Executive summary
Read through the Production lens β the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
phongnguyend/Practical.CleanArchitecture carries serious risk (38%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) β operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (36%) is the next concern β it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates (Domain vs controller coverage); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through⦠(Test Coverage); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,⦠(Dependency Hygiene).
For scale: Small (~16,424 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Raise Readiness 32 β 70 (the Healthy floor) β headline 38 β ~43.
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled β β¬11,000ββ¬56,000
| Cost to rebuild | β¬11,000ββ¬56,000 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7Γ (at 38% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small Β· 49% boilerplate Β· 30% straight-line Β· 21% branching logic |
| Dead frontend code | ~4478 LoC unreachable (54 file(s)) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~β¬34,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% β the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis β what's actually going on
Trajectory
Architecture β bounded-context dependency graph
At a glance β Code Health
At a glance β Architecture
At a glance β Maturity
At a glance β Readiness
At a glance β Security
At a glance β Domain Modelling
At a glance β Event-Driven
At a glance β Accessibility
At a glance β Performance
Security & Compliance β OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 β Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 77 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 β Security Misconfiguration | 50 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 β Cryptographic Failures | 5 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, raise unit-test coverage for the domain layer to ensure core correctness. Next, expand test coverage to include all unreached modules by importing them directly or through public entry points. Then, clean up the dependency graph by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports. Finally, add missing tooling scripts for linting and type-checking in CI, and immediately resolve the five leaked secrets found in UserConfiguration.cs.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning β start with UserConfiguration.cs (5). | +5.2 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) β that's where correctness matters most. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Domain vs controller coverage |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +5.3 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +5.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate. | +5.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). | +5.0 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json | 0.2 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json | 0.4 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| src/UIs/nextjs/package-lock.json | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/notification/templates/notification-api.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/notification/templates/notification-background.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/notification/templates/notification-grpc.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/product/templates/product-api.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/storage/templates/storage-api.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/webapi/templates/webapi.deployment.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| deployments/Azure/terraform/main.tf | 5.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: AZU-0012 |
| src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/templates/db.deployment.yaml | 5.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs | 6.0 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs | 7.0 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: UserStore |
| src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment β run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 92 of 95 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 β the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked β 95 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line β never an absolute scratch path. Here, 165 of 214 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals β a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it β Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled Β· advisory β not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score β and this report, byte for byte β is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | β deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | β deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | β | β deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | β deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | β deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 Β· 0.31.0 | β deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 Β· 0.69.3 | β deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming β sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | β LLM Β· sampled Β· advisory |
Run transparency β what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality β LLM provider failed β The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) β scanner not present in this environment β The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy β scanner not present in this environment β The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap β a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically β it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type β a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module β one class/IIFE β earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) β it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED β its repetition is the tool's, not the team's β so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies β runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic β it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image β the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals β a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural β it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers β Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles β a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree β a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy β mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history β a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension β pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual β undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded β it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment β a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present β it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample β it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample β it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project β a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural β it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns β a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) β it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database β a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules β it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles β risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension β code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS β files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally β the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup β a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively β flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name β but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree β landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes β interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape β roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction β literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${β¦}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only β an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics β a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention β a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only β a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body β a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain β infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards β a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present β it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see β only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence β a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync at 22.
D2 Β· Cognitive Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync at 37.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cognitive 37) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity β start with RabbitMQReceiver.cs. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity β start with FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.ReadAsync (cognitive 18) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity β start with ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.cs. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented β provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 Β· God Classes
1 god class(es) detected.
D4 Β· Code Duplication
7 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 Β· Coupling
19 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 3 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide finding(s) in Coupling. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorWebAssembly finding(s) in Coupling. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented β provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 Β· Cohesion (LCOM4)
2 of 72 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D8 Β· Code Coverage
Line coverage 3.6%, branch coverage 0.0%.
What to do
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified β provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 Β· Test Distribution
16 test methods: 16 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
D10 Β· Test Quality
0 skipped, 3 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 30 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality β start with ApplicationTests.cs (2), UserServiceTests.cs. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented β provenance only; does not change the score.
