Public report β€” Practical.CleanArchitecture, published 29 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-06-2026 @ 22:12 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Phongnguyend/Practical.CleanArchitecture

38% At Risk

Small Β· 16,424 LoC Β· 19 projects Β· rebuild ~0.2 person-years Β· weakest lens: Readiness (32%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated β€” reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this β–Έ

92/95dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic Β· confidence 1.0 Β· 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
165findings with an exact file:lineof 214 β€” the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
95/115dimensions across the health lenses16424 LoC Β· 19 projects β€” wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens β€” the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

phongnguyend/Practical.CleanArchitecture carries serious risk (38%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) β€” operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (36%) is the next concern β€” it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates (Domain vs controller coverage); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).

For scale: Small (~16,424 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

How the score is built β€” each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 32% Β· 45% weightAccessibility 36% Β· 25% weightCode Health 44% Β· 14% weightDomain Modelling 45% Β· 8% weightMaturity 49% Β· 4% weightPerformance 61% Β· 2% weightEvent-Driven 65% Β· 1% weightSecurity 68% Β· 1% weightArchitecture 84% Β· 0% weight

Raise Readiness 32 β†’ 70 (the Healthy floor) β‡’ headline 38 β†’ ~43.

Code composition β€” where the lines go
Business logic 20%Plumbing 74%Tests 6%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled β€” €11,000–€56,000
Cost to rebuild€11,000–€56,000 (0.1–0.4 person-years (186–593 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high β€” harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7Γ— (at 38% quality) β€” the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall Β· 49% boilerplate Β· 30% straight-line Β· 21% branching logic
Dead frontend code~4478 LoC unreachable (54 file(s)) β€” that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€34,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% β€” the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) β€” microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only β€” most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning β€” start with UserConfiguration.cs (5).
+5.2 pts Β· Low effort Β· Secret Scanning
2
Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) β€” that's where correctness matters most.
+5.3 pts Β· Medium effort Β· Domain vs controller coverage
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
+5.3 pts Β· Medium effort Β· Test Coverage

Diagnosis β€” what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens Β· High Β· Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there β€” that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (16,424 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 32%
β†’ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first β€” highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain Β· Medium Β· Root cause
71 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause β€” the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
Evidence: DM5 setters: 24 · DM4 anemic: 24 · DM2 primitive ids: 23
β†’ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move Β· Medium Β· Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) β€” that's where correctness matters most. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
β†’ Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) β€” that's where correctness matters most.
Improving trajectory Β· Info Β· Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+7.6 pts/run over 5 runs) β€” whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +7.6 pts/run over 5 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading β€” something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 38, unchanged across 5 runs.

025507510029 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityDomain ModellingEvent-DrivenAccessibilityPerformance

Architecture β€” bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch ArchTests ArchTests BlazorServerSide BlazorServerSide BlazorWebAssembly BlazorWebAssembly ContractTests ContractTests UnitTests UnitTests WebMVC WebMVC ctx:Application (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Application) Application (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Application) Application) ctx:Domain (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Domain) Domain (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Domain) Domain) ctx:Application (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Application)->ctx:Domain (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) Application) ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) Domain) ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application)->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:AspireAppHost (src/Microservices/AspireAppHost) AspireAppHost (src/Microservices/AspireAppHost) AspireAppHost (src/Microservices/AspireAppHost) ctx:Infrastructure (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) Infrastructure (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) Infrastructure) ctx:Infrastructure (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure)->ctx:Application (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:Infrastructure (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure)->ctx:Domain (src/Microservices/Common/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) Infrastructure) ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure)->ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure)->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator) Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator) Migrator) ctx:Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator)->ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) ctx:Modules.AuditLog Modules.AuditLog AuditLog ctx:Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator)->ctx:Modules.AuditLog ctx:Modules.Identity Modules.Identity Identity ctx:Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator)->ctx:Modules.Identity ctx:Modules.Notification Modules.Notification Notification ctx:Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator)->ctx:Modules.Notification ctx:Modules.Product Modules.Product Product ctx:Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator)->ctx:Modules.Product ctx:Modules.Storage Modules.Storage Storage ctx:Migrator (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Migrator)->ctx:Modules.Storage ctx:Modules.AuditLog->ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:Modules.AuditLog->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Modules.AuditLog->ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) ctx:Modules.Identity->ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:Modules.Identity->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Modules.Identity->ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) ctx:Modules.Notification->ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:Modules.Notification->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Modules.Notification->ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) ctx:Modules.Product->ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:Modules.Product->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Modules.Product->ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) ctx:Modules.Storage->ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:Modules.Storage->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:Modules.Storage->ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI) WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI) WebAPI) ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Application (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Application) ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Domain (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain) ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Infrastructure (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure) ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Modules.AuditLog ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Modules.Identity ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Modules.Notification ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Modules.Product ctx:WebAPI (src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI)->ctx:Modules.Storage __more__ +56 more contexts

At a glance β€” Code Health Β· 44% Β· Weak Β· gated by R7, X5

At a glance β€” Architecture Β· 84% Β· Strong

At a glance β€” Maturity Β· 49% Β· Weak Β· gated by D34, M2

At a glance β€” Readiness Β· 32% Β· Weak Β· gated by D8, D13, R4, R6, R8, P9

At a glance β€” Security Β· 68% Β· Adequate Β· gated by D30, D31, D36, D38

At a glance β€” Domain Modelling Β· 45% Β· Weak Β· gated by DM2, DM4

At a glance β€” Event-Driven Β· 65% Β· Adequate

At a glance β€” Accessibility Β· 36% Β· Weak Β· gated by AC1, AC4

At a glance β€” Performance Β· 61% Β· Adequate

Security & Compliance β€” OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 β€” Vulnerable & Outdated Components77High / Critical
A05:2021 β€” Security Misconfiguration50High / Critical
A02:2021 β€” Cryptographic Failures5High / Critical

Roadmap

First, raise unit-test coverage for the domain layer to ensure core correctness. Next, expand test coverage to include all unreached modules by importing them directly or through public entry points. Then, clean up the dependency graph by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports. Finally, add missing tooling scripts for linting and type-checking in CI, and immediately resolve the five leaked secrets found in UserConfiguration.cs.

