Public report — flutter_inappwebview, published 5 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 05-08-2026 @ 20:40 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Pichillilorenzo/flutter_Inappwebview

53% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
lower third — near Weak

Large · 181,211 LoC · rebuild ~1.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (44%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

30/32dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
46findings with an exact file:lineof 52 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
32/113dimensions across the health lenses181211 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

pichillilorenzo/flutter_inappwebview is sound in substance but carries real gaps (53%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (100%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (44%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (44%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them… (Tooling); Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript (Type Safety).

For scale: Large (~181,211 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.2 person-years (~1–3 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 44% · 46% weightCode Health 44% · 25% weightMaturity 55% · 14% weightSecurity 89% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 44 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 53 → ~58.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (12+)

12 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-01) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D35 · Change coupling: web_support.js ↔ in_app_web_view_web_element.dart flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2 locations) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 3 locations) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 3 locations) web_support/src/index.ts
  • R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29, cognitive 42) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R2 · Complex function setSettings (cyclomatic 21, cognitive 39) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js
  • R2 · Complex function getSize (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 13) flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €60,000–€300,000
Cost to rebuild€60,000–€300,000 (0.6–1.9 person-years (1,004–3,185 h), ~1–3 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 53% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeLarge · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~1.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€180,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 44% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+8.4 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
2
Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
+8.4 pts · Medium effort · Tooling
3
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
+8.3 pts · Medium effort · Type Safety

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Large asset (~1.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 44%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Large, ~1.2 person-years rebuild (181,211 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 44%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

32 modules, 75 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

(global)android.print…1fa4ca42c8d2bad.utils…bview_android_example…flutterwebviewexampleflutter_inappwebview…fa4ca42c8d2bad.models…381fa4ca42c8d2bad.src…droid.content_blocker…roid.find_interaction…iew_android.print_job…droid.pull_to_refresh…tter_inappwebview_ios…ca42c8d2bad.providers…a4ca42c8d2bad.screens…a4ca42c8d2bad.widgets…ebview.in_app_webview…er_inappwebview_macos…e4fb381fa4ca42c8d2bad…ndroid.in_app_browser…bview_android.webview…d.webview.web_message…webview_android.types…id.chrome_custom_tabs…d.credential_database…adless_in_app_webview…oid.plugin_scripts_js…process_global_config…webview_android.proxy…ndroid.service_worker…bview_android.tracing…_inappwebview_android(global)1android.print2…1fa4ca42c8d2bad.utils3…bview_android_example4…flutterwebviewexample5flutter_inappwebview6…fa4ca42c8d2bad.models7…381fa4ca42c8d2bad.src8…droid.content_blocker9…roid.find_interaction10…iew_android.print_job11…droid.pull_to_refresh12…tter_inappwebview_ios13…ca42c8d2bad.providers14…a4ca42c8d2bad.screens15…a4ca42c8d2bad.widgets16…ebview.in_app_webview17…er_inappwebview_macos18…e4fb381fa4ca42c8d2bad19…ndroid.in_app_browser20…bview_android.webview21…d.webview.web_message22…webview_android.types23…id.chrome_custom_tabs24…d.credential_database25…adless_in_app_webview26…oid.plugin_scripts_js27…process_global_config28…webview_android.proxy29…ndroid.service_worker30…bview_android.tracing31…_inappwebview_android326711132632213352511111552134121311111521412584293128341142913228122311262111111

At a glance — Code Health · 44% · Weak · gated by R1, R3

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 55% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 44% · Weak · gated by R6, P3

At a glance — Security · 89% · Strong

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection6High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components1Medium