D11 Β· Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).
D12 Β· Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 Β· Secret Scanning
5 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning β start with UserConfiguration.cs (5). β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
D14 Β· License Compliance
0 of 115 packages use a banned license.
D15 Β· Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 Β· Bus Factor
116 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (β₯90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/FilesController.cs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 Β· Explicit Debt
16 deducted debt markers + 22 dead symbols across 16424 LoC (0.4/KLoC) β score 9.2.
D18 Β· Solution Shape
19 projects, 498 .cs files, 16668 hand-written lines of code (16424 production / 244 test), 61 inter-project edges.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape β start with ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL.csproj, ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL.csproj. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository finding(s) in Solution Shape. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D20 Β· ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 Β· Naming Consistency
1 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
D24 Β· Comment Value
12 valuable / 2 redundant across 73 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value β start with Program.cs, RabbitMQReceiver.cs. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
D26 Β· Project Cohesion
1 of 19 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Split ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure finding(s) in Project Cohesion. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D27 Β· Navigability
86 % of calls cross a namespace and 20 % go through an interface, but 93 % of collaborators are co-located β so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium β clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
- Improve Navigability β currently 7.4/10. β 86 % of calls cross a namespace and 20 % go through an interface, but 93 % of collaborators are co-located β so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium β clean/modular boundaries expected.
D28 Β· Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities
27 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 18 medium, 2 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 18 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 warning-level).
- Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
D31 Β· IaC & Container Security
1279 finding(s): 2 critical, 229 high, 331 medium, 717 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 48 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security β start with Dockerfile (4), auditlog-api.deployment.yaml (3), auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml (3). β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (48 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security β start with main.tf (2). β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D33 Β· JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness
204 of 234 significant source file(s) are orphaned β their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.IdentityServer/HostedServices/SeedDataHostedService.cs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 Β· Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
69 finding(s): 1 critical, 33 high, 27 medium, 8 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 33 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β start with package-lock.json (33). β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
- Resolve the 16 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β start with package-lock.json (16). β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β start with package-lock.json. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 Β· Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt β alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×25) β Consent.cshtml:9, Index.cshtml:9, Index.cshtml:9, β¦
What to do
- Add a text alternative β alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 Β· Forms & labels
- This control has only a placeholder β a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×3) β Consent.cshtml:74, Index.cshtml:71, Index.cshtml:104
- A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×12) β Consent.cshtml:89, Index.cshtml:98, Index.cshtml:131, β¦
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×10) β Index.cshtml:25, Secrets.cshtml:51, Secrets.cshtml:51, β¦
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text β a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 Β· Page structure
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels β increase by at most one. (×13) β ExternalLogin.cshtml:6, ForgotPassword.cshtml:6, Login.cshtml:11, β¦
- A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). β ExternalLogins.cshtml:9
- An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. β LoggedOut.cshtml:20
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) β Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×2) β Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) β Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0
- An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. (×4) β Index.cshtml:39, Index.cshtml:51, Index.cshtml:63, β¦
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 Β· Keyboard semantics
- An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×14) β ConfirmDialog.razor:18, Pagination.razor:2, Pagination.razor:3, β¦
- An <a href="#"> (or javascript:) with a click handler is a button dressed as a link β it announces the wrong role and stops working without JS. Use a <button> for an action. (×5) β Edit.razor:50, Edit.razor:104, Edit.razor:108, β¦
- A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×6) β NavMenu.razor:8, NavMenu.razor:17, Star.tsx:8, β¦
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 Β· ARIA correctness
- aria-hidden="true" here hides the subtree from assistive tech, but a focusable descendant stays in the tab order β a keyboard user can land on a control screen readers can't see. Add inert, take the descendants out of the tab order (tabindex="-1"), or drop aria-hidden. (×2) β Secrets.cshtml:156, Secrets.cshtml:156
What to do
- Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
AC6 Β· Visual & motion safety
- A CSS rule's foreground/background colour pair falls below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×4) β app.css:0, site.css:0, bootstrap.css:0, β¦
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 Β· A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found β no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 Β· Captive dependencies
AX10 Β· Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code β check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 Β· Stateful singletons
AX3 Β· Project dependency cycles
AX4 Β· Dependency direction
AX5 Β· Architecture & structure
AX6 Β· Interface segregation
- `IUser` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. β IUser.cs:3
- `IEmailMessage` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. β IEmailNotification.cs:11
What to do
- Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 Β· Test isolation
AX9 Β· CQS / query purity
C1 Β· Data Protection
What to do
- Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) β partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 Β· Access Controls
C3 Β· Audit Trail
- An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete β missing: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent write-side hook), [Audited] per-entity coverage.