Ranked by impact Γ· effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning β€” start with UserConfiguration.cs (5).+5.2 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) β€” that's where correctness matters most.+5.3 ptsMediumDomain vs controller coverage
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+5.3 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+5.3 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+5.3 ptsMediumTooling
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+5.2 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.+5.0 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+5.0 ptsMediumDR & Backup

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 β€” a quality signature. Of 87 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 2% slop Β· 41% mixed Β· 57% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json0.2SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json0.4SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/UIs/nextjs/package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/notification/templates/notification-api.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/notification/templates/notification-background.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/notification/templates/notification-grpc.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/product/templates/product-api.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/storage/templates/storage-api.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/webapi/templates/webapi.deployment.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployments/Azure/terraform/main.tf5.8MixedIaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: AZU-0012
src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/templates/db.deployment.yaml5.8MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs7.0MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: UserStore
src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment β€” run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 92 of 95 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 β€” the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: βœ“ Measured β€” a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled β€” an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory β€” an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): βœ“ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; β—‹ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean β€” a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence β€” absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled Β· advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample β€” advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked β€” 95 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D36D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2C3DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8P9PF1PF2PF3R1R10R11R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality β€” in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report β€” three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line β€” never an absolute scratch path. Here, 165 of 214 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals β€” a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it β€” Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled Β· advisory β€” not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score β€” and this report, byte for byte β€” is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) β€” re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0βœ“ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0βœ“ deterministic
jscpdCode duplicationβ€”βœ“ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301βœ“ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301βœ“ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 Β· 0.31.0βœ“ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 Β· 0.69.3βœ“ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming β€” sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM Β· sampled Β· advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1570-bf28-7529-8ebe-c8589c3a7872.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension β€” tool, version, invocation and retained raw output β€” is in Appendix B β€” Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency β€” what happened this run

What ran differently this time β€” a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality β€” LLM provider failed β€” The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) β€” scanner not present in this environment β€” The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy β€” scanner not present in this environment β€” The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared β€” every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap β€” a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see β€” the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically β€” it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type β€” a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module β€” one class/IIFE β€” earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) β€” it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED β€” its repetition is the tool's, not the team's β€” so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies β€” runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic β€” it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image β€” the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals β€” a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural β€” it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers β€” Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles β€” a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree β€” a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy β€” mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history β€” a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension β€” pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual β€” undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded β€” it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment β€” a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present β€” it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample β€” it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample β€” it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project β€” a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural β€” it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns β€” a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) β€” it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database β€” a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules β€” it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles β€” risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension β€” code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS β€” files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally β€” the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup β€” a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively β€” flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name β€” but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree β€” landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes β€” interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape β€” roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction β€” literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only β€” an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics β€” a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention β€” a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only β€” a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body β€” a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards β€” a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present β€” it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see β€” only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence β€” a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) β€” D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity9.4 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is β€” methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 9.4 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync at 22.

RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cyclomatic 22)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:37
FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cyclomatic 22)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/MessageBusConsumers/FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs:76

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 Β· Cognitive Complexity8.8 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 8.8 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync at 37.

RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cognitive 37)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:37
FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cognitive 29)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/MessageBusConsumers/FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs:76
ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.ReadAsync (cognitive 18)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Excel/ExcelDataReader/ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.cs:24

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cognitive 37) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity β€” start with RabbitMQReceiver.cs. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity β€” start with FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.ReadAsync (cognitive 18) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity β€” start with ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.cs. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β€” Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented β€” provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 Β· God Classes9.7 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 9.7 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

1 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: UserStoresrc/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs:0

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 Β· Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 9.8 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

7 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) Β· Γ—2src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/HostedServices/SendEmailWorker.cs:45
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/RateLimiterPolicies/DefaultRateLimiterPolicy.cs:23
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/UsersController.cs:160
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Locks/LockManager.cs:48
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Repositories/EmailMessageRepository.cs:40

+ 1 more group(s) β€” more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 Β· Coupling7.2 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type β€” the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 7.2 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

19 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 3 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: ClassifiedAds.Persistence Β· Γ—3
Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide
Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorWebAssembly
Unstable project ClassifiedAds.WebMVC

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide finding(s) in Coupling. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorWebAssembly finding(s) in Coupling. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β€” Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented β€” provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 Β· Cohesion (LCOM4)9.7 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class β€” the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 9.7 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

2 of 72 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: UserStore (LCOM4 15) Β· Γ—2src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs:13

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D8 Β· Code Coverage1.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable β€” never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 1.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

Line coverage 3.6%, branch coverage 0.0%.

What to do

  1. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β€” Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified β€” provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 Β· Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

16 test methods: 16 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 Β· Test Quality8.5 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 8.5 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 3 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 30 tests.

No assertions: HomePage Β· Γ—3src/EndToEndUiTests/Playwright/ApplicationTests.cs:10
Mock framework: Moq

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality β€” start with ApplicationTests.cs (2), UserServiceTests.cs. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). β€” Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented β€” provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 Β· Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 Β· Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 Β· Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 0.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

5 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret Β· Γ—5src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning β€” start with UserConfiguration.cs (5). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 Β· License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

0 of 115 packages use a banned license.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 Β· Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex β€” the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 Β· Bus Factor7.6 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 7.6 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

116 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (β‰₯90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/FilesController.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 Β· Explicit Debt9.2 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code β€” TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 9.2 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

16 deducted debt markers + 22 dead symbols across 16424 LoC (0.4/KLoC) β†’ score 9.2.

Dead code: GetAuditEntriesQueryHandler Β· Γ—22src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/AuditLogEntries/Queries/GetAuditEntriesQuery.cs:16
TodoComment Β· Γ—15src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Infrastructure/Messaging/MessageBus.cs:121
CommentedOutCodesrc/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Web/Middleware/DebuggingMiddleware.cs:26

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 Β· Solution Shape8.5 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 8.5 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

19 projects, 498 .cs files, 16668 hand-written lines of code (16424 production / 244 test), 61 inter-project edges.

Monorepo: only 1 of 17 solutions was scored
Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository
Shell project: ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL Β· Γ—2src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL.csproj
Thin analysable surface across projects

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape β€” start with ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL.csproj, ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL.csproj. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository finding(s) in Solution Shape. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 Β· ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled Β· advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective Critical / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 Β· Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled Β· advisory

What it measures: Whether names β€” types, methods, variables β€” are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective Exemplary / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

1 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent naming for RabbitMQ options classes. Some are named 'RabbitMQSenderOptions', 'RabbitMQReceiverOptions', while others are 'RabbitMQOptions'. This creates confusion about whether 'RabbitMQOptions' is a base class or a separate configuration.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 Β· Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled Β· advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it β€” explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective Weak / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 2 redundant across 73 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment Β· Γ—2src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:32

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value β€” start with Program.cs, RabbitMQReceiver.cs. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 Β· Project Cohesion8.9 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 8.9 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

1 of 19 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure finding(s) in Project Cohesion. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 Β· Navigability7.4 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call β€” low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≀400 methods) β€” not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 7.4 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

86 % of calls cross a namespace and 20 % go through an interface, but 93 % of collaborators are co-located β€” so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium β€” clean/modular boundaries expected.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability β€” currently 7.4/10. β€” 86 % of calls cross a namespace and 20 % go through an interface, but 93 % of collaborators are co-located β€” so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium β€” clean/modular boundaries expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 Β· Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed β€” scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings β€” likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files β€” exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities2.2 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 2.2 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

27 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 18 medium, 2 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.SignalR.Protocols.MessagePack 10.0.8 Β· Γ—7detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 Β· Γ—18detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 6.12.1 Β· Γ—2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 18 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Low CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 Β· IaC & Container Security0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 0.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

1279 finding(s): 2 critical, 229 high, 331 medium, 717 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 Β· Γ—48src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.IdentityServer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: AZU-0012 Β· Γ—2deployments/Azure/terraform/main.tfdetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 48 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security β€” start with Dockerfile (4), auditlog-api.deployment.yaml (3), auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml (3). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (48 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security β€” start with main.tf (2). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 Β· JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) β€” the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness1.4 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned β€” last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 1.4 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

204 of 234 significant source file(s) are orphaned β€” their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.IdentityServer/HostedServices/SeedDataHostedService.cs.

Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 Β· Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together β€” pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only β€” tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file β‰₯10 revisions, β‰₯5 shared commits, β‰₯50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only β€” test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity β€” generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals β€” generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions β€” scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 0.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database β€” npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 0.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

69 finding(s): 1 critical, 33 high, 27 medium, 8 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Β· Γ—33src/UIs/angular/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/UIs/vuejs/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Β· Γ—16src/UIs/angular/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 33 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” start with package-lock.json (33). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 16 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” start with package-lock.json (16). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities β€” start with package-lock.json. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS Β· M = Maturity Β· P = Readiness.

AC1 Β· Text alternatives2.2 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Accessibility β€” Whether non-text content carries a text alternative β€” img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt β€” alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×25) β€” Consent.cshtml:9, Index.cshtml:9, Index.cshtml:9, …

What to do

  • Add a text alternative β€” alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 Β· Forms & labels7.1 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Accessibility β€” Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has only a placeholder β€” a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×3) β€” Consent.cshtml:74, Index.cshtml:71, Index.cshtml:104
  • A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×12) β€” Consent.cshtml:89, Index.cshtml:98, Index.cshtml:131, …
  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×10) β€” Index.cshtml:25, Secrets.cshtml:51, Secrets.cshtml:51, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text β€” a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 Β· Page structure4.6 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Accessibility β€” Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels β€” increase by at most one. (×13) β€” ExternalLogin.cshtml:6, ForgotPassword.cshtml:6, Login.cshtml:11, …
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). β€” ExternalLogins.cshtml:9
  • An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. β€” LoggedOut.cshtml:20
  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) β€” Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0
  • A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×2) β€” Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) β€” Callback.cshtml:0, Challenge.cshtml:0
  • An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. (×4) β€” Index.cshtml:39, Index.cshtml:51, Index.cshtml:63, …

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 Β· Keyboard semantics1.1 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Accessibility β€” Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable β€” no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×14) β€” ConfirmDialog.razor:18, Pagination.razor:2, Pagination.razor:3, …
  • An <a href="#"> (or javascript:) with a click handler is a button dressed as a link β€” it announces the wrong role and stops working without JS. Use a <button> for an action. (×5) β€” Edit.razor:50, Edit.razor:104, Edit.razor:108, …
  • A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×6) β€” NavMenu.razor:8, NavMenu.razor:17, Star.tsx:8, …

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 Β· ARIA correctness7.8 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Accessibility β€” Whether ARIA is used correctly β€” valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

  • aria-hidden="true" here hides the subtree from assistive tech, but a focusable descendant stays in the tab order β€” a keyboard user can land on a control screen readers can't see. Add inert, take the descendants out of the tab order (tabindex="-1"), or drop aria-hidden. (×2) β€” Secrets.cshtml:156, Secrets.cshtml:156

What to do

  • Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
AC6 Β· Visual & motion safety7.6 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Accessibility β€” Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast β€” PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL β€” only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

  • A CSS rule's foreground/background colour pair falls below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×4) β€” app.css:0, site.css:0, bootstrap.css:0, …

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 Β· A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found β€” no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 Β· Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency β€” a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 Β· Code composition4.9 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” How the codebase splits by code ROLE β€” domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention β€” a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code β€” check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 Β· Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 Β· Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 Β· Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) β€” the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 Β· Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 Β· Interface segregation9.9 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat β€” the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IUser` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. β€” IUser.cs:3
  • `IEmailMessage` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. β€” IEmailNotification.cs:11

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 Β· Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects β€” tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 Β· CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free β€” a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set β€” a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 Β· Data Protection8.5 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Security β€” Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) β€” partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 Β· Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Other Β· Security β€” Whether access is authorized by default β€” [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 Β· Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Security β€” Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete β€” missing: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent write-side hook), [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
DM1 Β· Aggregate boundaries4.7 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Domain Modelling β€” Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference β€” the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set β€” a root not using those names is invisible.

  • `FileEntryEmbedding` references the aggregate root `FileEntry` directly (via `FileEntry`) β€” hold its `FileEntryId` instead. β€” FileEntryEmbedding.cs:20
  • `FileEntryText` references the aggregate root `FileEntry` directly (via `FileEntry`) β€” hold its `FileEntryId` instead. β€” FileEntryText.cs:11
  • `ProductEmbedding` references the aggregate root `Product` directly (via `Product`) β€” hold its `ProductId` instead. β€” ProductEmbedding.cs:16
  • `User` references the aggregate root `UserLogin` directly (via `UserLogins`) β€” hold its `UserLoginId` instead. β€” User.cs:46
  • `UserLogin` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) β€” hold its `UserId` instead. β€” UserLogin.cs:15

What to do

  • Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM2 Β· Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Domain Modelling β€” How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int β€” adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically β€” non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `AuditLogEntry.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β€” AuditLogEntry.cs:7
  • `AuditLogEntry.ObjectId` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ObjectId { String Value }`). β€” AuditLogEntry.cs:11
  • `ConfigurationEntry.Key` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct Key { String Value }`). β€” ConfigurationEntry.cs:7
  • `EmailMessageBase.CopyFromId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CopyFromId { Guid Value }`). β€” EmailMessage.cs:42
  • `EmailMessageAttachment.EmailMessageId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EmailMessageId { Guid Value }`). β€” EmailMessageAttachment.cs:7
  • `EmailMessageAttachment.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β€” EmailMessageAttachment.cs:9
  • `FileEntry.EncryptionKey` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EncryptionKey { String Value }`). β€” FileEntry.cs:22
  • `DeletedFileEntry.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β€” FileEntry.cs:37
  • `FileEntryEmbedding.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β€” FileEntryEmbedding.cs:18
  • `FileEntryText.FileEntryId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FileEntryId { Guid Value }`). β€” FileEntryText.cs:9
  • `OutboxMessageBase.TriggeredById` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TriggeredById { Guid Value }`). β€” OutboxMessage.cs:17
  • `OutboxMessageBase.ObjectId` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ObjectId { String Value }`). β€” OutboxMessage.cs:19
  • `OutboxMessageBase.ActivityId` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ActivityId { String Value }`). β€” OutboxMessage.cs:25
  • `PasswordHistory.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β€” PasswordHistory.cs:7
  • `ProductEmbedding.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProductId { Guid Value }`). β€” ProductEmbedding.cs:14
  • `SmsMessageBase.CopyFromId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CopyFromId { Guid Value }`). β€” SmsMessage.cs:32
  • `User.Auth0UserId` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct Auth0UserId { String Value }`). β€” User.cs:36
  • `User.AzureAdB2CUserId` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AzureAdB2CUserId { String Value }`). β€” User.cs:38
  • `UserLogin.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β€” UserLogin.cs:7
  • `UserLogin.ProviderKey` is a raw `String` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProviderKey { String Value }`). β€” UserLogin.cs:11
  • `UserRole.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β€” UserRole.cs:7
  • `UserRole.RoleId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct RoleId { Guid Value }`). β€” UserRole.cs:9
  • `UserToken.UserId` is a raw `Guid` β€” give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). β€” UserToken.cs:7