Roadmap

First, integrate security and performance tooling into the CI pipeline to ensure security regressions fail the build. Next, add eslint and TypeScript type-checking to package scripts and run them in CI to improve code quality. Then, migrate the remaining JavaScript files to TypeScript to enhance type safety. After that, split the two largest files into smaller, focused modules to improve maintainability. Finally, implement version stamping in the build manifest to ensure releases are traceable.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+8.4 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+8.4 ptsMediumTooling
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.+8.3 ptsMediumType Safety
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.+8.3 ptsMediumLarge Files
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+8.0 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.+6.6 ptsMediumCode Duplication
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.+6.2 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+5.6 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 34 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 35% mixed · 65% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
test_node_server/index.js6.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: raw-html-format
flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/headless_in_app_webview.dart6.5MixedChange Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: headless_in_app_webview.dart ↔ headless_in_app_web_view_web_element.dart
.github/workflows/lock.yaml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/stale.yaml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_browser/platform_in_app_browser.dart7.4MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: PlatformInAppBrowserEvents
flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_inappwebview_controller.dart7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: PlatformInAppWebViewController
flutter_inappwebview_windows/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart
flutter_inappwebview_android/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart
flutter_inappwebview_macos/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart7.8MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart
flutter_inappwebview_linux/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: LinuxInAppWebViewController
flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart7.8MixedGod Classes: TooManyMethods: WebPlatformInAppWebViewController
web_support/package-lock.json7.9MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]
flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: InAppWebViewController
flutter_inappwebview_ios/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart
flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_browser/in_app_browser.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: InAppBrowser
flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_settings.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_settings.dart
flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_webview.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: in_app_webview/platform_webview.dart
flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: InAppWebViewPlatform
flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/types/web_resource_error_type.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: FileTooLong: types/web_resource_error_type.dart
flutter_inappwebview_android/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: AndroidInAppWebViewPlatform

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 30 of 32 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 32 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D16D19D21D28D29D33D34D35D38AX9DM4DM5DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P6R1R10R2R3R5R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 46 of 52 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd3a8-5fec-7401-9b86-10cb14ee76bc.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D3 · God Classes9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

36 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: PlatformInAppWebViewController · ×20flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_inappwebview_controller.dart:68
FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart · ×16flutter_inappwebview_windows/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

43 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_inappwebview_controller.dart.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The Flutter InAppWebView plugin is well documented: a single README with an endorsed badge lists the supported platforms (Windows, Web, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android), each platform's usage notes, and cross-platform examples. The README also includes a dedicated 'Usage' section for the Windows/Android/Web/macOS/Linux platform interfaces, plus a short example README for each platform. There is no architecture or design documentation, but the README itself is clear and complete.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The Flutter InAppWebView plugin is well documented: a single README with an endorsed badge lists the supported platforms (Windows, Web, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android), each platform's usage notes, and cross-platform examples. The README also includes a dedicated 'Usage' section for the Windows/Android/Web/macOS/Linux platform interfaces, plus a short example README for each platform. There is no architecture or design documentation, but the README itself is clear and complete.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 4 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×2.github/workflows/lock.yaml:20detected by semgrep finding
Medium: raw-html-format · ×4test_node_server/index.js:163detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with index.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with lock.yaml, stale.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: web_support.js↔in_app_web_view_web_element.dart 76%; headless_in_app_webview.dart↔headless_in_app_web_view_web_element.dart 50%; InAppWebViewClient.java↔InAppWebViewClientCompat.java 50%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: headless_in_app_webview.dart ↔ headless_in_app_web_view_web_element.dartflutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/headless_in_app_webview.dart
Change coupling: web_support.js ↔ in_app_web_view_web_element.dart · ×2flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]web_support/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain entities own their behaviour — a data-only entity with public mutable state whose logic lives in a foreign service is anemic. Rich models enforce their own invariants; an immutable `@freezed`/`@immutable` value class is rich by construction.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an entity protects its own invariants — a class whose identity is derived from its fields (value equality) but whose fields are publicly mutable bypasses that invariant. Encapsulated state keeps identity-bearing fields immutable.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain entity fused to a persistence ORM (drift/floor/isar/objectbox/hive) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 9 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
  • A CI pipeline exists but no build/compile step was matched — changes may merge without being compiled. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
  • Add an explicit build/compile step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is compiled before merge.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 2 typed · 4 plain JS — the untyped files are flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js, test_node_server/client.js, test_node_server/index.js, test_node_server/public/js/main.js. 0 production file(s) opt out entirely with @ts-nocheck · 7 @ts-ignore suppression(s).

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:589 · web_support/src/index.ts:655 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — web_support.js:589
  • flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:436 · web_support/src/index.ts:498 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — web_support.js:436
  • flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:177 · web_support/src/index.ts:217 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — web_support.js:177
  • flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:285 · web_support/src/index.ts:338 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — web_support.js:285
  • flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:315 · flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:330 · flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:345 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. — web_support.js:315
  • web_support/src/index.ts:373 · web_support/src/index.ts:389 · web_support/src/index.ts:405 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.ts:373
  • flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:37 · web_support/src/index.ts:62 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — web_support.js:37
  • flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js:95 · web_support/src/index.ts:125 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — web_support.js:95

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×6) — web_support.js:47, index.ts:73, web_support.js:296, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 2 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: web_support/src/index.ts (719), flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js (691).

