Public report — jsPDF, published 6 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 06-08-2026 @ 20:32 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Parallax/jsPDF

36% At Risk

— · weakest lens: Readiness (31%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

42/44dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
194findings with an exact file:lineof 204 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
44/102dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

parallax/jsPDF carries serious gaps (36%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (31%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (35%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package (Security & performance tooling); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).

For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 31% · 50% weightSecurity 35% · 27% weightCode Health 41% · 15% weightMaturity 59% · 8% weight

Raise Readiness 31 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 36 → ~43.

New since the last scan (100+)

165 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.

  • D1 · text (cyclomatic 123) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · Ad (cyclomatic 97) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · rb (cyclomatic 85) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · Je (cyclomatic 69) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · Le (cyclomatic 66) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · Me (cyclomatic 61) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · Kc (cyclomatic 53) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · _resolveCharType (cyclomatic 52) src/libs/bidiEngine.js
  • D1 · WebPDecodeRGBA (cyclomatic 52) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · Jb (cyclomatic 49) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · jsPDF (cyclomatic 46) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · GifReader (cyclomatic 44) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D1 · output (cyclomatic 34) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · addFrame (cyclomatic 33) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D1 · Cd (cyclomatic 33) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · table (cyclomatic 32) src/modules/cell.js
  • D1 · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31) src/modules/annotations.js
  • D1 · encodeColorString (cyclomatic 29) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · doBidiReorder (cyclomatic 29) src/libs/bidiEngine.js
  • D1 · viewerPreferences (cyclomatic 26) src/modules/viewerpreferences.js
  • D1 · to8bitStream (cyclomatic 24) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · getPageSize (cyclomatic 23) src/modules/html.js
  • D1 · addImage (cyclomatic 23) src/modules/addimage.js
  • D1 · Oc (cyclomatic 23) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · putStream (cyclomatic 22) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · getImageFileTypeByImageData (cyclomatic 22) src/modules/addimage.js
  • D1 · oc (cyclomatic 22) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · getCorrectForm (cyclomatic 21) src/modules/arabic.js
  • D1 · gc (cyclomatic 20) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · putImage (cyclomatic 19) src/modules/addimage.js
  • D1 · GifWriter (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D1 · GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D1 · H (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · ge (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · getCharWidthsArray (cyclomatic 18) src/modules/split_text_to_size.js
  • D1 · combineFontStyleAndFontWeight (cyclomatic 17) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · putCatalog (cyclomatic 17) src/jspdf.js
  • D1 · hc (cyclomatic 17) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D1 · cell (cyclomatic 16) src/modules/cell.js
  • D1 · toPDFName (cyclomatic 16) src/libs/pdfname.js
  • D2 · rb (cognitive 245) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · text (cognitive 183) src/jspdf.js
  • D2 · Me (cognitive 173) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · WebPDecodeRGBA (cognitive 165) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · Je (cognitive 160) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · Ad (cognitive 155) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · Le (cognitive 151) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · Jb (cognitive 105) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · GifReader (cognitive 84) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D2 · Kc (cognitive 77) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · viewerPreferences (cognitive 61) src/modules/viewerpreferences.js
  • D2 · _resolveCharType (cognitive 52) src/libs/bidiEngine.js
  • D2 · jsPDF (cognitive 51) src/jspdf.js
  • D2 · getImageFileTypeByImageData (cognitive 50) src/modules/addimage.js
  • D2 · output (cognitive 47) src/jspdf.js
  • D2 · (anonymous) (cognitive 43) src/modules/annotations.js
  • D2 · Cd (cognitive 43) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · table (cognitive 40) src/modules/cell.js
  • D2 · Oc (cognitive 39) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · to8bitStream (cognitive 38) src/jspdf.js
  • D2 · oc (cognitive 38) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · encodeColorString (cognitive 37) src/jspdf.js
  • D2 · GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream (cognitive 35) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D2 · addFrame (cognitive 34) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D2 · H (cognitive 33) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · putStream (cognitive 31) src/jspdf.js
  • D2 · doBidiReorder (cognitive 31) src/libs/bidiEngine.js
  • D2 · De (cognitive 29) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · splitParagraphIntoLines (cognitive 28) src/modules/split_text_to_size.js
  • D2 · _computeLevels (cognitive 27) src/libs/bidiEngine.js
  • D2 · GifWriter (cognitive 26) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D2 · gc (cognitive 26) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · cell (cognitive 25) src/modules/cell.js
  • D2 · putImage (cognitive 22) src/modules/addimage.js
  • D2 · getCharWidthsArray (cognitive 21) src/modules/split_text_to_size.js
  • D2 · ge (cognitive 21) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · combineFontStyleAndFontWeight (cognitive 20) src/jspdf.js
  • D2 · getCorrectForm (cognitive 20) src/modules/arabic.js
  • D2 · addImage (cognitive 20) src/modules/addimage.js
  • D2 · GifWriterOutputLZWCodeStream (cognitive 20) src/libs/omggif.js
  • D2 · utf8TextFunction (cognitive 19) src/modules/utf8.js
  • D2 · getPageSize (cognitive 19) src/modules/html.js
  • D2 · getTextDimensions (cognitive 19) src/modules/cell.js
  • D2 · _invertByLevel (cognitive 19) src/libs/bidiEngine.js
  • D2 · processPNG (cognitive 17) src/modules/png_support.js
  • D2 · processIndexedPNG (cognitive 17) src/modules/png_support.js
  • D2 · toPDFName (cognitive 17) src/libs/pdfname.js
  • D2 · hc (cognitive 17) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D2 · nodeReadFile (cognitive 16) src/modules/fileloading.js
  • D2 · processDU (cognitive 16) src/libs/JPEGEncoder.js
  • D2 · encode (cognitive 16) src/libs/JPEGEncoder.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: src/jspdf.js src/jspdf.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: specs/jspdf.unit.spec.js test/specs/jspdf.unit.spec.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: modules/png_support.js src/modules/png_support.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: libs/bidiEngine.js src/libs/bidiEngine.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: libs/WebPDecoder.js src/libs/WebPDecoder.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: js/ace.js examples/js/ace.js
  • D3 · FileTooLong: web/viewer.js examples/PDF.js/web/viewer.js
  • D8 · No automated tests
  • D18 · Dimension evaluation failed