What to do
- Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
DM1 Β· Aggregate boundaries
- `FileEntryEmbedding` references the aggregate root `FileEntry` directly (via `FileEntry`) β hold its `FileEntryId` instead. β FileEntryEmbedding.cs:20
- `FileEntryText` references the aggregate root `FileEntry` directly (via `FileEntry`) β hold its `FileEntryId` instead. β FileEntryText.cs:11
- `ProductEmbedding` references the aggregate root `Product` directly (via `Product`) β hold its `ProductId` instead. β ProductEmbedding.cs:16
- `User` references the aggregate root `UserLogin` directly (via `UserLogins`) β hold its `UserLoginId` instead. β User.cs:46
- `UserLogin` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) β hold its `UserId` instead. β UserLogin.cs:15
What to do
- Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM2 Β· Strongly-typed ids
- `AuditLogEntry.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β AuditLogEntry.cs:7
- `AuditLogEntry.ObjectId` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ObjectId { String Value }`). β AuditLogEntry.cs:11
- `ConfigurationEntry.Key` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct Key { String Value }`). β ConfigurationEntry.cs:7
- `EmailMessageBase.CopyFromId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CopyFromId { Guid Value }`). β EmailMessage.cs:42
- `EmailMessageAttachment.EmailMessageId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EmailMessageId { Guid Value }`). β EmailMessageAttachment.cs:7
- `EmailMessageAttachment.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β EmailMessageAttachment.cs:9
- `FileEntry.EncryptionKey` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EncryptionKey { String Value }`). β FileEntry.cs:22
- `DeletedFileEntry.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β FileEntry.cs:37
- `FileEntryEmbedding.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β FileEntryEmbedding.cs:18
- `FileEntryText.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β FileEntryText.cs:9
- `OutboxMessageBase.TriggeredById` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TriggeredById { Guid Value }`). β OutboxMessage.cs:17
- `OutboxMessageBase.ObjectId` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ObjectId { String Value }`). β OutboxMessage.cs:19
- `OutboxMessageBase.ActivityId` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ActivityId { String Value }`). β OutboxMessage.cs:25
- `PasswordHistory.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β PasswordHistory.cs:7
- `ProductEmbedding.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProductId { Guid Value }`). β ProductEmbedding.cs:14
- `SmsMessageBase.CopyFromId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CopyFromId { Guid Value }`). β SmsMessage.cs:32
- `User.Auth0UserId` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct Auth0UserId { String Value }`). β User.cs:36
- `User.AzureAdB2CUserId` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AzureAdB2CUserId { String Value }`). β User.cs:38
- `UserLogin.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β UserLogin.cs:7
- `UserLogin.ProviderKey` is a raw `String` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProviderKey { String Value }`). β UserLogin.cs:11
- `UserRole.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β UserRole.cs:7
- `UserRole.RoleId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct RoleId { Guid Value }`). β UserRole.cs:9
- `UserToken.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β UserToken.cs:7
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain β finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 Β· Rich vs anemic model
- `AuditLogEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β AuditLogEntry.cs:5
- `ConfigurationEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β ConfigurationEntry.cs:5
- `CustomMigrationHistory` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β CustomMigrationHistory.cs:5
- `EmailMessage` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β EmailMessage.cs:7
- `EmailMessageBase` is an aggregate/entity with 13 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β EmailMessage.cs:16
- `EmailMessageAttachment` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β EmailMessageAttachment.cs:5
- `EmbeddingCacheEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β EmbeddingCacheEntry.cs:5
- `FileEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 13 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β FileEntry.cs:6
- `DeletedFileEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β FileEntry.cs:35
- `FileEntryEmbedding` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β FileEntryEmbedding.cs:6
- `FileEntryText` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β FileEntryText.cs:5