What to do

  • Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R5 · Dependency Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in test_node_server/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health44%Weak — gated by R1, R3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture100%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity55%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness44%Weak — gated by R6, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security89%StrongSolid.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not included — 81 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (9 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (9 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (9 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (9 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (9 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (9 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (9 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.dart, .java, .swift, .ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~6217 lines of test source are present (.dart) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json and a Dart pubspec.yaml), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .dart, .java, .swift — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.dart, .java, .swift, .ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.dart, .java, .swift, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json and a Dart pubspec.yaml — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .dart, .java, .swift, .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.dart) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for Dart: aggregate-vs-value-object classification cannot be told apart in source (every class-holding-class reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no in-repo typed-id idiom — primitive-obsession recorded as advisory DM8, DM2 not gated
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for Dart: a cross-package domain leak cannot be told apart in source from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most repositories ship a single package — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for Dart: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, which this analysis does not build from source alone for this language. Reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `flutter test --coverage` (or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R4 Test Coverage — 3 test file(s) reach none of 3 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 3 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×2
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/lock.yaml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dessant/lock-threads@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dessant/lock-threads@v5.0.1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dessant/lock-threads/commits/v5.0.1 --jq .sha`. Note that `v5.0.1` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/stale.yaml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/stale@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/stale@v9.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/stale/commits/v9.0.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v9.0.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×1
  • Boundary-crossing change coupling: headless_in_app_webview.dart ↔ headless_in_app_web_view_web_element.dart flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/headless_in_app_webview.dart — `flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/headless_in_app_webview.dart` (context flutter_inappwebview) and `flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/web/headless_in_app_web_view_web_element.dart` (context flutter_inappwebview_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Warning — 43 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×20
  • TooManyMethods: PlatformInAppWebViewController flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_inappwebview_controller.dart:68 — TooManyMethods — 162 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: InAppWebViewController flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:12 — TooManyMethods — 159 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: InAppBrowser flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_browser/in_app_browser.dart:16 — TooManyMethods — 129 methods. Most of these members implement src.PlatformInAppBrowserEvents (96 of 129 members), so moving them onto a smaller type would remove them from that contract rather than reduce it. To reduce it, split the contract instead: give each cohesive group of operations its own smaller interface and its own implementing type. Where the contract has to stay whole, move the work behind these members into collaborator types, so what is left here is a forward per member rather than a responsibility per member.
  • TooManyMethods: AndroidInAppWebViewController flutter_inappwebview_android/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:45 — TooManyMethods — 122 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: WindowsInAppWebViewController flutter_inappwebview_windows/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:47 — TooManyMethods — 119 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: LinuxInAppWebViewController flutter_inappwebview_linux/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:43 — TooManyMethods — 107 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: MacOSInAppWebViewController flutter_inappwebview_macos/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:46 — TooManyMethods — 107 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: PlatformInAppBrowserEvents flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_browser/platform_in_app_browser.dart:736 — TooManyMethods — 96 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: WebPlatformInAppWebViewController flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:41 — TooManyMethods — 65 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: InAppWebViewPlatform flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart:43 — TooManyMethods — 62 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: AndroidInAppWebViewPlatform flutter_inappwebview_android/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart:20 — TooManyMethods — 58 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: IOSInAppWebViewPlatform flutter_inappwebview_ios/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart:16 — TooManyMethods — 51 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: MacOSInAppWebViewPlatform flutter_inappwebview_macos/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart:14 — TooManyMethods — 49 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: LinuxInAppWebViewPlatform flutter_inappwebview_linux/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart:18 — TooManyMethods — 47 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: WindowsInAppWebViewPlatform flutter_inappwebview_windows/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart:16 — TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ChromeSafariBrowser flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/chrome_safari_browser/chrome_safari_browser.dart:8 — TooManyMethods — 42 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: X509Certificate flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/x509_certificate/x509_certificate.dart:13 — TooManyMethods — 39 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: WebUri flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/web_uri.dart:1 — TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: WebPlatformInAppWebViewPlatform flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/src/inappwebview_platform.dart:7 — TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: PlatformInAppBrowser flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_browser/platform_in_app_browser.dart:78 — TooManyMethods — 35 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×16
