — GeminiService.cs:156
`GetJobResultAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — GeminiService.cs:573
`EnhanceMessagesBatchAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — GeminiService.cs:593
`FallbackRedisService` has 21 unfinished members out of 31 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:265
`GetServer` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×4) — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:282, EmbeddedRedisService.cs:287, EmbeddedRedisService.cs:292, …
`GetServerListAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:302
`GetEndPoints` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:354
`Wait` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:359, EmbeddedRedisService.cs:364
`WaitAll` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:369
`HashSlot` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:374
`GetSubscriber` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:379
`GetServers` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:384
`ConfigureAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:389
`Configure` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:394
`GetStormLog` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:399
`ResetStormLog` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:404
`PublishReconfigure` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:409
`PublishReconfigureAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:414
`GetHashSlot` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:419
`AddLibraryNameSuffix` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:424
`GetCounters` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:429
`FallbackDatabase` has 417 unfinished members out of 484 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:464
`CreateBatch` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:477
`CreateTransaction` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:482
`GeoDistance` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:507
`GeoHash` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — EmbeddedRedisService.cs:517
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 8 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
Only 2/8 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (dotnet test / npm test / pytest / a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().
Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P9 · Domain vs controller coverage1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.
Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.
Domain coverage is 0% — the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.
What to do
Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 13 use(s) across 65,026 production line(s) (~0.2/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
7 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
What to do
Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×5) — DatabaseConfigurationProvider.cs:77, RssReaderService.cs:1876, RssReaderService.cs:1887, …
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 440/471 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — RedisNotificationRateLimiter.cs:78, RedisNotificationRateLimiter.cs:120, RedisNotificationRateLimiter.cs:154, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×2) — Program.cs:1564, ExceptionSanitizer.cs:388
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.6 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 13 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (24%; ≈26% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 42 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 22 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 1 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED1 Handler temporal coupling — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED2 Event/command shape — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED3 Event naming — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ED4 Outbox / dual-write — no events and no event/broker handlers detected — event-driven integration not assessable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High CVE: AutoMapper 14.0.0 — AutoMapper 14.0.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.10 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.10 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Dead code: MapCoinGeckoIdToFmpSymbol Application/Features/Crypto/Services/CryptoDataOrchestrator.cs:265— Method MapCoinGeckoIdToFmpSymbol — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BroadcastOrchestrationService Application/Services/BroadcastOrchestrationService.cs:3— NamedType BroadcastOrchestrationService — no references found in solution.
Dead code: ForwardingRuleWithReplacementsDto Infrastructure/Features/Forwarding/Repositories/ForwardingRuleRepository.cs:71— NamedType ForwardingRuleWithReplacementsDto — no references found in solution.
Dead code: SanitizeSensitiveData Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs:945— Method SanitizeSensitiveData — no references found in solution.
Dead code: SanitizeSensitiveData Infrastructure/Services/DynamicConfigurationService.cs:83— Method SanitizeSensitiveData — no references found in solution.
Dead code: HandleFetchException Infrastructure/Services/RssReaderService.cs:1593— Method HandleFetchException — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EnhanceMessageWithAiAsync Infrastructure/Services/TelegramUserApiClient.cs:1336— Method EnhanceMessageWithAiAsync — no references found in solution.
Dead code: RecoverCaptionFromMedia Infrastructure/Services/TelegramUserApiClient.cs:1934— Method RecoverCaptionFromMedia — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EnhanceCaptionWithAiAsync Infrastructure/Services/TelegramUserApiClient.cs:1956— Method EnhanceCaptionWithAiAsync — no references found in solution.
Dead code: CheckGeminiJobResultAsync Infrastructure/Services/TelegramUserApiClient.cs:2623— Method CheckGeminiJobResultAsync — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EscapeTelegramMarkdownV2 BackgroundTasks/Services/NotificationSendingService.cs:552— Method EscapeTelegramMarkdownV2 — no references found in solution.
Dead code: UserLookupHandler TelegramPanel/Application/CommandHandlers/Admin/UserLookupHandler.cs:3— NamedType UserLookupHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BuildPaginatedKeyboard TelegramPanel/Application/CommandHandlers/Features/Educational/EducationalContentHandler.cs:672— Method BuildPaginatedKeyboard — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetErrorStateKeyboard TelegramPanel/Application/CommandHandlers/Features/News/FundamentalAnalysisCallbacks.cs:431— Method GetErrorStateKeyboard — no references found in solution.