- `LocalizationEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β LocalizationEntry.cs:5
- `OutboxMessageBase` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β OutboxMessage.cs:13
- `PasswordHistory` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β PasswordHistory.cs:5
- `Product` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β Product.cs:5
- `ProductEmbedding` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β ProductEmbedding.cs:6
- `Role` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β Role.cs:6
- `RoleClaim` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β RoleClaim.cs:5
- `SmsMessageBase` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β SmsMessage.cs:14
- `User` is an aggregate/entity with 21 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β User.cs:6
- `UserClaim` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β UserClaim.cs:5
- `UserLogin` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β UserLogin.cs:5
- `UserRole` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β UserRole.cs:5
- `UserToken` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β the business logic lives in a service. β UserToken.cs:5
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 Β· Encapsulated state
- `AuditLogEntry` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, Action, ObjectId, Log). β AuditLogEntry.cs:5
- `ConfigurationEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Key, Value, Description, IsSensitive). β ConfigurationEntry.cs:5
- `CustomMigrationHistory` exposes public setter(s) (MigrationName). β CustomMigrationHistory.cs:5
- `EmailMessage` exposes public setter(s) (EmailMessageAttachments). β EmailMessage.cs:7
- `EmailMessageBase` exposes public setter(s) (From, Tos, CCs, BCCs, Subject, Body, β¦). β EmailMessage.cs:16
- `EmailMessageAttachment` exposes public setter(s) (EmailMessageId, FileEntryId, Name, EmailMessage, FileEntry). β EmailMessageAttachment.cs:5
- `EmbeddingCacheEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Text, Provider, Model, Embedding, InputTokenCount, OutputTokenCount, β¦). β EmbeddingCacheEntry.cs:5
- `FileEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Description, Size, UploadedTime, FileName, FileLocation, β¦). β FileEntry.cs:6
- `DeletedFileEntry` exposes public setter(s) (FileEntryId). β FileEntry.cs:35
- `FileEntryEmbedding` exposes public setter(s) (ChunkName, ChunkLocation, ShortText, Embedding, TokenDetails, FileEntryId, β¦). β FileEntryEmbedding.cs:6
- `FileEntryText` exposes public setter(s) (TextLocation, FileEntryId, FileEntry). β FileEntryText.cs:5
- `LocalizationEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Value, Culture, Description). β LocalizationEntry.cs:5
- `OutboxMessageBase` exposes public setter(s) (EventType, TriggeredById, ObjectId, Payload, Published, ActivityId, β¦). β OutboxMessage.cs:13
- `PasswordHistory` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, PasswordHash, User). β PasswordHistory.cs:5
- `Product` exposes public setter(s) (Code, Name, Description). β Product.cs:5
- `ProductEmbedding` exposes public setter(s) (Text, Embedding, TokenDetails, ProductId, Product). β ProductEmbedding.cs:6
- `Role` exposes public setter(s) (Name, NormalizedName, ConcurrencyStamp, Claims, UserRoles). β Role.cs:6
- `RoleClaim` exposes public setter(s) (Type, Value, Role). β RoleClaim.cs:5
- `SmsMessageBase` exposes public setter(s) (Message, PhoneNumber, AttemptCount, MaxAttemptCount, NextAttemptDateTime, ExpiredDateTime, β¦). β SmsMessage.cs:14
- `User` exposes public setter(s) (UserName, NormalizedUserName, Email, NormalizedEmail, EmailConfirmed, PasswordHash, β¦). β User.cs:6
- `UserClaim` exposes public setter(s) (Type, Value, User). β UserClaim.cs:5
- `UserLogin` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, LoginProvider, ProviderKey, ProviderDisplayName, User). β UserLogin.cs:5
- `UserRole` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, RoleId, User, Role). β UserRole.cs:5
- `UserToken` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, LoginProvider, TokenName, TokenValue). β UserToken.cs:5
What to do
- Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 Β· Domain β infrastructure boundary
DM8 Β· Value-object opportunities
ED1 Β· Handler temporal coupling
- `WebhookConsumer.HandleAsync` makes a synchronous remote call (an HTTP call) while handling an event. The handler now depends, in real time, on another service being up and fast β the opposite of why you went event-driven. Publish a follow-up message (or use the outbox) instead of calling out and awaiting a response inside the handler. (×6) β WebhookConsumer.cs:33, WebhookConsumer.cs:39, WebhookConsumer.cs:45, β¦
What to do
- Remove synchronous remote calls from message handlers β react by publishing further messages, so services stay temporally decoupled.