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+8.2 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+8.2 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+9.8 pts · Medium effort · Observability

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.

At a glance — Code Health · 41% · Weak · gated by D2, D3, R1, R3

At a glance — Architecture · — · —

At a glance — Maturity · 59% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 31% · Weak · gated by D8, D9, P2, P3

At a glance — Security · 35% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, D36, D38

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection28High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures19High / Critical

Roadmap

First, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog and establish health checks to improve observability. Next, introduce static application security testing and dependency scanning to strengthen security and performance tooling. Then, clean up the codebase by removing unused dependencies and explicitly declaring imports. Finally, address the single missing automated test and ensure all tests are properly distributed.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+8.2 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+8.2 ptsLowTest Distribution
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+9.8 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.+9.8 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+8.6 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.+6.0 ptsMediumType Safety
Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.+6.0 ptsMediumLarge Files
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.+4.5 ptsMediumCyclomatic Complexity

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 30 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 3% slop · 67% mixed · 30% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
package-lock.json0.2SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
examples/js/basic.js4.4MixedSecrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token
examples/node/arabic.js4.4MixedSecrets (history): Secret: aws-access-token
.github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/npm-publish.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
examples/js/ace.js6.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: wildcard-postmessage-configuration
src/jspdf.js7.0MixedCyclomatic Complexity: text (cyclomatic 123)
src/libs/WebPDecoder.js7.0MixedCyclomatic Complexity: Ad (cyclomatic 97)
src/libs/omggif.js7.0MixedCyclomatic Complexity: GifReader (cyclomatic 44)
src/libs/bidiEngine.js7.0MixedCyclomatic Complexity: _resolveCharType (cyclomatic 52)
src/modules/addimage.js7.1MixedCyclomatic Complexity: addImage (cyclomatic 23)
src/modules/cell.js7.1MixedCyclomatic Complexity: table (cyclomatic 32)
.github/workflows/stale.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/modules/split_text_to_size.js7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: getCharWidthsArray (cyclomatic 18)
src/modules/png_support.js7.4MixedCognitive Complexity: processPNG (cognitive 17)
src/modules/annotations.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31)
src/modules/viewerpreferences.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: viewerPreferences (cyclomatic 26)
src/modules/html.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: getPageSize (cyclomatic 23)
src/modules/arabic.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: getCorrectForm (cyclomatic 21)
src/libs/pdfname.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: toPDFName (cyclomatic 16)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 42 of 44 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 44 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D8D9D12D13D15D16D19D21D26D27D28D29D33D34D35D36D37D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 194 of 204 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd8c7-2ab4-7e44-bff3-d54f9f2257da.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

40 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was text at 123.

text (cyclomatic 123)src/jspdf.js:3487
Ad (cyclomatic 97)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3287
rb (cyclomatic 85)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1136
Je (cyclomatic 69)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1823
Le (cyclomatic 66)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:2815

+ 35 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 text (cyclomatic 123) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with jspdf.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Ad (cyclomatic 97) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with WebPDecoder.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 rb (cyclomatic 85) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with WebPDecoder.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity2.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

51 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was rb at 245.

rb (cognitive 245)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1136
text (cognitive 183)src/jspdf.js:3487
Me (cognitive 173)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:2081
WebPDecodeRGBA (cognitive 165)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:5103
Je (cognitive 160)src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1823

+ 46 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 rb (cognitive 245) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with WebPDecoder.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 text (cognitive 183) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with jspdf.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Me (cognitive 173) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with WebPDecoder.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: src/jspdf.js · ×7src/jspdf.js:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with WebPDecoder.js, ace.js, bidiEngine.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  2. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — the solution has no test code.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The documentation is clear and complete for a PDF-generation library: an excellent README with live demo links, install instructions, and a dedicated test project showing Vite compatibility; architecture/design docs (modules_xmp_metadata.js.html, modules_webp_support.js.html) cover the module API and are clipped only at the end of the xMP metadata section. The visible content is strong.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The documentation is clear and complete for a PDF-generation library: an excellent README with live demo links, install instructions, and a dedicated test project showing Vite compatibility; architecture/design docs (modules_xmp_metadata.js.html, modules_webp_support.js.html) cover the module API and are clipped only at the end of the xMP metadata section. The visible content is strong.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

78 finding(s): 0 critical, 78 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: aws-access-token · ×18examples/js/basic.js:361detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 18 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with arabic.js (9), basic.js (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

28 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 1 medium, 16 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×11.github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:11detected by semgrep finding
Medium: wildcard-postmessage-configurationexamples/js/ace.js:1240detected by semgrep finding
Low: plaintext-http-link · ×16docs/global.html:1683detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with index.html (7), total_mess.html (7), global.html. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with continuous-integration.yml (8), npm-publish.yml (2), stale.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ace.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

64 finding(s): 1 critical, 21 high, 30 medium, 12 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×21package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×28package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 28 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (28). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 21 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (21). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
R1 · Type Safety0.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 3 typed · 137 plain JS

