Platformplatform/PlatformPlatform

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ProcessPendingStripeEvents.SyncStateFromStripe at 67.

+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 ProcessPendingStripeEvents.SyncStateFromStripe (cyclomatic 67) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ProcessPendingStripeEvents.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 1 UserRepository.Search (cyclomatic 30) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with UserRepository.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 1 GetTenantsHandler.Handle (cyclomatic 27) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with GetTenants.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
4. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

12 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ProcessPendingStripeEvents.SyncStateFromStripe at 64.

+ 7 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 ProcessPendingStripeEvents.SyncStateFromStripe (cognitive 64) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ProcessPendingStripeEvents.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 1 ProcessPendingStripeEvents.EmitBillingEventsFromEventsListAsync… finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ProcessPendingStripeEvents.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 1 UserRepository.Search (cognitive 28) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with UserRepository.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

8 duplicated block group(s) detected.

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

13 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 of 31 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

What to do

1. Resolve the 7 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with ExternalAuthenticationService.cs, FeatureFlag.cs, Result.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
2. Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

909 test methods: 909 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 3 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 909 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 60 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 24590 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 projects, 556 .cs files, 48849 hand-written lines of code (24590 production / 24259 test), plus 442 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 25 inter-project edges (build failed).

+ 10 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No public API surface exposed; nothing to be inconsistent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 % of calls cross a namespace and 15 % go through an interface, but 97 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

What to do

1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.2/10. — 93 % of calls cross a namespace and 15 % go through an interface, but 97 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

What to do

1. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 5 low.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 2 medium, 2 low.

What to do

1. Resolve the 4 High CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
2. Resolve the 2 Medium CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 2 Low CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

What to do

1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (.github/SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 4 medium, 4 low.

What to do

1. Resolve the 4 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
2. Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
3. Resolve the 4 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, and video has a captions track. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, fieldsets have a legend, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

• This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×3) — AvatarUpload.tsx:25, TenantLogoPicker.tsx:112, UserAvatarPicker.tsx:105
• A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child. — Field.tsx:10

What to do

• Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language and title, expose a main landmark and a sane heading order, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

• No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — index.html:2, index.html:2
• user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. (×2) — index.html:6, index.html:6

What to do

• Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, and no aria-hidden on a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible, never computed or runtime colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

• No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

• Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

• `SinglePageAppConfiguration` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_htmlTemplate, _remoteEntryJsContent; e.g. `_htmlTemplate` at line 133). — SinglePageAppConfiguration.cs:10

What to do

• Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

• `IUserRepository` declares 21 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — UserRepository.cs:13
• `IStripeClient` declares 28 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IStripeClient.cs:5

What to do

• Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

• `BillingEventSummary` (slice 'BackOffice') depends on `BillingEventId` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetBackOfficeBillingEvents.cs:32
• `BackOfficeDashboardPlanDistributionEntry` (slice 'BackOffice') depends on `SubscriptionPlan` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetDashboardPlanDistribution.cs:17
• `BackOfficeDashboardLogin` (slice 'BackOffice') depends on `LoginMethod` from slice 'Authentication'. — GetDashboardRecentLogins.cs:20
• `LoginEntry` (slice 'BackOffice') depends on `LoginMethod` from slice 'Authentication'. — GetDashboardRecentLogins.cs:114
• `BackOfficeDashboardPayment` (slice 'BackOffice') depends on `PaymentTransactionId` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetDashboardRecentPayments.cs:17
• `BackOfficeDashboardStripeEvent` (slice 'BackOffice') depends on `BillingEventId` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetDashboardRecentStripeEvents.cs:17
• `BackOfficeInvoiceSummary` (slice 'BackOffice') depends on `PaymentTransactionId` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetBackOfficeInvoices.cs:29
• `PaymentTransactionResponse` (slice 'Billing') depends on `PaymentTransactionId` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetPaymentHistory.cs:15
• `FeatureFlagTenantInfo` (slice 'FeatureFlags') depends on `SubscriptionPlan` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetFeatureFlagTenants.cs:63
• `FeatureFlagUserInfo` (slice 'FeatureFlags') depends on `UserRole` from slice 'Users'. — GetFeatureFlagUsers.cs:63
• `TenantDetailResponse` (slice 'Tenants') depends on `SubscriptionPlan` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetTenantDetail.cs:14
• `TenantPaymentTransaction` (slice 'Tenants') depends on `PaymentTransactionId` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetTenantPaymentHistory.cs:21
• `TenantSummary` (slice 'Tenants') depends on `SubscriptionPlan` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetTenants.cs:35
• `TenantUserSummary` (slice 'Tenants') depends on `UserRole` from slice 'Users'. — GetTenantUsers.cs:29
• `Tenant` (slice 'Tenants') depends on `SubscriptionPlan` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — Tenant.cs:7
• `BackOfficeUserTenantMembership` (slice 'Users') depends on `SubscriptionPlan` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetBackOfficeUserDetail.cs:39
• `BackOfficeUserLoginEntry` (slice 'Users') depends on `LoginMethod` from slice 'Authentication'. — GetBackOfficeUserLoginHistory.cs:21
• `BackOfficeUserSummary` (slice 'Users') depends on `SubscriptionPlan` from slice 'Subscriptions'. — GetBackOfficeUsers.cs:32
• `BackOfficeUserSession` (slice 'Users') depends on `LoginMethod` from slice 'Authentication'. — GetBackOfficeUserSessions.cs:22
• `ExternalIdentity` (slice 'Users') depends on `ExternalProviderType` from slice 'ExternalAuthentication'. — User.cs:126

