Public report — phoenix, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
118findings with an exact file:lineof 124 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
30/104dimensions across the health lenses37747 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Preview lens: this repo is pre-1.0 / in development, so the colour bands are relaxed to what a preview needs — *green* means good enough for a preview, not yet production-stable. Code correctness and security stay near-strict even here; the score itself is absolute and comparable across repos.
phoenix-tui/phoenix is in good health (77%). It can be evolved and depended on with normal engineering discipline; the items below are improvements, not blockers.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (68%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene); Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 'Testing' section to the root README (Documentation (README)).
For scale: Medium (~37,747 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~2.0 person-years (~1–4 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
1.2× (at 77% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~2.0 person-years of build effort (about ~€300,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 68% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 1.2× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
146 modules, 210 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
26
Medium
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
2
Medium
Roadmap
First, stamp a version in your build or package manifest to ensure builds and releases are traceable. Next, record significant architectural decisions in dated documents that state the context, decision, and consequences. Then, add a testing section to the root README to explain how to run the test suite. Finally, resolve the static analysis findings in syscalls_windows.go, clipboard_windows.go, and stdin_unblock_windows.go, followed by addressing the god classes in style.go, textarea.go, and mock_terminal.go.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 29 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 118 of 124 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
18 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Parser.ParseKey at 51. A further 3 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being service.isWordBoundary at 33 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 13 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Parser.ParseKey (cyclomatic 51) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with parser.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 renderer.runeDisplayWidth (cyclomatic 41) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with inline.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 EmacsKeybindings.Handle (cyclomatic 37) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with emacs.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 31 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Program.Start (cognitive 45) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with program.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Program.Run (cognitive 44) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with program.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 renderer.truncateLine (cognitive 44) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with inline.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
Low: use-of-unsafe-block · ×26clipboard/internal/infrastructure/native/clipboard_windows.go:194detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 26 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with syscalls_windows.go (15), clipboard_windows.go (4), stdin_unblock_windows.go (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED3 · Event naming7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.
`EventClick` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventDoubleClick` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventDrag` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventHoverEnter` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventHoverLeave` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventHoverMove` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventMotion` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventPress` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventRelease` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventScroll` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
`EventTripleClick` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — mouse_event.go:12
What to do
Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 4 of 18 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.4 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~63611 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED1 Handler temporal coupling — no event handlers detected — temporal-coupling check not applicable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (1 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds)
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
TooManyMethods: Style style/internal/domain/model/style.go:34— TooManyMethods — 56 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: TextArea components/input/internal/textarea/domain/model/textarea.go:11— TooManyMethods — 44 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: MockTerminal testing/mock_terminal.go:39— TooManyMethods — 33 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: TextInput components/input/internal/input/domain/model/input.go:12— TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: List components/list/internal/domain/model/list.go:10— TooManyMethods — 31 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Console terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/console.go:66— TooManyMethods — 31 methods. Most of these members implement terminal.internalTerminal (30 of 31 members), so moving them onto a smaller type would remove them from that contract rather than reduce it. To reduce it, split the contract instead: give each cohesive group of operations its own smaller interface and its own implementing type. Where the contract has to stay whole, move the work behind these members into collaborator types, so what is left here is a forward per member rather than a responsibility per member.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:128— components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:128-143 | components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:180-195 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:128` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) components/multiselect/internal/domain/model/multiselect.go:251— components/multiselect/internal/domain/model/multiselect.go:251-266 | components/select/internal/domain/model/select.go:198-213 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) core/internal/domain/service/unicode_service.go:201— core/internal/domain/service/unicode_service.go:201-216 | core/internal/domain/service/unicode_service.go:238-253 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/internal/domain/service/unicode_service.go:201` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:48— mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:48-63 | mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go:42-57 — before extracting anything, compare `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go` and `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 53 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:48` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) tea/internal/application/program/program.go:191— tea/internal/application/program/program.go:191-209 | tea/internal/application/program/program.go:319-334 