ED2 Β· Event/command shape
ED3 Β· Event naming
ED4 Β· Outbox / dual-write
- `SendEmailMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic β a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. β SendEmailMessagesCommand.cs:40
- `PublishOutboxMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic β a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. β PublishOutboxMessagesCommand.cs:36
- `SendSmsMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic β a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. β SendSmsMessagesCommand.cs:40
What to do
- Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically β no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 Β· Idempotency
- `Commands.PublishOutboxMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice β add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. β PublishOutboxMessagesCommand.cs:36
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent β guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 Β· Unfinished & placeholder code
- A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException β generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×12) β RoleStore.cs:25, RoleStore.cs:30, RoleStore.cs:35, β¦
What to do
- Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 Β· Incompleteness & stubs
- `RoleStore` has 10 unfinished members out of 11 β a scaffolded type that was never implemented. β RoleStore.cs:10
- `CreateAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:23
- `DeleteAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:28
- `FindByIdAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:33
- `FindByNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:38
- `GetNormalizedRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:43
- `GetRoleIdAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:48
- `GetRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:53
- `SetNormalizedRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:58
- `SetRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:63
- `UpdateAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β RoleStore.cs:68
- `GetAllStrings` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) β DefaultStringLocalizer.cs:26, SqlServerStringLocalizer.cs:36
- `SendAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β a placeholder return that was never filled in. (×4) β FakeSender.cs:9, FakeEmailNotification.cs:9, FakeSmsNotification.cs:9, β¦
- `FakeStorageManager` has 3 unfinished members out of 5 β a scaffolded type that was never implemented. β FakeStorageManager.cs:9
- `DeleteAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β a placeholder return that was never filled in. β FakeStorageManager.cs:17
- `ArchiveAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β a placeholder return that was never filled in. β FakeStorageManager.cs:27
- `UnArchiveAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β a placeholder return that was never filled in. β FakeStorageManager.cs:32
- `OnAuthorization` takes parameters but its body is empty β it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. β CustomAuthorizationFilter.cs:7
- `OnException` takes parameters but its body is empty β it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. β CustomExceptionFilter.cs:7
- `RefreshToken` has an empty body β confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. β TokenManager.cs:30
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed β dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×4) β IdentityServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:88, IdentityServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:89, LocalizationServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:47, β¦
What to do
- Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) β they are dead surface that looks live.
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 Β· Documentation (README)
- 111 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched β it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
- Add a README to the 19 of 19 project(s) that lack one β worth up to 2 pts.
- Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 Β· Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found β decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md β the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 Β· Folder & project structure
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder β the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 Β· Documentation accuracy
P1 Β· CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (dotnet test / npm test / pytest / a test job) was matched β the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.
P2 Β· Observability
- Only 8/13 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded β they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 Β· Security & performance tooling
- <NuGetAudit>false</NuGetAudit> in MSBuild suppresses NuGet's vulnerability audit project-wide. β Directory.Build.props:4
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
P4 Β· Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced β a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 Β· DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
P7 Β· Outbound HTTP resilience
P8 Β· Schema migrations
P9 Β· Domain vs controller coverage
- Domain coverage is 8% β the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.
What to do
- Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) β that's where correctness matters most.
PF1 Β· Benchmark discipline
- No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions β but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
- Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.