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • src/jspdf.js:5168 · src/jspdf.js:5241 — jspdf.js:5168
  • src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3979 · src/libs/bidiEngine.js:2056 · test/specs/jspdf.unit.spec.js:781 — WebPDecoder.js:3979
  • src/libs/JPEGEncoder.js:63 · src/libs/JPEGEncoder.js:170 · src/libs/JPEGEncoder.js:374 · src/libs/bidiEngine.js:10 — JPEGEncoder.js:63
  • src/jspdf.js:392 · src/jspdf.js:438 — jspdf.js:392
  • src/jspdf.js:4721 · src/jspdf.js:4779 — jspdf.js:4721
  • src/jspdf.js:4679 · src/jspdf.js:4848 — jspdf.js:4679
  • src/jspdf.js:4506 · src/jspdf.js:4680 · src/jspdf.js:4849 — jspdf.js:4506
  • src/polyfills.js:25 · src/polyfills.js:81 — polyfills.js:25

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — jspdf.js:3487, WebPDecoder.js:3287, WebPDecoder.js:1136, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files2.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 15 file(s) over 400 lines

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — jspdf-tests.ts, jspdf-tests-node.ts, Blob.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 13 application, 11 tooling and 63 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (13 application, 11 tooling, 63 test roots considered) (×5) — jspdf-tests.ts, jspdf-tests-node.ts, cli.js, …
  • Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×2) — jspdf.js:6179, fontFace.js:302