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tea/internal/application/program/program.go:191` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) tea/internal/application/program/program.go:215— tea/internal/application/program/program.go:215-230 | tea/internal/application/program/program.go:340-355 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tea/internal/application/program/program.go:215` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) components/multiselect/internal/domain/model/multiselect.go:191— components/multiselect/internal/domain/model/multiselect.go:191-204 | components/select/internal/domain/model/select.go:147-160 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/multiselect/internal/domain/model/multiselect.go:191` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) components/multiselect/multiselect.go:267— components/multiselect/multiselect.go:267-280 | components/select/select.go:187-200 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/multiselect/multiselect.go:267` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) tea/internal/application/program/program.go:164— tea/internal/application/program/program.go:164-177 | tea/internal/application/program/program.go:291-304 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tea/internal/application/program/program.go:164` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) clipboard/clipboard.go:519— clipboard/clipboard.go:519-529 | clipboard/clipboard.go:559-569 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `clipboard/clipboard.go:519` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:204— clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:204-214 | clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:261-271 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:204` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) components/form/internal/domain/model/form.go:80— components/form/internal/domain/model/form.go:80-90 | components/form/internal/domain/model/form.go:106-116 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/form/internal/domain/model/form.go:80` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) components/multiselect/multiselect.go:219— components/multiselect/multiselect.go:219-227 | components/select/select.go:154-162 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/multiselect/multiselect.go:219` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:23— style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:23-31 | style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:70-78 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:23` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:129— terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:129-137 | terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:150-158 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:129` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×2
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 clipboard/go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.40.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C clipboard get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line clipboard/go.mod already holds for it). (in 6 dependency files)
Medium CVE: GO-2025-4006 clipboard/go.mod— stdlib 1.25.1 (net/mail): GO-2025-4006 — fixed in Go 1.25.2; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. (in 10 dependency files) This one row stands for the 38 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.25.1: GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) style/internal/domain/service/spacing_calculator.go:82— style/internal/domain/service/spacing_calculator.go:82-96 | style/internal/domain/service/spacing_calculator.go:130-144 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:32— style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:32-46 | style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:79-93 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `style/internal/domain/model/theme_presets.go:32` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) components/input/examples/styled/main.go:37— components/input/examples/styled/main.go:37-48 | components/input/examples/validated/main.go:48-61 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/input/examples/styled/main.go:37` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) render/internal/application/renderer.go:40— render/internal/application/renderer.go:40-52 | render/internal/application/renderer.go:60-71 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `render/internal/application/renderer.go:40` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Parser.ParseKey (cyclomatic 51) tea/internal/infrastructure/ansi/parser.go:29— Parser.ParseKey has cyclomatic complexity 51 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
renderer.runeDisplayWidth (cyclomatic 41) tea/internal/infrastructure/renderer/inline.go:253— renderer.runeDisplayWidth has cyclomatic complexity 41 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
EmacsKeybindings.Handle (cyclomatic 37) components/input/internal/textarea/infrastructure/keybindings/emacs.go:28— EmacsKeybindings.Handle has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
Program.Run (cyclomatic 24) tea/internal/application/program/program.go:144— Program.Run has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). Of this number, 19 points are the body's own statements and 5 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Program.Start (cyclomatic 24) tea/internal/application/program/program.go:271— Program.Start has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 24 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 285). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
service.isEmoji (cyclomatic 23) core/internal/domain/service/unicode_service.go:112— service.isEmoji has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
model.Update (cyclomatic 21) examples/context-menu/main.go:55— model.Update has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ImageCodec.DetectFormat (cyclomatic 20) clipboard/internal/domain/service/image_codec.go:147— ImageCodec.DetectFormat has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
model.View (cyclomatic 20) examples/context-menu/main.go:192— model.View has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
RenderCommand.Execute (cyclomatic 20) style/internal/application/command/render.go:60— RenderCommand.Execute has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
model.updateWrite (cyclomatic 19) clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:141— model.updateWrite has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
model.drawButton (cyclomatic 19) examples/hover-highlight/main.go:289— model.drawButton has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
FlexboxLayoutService.calculateMainAxisPositions (cyclomatic 19) layout/internal/domain/service/flexbox_layout_service.go:120— FlexboxLayoutService.calculateMainAxisPositions has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Table.View (cyclomatic 17) components/table/table.go:224— Table.View has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
RenderService.Render (cyclomatic 17) layout/internal/domain/service/render_service.go:76— RenderService.Render has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Reader.Read (cyclomatic 17) tea/internal/infrastructure/input/reader.go:79— Reader.Read has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
renderer.truncateLine (cyclomatic 17) tea/internal/infrastructure/renderer/inline.go:319— renderer.truncateLine has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Style.Validate (cyclomatic 16) style/internal/domain/model/style.go:601— Style.Validate has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1152.