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain β€” finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 Β· Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Domain Modelling β€” Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query β€” only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query β€” logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `AuditLogEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” AuditLogEntry.cs:5
  • `ConfigurationEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” ConfigurationEntry.cs:5
  • `CustomMigrationHistory` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” CustomMigrationHistory.cs:5
  • `EmailMessage` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” EmailMessage.cs:7
  • `EmailMessageBase` is an aggregate/entity with 13 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” EmailMessage.cs:16
  • `EmailMessageAttachment` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” EmailMessageAttachment.cs:5
  • `EmbeddingCacheEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” EmbeddingCacheEntry.cs:5
  • `FileEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 13 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” FileEntry.cs:6
  • `DeletedFileEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” FileEntry.cs:35
  • `FileEntryEmbedding` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” FileEntryEmbedding.cs:6
  • `FileEntryText` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” FileEntryText.cs:5
  • `LocalizationEntry` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” LocalizationEntry.cs:5
  • `OutboxMessageBase` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” OutboxMessage.cs:13
  • `PasswordHistory` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” PasswordHistory.cs:5
  • `Product` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” Product.cs:5
  • `ProductEmbedding` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” ProductEmbedding.cs:6
  • `Role` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” Role.cs:6
  • `RoleClaim` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” RoleClaim.cs:5
  • `SmsMessageBase` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” SmsMessage.cs:14
  • `User` is an aggregate/entity with 21 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” User.cs:6
  • `UserClaim` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” UserClaim.cs:5
  • `UserLogin` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” UserLogin.cs:5
  • `UserRole` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” UserRole.cs:5
  • `UserToken` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) β€” the business logic lives in a service. β€” UserToken.cs:5

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 Β· Encapsulated state6.7 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Domain Modelling β€” Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

  • `AuditLogEntry` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, Action, ObjectId, Log). β€” AuditLogEntry.cs:5
  • `ConfigurationEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Key, Value, Description, IsSensitive). β€” ConfigurationEntry.cs:5
  • `CustomMigrationHistory` exposes public setter(s) (MigrationName). β€” CustomMigrationHistory.cs:5
  • `EmailMessage` exposes public setter(s) (EmailMessageAttachments). β€” EmailMessage.cs:7
  • `EmailMessageBase` exposes public setter(s) (From, Tos, CCs, BCCs, Subject, Body, …). β€” EmailMessage.cs:16
  • `EmailMessageAttachment` exposes public setter(s) (EmailMessageId, FileEntryId, Name, EmailMessage, FileEntry). β€” EmailMessageAttachment.cs:5
  • `EmbeddingCacheEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Text, Provider, Model, Embedding, InputTokenCount, OutputTokenCount, …). β€” EmbeddingCacheEntry.cs:5
  • `FileEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Description, Size, UploadedTime, FileName, FileLocation, …). β€” FileEntry.cs:6
  • `DeletedFileEntry` exposes public setter(s) (FileEntryId). β€” FileEntry.cs:35
  • `FileEntryEmbedding` exposes public setter(s) (ChunkName, ChunkLocation, ShortText, Embedding, TokenDetails, FileEntryId, …). β€” FileEntryEmbedding.cs:6
  • `FileEntryText` exposes public setter(s) (TextLocation, FileEntryId, FileEntry). β€” FileEntryText.cs:5
  • `LocalizationEntry` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Value, Culture, Description). β€” LocalizationEntry.cs:5
  • `OutboxMessageBase` exposes public setter(s) (EventType, TriggeredById, ObjectId, Payload, Published, ActivityId, …). β€” OutboxMessage.cs:13
  • `PasswordHistory` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, PasswordHash, User). β€” PasswordHistory.cs:5
  • `Product` exposes public setter(s) (Code, Name, Description). β€” Product.cs:5
  • `ProductEmbedding` exposes public setter(s) (Text, Embedding, TokenDetails, ProductId, Product). β€” ProductEmbedding.cs:6
  • `Role` exposes public setter(s) (Name, NormalizedName, ConcurrencyStamp, Claims, UserRoles). β€” Role.cs:6
  • `RoleClaim` exposes public setter(s) (Type, Value, Role). β€” RoleClaim.cs:5
  • `SmsMessageBase` exposes public setter(s) (Message, PhoneNumber, AttemptCount, MaxAttemptCount, NextAttemptDateTime, ExpiredDateTime, …). β€” SmsMessage.cs:14
  • `User` exposes public setter(s) (UserName, NormalizedUserName, Email, NormalizedEmail, EmailConfirmed, PasswordHash, …). β€” User.cs:6
  • `UserClaim` exposes public setter(s) (Type, Value, User). β€” UserClaim.cs:5
  • `UserLogin` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, LoginProvider, ProviderKey, ProviderDisplayName, User). β€” UserLogin.cs:5
  • `UserRole` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, RoleId, User, Role). β€” UserRole.cs:5
  • `UserToken` exposes public setter(s) (UserId, LoginProvider, TokenName, TokenValue). β€” UserToken.cs:5

What to do

  • Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 Β· Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Domain Modelling β€” Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) β€” the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES β€” resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES β€” rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 Β· Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Domain Modelling β€” Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted β€” a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED1 Β· Handler temporal coupling4.1 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Event-Driven β€” Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `WebhookConsumer.HandleAsync` makes a synchronous remote call (an HTTP call) while handling an event. The handler now depends, in real time, on another service being up and fast β€” the opposite of why you went event-driven. Publish a follow-up message (or use the outbox) instead of calling out and awaiting a response inside the handler. (×6) β€” WebhookConsumer.cs:33, WebhookConsumer.cs:39, WebhookConsumer.cs:45, …

What to do

  • Remove synchronous remote calls from message handlers β€” react by publishing further messages, so services stay temporally decoupled.
ED2 Β· Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Event-Driven β€” Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 Β· Event naming10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Event-Driven β€” Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge β€” low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

ED4 Β· Outbox / dual-write7.1 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Event-Driven β€” Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

  • `SendEmailMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic β€” a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. β€” SendEmailMessagesCommand.cs:40
  • `PublishOutboxMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic β€” a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. β€” PublishOutboxMessagesCommand.cs:36
  • `SendSmsMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic β€” a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. β€” SendSmsMessagesCommand.cs:40

What to do

  • Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically β€” no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 Β· Idempotency9.6 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled Β· advisory

Other Β· Readiness β€” Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect β€” heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations β€” command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) β€” that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `Commands.PublishOutboxMessagesCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice β€” add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. β€” PublishOutboxMessagesCommand.cs:36