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health41%Weak — gated by D2, D3, R1, R3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity59%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness31%Weak — gated by D8, D9, P2, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security35%Weak — gated by D28, D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 59 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
  • AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 53 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×21
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — cross-spawn 5.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.0.6
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — engine.io 6.6.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.6.7
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.6
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — koa 2.16.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — linkify-it 3.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — linkify-it 3.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — picomatch 2.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — socket.io-parser 4.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.2.7
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — socket.io-parser 4.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.2.6
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — taffydb: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — tmp 0.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.2.6
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — underscore 1.13.7: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.13.8
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — ws 8.18.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.21.0
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×18
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/js/basic.js:361 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token examples/node/arabic.js:1 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×11
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:11 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:13 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:34 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:36 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:57 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:59 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:77 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/continuous-integration.yml:79 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/npm-publish.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/npm-publish.yml:15 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/stale.yml:13 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.5.4
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — the solution has no test code. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 128 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×28
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — ajv 6.12.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.14.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — bn.js 4.11.9: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.12.3
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.13
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.7
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.3.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.3.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.11
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.3.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.6
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.6
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.7
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.3.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — dompurify 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.4.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — follow-redirects 1.15.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.16.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.14.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — markdown-it 12.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 14.2.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — morgan 1.10.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — picomatch 2.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.3.2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — qs 6.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.14.1
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — qs 6.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.15.2
  • + 3 more in this group — see findings.md.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×7
  • FileTooLong: src/jspdf.js src/jspdf.js:0 — FileTooLong — 6179 lines.
  • FileTooLong: specs/jspdf.unit.spec.js test/specs/jspdf.unit.spec.js:0 — FileTooLong — 3654 lines.
  • FileTooLong: modules/png_support.js src/modules/png_support.js:0 — FileTooLong — 545 lines.
  • FileTooLong: libs/bidiEngine.js src/libs/bidiEngine.js:0 — FileTooLong — 2690 lines.
  • FileTooLong: libs/WebPDecoder.js src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:0 — FileTooLong — 5449 lines.
  • FileTooLong: js/ace.js examples/js/ace.js:0 — FileTooLong — 15247 lines.
  • FileTooLong: web/viewer.js examples/PDF.js/web/viewer.js:0 — FileTooLong — 20038 lines.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · text (cyclomatic 123) · ×1
  • text (cyclomatic 123) src/jspdf.js:3487 — text has cyclomatic complexity 123 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Ad (cyclomatic 97) · ×1
  • Ad (cyclomatic 97) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3287 — Ad has cyclomatic complexity 97 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · rb (cyclomatic 85) · ×1
  • rb (cyclomatic 85) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1136 — rb has cyclomatic complexity 85 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Je (cyclomatic 69) · ×1