Program.Start (cognitive 45) tea/internal/application/program/program.go:271— Program.Start has cognitive complexity 45 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 31, loops 9, boolean chains 3, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 23). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 45 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 285). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
Program.Run (cognitive 44) tea/internal/application/program/program.go:144— Program.Run has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 30, loops 9, boolean chains 3, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 23). Of this number, 40 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
renderer.truncateLine (cognitive 44) tea/internal/infrastructure/renderer/inline.go:319— renderer.truncateLine has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 29, loops 9, boolean chains 3, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 29). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
model.drawButton (cognitive 43) examples/hover-highlight/main.go:289— model.drawButton has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 37, boolean chains 3, loops 3 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Table.View (cognitive 39) components/table/table.go:224— Table.View has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 29, loops 8, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 21). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
model.View (cognitive 39) examples/context-menu/main.go:192— model.View has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 24, loops 12, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FlexboxLayoutService.calculateMainAxisPositions (cognitive 38) layout/internal/domain/service/flexbox_layout_service.go:120— FlexboxLayoutService.calculateMainAxisPositions has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27, loops 10, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
model.Update (cognitive 37) examples/context-menu/main.go:55— model.Update has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 28, match/switch 5, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 21). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Parser.ParseKey (cognitive 35) tea/internal/infrastructure/ansi/parser.go:29— Parser.ParseKey has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 14, boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
renderer.stripANSI (cognitive 32) tea/internal/infrastructure/renderer/inline.go:199— renderer.stripANSI has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, loops 7, boolean chains 2, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 20). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TodoModel.View (cognitive 29) tea/examples/todo/main.go:141— TodoModel.View has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23, loops 6 (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
RenderCommand.Execute (cognitive 27) style/internal/application/command/render.go:60— RenderCommand.Execute has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 24, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Reader.Read (cognitive 27) tea/internal/infrastructure/input/reader.go:79— Reader.Read has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, boolean chains 4, loops 2 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
model.updateWrite (cognitive 26) clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:141— model.updateWrite has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 13). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Size.String (cognitive 26) layout/internal/domain/value/size.go:246— Size.String has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
RenderService.Render (cognitive 24) layout/internal/domain/service/render_service.go:76— RenderService.Render has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, loops 5 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
renderer.runeDisplayWidth (cognitive 23) tea/internal/infrastructure/renderer/inline.go:253— renderer.runeDisplayWidth has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 20, if/else 2, match/switch 1. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
TodoModel.Update (cognitive 22) tea/examples/todo/main.go:48— TodoModel.Update has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, match/switch 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 13). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Program.execWithTTYControl (cognitive 21) tea/internal/application/program/tty_control_linux.go:63— Program.execWithTTYControl has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TimerModel.Update (cognitive 20) tea/examples/timer/main.go:49— TimerModel.Update has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 12). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Flex.Render (cognitive 19) layout/layout.go:757— Flex.Render has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 10, if/else 9 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
ImageCodec.DetectFormat (cognitive 18) clipboard/internal/domain/service/image_codec.go:147— ImageCodec.DetectFormat has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
NavigationService.MoveUp (cognitive 18) components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:105— NavigationService.MoveUp has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
NavigationService.MoveDown (cognitive 18) components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:157— NavigationService.MoveDown has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Renderer.applyOperations (cognitive 18) render/internal/application/renderer.go:166— Renderer.applyOperations has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
InlineRenderer.Render (cognitive 18) tea/internal/infrastructure/renderer/inline.go:77— InlineRenderer.Render has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
model.View (cognitive 17) clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:273— model.View has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Renderer.renderFullScreen (cognitive 17) render/internal/application/renderer.go:124— Renderer.renderFullScreen has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 3 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
model.updateMenu (cognitive 16) clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:64— model.updateMenu has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 7). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
model.updateConvert (cognitive 16) clipboard/examples/richtext-clipboard/main.go:230— model.updateConvert has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 7). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Input.renderContent (cognitive 16) components/input/input.go:202— Input.renderContent has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
EmacsKeybindings.Handle (cognitive 16) components/input/internal/textarea/infrastructure/keybindings/emacs.go:28— EmacsKeybindings.Handle has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 12, if/else 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
service.isEmoji (cognitive 16) core/internal/domain/service/unicode_service.go:112— service.isEmoji has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 13, if/else 3. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Size.Constrain (cognitive 16) layout/internal/domain/value/size.go:215— Size.Constrain has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
DefaultTextAligner.AlignVertical (cognitive 16) style/internal/domain/service/text_aligner.go:80— DefaultTextAligner.AlignVertical has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 11, if/else 4, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