What to do

• Keep slices independent: share cross-slice needs via an explicit contract/shared-kernel, not direct references between slices.

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

• No in-app HTTPS enforcement, but ForwardedHeaders / 127.0.0.1 binding indicates a reverse-proxy topology — adding UseHttpsRedirection in the app would be wrong in this layout. Verify the reverse proxy enforces TLS. — Program.cs:98

What to do

• Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

• Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.

What to do

• Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

• `FeatureFlag.FlagKey` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct FlagKey { String Value }`). — FeatureFlag.cs:31
• `BillingEvent.StripeEventId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct StripeEventId { String Value }`). — BillingEvent.cs:50

What to do

• Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

• `AggregateRoot` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — AggregateRoot.cs:22
• `AudibleEntity` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — AudibleEntity.cs:9
• `SoftDeletableAggregateRoot` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — SoftDeletableAggregateRoot.cs:3

What to do

• Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

• `SessionConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — SessionConfiguration.cs:10
• `SessionRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — SessionRepository.cs:64
• `EmailLoginRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — EmailLoginRepository.cs:28
• `ExternalLoginRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — ExternalLoginRepository.cs:26
• `FeatureFlagConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — FeatureFlagConfiguration.cs:9
• `FeatureFlagRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — FeatureFlagRepository.cs:55
• `BillingEventConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — BillingEventConfiguration.cs:8
• `BillingEventRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — BillingEventRepository.cs:57
• `StripeEventConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — StripeEventConfiguration.cs:8
• `StripeEventRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — StripeEventRepository.cs:69
• `SubscriptionConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — SubscriptionConfiguration.cs:12
• `SubscriptionRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — SubscriptionRepository.cs:88
• `TenantConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — TenantConfiguration.cs:8
• `TenantRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — TenantRepository.cs:69
• `UserConfiguration` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — UserConfiguration.cs:12
• `UserRepository` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — UserRepository.cs:130
• `DomainEventCollector` (domain layer) uses `EF Core` inside a method body — infrastructure reached without it appearing in any signature. — DomainEventCollector.cs:6

What to do

• Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

• The parameters [pageoffset, pagesize, search] travel together across 6 signatures — that's a missing value object. Extracting them into one type (e.g. `Address`, `Money`, `Coordinate`) removes repetition, prevents argument-order mistakes, and gives the concept a home for its rules. — UserRepository.cs:45

What to do

• Extract recurring primitive parameter clusters into value objects so the concept (and its rules) lives in one place.

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

• `TenantCreatedEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — TenantEvents.cs:6
• `IDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — IDomainEvent.cs:16

What to do

• Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

• `Commands.LogoutHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — Logout.cs:21
• `Commands.RefreshAuthenticationTokensHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — RefreshAuthenticationTokens.cs:32
• `Commands.RevokeSessionHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — RevokeSession.cs:26
• `Commands.UpdateBillingInfoHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — UpdateBillingInfo.cs:46
• `Commands.CompleteEmailSignupHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CompleteEmailSignup.cs:36
• `Commands.ResendEmailLoginCodeHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — ResendEmailLoginCode.cs:36
• `Commands.CompleteExternalSignupHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CompleteExternalSignup.cs:44
• `Commands.ActivateFeatureFlagHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — ActivateFeatureFlag.cs:26
• `Commands.DeactivateFeatureFlagHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — DeactivateFeatureFlag.cs:26
• `Commands.DeleteFeatureFlagHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — DeleteFeatureFlag.cs:26
• `Commands.SetTenantFeatureFlagInternalHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — SetTenantFeatureFlagInternal.cs:38
• `Commands.SetTenantFeatureFlagOwnerHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — SetTenantFeatureFlagOwner.cs:35
• `Commands.SetUserFeatureFlagHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — SetUserFeatureFlag.cs:34
• `Commands.SetUserFeatureFlagInternalHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — SetUserFeatureFlagInternal.cs:39
• `Commands.AcknowledgeBillingDriftHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — AcknowledgeBillingDrift.cs:22
• `Commands.SetTenantAbInclusionPinHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — SetTenantAbInclusionPin.cs:22
• `Commands.CreateTenantHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CreateTenant.cs:19
• `Commands.RemoveTenantLogoHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — RemoveTenantLogo.cs:21
• `Commands.UpdateTenantHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — UpdateCurrentTenant.cs:32
• `Commands.UpdateTenantLogoHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — UpdateTenantLogo.cs:42
• `Commands.SetUserAbInclusionPinHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — SetUserAbInclusionPin.cs:22
• `Commands.ChangeLocaleHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — ChangeLocale.cs:26
• `Commands.ChangeUserRoleHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — ChangeUserRole.cs:22
• `Commands.RemoveAvatarHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — RemoveAvatar.cs:14
• `Commands.UpdateCurrentUserHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — UpdateCurrentUser.cs:33