  • Je (cyclomatic 69) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1823 — Je has cyclomatic complexity 69 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Le (cyclomatic 66) · ×1
  • Le (cyclomatic 66) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:2815 — Le has cyclomatic complexity 66 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Me (cyclomatic 61) · ×1
  • Me (cyclomatic 61) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:2081 — Me has cyclomatic complexity 61 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Kc (cyclomatic 53) · ×1
  • Kc (cyclomatic 53) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1624 — Kc has cyclomatic complexity 53 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · _resolveCharType (cyclomatic 52) · ×1
  • _resolveCharType (cyclomatic 52) src/libs/bidiEngine.js:2257 — _resolveCharType has cyclomatic complexity 52 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · WebPDecodeRGBA (cyclomatic 52) · ×1
  • WebPDecodeRGBA (cyclomatic 52) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:5103 — WebPDecodeRGBA has cyclomatic complexity 52 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Jb (cyclomatic 49) · ×1
  • Jb (cyclomatic 49) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:993 — Jb has cyclomatic complexity 49 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · jsPDF (cyclomatic 46) · ×1
  • jsPDF (cyclomatic 46) src/jspdf.js:209 — jsPDF has cyclomatic complexity 46 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · GifReader (cyclomatic 44) · ×1
  • GifReader (cyclomatic 44) src/libs/omggif.js:420 — GifReader has cyclomatic complexity 44 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · output (cyclomatic 34) · ×1
  • output (cyclomatic 34) src/jspdf.js:3075 — output has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · addFrame (cyclomatic 33) · ×1
  • addFrame (cyclomatic 33) src/libs/omggif.js:134 — addFrame has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Cd (cyclomatic 33) · ×1
  • Cd (cyclomatic 33) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3612 — Cd has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · table (cyclomatic 32) · ×1
  • table (cyclomatic 32) src/modules/cell.js:379 — table has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31) src/modules/annotations.js:79 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · encodeColorString (cyclomatic 29) · ×1
  • encodeColorString (cyclomatic 29) src/jspdf.js:1646 — encodeColorString has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · doBidiReorder (cyclomatic 29) · ×1
  • doBidiReorder (cyclomatic 29) src/libs/bidiEngine.js:2559 — doBidiReorder has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · viewerPreferences (cyclomatic 26) · ×1
  • viewerPreferences (cyclomatic 26) src/modules/viewerpreferences.js:109 — viewerPreferences has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · to8bitStream (cyclomatic 24) · ×1
  • to8bitStream (cyclomatic 24) src/jspdf.js:2513 — to8bitStream has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getPageSize (cyclomatic 23) · ×1
  • getPageSize (cyclomatic 23) src/modules/html.js:864 — getPageSize has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · addImage (cyclomatic 23) · ×1
  • addImage (cyclomatic 23) src/modules/addimage.js:788 — addImage has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Oc (cyclomatic 23) · ×1
  • Oc (cyclomatic 23) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3209 — Oc has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · putStream (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • putStream (cyclomatic 22) src/jspdf.js:1761 — putStream has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getImageFileTypeByImageData (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • getImageFileTypeByImageData (cyclomatic 22) src/modules/addimage.js:130 — getImageFileTypeByImageData has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · oc (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • oc (cyclomatic 22) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:740 — oc has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getCorrectForm (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • getCorrectForm (cyclomatic 21) src/modules/arabic.js:264 — getCorrectForm has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · gc (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • gc (cyclomatic 20) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:640 — gc has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · putImage (cyclomatic 19) · ×1
  • putImage (cyclomatic 19) src/modules/addimage.js:201 — putImage has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · GifWriter (cyclomatic 19) · ×1
  • GifWriter (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/omggif.js:34 — GifWriter has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream (cyclomatic 19) · ×1
  • GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/omggif.js:764 — GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · H (cyclomatic 19) · ×1
  • H (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:97 — H has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ge (cyclomatic 19) · ×1