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent β€” guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 Β· Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Code Health β€” Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException β€” generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×12) β€” RoleStore.cs:25, RoleStore.cs:30, RoleStore.cs:35, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 Β· Incompleteness & stubs5.6 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Code Health β€” Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `RoleStore` has 10 unfinished members out of 11 β€” a scaffolded type that was never implemented. β€” RoleStore.cs:10
  • `CreateAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:23
  • `DeleteAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:28
  • `FindByIdAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:33
  • `FindByNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:38
  • `GetNormalizedRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:43
  • `GetRoleIdAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:48
  • `GetRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:53
  • `SetNormalizedRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:58
  • `SetRoleNameAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:63
  • `UpdateAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. β€” RoleStore.cs:68
  • `GetAllStrings` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException β€” scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×2) β€” DefaultStringLocalizer.cs:26, SqlServerStringLocalizer.cs:36
  • `SendAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β€” a placeholder return that was never filled in. (×4) β€” FakeSender.cs:9, FakeEmailNotification.cs:9, FakeSmsNotification.cs:9, …
  • `FakeStorageManager` has 3 unfinished members out of 5 β€” a scaffolded type that was never implemented. β€” FakeStorageManager.cs:9
  • `DeleteAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β€” a placeholder return that was never filled in. β€” FakeStorageManager.cs:17
  • `ArchiveAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β€” a placeholder return that was never filled in. β€” FakeStorageManager.cs:27
  • `UnArchiveAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant β€” a placeholder return that was never filled in. β€” FakeStorageManager.cs:32
  • `OnAuthorization` takes parameters but its body is empty β€” it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. β€” CustomAuthorizationFilter.cs:7
  • `OnException` takes parameters but its body is empty β€” it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. β€” CustomExceptionFilter.cs:7
  • `RefreshToken` has an empty body β€” confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. β€” TokenManager.cs:30
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed β€” dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×4) β€” IdentityServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:88, IdentityServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:89, LocalizationServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:47, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) β€” they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 Β· Documentation (README)6.5 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • 111 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched β€” it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 19 of 19 project(s) that lack one β€” worth up to 2 pts.
  • Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 Β· Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found β€” decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md β€” the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 Β· Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the repo is organised deliberately β€” src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder β€” the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 Β· Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled Β· advisory

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 Β· CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (dotnet test / npm test / pytest / a test job) was matched β€” the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.
P2 Β· Observability8.8 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether the code is diagnosable in production β€” structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 8/13 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded β€” they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 Β· Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • <NuGetAudit>false</NuGetAudit> in MSBuild suppresses NuGet's vulnerability audit project-wide. β€” Directory.Build.props:4

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
P4 Β· Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) β€” from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced β€” a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 Β· DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified β€” backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees β€” from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
P7 Β· Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 Β· Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

P9 Β· Domain vs controller coverage1.8 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer β€” a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

  • Domain coverage is 8% β€” the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.

What to do

  • Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) β€” that's where correctness matters most.
PF1 Β· Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Performance β€” Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks β€” a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI β€” scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions β€” but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.
PF2 Β· Allocation hygiene6.3 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Performance β€” Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC β€” Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs β€” Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths β€” currently 9 use(s) across 16,855 production line(s) (~0.5/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 Β· Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Performance β€” Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive β€” a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and β€” for a library with β‰₯5 awaits β€” the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 3 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) β€” these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it β€” never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
R1 Β· Type Safety9.8 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 Β· Code Duplication6.6 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:8 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:36 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:56 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:80 β€” actions.tsx:8
  • src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/ListProducts/ListProducts.tsx:287 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Products/ListProducts/ListProducts.tsx:359 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Products/ListProducts/ListProducts.tsx:287 β€” ListProducts.tsx:287
  • src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:93 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Settings/actions.tsx:93 · src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Users/actions.tsx:93 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Products/actions.tsx:93 β€” actions.tsx:93
  • src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:377 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:457 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:377 β€” ViewUser.tsx:377
  • src/UIs/vuejs/src/views/files/Edit.vue:137 · src/UIs/vuejs/src/views/files/List.vue:108 β€” Edit.vue:137
  • src/UIs/angular/src/app/products/add-product/add-product.guard.ts:4 · src/UIs/angular/src/app/products/edit-product/edit-product.guard.ts:4 β€” add-product.guard.ts:4
  • src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Settings/ListConfigurationEntries/ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:31 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Settings/ListConfigurationEntries/ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:51 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Settings/ListConfigurationEntries/ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:31 β€” ListConfigurationEntries.tsx:31
  • src/UIs/bff/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:30 · src/UIs/nextjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:32 · src/UIs/reactjs/src/containers/Users/ViewUser/ViewUser.tsx:30 β€” ViewUser.tsx:30

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 Β· Import Boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Architecture β€” Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

R2 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity9.8 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) β€” real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster β€” extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) β€” reducer.tsx:79, reducer.tsx:79, ViewUser.tsx:10, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≀ 5.
R3 Β· Large Files9.7 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 Β· Test Coverage3.1 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Readiness β€” Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph β€” measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph β€” measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively β€” its behavior is unverified. (×8) β€” ViewUser.tsx, ListConfigurationEntries.tsx, ListProducts.tsx, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 Β· Dependency Freshness8.7 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Readiness β€” How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 Β· Tooling3.3 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Readiness β€” Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck β€” detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test βœ— · lint βœ“ · typecheck βœ—

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 Β· Dead Code0.7 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Code Health β€” Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 4 application, 24 tooling and 4 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check β€” an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (4 application, 24 tooling, 4 test roots considered) (×7) β€” ViewUser.tsx, ListConfigurationEntries.tsx, ListProducts.tsx, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports β€” every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 Β· Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Readiness β€” npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps β€” from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in src/UIs/angular/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members β€” dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
  • Only test files import it β€” move it to devDependencies. β€” App.test.js:2

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 Β· Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

React / JS Β· Architecture β€” Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) β€” files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 Β· Web-Security Posture7.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Security β€” Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • Password-hash field compared with `==` β€” use a constant-time compare to avoid timing oracles (CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals). β€” UserStore.cs:145
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (βˆ’1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Compare password hashes with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` (constant time, no timing oracle).
  • Set secure cookie flags β€” CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 Β· Async correctness7.1 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Code Health β€” Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×3) β€” HashiCorpVaultConfigurationProvider.cs:34, SignalRNotification.cs:30, PuppeteerSharpCollectionExtensions.cs:13
  • `async void` can't be awaited and its exceptions crash the process instead of propagating. Return `Task` unless this is a top-level event handler. (×7) β€” List.cs:67, List.cs:71, List.cs:61, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 Β· Cancellation propagation6.5 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Code Health β€” Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 124/293 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention β€” judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter β€” work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) β€” DatabaseRetryDecoratorBase.cs:32, SyncUsersCommand.cs:34, SyncUsersCommand.cs:78, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 Β· Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Other Β· Code Health β€” Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 Β· Structured logging4.5 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Code Health β€” Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

  • Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text β€” you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. (×19) β€” ErrorCatchingInterceptor.cs:89, LoggingInterceptor.cs:34, LoggingInterceptor.cs:61, …