PF2 Β· Allocation hygiene
What to do
- Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths β currently 9 use(s) across 16,855 production line(s) (~0.5/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 Β· Async & latency hygiene
- 3 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) β these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
What to do
- Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it β never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
R1 Β· Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 Β· Code Duplication
- src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:8 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:36 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:56 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:80 β actions.tsx:8
- src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/ListProducts/ListProducts.tsx:287 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Products/ListProducts/ListProducts.tsx:359 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Products/ListProducts/ListProducts.tsx:287 β ListProducts.tsx:287
- src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:93 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Settings/actions.tsx:93 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Users/actions.tsx:93 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:93 β actions.tsx:93
- src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:377 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:457 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:377 β ViewUser.tsx:377
- src/UIs/vuejs/src/views/files/Edit.vue:137 · src/UIs/vuejs/src/views/files/List.vue:108 β Edit.vue:137
- src/UIs/angular/src/app/products/add-product/add-product.guard.ts:4 · src/UIs/angular/src/app/products/edit-product/edit-product.guard.ts:4 β add-product.guard.ts:4
- src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Settings/ListConfigurationEntries/ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:31 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Settings/ListConfigurationEntries/ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:51 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Settings/ListConfigurationEntries/ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:31 β ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:31
- src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:30 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:32 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:30 β ViewUser.tsx:30
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 Β· Import Boundaries
R2 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster β extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) β reducer.tsx:79, reducer.tsx:79, ViewUser.tsx:10, β¦
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic β€ 5.
R3 Β· Large Files
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 Β· Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively β its behavior is unverified. (×8) β ViewUser.tsx, ListConfigurationEntries.tsx, ListProducts.tsx, β¦
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 Β· Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 Β· Tooling
- test β · lint β · typecheck β
What to do
- Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 Β· Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 4 application, 24 tooling and 4 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check β an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (4 application, 24 tooling, 4 test roots considered) (×7) β ViewUser.tsx, ListConfigurationEntries.tsx, ListProducts.tsx, β¦
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports β every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 Β· Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in src/UIs/angular/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members β dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
- Only test files import it β move it to devDependencies. β App.test.js:2
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 Β· Circular Imports
S1 Β· Web-Security Posture
- Password-hash field compared with `==` β use a constant-time compare to avoid timing oracles (CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals). β UserStore.cs:145
- No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (β1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
- Compare password hashes with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` (constant time, no timing oracle).
- Set secure cookie flags β CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 Β· Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×3) β HashiCorpVaultConfigurationProvider.cs:34, SignalRNotification.cs:30, PuppeteerSharpCollectionExtensions.cs:13
- `async void` can't be awaited and its exceptions crash the process instead of propagating. Return `Task` unless this is a top-level event handler. (×7) β List.cs:67, List.cs:71, List.cs:61, β¦
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 Β· Cancellation propagation
- Only 124/293 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention β judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter β work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) β DatabaseRetryDecoratorBase.cs:32, SyncUsersCommand.cs:34, SyncUsersCommand.cs:78, β¦
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 Β· Exception handling
X4 Β· Structured logging
- Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text β you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. (×19) β ErrorCatchingInterceptor.cs:89, LoggingInterceptor.cs:34, LoggingInterceptor.cs:61, β¦
What to do
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 Β· Nullable reference types
- 3/15 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
- ~0.0 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes β each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
WCAG coverage β what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 Β· Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 Β· Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 Β· Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 Β· Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 Β· ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 Β· Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial β literal CSS only |
| AC7 Β· A11y enforcement | enforcement β no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference β by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 44% | Weak β gated by R7, X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 84% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 49% | Weak β gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 32% | Weak β gated by D8, D13, R4, R6, R8, P9 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 68% | Adequate β gated by D30, D31, D36, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 45% | Weak β gated by DM2, DM4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 65% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Accessibility | 36% | Weak β gated by AC1, AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 61% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not included β 21 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX7 Slice cohesion β not applicable β not a vertical-slice architecture
- AXB2 Runtime readiness β no data
- C4 Data Retention β Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data β absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights β Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary β absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D19 Documentation Quality β LLM evaluation failed