  • ge (cyclomatic 19) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:845 — ge has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getCharWidthsArray (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • getCharWidthsArray (cyclomatic 18) src/modules/split_text_to_size.js:47 — getCharWidthsArray has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · combineFontStyleAndFontWeight (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • combineFontStyleAndFontWeight (cyclomatic 17) src/jspdf.js:368 — combineFontStyleAndFontWeight has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · putCatalog (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • putCatalog (cyclomatic 17) src/jspdf.js:2877 — putCatalog has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · hc (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • hc (cyclomatic 17) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3557 — hc has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · cell (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • cell (cyclomatic 16) src/modules/cell.js:269 — cell has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · toPDFName (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • toPDFName (cyclomatic 16) src/libs/pdfname.js:6 — toPDFName has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · rb (cognitive 245) · ×1
  • rb (cognitive 245) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1136 — rb has cognitive complexity 245 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · text (cognitive 183) · ×1
  • text (cognitive 183) src/jspdf.js:3487 — text has cognitive complexity 183 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Me (cognitive 173) · ×1
  • Me (cognitive 173) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:2081 — Me has cognitive complexity 173 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · WebPDecodeRGBA (cognitive 165) · ×1
  • WebPDecodeRGBA (cognitive 165) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:5103 — WebPDecodeRGBA has cognitive complexity 165 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Je (cognitive 160) · ×1
  • Je (cognitive 160) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1823 — Je has cognitive complexity 160 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Ad (cognitive 155) · ×1
  • Ad (cognitive 155) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3287 — Ad has cognitive complexity 155 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Le (cognitive 151) · ×1
  • Le (cognitive 151) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:2815 — Le has cognitive complexity 151 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Jb (cognitive 105) · ×1
  • Jb (cognitive 105) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:993 — Jb has cognitive complexity 105 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GifReader (cognitive 84) · ×1
  • GifReader (cognitive 84) src/libs/omggif.js:420 — GifReader has cognitive complexity 84 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Kc (cognitive 77) · ×1
  • Kc (cognitive 77) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1624 — Kc has cognitive complexity 77 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · viewerPreferences (cognitive 61) · ×1
  • viewerPreferences (cognitive 61) src/modules/viewerpreferences.js:109 — viewerPreferences has cognitive complexity 61 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · _resolveCharType (cognitive 52) · ×1
  • _resolveCharType (cognitive 52) src/libs/bidiEngine.js:2257 — _resolveCharType has cognitive complexity 52 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · jsPDF (cognitive 51) · ×1
  • jsPDF (cognitive 51) src/jspdf.js:209 — jsPDF has cognitive complexity 51 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getImageFileTypeByImageData (cognitive 50) · ×1
  • getImageFileTypeByImageData (cognitive 50) src/modules/addimage.js:130 — getImageFileTypeByImageData has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · output (cognitive 47) · ×1
  • output (cognitive 47) src/jspdf.js:3075 — output has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 43) · ×1
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 43) src/modules/annotations.js:79 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Cd (cognitive 43) · ×1
  • Cd (cognitive 43) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3612 — Cd has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · table (cognitive 40) · ×1
  • table (cognitive 40) src/modules/cell.js:379 — table has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Oc (cognitive 39) · ×1
  • Oc (cognitive 39) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3209 — Oc has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · to8bitStream (cognitive 38) · ×1
  • to8bitStream (cognitive 38) src/jspdf.js:2513 — to8bitStream has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · oc (cognitive 38) · ×1
  • oc (cognitive 38) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:740 — oc has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · encodeColorString (cognitive 37) · ×1
  • encodeColorString (cognitive 37) src/jspdf.js:1646 — encodeColorString has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream (cognitive 35) · ×1
  • GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream (cognitive 35) src/libs/omggif.js:764 — GifReaderLZWOutputIndexStream has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · addFrame (cognitive 34) · ×1
  • addFrame (cognitive 34) src/libs/omggif.js:134 — addFrame has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · H (cognitive 33) · ×1
  • H (cognitive 33) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:97 — H has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · putStream (cognitive 31) · ×1
  • putStream (cognitive 31) src/jspdf.js:1761 — putStream has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · doBidiReorder (cognitive 31) · ×1
  • doBidiReorder (cognitive 31) src/libs/bidiEngine.js:2559 — doBidiReorder has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · De (cognitive 29) · ×1
  • De (cognitive 29) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:1774 — De has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · splitParagraphIntoLines (cognitive 28) · ×1
  • splitParagraphIntoLines (cognitive 28) src/modules/split_text_to_size.js:183 — splitParagraphIntoLines has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · _computeLevels (cognitive 27) · ×1