main.runPerformanceDemo (cognitive 16) terminal/examples/platform_demo/main.go:55— main.runPerformanceDemo has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 3, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 2). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) tea/internal/domain/model/cmd.go:48— tea/internal/domain/model/cmd.go:48-68 | tea/tea.go:458-478 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tea/internal/domain/model/cmd.go:48` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:134— mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:134-153 | mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go:113-132 | mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/x10_parser.go:97-116 — before extracting anything, compare `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go` and `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 53 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:134` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) tea/internal/domain/model/cmd.go:109— tea/internal/domain/model/cmd.go:109-128 | tea/tea.go:519-538 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tea/internal/domain/model/cmd.go:109` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:31— components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:31-49 | components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:76-94 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/input/internal/textarea/domain/service/navigation.go:31` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:89— mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:89-105 | mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go:80-96 | mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/x10_parser.go:63-79 — before extracting anything, compare `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go` and `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 53 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/sgr_parser.go:89` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) tea/internal/infrastructure/input/cancelable_reader.go:177— tea/internal/infrastructure/input/cancelable_reader.go:177-197 | tea/internal/infrastructure/input/cancelable_reader.go:219-235 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tea/internal/infrastructure/input/cancelable_reader.go:177` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 4) components/modal/examples/basic/main.go:41— components/modal/examples/basic/main.go:41-55 | components/modal/examples/confirmation/main.go:57-71 | components/modal/examples/custom_buttons/main.go:71-85 | components/modal/examples/help_screen/main.go:42-56 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 4 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 4 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/modal/examples/basic/main.go:41` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go:53— mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go:53-65 | mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/x10_parser.go:35-48 — before extracting anything, compare `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go` and `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/x10_parser.go` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `mouse/internal/infrastructure/parser/urxvt_parser.go:53` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) components/modal/examples/basic/main.go:77— components/modal/examples/basic/main.go:77-87 | components/modal/examples/confirmation/main.go:105-115 | components/modal/examples/help_screen/main.go:101-111 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/modal/examples/basic/main.go:77` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) components/progress/examples/multi_progress/main.go:45— components/progress/examples/multi_progress/main.go:45-54 | components/progress/examples/spinner_simple/main.go:32-42 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `components/progress/examples/multi_progress/main.go:45` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) clipboard/internal/domain/service/clipboard_history.go:87— clipboard/internal/domain/service/clipboard_history.go:87-92 | clipboard/internal/domain/service/clipboard_history.go:110-114 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `clipboard/internal/domain/service/clipboard_history.go:87` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block clipboard/internal/infrastructure/native/clipboard_windows.go:194— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts between `unsafe.Pointer` and `uintptr` and does arithmetic on the result. That is the one unsafe form whose validity depends on HOW it is written: the Go rules require the conversion, the arithmetic and the conversion back to sit in a single expression, because the collector may move the object between separate statements and leave a stale address behind. Check this line against the `unsafe.Pointer` rules and keep `go vet` (its `unsafeptr` pass) on the package — of the unsafe shapes in this repository, this is the one worth a second reader.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block clipboard/internal/infrastructure/native/clipboard_windows.go:204— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site reinterprets a memory region as another type. The conversion itself is checked by nothing, so it is correct only while the region is at least as large as the target type and correctly aligned for it — assert that before the conversion wherever the length or the offset comes from data this process did not produce.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block clipboard/internal/infrastructure/native/clipboard_windows.go:236— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block clipboard/internal/infrastructure/native/clipboard_windows.go:238— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site reinterprets a memory region as another type. The conversion itself is checked by nothing, so it is correct only while the region is at least as large as the target type and correctly aligned for it — assert that before the conversion wherever the length or the offset comes from data this process did not produce.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block tea/internal/application/program/tty_control_darwin.go:38— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block tea/internal/application/program/tty_control_darwin.go:47— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block tea/internal/application/program/tty_control_linux.go:38— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block tea/internal/application/program/tty_control_linux.go:47— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block tea/internal/infrastructure/input/stdin_unblock_windows.go:88— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site reinterprets a memory region as another type. The conversion itself is checked by nothing, so it is correct only while the region is at least as large as the target type and correctly aligned for it — assert that before the conversion wherever the length or the offset comes from data this process did not produce.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block tea/internal/infrastructure/input/stdin_unblock_windows.go:94— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block tea/internal/infrastructure/input/stdin_unblock_windows.go:96— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:42— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:54— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:74— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:75— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:95— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:96— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:128— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:129— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:130— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:131— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:149— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:150— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:151— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
Low: use-of-unsafe-block terminal/internal/infrastructure/windows/syscalls_windows.go:152— Using the unsafe package in Go gives you low-level memory management and many of the strengths of the C language, but also steps around the type safety of Go and can lead to buffer overflows and possible arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Only use this package if you absolutely know what you're doing. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is. This site converts an `unsafe.Pointer` to `uintptr` but does no arithmetic on the result. That is the form Go's `unsafe.Pointer` rules permit for handing an address to a system or foreign call, and it is valid provided the conversion stays inside the call expression rather than being stored in a variable first — which is what `go vet`'s `unsafeptr` pass checks. Keep that pass on the package so a later edit that lifts the `uintptr` into a local, or starts doing arithmetic on it, is caught.
+ 1 more in this group — see findings.md.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`go test -v -race -coverprofile=coverage.out -covermode`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.go), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fc92a-4c75-7fde-908e-7e9e11836ac1 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Warnings: 94 · Recommendations: 28 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 19:47 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.