What to do

  • Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 Β· Nullable reference types3.6 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Code Health β€” Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 3/15 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~0.0 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes β€” each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage β€” what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; β‰ˆ30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim β€” a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 Β· Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 Β· Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 Β· Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 Β· Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 Β· ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 Β· Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial β€” literal CSS only
AC7 Β· A11y enforcementenforcement β€” no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed β€” these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference β€” by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health44%Weak β€” gated by R7, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture84%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity49%Weak β€” gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness32%Weak β€” gated by D8, D13, R4, R6, R8, P9Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security68%Adequate β€” gated by D30, D31, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling45%Weak β€” gated by DM2, DM4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven65%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Accessibility36%Weak β€” gated by AC1, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance61%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included β€” 21 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX7 Slice cohesion β€” not applicable β€” not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness β€” no data
  • C4 Data Retention β€” Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data β€” absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights β€” Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary β€” absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D19 Documentation Quality β€” LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency β€” No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling β€” Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance β€” no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) β€” No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) β€” no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy β€” No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency β€” The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity β€” no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles β€” architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling β€” no integration events detected β€” coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity β€” no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing β€” not run β€” 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty β€” no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene β€” not evidenced β€” no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene β€” no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing β€” no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults β€” no data
  • X8 JS interop contract β€” no data