  • _computeLevels (cognitive 27) src/libs/bidiEngine.js:2409 — _computeLevels has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GifWriter (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • GifWriter (cognitive 26) src/libs/omggif.js:34 — GifWriter has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · gc (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • gc (cognitive 26) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:640 — gc has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · cell (cognitive 25) · ×1
  • cell (cognitive 25) src/modules/cell.js:269 — cell has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · putImage (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • putImage (cognitive 22) src/modules/addimage.js:201 — putImage has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getCharWidthsArray (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • getCharWidthsArray (cognitive 21) src/modules/split_text_to_size.js:47 — getCharWidthsArray has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ge (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • ge (cognitive 21) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:845 — ge has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · combineFontStyleAndFontWeight (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • combineFontStyleAndFontWeight (cognitive 20) src/jspdf.js:368 — combineFontStyleAndFontWeight has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getCorrectForm (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • getCorrectForm (cognitive 20) src/modules/arabic.js:264 — getCorrectForm has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · addImage (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • addImage (cognitive 20) src/modules/addimage.js:788 — addImage has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GifWriterOutputLZWCodeStream (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • GifWriterOutputLZWCodeStream (cognitive 20) src/libs/omggif.js:270 — GifWriterOutputLZWCodeStream has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · utf8TextFunction (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • utf8TextFunction (cognitive 19) src/modules/utf8.js:239 — utf8TextFunction has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getPageSize (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • getPageSize (cognitive 19) src/modules/html.js:864 — getPageSize has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getTextDimensions (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • getTextDimensions (cognitive 19) src/modules/cell.js:179 — getTextDimensions has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · _invertByLevel (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • _invertByLevel (cognitive 19) src/libs/bidiEngine.js:2477 — _invertByLevel has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · processPNG (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • processPNG (cognitive 17) src/modules/png_support.js:55 — processPNG has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · processIndexedPNG (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • processIndexedPNG (cognitive 17) src/modules/png_support.js:376 — processIndexedPNG has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · toPDFName (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • toPDFName (cognitive 17) src/libs/pdfname.js:6 — toPDFName has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · hc (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • hc (cognitive 17) src/libs/WebPDecoder.js:3557 — hc has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · nodeReadFile (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • nodeReadFile (cognitive 16) src/modules/fileloading.js:125 — nodeReadFile has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · processDU (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • processDU (cognitive 16) src/libs/JPEGEncoder.js:1039 — processDU has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · encode (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • encode (cognitive 16) src/libs/JPEGEncoder.js:1104 — encode has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1
  • Medium: wildcard-postmessage-configuration examples/js/ace.js:1240 — The target origin of the window.postMessage() API is set to "*". This could allow for information disclosure due to the possibility of any origin allowed to receive the message.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
Recommendation — 22 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×16
  • Low: plaintext-http-link docs/global.html:1683 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link docs/index.html:69 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link docs/index.html:69 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link docs/index.html:69 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link docs/index.html:71 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link docs/index.html:71 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link docs/index.html:257 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/showcase_supported_html.html:207 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/total_mess.html:21 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/total_mess.html:50 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/total_mess.html:57 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/total_mess.html:63 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/total_mess.html:70 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/total_mess.html:139 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link examples/html2pdf/total_mess.html:153 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link index.html:133 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .78artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .28artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .64artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fd8c7-2ab4-7e44-bff3-d54f9f2257da · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md