- D22 Internal API Consistency β No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling β Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance β no ADRs to check
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) β No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) β no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy β No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency β The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D7 Architectural Integrity β no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles β architectural integrity not assessed
- DM3 Integration-event coupling β no integration events detected β coupling check not applicable
- DM7 Repository granularity β no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ES1 Event Sourcing β not run β 0/3 markers found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty β no data
- P6 Release Hygiene β not evidenced β no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene β no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing β no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults β no data
- X8 JS interop contract β no data
Appendix A β Findings (grouped)
Issue β 96 finding(s)
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.IdentityServer/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.Migrator/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.IdentityServer/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.Migrator/Dockerfile
- High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0109 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog.configmap.yml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0109 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration.configmap.yml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0109 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity.configmap.yml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.SignalR.Protocols.MessagePack 10.0.8
- High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 8.0.2
- High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 8.0.2
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Modules.Identity/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/Microservices/Services.Identity/ClassifiedAds.Services.Identity/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34
- Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34
- Critical IaC: AZU-0012 deployments/Azure/terraform/main.tf
- Critical IaC: AZU-0013 deployments/Azure/terraform/main.tf
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/vuejs/package-lock.json
Warning β 100 finding(s)
- Dead code: GetAuditEntriesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/AuditLogEntries/Queries/GetAuditEntriesQuery.cs:16
- Dead code: GetPagedAuditEntriesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/AuditLogEntries/Queries/GetPagedAuditEntriesQuery.cs:18
- Dead code: AddEntityCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Common/Commands/AddEntityCommand.cs:19
- Dead code: UpdateEntityCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Common/Commands/UpdateEntityCommand.cs:19
- Dead code: GetFileEntriesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/FileEntries/Queries/GetFileEntriesQuery.cs:15
- Dead code: AddUpdateProductCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Products/Commands/AddUpdateProductCommand.cs:13
- Dead code: DeleteProductCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Products/Commands/DeleteProductCommand.cs:12
- Dead code: GetProductQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Products/Queries/GetProductQuery.cs:17
- Dead code: AddClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/AddClaimCommand.cs:14
- Dead code: AddUpdateRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/AddUpdateRoleCommand .cs:13
- Dead code: DeleteClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/DeleteClaimCommand.cs:14
- Dead code: DeleteRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/DeleteRoleCommand.cs:13
- Dead code: GetRoleQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Queries/GetRoleQuery.cs:19
- Dead code: GetRolesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Queries/GetRolesQuery.cs:17
- Dead code: AddClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/AddClaimCommand.cs:14
- Dead code: AddRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/AddRoleCommand .cs:14
- Dead code: DeleteClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/DeleteClaimCommand.cs:14
- Dead code: DeleteRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/DeleteRoleCommand.cs:14
- Dead code: DeleteUserCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/DeleteUserCommand.cs:13
- Dead code: GetUserQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Queries/GetUserQuery.cs:19
- Dead code: GetUsersQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Queries/GetUsersQuery.cs:17
- Dead code: OnInputFileChange src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Files/Pages/Upload.cs:68
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Infrastructure/Messaging/MessageBus.cs:121
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/HistoricalPasswordValidator.cs:20
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/WeakPasswordValidator.cs:21
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Interceptors/ErrorCatchingInterceptor.cs:81
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:32
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Storages/Local/LocalFileStorageManager.cs:53
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Storages/Local/LocalFileStorageManager.cs:59
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Web/Authorization/Requirements/PermissionRequirement.cs:23
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Web/ClaimsTransformations/CustomClaimsTransformation.cs:54
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Authorization/FileEntryAuthorizationHandler.cs:12
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/ConfigurationEntriesController.cs:145
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/ProductsController.cs:249
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Tenants/AdsDbContextMultiTenantConnectionStringResolver.cs:30
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Tenants/AdsReadOnlyDbContextMultiTenantConnectionStringResolver.cs:30
- TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Tenants/TenantResolver.cs:33
- No assertions: HomePage src/EndToEndUiTests/Playwright/ApplicationTests.cs:10
- No assertions: HomePage src/EndToEndUiTests/Selenium/ApplicationTests.cs:9
- No assertions: GetUsers src/Microservices/Services.Identity/ClassifiedAds.Services.Identity.IntegrationTests/Grpc/UserServiceTests.cs:17
- Off the main sequence: ClassifiedAds.Persistence
- Off the main sequence: ClassifiedAds.Application
- Off the main sequence: ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure
- Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/HostedServices/SendEmailWorker.cs:45
- Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/FilesController.cs:402
- Low cohesion: UserStore (LCOM4 15) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs:13
- Low cohesion: AdsDbContext (LCOM4 4) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/AdsDbContext.cs:19
- RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cyclomatic 22) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:37
- FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cyclomatic 22) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/MessageBusConsumers/FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs:76
- CommentedOutCode src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Web/Middleware/DebuggingMiddleware.cs:26
- Monorepo: only 1 of 17 solutions was scored
- Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository
- LLM evaluation failed
- RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cognitive 37) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:37
- FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cognitive 29) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/MessageBusConsumers/FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs:76
- ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.ReadAsync (cognitive 18) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Excel/ExcelDataReader/ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.cs:24
- TooManyMethods: UserStore src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs:0
- Unpinned build actions
- Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/RateLimiterPolicies/DefaultRateLimiterPolicy.cs:23
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/UsersController.cs:160
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Locks/LockManager.cs:48
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Repositories/EmailMessageRepository.cs:40
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusReceiver.cs:34
- Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide
- Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorWebAssembly
- Unstable project ClassifiedAds.WebMVC
Recommendation β 16 finding(s)
- Shell project: ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL.csproj
- Shell project: ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL.csproj
- redundant comment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:32
- redundant comment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide/Program.cs:41
- Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 6.12.1
- Low CVE: NuGet.Protocol 6.12.1
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Thin analysable surface across projects
- No ADRs found
- Inconsistent naming for RabbitMQ options classes. Some are named 'RabbitMQSenderOptions', 'RabbitMQReceiverOptions', while others are 'RabbitMQOptions'. This creates confusion about whether 'RabbitMQOptions' is a base class or a separate configuration.
- Bounded contexts not declared
- Split ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure
- Dormant codebase
- No build provenance
- No artifact signing
- No SBOM
Info β 2 finding(s)
- Mock framework: Moq
- No exposed public API
Appendix B β Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 Β· Secrets (history) | gitleaks | β | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | β | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | β |
| D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | β | dotnet list src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Monolith.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 27 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 Β· IaC & Container Security | trivy | β | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 1279 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 Β· Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | β | semgrep: not applicable β No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) β no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | β |
| D33 Β· JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | β | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | β |
| D37 Β· Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | β | disclosure: not applicable β No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | β |
| D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | β | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 69 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
Appendix C β Personal-data map
Email β 24 field(s)
- SendEmailMessagesCommandHandler._emailNotification src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/EmailMessages/Commands/SendEmailMessagesCommand.cs:23
- UserDTO.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:12
- UserDTO.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:14
- UserDTO.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:16
- UserModel.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:16
- UserModel.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:18
- UserModel.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:20
- Detail.SendPasswordResetEmailDialog src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Pages/Detail.cs:26
- Detail.SendEmailAddressConfirmationEmailDialog src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Pages/Detail.cs:28
- EmailMessage.EmailMessageAttachments src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/EmailMessage.cs:9
- EmailMessageAttachment.EmailMessageId src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/EmailMessageAttachment.cs:7
- EmailMessageAttachment.EmailMessage src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/EmailMessageAttachment.cs:13
- User.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:12
- User.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:14
- User.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:16
- IUser.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:9
- User.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:24
- Auth0User.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/IdentityProviders/Auth0/Auth0User.cs:23
- NotificationOptions.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Notification/NotificationOptions.cs:9
- Permissions.SendResetPasswordEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Authorization/Permissions.cs:35
- Permissions.SendConfirmationEmailAddressEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Authorization/Permissions.cs:36
- UserModel.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:13
- UserModel.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:15
- UserModel.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:17
Phone β 10 field(s)
- UserDTO.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:18
- UserDTO.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:20
- UserModel.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:23
- UserModel.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:25
- SmsMessageBase.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/SmsMessage.cs:18
- User.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:20
- User.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:22
- ISmsMessage.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Notification/ISmsNotification.cs:15
- UserModel.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:19
- UserModel.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:21
Name β 6 field(s)
- IUser.FirstName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:13
- IUser.LastName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:15
- User.FirstName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:28
- User.LastName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:30
- Auth0User.GivenName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/IdentityProviders/Auth0/Auth0User.cs:17
- Auth0User.FamilyName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/IdentityProviders/Auth0/Auth0User.cs:20
Address β 1 field(s)
- Address.ZipCode src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/ValueObjects/Address.cs:9