Appendix A β€” Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue β€” 96 finding(s)
D31 Β· IaC & Container Security Β· High IaC Β· Γ—48
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.IdentityServer/Dockerfile β€” Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.Migrator/Dockerfile β€” Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.IdentityServer/Dockerfile β€” Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.Migrator/Dockerfile β€” Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml β€” Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-api.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml β€” Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog-grpc.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0109 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/auditlog/templates/auditlog.configmap.yml β€” ConfigMap with secrets
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml β€” Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration-api.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0109 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/configuration/templates/configuration.configmap.yml β€” ConfigMap with secrets
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml β€” Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-api.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml β€” Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-authserver.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml β€” Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity-grpc.deployment.yaml β€” Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0109 src/Microservices/.helm/microservices/charts/identity/templates/identity.configmap.yml β€” ConfigMap with secrets
  • + 23 more in this group β€” see findings.md.
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· High CVE Β· Γ—33
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” fast-uri: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” fast-uri: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” http-proxy-middleware: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” picomatch: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” piscina: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” ws: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” flatted: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” flatted: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” form-data: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” react-router: [GHSA redacted] (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” react-router: [GHSA redacted] (in 2 lockfiles)
  • + 8 more in this group β€” see findings.md.
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· High CVE Β· Γ—7
  • High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.SignalR.Protocols.MessagePack 10.0.8 β€” Microsoft.AspNetCore.SignalR.Protocols.MessagePack 10.0.8 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 8.0.2 β€” System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 8.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 8.0.2 β€” System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 8.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D13 Β· Secret Scanning Β· Leaked secret Β· Γ—5
  • Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34 β€” high-entropy-secret detected.
  • Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/ModularMonolith/ClassifiedAds.Modules.Identity/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34 β€” high-entropy-secret detected.
  • Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/Microservices/Services.Identity/ClassifiedAds.Services.Identity/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34 β€” high-entropy-secret detected.
  • Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34 β€” high-entropy-secret detected.
  • Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/DbConfigurations/UserConfiguration.cs:34 β€” high-entropy-secret detected.
D31 Β· IaC & Container Security Β· Critical IaC Β· Γ—2
  • Critical IaC: AZU-0012 deployments/Azure/terraform/main.tf β€” The default action on Storage account network rules should be set to deny
  • Critical IaC: AZU-0013 deployments/Azure/terraform/main.tf β€” Key vault should have the network acl block specified
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· Critical CVE Β· Γ—1
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/vuejs/package-lock.json β€” shell-quote: [GHSA redacted]
Warning β€” 100 finding(s)
D17 Β· Explicit Debt Β· Dead code Β· Γ—22
  • Dead code: GetAuditEntriesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/AuditLogEntries/Queries/GetAuditEntriesQuery.cs:16 β€” NamedType GetAuditEntriesQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetPagedAuditEntriesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/AuditLogEntries/Queries/GetPagedAuditEntriesQuery.cs:18 β€” NamedType GetPagedAuditEntriesQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AddEntityCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Common/Commands/AddEntityCommand.cs:19 β€” NamedType AddEntityCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: UpdateEntityCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Common/Commands/UpdateEntityCommand.cs:19 β€” NamedType UpdateEntityCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetFileEntriesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/FileEntries/Queries/GetFileEntriesQuery.cs:15 β€” NamedType GetFileEntriesQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AddUpdateProductCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Products/Commands/AddUpdateProductCommand.cs:13 β€” NamedType AddUpdateProductCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: DeleteProductCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Products/Commands/DeleteProductCommand.cs:12 β€” NamedType DeleteProductCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetProductQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Products/Queries/GetProductQuery.cs:17 β€” NamedType GetProductQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AddClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/AddClaimCommand.cs:14 β€” NamedType AddClaimCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AddUpdateRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/AddUpdateRoleCommand .cs:13 β€” NamedType AddUpdateRoleCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: DeleteClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/DeleteClaimCommand.cs:14 β€” NamedType DeleteClaimCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: DeleteRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Commands/DeleteRoleCommand.cs:13 β€” NamedType DeleteRoleCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetRoleQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Queries/GetRoleQuery.cs:19 β€” NamedType GetRoleQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetRolesQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Roles/Queries/GetRolesQuery.cs:17 β€” NamedType GetRolesQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AddClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/AddClaimCommand.cs:14 β€” NamedType AddClaimCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AddRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/AddRoleCommand .cs:14 β€” NamedType AddRoleCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: DeleteClaimCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/DeleteClaimCommand.cs:14 β€” NamedType DeleteClaimCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: DeleteRoleCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/DeleteRoleCommand.cs:14 β€” NamedType DeleteRoleCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: DeleteUserCommandHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Commands/DeleteUserCommand.cs:13 β€” NamedType DeleteUserCommandHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetUserQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Queries/GetUserQuery.cs:19 β€” NamedType GetUserQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetUsersQueryHandler src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/Queries/GetUsersQuery.cs:17 β€” NamedType GetUsersQueryHandler β€” no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: OnInputFileChange src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Files/Pages/Upload.cs:68 β€” Method OnInputFileChange β€” no references found in solution.
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· Medium CVE Β· Γ—18
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.187 β€” MessagePack 2.5.187 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 9 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 β€” MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· Medium CVE Β· Γ—16
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” follow-redirects: [GHSA redacted] (in 5 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” http-proxy-middleware: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” picomatch: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” uuid: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” webpack-dev-server: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/angular/package-lock.json β€” webpack-dev-server: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” ajv: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/UIs/bff/reactjs/package-lock.json β€” axios: [GHSA redacted] (in 4 lockfiles)
D17 Β· Explicit Debt Β· TodoComment Β· Γ—15
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Infrastructure/Messaging/MessageBus.cs:121 β€” // TODO: Take Note β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/HistoricalPasswordValidator.cs:20 β€” // TODO: check password histories, etc. β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/WeakPasswordValidator.cs:21 β€” // TODO: check weak password, leaked password, password histories, etc. β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Interceptors/ErrorCatchingInterceptor.cs:81 β€” // TODO: Ignore serialize large argument object. β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:32 β€” // TODO: add log here β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Storages/Local/LocalFileStorageManager.cs:53 β€” // TODO: move to archive storage β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Storages/Local/LocalFileStorageManager.cs:59 β€” // TODO: move to active storage β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Web/Authorization/Requirements/PermissionRequirement.cs:23 β€” // TODO: check claims β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Web/ClaimsTransformations/CustomClaimsTransformation.cs:54 β€” // TODO: Get from Db β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Authorization/FileEntryAuthorizationHandler.cs:12 β€” // TODO: check CreatedById β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/ConfigurationEntriesController.cs:145 β€” // TODO: import to database β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/ProductsController.cs:249 β€” // TODO: import to database β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Tenants/AdsDbContextMultiTenantConnectionStringResolver.cs:30 β€” // TODO: query configuration store to get ConnectionString β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Tenants/AdsReadOnlyDbContextMultiTenantConnectionStringResolver.cs:30 β€” // TODO: query configuration store to get ConnectionString β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Tenants/TenantResolver.cs:33 β€” // TODO: query configuration store to get Tenant information β€” source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D10 Β· Test Quality Β· No assertions Β· Γ—3
  • No assertions: HomePage src/EndToEndUiTests/Playwright/ApplicationTests.cs:10 β€” Test method exercises code but verifies nothing β€” add an assertion.
  • No assertions: HomePage src/EndToEndUiTests/Selenium/ApplicationTests.cs:9 β€” Test method exercises code but verifies nothing β€” add an assertion.
  • No assertions: GetUsers src/Microservices/Services.Identity/ClassifiedAds.Services.Identity.IntegrationTests/Grpc/UserServiceTests.cs:17 β€” Test method exercises code but verifies nothing β€” add an assertion.
D5 Β· Coupling Β· Off the main sequence Β· Γ—3
  • Off the main sequence: ClassifiedAds.Persistence β€” ClassifiedAds.Persistence: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.22, distance 0.78 β€” zone of pain β€” concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: ClassifiedAds.Application β€” ClassifiedAds.Application: abstractness 0.08, instability 0.14, distance 0.77 β€” zone of pain β€” concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure β€” ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.01, instability 0.27, distance 0.72 β€” zone of pain β€” concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D4 Β· Code Duplication Β· Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) Β· Γ—2
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/HostedServices/SendEmailWorker.cs:45 β€” src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/HostedServices/SendEmailWorker.cs:45-62 | src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/HostedServices/SendSmsWorker.cs:45-62
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/FilesController.cs:402 β€” src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/FilesController.cs:402-419 | src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/ProductsController.cs:206-223
D6 Β· Cohesion (LCOM4) Β· Low cohesion Β· Γ—2
  • Low cohesion: UserStore (LCOM4 15) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs:13 β€” UserStore's methods form 15 groups that share no state and don't call each other β€” a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
  • Low cohesion: AdsDbContext (LCOM4 4) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/AdsDbContext.cs:19 β€” AdsDbContext's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other β€” a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
D1 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity Β· RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cyclomatic 22) Β· Γ—1
  • RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cyclomatic 22) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:37 β€” RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity Β· FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cyclomatic 22) Β· Γ—1
  • FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cyclomatic 22) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/MessageBusConsumers/FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs:76 β€” FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D17 Β· Explicit Debt Β· CommentedOutCode Β· Γ—1
  • CommentedOutCode src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Web/Middleware/DebuggingMiddleware.cs:26 β€” 3 consecutive commented-code lines
D18 Β· Solution Shape Β· Monorepo Β· Γ—1
  • Monorepo: only 1 of 17 solutions was scored β€” This repository contains 17 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Monolith.slnx` β€” the other 16 (`src/EndToEndApiTests/ClassifiedAds.ApiIntegrationTests.sln`, `src/EndToEndUiTests/Playwright/ClassifiedAds.EndToEndTests.slnx`, `src/EndToEndUiTests/Selenium/ClassifiedAds.EndToEndTests.slnx`, `src/IdentityServers/Duende/ClassifiedAds.Duende.slnx`, `src/IdentityServers/OpenIddict/ClassifiedAds.OpenIddict.slnx`, `src/Microservices/ClassifiedAds.Microservices.slnx`, +10 more) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it β€” `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) β€” to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D18 Β· Solution Shape Β· Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository Β· Γ—1
  • Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository β€” The scored solution `src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Monolith.slnx` is not representative of this repository β€” it references only 562 of 2028 discovered C# files (28 %). Lenses that need the product's source (domain modelling, event-driven, event sourcing) abstain because the aggregates, EF configs, and domain events under the product tree were not loaded. Point the scan at the product solution (or scan its directory directly) so the whole codebase is analyzed, not a build-tooling sub-solution.
D19 Β· Documentation Quality Β· LLM evaluation failed Β· Γ—1
  • LLM evaluation failed β€” JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1217.
D2 Β· Cognitive Complexity Β· RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cognitive 37) Β· Γ—1
  • RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync (cognitive 37) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:37 β€” RabbitMQReceiver.ReceiveAsync has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15).
D2 Β· Cognitive Complexity Β· FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cognitive 29) Β· Γ—1
  • FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync (cognitive 29) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Background/MessageBusConsumers/FileEmbeddingConsumer.cs:76 β€” FileEmbeddingConsumer.ProcessFileAsync has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D2 Β· Cognitive Complexity Β· ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.ReadAsync (cognitive 18) Β· Γ—1
  • ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.ReadAsync (cognitive 18) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Excel/ExcelDataReader/ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.cs:24 β€” ImportConfigurationEntriesFromExcelHandler.ReadAsync has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D3 Β· God Classes Β· TooManyMethods Β· Γ—1
  • TooManyMethods: UserStore src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Identity/UserStore.cs:0 β€” TooManyMethods β€” 154 lines, 45 methods.
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing Β· Unpinned build actions Β· Γ—1
  • Unpinned build actions β€” CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 Β· Code Duplication Β· Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) Β· Γ—1
  • Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/RateLimiterPolicies/DefaultRateLimiterPolicy.cs:23 β€” src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/RateLimiterPolicies/DefaultRateLimiterPolicy.cs:23-43 | src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/RateLimiterPolicies/GetAuditLogsRateLimiterPolicy.cs:23-43
D4 Β· Code Duplication Β· Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) Β· Γ—1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/UsersController.cs:160 β€” src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/UsersController.cs:160-177 | src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/UsersController.cs:187-205
D4 Β· Code Duplication Β· Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) Β· Γ—1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Locks/LockManager.cs:48 β€” src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Locks/LockManager.cs:48-63 | src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Locks/LockManager.cs:71-84
D4 Β· Code Duplication Β· Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Β· Γ—1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Repositories/EmailMessageRepository.cs:40 β€” src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Repositories/EmailMessageRepository.cs:40-54 | src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence/Repositories/SmsMessageRepository.cs:40-54
D4 Β· Code Duplication Β· Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Β· Γ—1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusReceiver.cs:34 β€” src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusReceiver.cs:34-47 | src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusSubscriptionReceiver.cs:36-49
D5 Β· Coupling Β· Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide Β· Γ—1
  • Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide β€” ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide has instability 1.00 with 0 dependents.
D5 Β· Coupling Β· Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorWebAssembly Β· Γ—1
  • Unstable project ClassifiedAds.BlazorWebAssembly β€” ClassifiedAds.BlazorWebAssembly has instability 1.00 with 0 dependents.
D5 Β· Coupling Β· Unstable project ClassifiedAds.WebMVC Β· Γ—1
  • Unstable project ClassifiedAds.WebMVC β€” ClassifiedAds.WebMVC has instability 1.00 with 0 dependents.
Recommendation β€” 16 finding(s)
D18 Β· Solution Shape Β· Shell project Β· Γ—2
  • Shell project: ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL.csproj β€” `ClassifiedAds.Persistence.MySQL` contributes only 0 significant line(s) β€” an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL/ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL.csproj β€” `ClassifiedAds.Persistence.PostgreSQL` contributes only 0 significant line(s) β€” an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D24 Β· Comment Value Β· redundant comment Β· Γ—2
  • redundant comment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Messaging/RabbitMQ/RabbitMQReceiver.cs:32 β€” "add log here" β€” delete - generated stub placeholder; remove from codebase
  • redundant comment src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.BlazorServerSide/Program.cs:41 β€” "Add services to the container." β€” delete - duplicate of above; one comment per DI registration
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities Β· Low CVE Β· Γ—2
  • Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 6.12.1 β€” NuGet.Packaging 6.12.1 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 2 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Low CVE: NuGet.Protocol 6.12.1 β€” NuGet.Protocol 6.12.1 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 2 projects β€” one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D16 Β· Bus Factor Β· Off-boarding risk Β· Γ—1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 β€” If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 116 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Controllers/FilesController.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D18 Β· Solution Shape Β· Thin analysable surface across projects Β· Γ—1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects β€” 2 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `ClassifiedAds.AspireAppHost` with 14 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 82 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.5 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 Β· ADR Quality Β· No ADRs found Β· Γ—1
  • No ADRs found β€” No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 Β· Naming Consistency Β· Inconsistent naming for RabbitMQ options classes. Some are named 'RabbitMQSenderOptions', 'RabbitMQReceiverOptions', while others are 'RabbitMQOptions'. This creates confusion about whether 'RabbitMQOptions' is a base class or a separate configuration. Β· Γ—1
  • Inconsistent naming for RabbitMQ options classes. Some are named 'RabbitMQSenderOptions', 'RabbitMQReceiverOptions', while others are 'RabbitMQOptions'. This creates confusion about whether 'RabbitMQOptions' is a base class or a separate configuration. β€” Standardize the naming of RabbitMQ configuration classes. Use 'RabbitMQOptions' as the base class and 'RabbitMQSenderOptions' and 'RabbitMQReceiverOptions' as derived classes, or rename all to 'RabbitMQSenderConfiguration' and 'RabbitMQReceiverConfiguration' for clarity. (symbols: ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure.Messaging.RabbitMQ.RabbitMQSenderOptions, ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure.Messaging.RabbitMQ.RabbitMQOptions, ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure.Messaging.RabbitMQ.RabbitMQSenderOptions.RoutingKey, ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure.Messaging.RabbitMQ.RabbitMQReceiverOptions)
D23 Β· Boundary Type-Coupling Β· Bounded contexts not declared Β· Γ—1
  • Bounded contexts not declared β€” At 16k LoC across 19 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (β‰₯2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D26 Β· Project Cohesion Β· Split ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure Β· Γ—1
  • Split ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure β€” A generic infrastructure project at 55k LoC and 163 types across 52 namespaces is a sprawling grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: AdsFeed, AdBidding, Pricing, Notifications
D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness Β· Dormant codebase Β· Γ—1
  • Dormant codebase β€” 204 of 234 significant files have no living knowledge β€” the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 204 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing Β· No build provenance Β· Γ—1
  • No build provenance β€” No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing Β· No artifact signing Β· Γ—1
  • No artifact signing β€” No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing Β· No SBOM Β· Γ—1
  • No SBOM β€” No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
Info β€” 2 finding(s)
D10 Β· Test Quality Β· Mock framework Β· Γ—1
  • Mock framework: Moq β€” ClassifiedAds.UnitTests references Moq.
D22 Β· Internal API Consistency Β· No exposed public API Β· Γ—1
  • No exposed public API β€” No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B β€” Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension β€” the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative β€” never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json β€” kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 Β· Secrets (history)gitleaksβ€”gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepβ€”semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0β€”
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetβ€”dotnet list src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Monolith.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json27artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 Β· IaC & Container Securitytrivyβ€”trivy config --format json --quiet .1279artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 Β· Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepβ€”semgrep: not applicable β€” No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) β€” no data-compliance surface to assess.0β€”
D33 Β· JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivyβ€”trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0β€”
D37 Β· Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosureβ€”disclosure: not applicable β€” No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0β€”
D38 Β· OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerβ€”osv-scanner --format json --recursive .69artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019f1570-bf28-7529-8ebe-c8589c3a7872 Β· every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C β€” Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data β€” 41 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from β€” right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational β€” it feeds no score.