Dead code: ShouldShowProcessingToast TelegramPanel/Application/CommandHandlers/Settings/SettingsCallbackQueryHandler.cs:363— Method ShouldShowProcessingToast — no references found in solution.
Dead code: FrankfurterResponse TelegramPanel/Infrastructure/Services/MarketDataService.cs:541— NamedType FrankfurterResponse — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EscapeTelegramMarkdownV2 TelegramPanel/Infrastructure/TelegramMessageSender.cs:588— Method EscapeTelegramMarkdownV2 — no references found in solution.
TodoComment Shared/Security/SecureExceptionSanitizer.cs:67— // TODO: Use a secure key vault or environment variable — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment TelegramPanel/Application/CommandHandlers/Settings/SettingsCallbackQueryHandler.cs:1130— // TODO: Replace with your actual Privacy Policy URL and Support Contact information. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment TelegramPanel/Infrastructure/Services/UpdateHandler.cs:86— // TODO: Here you would typically route to a command handler, state machine, etc. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment WebAPI/Controllers/TelegramConfigurationController.cs:15— // TODO: Consider specific admin role if available e.g., [Authorize(Roles = AppRoles.Administrator)] — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment WebAPI/Controllers/TestController.cs:67— // TODO: Replace with a secure key management solution — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Off the main sequence: Domain — Domain: abstractness 0.09, instability 0.00, distance 0.91 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Shared — Shared: abstractness 0.12, instability 0.00, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1212.
CRAP 1722: ForwardingJobActions.ApplyEditOptions Application/Features/Forwarding/Services/ForwardingJobActions.cs:720— Cyclomatic 41 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 930: CryptoDataOrchestrator.GetCryptoDetailsAsync Application/Features/Crypto/Services/CryptoDataOrchestrator.cs:57— Cyclomatic 30 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 600: ForwardingJobActions.ProcessAndRelayMessageAsync Application/Features/Forwarding/Services/ForwardingJobActions.cs:194— Cyclomatic 24 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 506: ForwardingJobActions.CloneEntityWithNewOffset Application/Features/Forwarding/Services/ForwardingJobActions.cs:1022— Cyclomatic 22 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 462: GeminiService.AttemptApiCallAsync Application/Services/GeminiService.cs:415— Cyclomatic 21 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 380: ForwardingJobActions.ShouldProcessMessageBasedOnFilters Application/Features/Forwarding/Services/ForwardingJobActions.cs:337— Cyclomatic 19 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 272: ForwardingJobActions.ProcessCustomSendAsync Application/Features/Forwarding/Services/ForwardingJobActions.cs:443— Cyclomatic 16 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 210: ForwardingJobActions.ForwardingJobActions.ctor Application/Features/Forwarding/Services/ForwardingJobActions.cs:30— Cyclomatic 14 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
No tests discovered — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) built and ran but no tests were discovered, so reliability couldn't be exercised.
D16 · Bus Factor· Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
Small-team knowledge concentration — 170 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 170 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
Shell project: Application.Tests Application.Tests/Application.Tests.csproj— `Application.Tests` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 56k LoC across 8 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
redundant comment Application/Common/Interfaces/Cashe/ICacheService.cs:7— "--- NEW METHODS FOR THE UPGRADE ---" — trim - generated marker restating new methods; remove or link to migration notes
Split Application — Catch-all name that is huge (11k LoC) and sprawls over 34 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: split the 34 namespaces into cohesive application modules
Split Infrastructure — Generic catch-all at 20k LoC across 20 namespaces is a sprawling grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: separate the 20 namespaces into focused infrastructure packages
Split TelegramPanel — Catch-all name that is large and spans 31 unrelated namespaces despite moderate size. Suggested: by namespace: break the 31 namespaces into cohesive Telegram panel modules
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Dormant codebase — 167 of 221 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 167 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
IL efficiency: 41 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget Infrastructure/Services/AdviceService.cs:15— 41 of 2004 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Infrastructure.Services.AdviceService..cctor @ Infrastructure/Services/AdviceService.cs:15, 5941 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.6/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution· Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
Tests co-located / outside the solution — 1 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
Run 019f1571-b82c-73c6-b413-67950f1e37f6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 15 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 15 · Warnings: 277 · Recommendations: 17 · Info: 62 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-06-2026 @ 22:13 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.