What to do

• Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

• A placeholder string ("billing@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — MockStripeClient.cs:285

What to do

• Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

• `StopAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — PlatformCurrencyStartupResolver.cs:45
• `GetEventsForCustomerAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — StripeClient.cs:1122
• `GetPlatformCurrencyAsync` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — UnconfiguredStripeClient.cs:73
• `BuildCustomerDashboardUrl` looks like it should compute a result but its body just returns a constant — a placeholder return that was never filled in. — UnconfiguredStripeClient.cs:170

What to do

• Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

• Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
• Add a README to the 13 of 13 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

• No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
• No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

• Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
• Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

• Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
• Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
• Only 4/13 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

• Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
• Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
• Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

• Only 4/9 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

• Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

• Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

• Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

• Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

• A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

• Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

• No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

• Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

• Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 22 use(s) across 25,244 production line(s) (~0.9/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

• Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:62 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/feature-flag-flows.spec.ts:374 — back-office-flows.spec.ts:62
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/permission-based-ui-flows.spec.ts:5 · application/main/WebApp/tests/e2e/federated-navigation-flows.spec.ts:5 — permission-based-ui-flows.spec.ts:5
• application/account/WebApp/routes/account/billing/-components/usePlansPageState.ts:77 · application/shared-webapp/ui/hooks/useDateRangeField.ts:334 — usePlansPageState.ts:77
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:9 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:64 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/billing-events-flows.spec.ts:7 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/feature-flag-flows.spec.ts:379 — back-office-flows.spec.ts:9
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/localization-flows.spec.ts:3 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/permission-based-ui-flows.spec.ts:3 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/signup-flows.spec.ts:7 — localization-flows.spec.ts:3
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/login-flows.spec.ts:5 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/permission-based-ui-flows.spec.ts:3 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/signup-flows.spec.ts:6 — login-flows.spec.ts:5
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/mobile-view-flows.spec.ts:5 · application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/permission-based-ui-flows.spec.ts:4 · application/main/WebApp/tests/e2e/federated-navigation-flows.spec.ts:4 — mobile-view-flows.spec.ts:5
• application/shared-webapp/ui/components/Sidebar.tsx:654 · application/shared-webapp/ui/components/Sidebar.tsx:683 — Sidebar.tsx:654

What to do

• Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:2 imports @shared/e2e/fixtures/page-auth, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — back-office-flows.spec.ts:2
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:3 imports @shared/e2e/utils/constants, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — back-office-flows.spec.ts:3
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:4 imports @shared/e2e/utils/test-assertions, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — back-office-flows.spec.ts:4
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:5 imports @shared/e2e/utils/test-data, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — back-office-flows.spec.ts:5
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/back-office-flows.spec.ts:6 imports @shared/e2e/utils/test-step-wrapper, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — back-office-flows.spec.ts:6
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/billing-events-flows.spec.ts:2 imports @shared/e2e/fixtures/page-auth, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — billing-events-flows.spec.ts:2
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/billing-events-flows.spec.ts:3 imports @shared/e2e/utils/constants, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — billing-events-flows.spec.ts:3
• application/account/WebApp/tests/e2e/billing-events-flows.spec.ts:4 imports @shared/e2e/utils/test-assertions, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — billing-events-flows.spec.ts:4

What to do

• Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

• Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — labels.ts:1, CurrentPlanDetails.tsx:21, DatePicker.tsx:44, …

What to do

• Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

• Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the package.json wires up test, lint and typecheck scripts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

• test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

• Add the missing scripts (eslint, tsc --noEmit) and run them in CI.

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

• 7 file(s) (~106 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — utils
• Unreachable from the 20 application, 17 tooling and 30 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
• no import path from any entry point (20 application, 17 tooling, 30 test roots considered) (×6) — Sidebar.tsx, Calendar.tsx, Table.tsx, …

What to do

• Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

• Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — lingui.config.ts:1, lingui.factory.ts:1, createLinguiConfig.ts:1
• Declared in application/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

• Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

• MD5/SHA1 is broken for security purposes (collision-vulnerable). Use SHA-256+ for content integrity; for password storage, use a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt). — UpdateTenantLogo.cs:79

What to do

• Replace MD5/SHA1 with SHA-256+ for content hashing; switch to a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage.

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

• Only 265/278 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
• No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×13) — ApiAggregationService.cs:16, ApiAggregationService.cs:25, ApiAggregationService.cs:65, …

What to do

• Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

• ~1.7 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

• Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.