Email β€” 24 field(s)
  • SendEmailMessagesCommandHandler._emailNotification src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/EmailMessages/Commands/SendEmailMessagesCommand.cs:23
  • UserDTO.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:12
  • UserDTO.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:14
  • UserDTO.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:16
  • UserModel.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:16
  • UserModel.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:18
  • UserModel.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:20
  • Detail.SendPasswordResetEmailDialog src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Pages/Detail.cs:26
  • Detail.SendEmailAddressConfirmationEmailDialog src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Pages/Detail.cs:28
  • EmailMessage.EmailMessageAttachments src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/EmailMessage.cs:9
  • EmailMessageAttachment.EmailMessageId src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/EmailMessageAttachment.cs:7
  • EmailMessageAttachment.EmailMessage src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/EmailMessageAttachment.cs:13
  • User.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:12
  • User.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:14
  • User.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:16
  • IUser.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:9
  • User.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:24
  • Auth0User.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/IdentityProviders/Auth0/Auth0User.cs:23
  • NotificationOptions.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/Notification/NotificationOptions.cs:9
  • Permissions.SendResetPasswordEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Authorization/Permissions.cs:35
  • Permissions.SendConfirmationEmailAddressEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Authorization/Permissions.cs:36
  • UserModel.Email src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:13
  • UserModel.NormalizedEmail src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:15
  • UserModel.EmailConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:17
Phone β€” 10 field(s)
  • UserDTO.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:18
  • UserDTO.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Application/Users/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:20
  • UserModel.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:23
  • UserModel.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Blazor.Modules/Users/Models/UserModel.cs:25
  • SmsMessageBase.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/SmsMessage.cs:18
  • User.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:20
  • User.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Entities/User.cs:22
  • ISmsMessage.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/Notification/ISmsNotification.cs:15
  • UserModel.PhoneNumber src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:19
  • UserModel.PhoneNumberConfirmed src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.WebAPI/Models/Users/UserModel.cs:21
Name β€” 6 field(s)
  • IUser.FirstName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:13
  • IUser.LastName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:15
  • User.FirstName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:28
  • User.LastName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/IdentityProviders/IUser.cs:30
  • Auth0User.GivenName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/IdentityProviders/Auth0/Auth0User.cs:17
  • Auth0User.FamilyName src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Infrastructure/IdentityProviders/Auth0/Auth0User.cs:20
Address β€” 1 field(s)
  • Address.ZipCode src/Monolith/ClassifiedAds.Domain/ValueObjects/Address.cs:9

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric β€” drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md