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart flutter_inappwebview_windows/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 2653 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 99% of them inside a single declaration: WindowsInAppWebViewController (51-3502). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart flutter_inappwebview_android/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 2427 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 99% of them inside a single declaration: AndroidInAppWebViewController (49-3227). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart flutter_inappwebview_ios/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 2385 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 99% of them inside a single declaration: IOSInAppWebViewController (51-3178). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/platform_inappwebview_controller.dart flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_inappwebview_controller.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 2340 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 98% of them inside a single declaration: PlatformInAppWebViewController (86-4745). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart flutter_inappwebview_macos/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 2326 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 99% of them inside a single declaration: MacOSInAppWebViewController (50-3093). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_settings.dart flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_settings.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 2107 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 89% of them inside a single declaration: InAppWebViewSettings_ (62-3518). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart flutter_inappwebview_linux/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 1762 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 98% of them inside a single declaration: LinuxInAppWebViewController (47-2358). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/platform_webview.dart flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_webview.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 1559 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 98% of them inside a single declaration: PlatformWebViewCreationParams (41-2783). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_browser/platform_in_app_browser.dart flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_browser/platform_in_app_browser.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 1340 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 74% of them inside a single declaration: PlatformInAppBrowserEvents (745-2470). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: types/web_resource_error_type.dart flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/types/web_resource_error_type.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 1008 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 100% of them inside a single declaration: WebResourceErrorType_ (8-1505). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: src/exchangeable_object_generator.dart dev_packages/generators/lib/src/exchangeable_object_generator.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 908 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 97% of them inside a single declaration: ExchangeableObjectGenerator (43-1185). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview.dart flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 884 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 98% of them inside a single declaration: InAppWebView (21-911). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/headless_in_app_webview.dart flutter_inappwebview/lib/src/in_app_webview/headless_in_app_webview.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 877 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 99% of them inside a single declaration: HeadlessInAppWebView (15-944). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 795 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 97% of them inside a single declaration: WebPlatformInAppWebViewController (45-1133). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
  • FileTooLong: web_storage/platform_web_storage.dart flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/web_storage/platform_web_storage.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 607 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/util.dart flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/util.dart:0 — FileTooLong — 528 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×4
  • Medium: raw-html-format test_node_server/index.js:163 — User data flows into the host portion of this manually-constructed HTML. This can introduce a Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) vulnerability if this comes from user-provided input. Consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize the HTML within.
  • Medium: direct-response-write test_node_server/index.js:177 — Detected directly writing to a Response object from user-defined input. This bypasses any HTML escaping and may expose your application to a Cross-Site-scripting (XSS) vulnerability. Instead, use 'resp.render()' to render safely escaped HTML. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: raw-html-format test_node_server/index.js:182 — User data flows into the host portion of this manually-constructed HTML. This can introduce a Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) vulnerability if this comes from user-provided input. Consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize the HTML within.
  • Medium: raw-html-format test_node_server/index.js:240 — User data flows into the host portion of this manually-constructed HTML. This can introduce a Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) vulnerability if this comes from user-provided input. Consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize the HTML within.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×2
  • Change coupling: web_support.js ↔ in_app_web_view_web_element.dart flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js — `flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/assets/web/web_support.js` and `flutter_inappwebview_web/lib/web/in_app_web_view_web_element.dart` change together 76% of the time (16 of the 21 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
  • Change coupling: InAppWebViewClient.java ↔ InAppWebViewClientCompat.java flutter_inappwebview_android/android/src/main/java/com/pichillilorenzo/flutter_inappwebview_android/webview/in_app_webview/InAppWebViewClient.java — `flutter_inappwebview_android/android/src/main/java/com/pichillilorenzo/flutter_inappwebview_android/webview/in_app_webview/InAppWebViewClient.java` and `flutter_inappwebview_android/android/src/main/java/com/pichillilorenzo/flutter_inappwebview_android/webview/in_app_webview/InAppWebViewClientCompat.java` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×1
  • Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] web_support/package-lock.json — esbuild 0.24.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.25.0
Recommendation — 4 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.dart) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .dart, .java, .swift · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .dart, .java, .swift — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (0 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .dart, .java, .swift, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 43 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_inappwebview_controller.dart, flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_settings.dart, flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_webview/platform_webview.dart, flutter_inappwebview_windows/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart, flutter_inappwebview_macos/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart, flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/in_app_browser/platform_in_app_browser.dart, flutter_inappwebview_linux/lib/src/in_app_webview/in_app_webview_controller.dart, flutter_inappwebview_platform_interface/lib/src/types/web_resource_error_type.dart (+35 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.dart) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `flutter test --coverage` (or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (package.json and a Dart pubspec.yaml) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .6artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .1artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fd3a8-5fec-7401-9b86-10cb14ee76bc · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md