Public report of postalserver/postal, published 25 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 25 October 2026, 08:13 UTC · Survey ID cd_9d89532bcce34a66a3c962379773717d
postalserver/postal
Measured 25 October 2026, 08:12 UTC, at code version d96eddb
No regression since the last survey
A regression is a drop of 0.5 points or more in the score, or of 2.5 or more out of 10 in a dimension, since the last survey.
CAI scoreAt riskDown 4 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 11,947 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Accessibility, 23
Findings by how serious they are
60 critical111 serious55 minor
9 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
25 October 2026, 08:12 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.
A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
71of 71 dimensions measured by tools.
175of 226 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 51 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
71dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 11,947 lines of product code in 1 project.
postalserver/postal is rated At risk because critical security findings are open. It scores 34 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Accessibility, at 23, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are labelling the form fields and buttons and making the controls keyboard-usable, each worth about 6 points. Raising Accessibility to 70 would lift the score to about 43.
Eighteen pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Eight known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and eight passwords or keys in the code's history and three in the code are open to anyone who can read the repository. Pinning each tool to an exact version, updating the vulnerable packages and replacing each exposed password or key would close these risks. Limiting each secret to its own step would fix the four secrets exposed to more of the pipeline than needed, and switching the validation back on would deal with the two security checks on connections or logins switched off. The nine pieces of business logic tied to the database or web code need separating from the database and web code.
The product code is 11,947 lines, about €17,000 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/application/global/_reset.scss
Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/application/global/_reset.scss
Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/application/elements/_spam_range.scss
Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Rebuild cost: about €17,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€5,500 to €28,000, for 92 to 292 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 34. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 11,947 lines of product code
How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Raises the score by about 6 points · Medium effort · Forms & labels
2
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €17,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Accessibility, at 23 (Critical). Accessibility is about whether the interface is built so that everyone can use it, including people who can't see the screen or can't use a mouse. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Accessibility also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Accessibility grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Accessibility actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 6 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
27 modules, with 12 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
Postal.MessageDB.Migrations uses Postal.MessageDB, so a change to Postal.MessageDB can break Postal.MessageDB.Migrations, while a change to Postal.MessageDB.Migrations can't break Postal.MessageDB.
Position
Below the diagonal: Postal.MessageDB.Migrations uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in Postal.MessageDB.Message uses a type in Postal.
The types involved
Postal.MessageDB.Message.NotFound → Postal.Error
Direction
Postal.MessageDB.Message uses Postal, so a change to Postal can break Postal.MessageDB.Message, while a change to Postal.MessageDB.Message can't break Postal.
Position
Below the diagonal: Postal.MessageDB.Message uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Postal.MessageDB.Webhooks uses Postal, so a change to Postal can break Postal.MessageDB.Webhooks, while a change to Postal.MessageDB.Webhooks can't break Postal.
Position
Below the diagonal: Postal.MessageDB.Webhooks uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Postal.MessageInspectors uses Postal, so a change to Postal can break Postal.MessageInspectors, while a change to Postal.MessageInspectors can't break Postal.
Position
Below the diagonal: Postal.MessageInspectors uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health · 62% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
42
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
24
High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
12
High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration
3
High / Critical
A01:2025 — Broken Access Control
3
Medium
Roadmap
First, ensure every form control and button has a proper programmatic label and make custom interactive elements fully keyboard-operable with valid anchor links. Next, maintain visible focus styles, respect reduced motion preferences, and improve color contrast to meet accessibility standards. Finally, integrate automated accessibility checks into your test suite to block regressions in CI, and strengthen data protection by vaulting keys and encrypting sensitive columns.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / REDACTED Manager, HashiCorp Vault — kms_encrypted or vault-rails, not only the master key beside credentials.yml.enc) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (encrypts, lockbox) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 60
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 111
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 55
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 9
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 71 of 71 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 71 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 175 of 226 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rb) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (SimpleCov — `require "simplecov"` in your `spec_helper.rb`/`test_helper.rb`, which writes `coverage/.resultset.json` (or lcov via `simplecov-lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (SimpleCov — `require "simplecov"` in your `spec_helper.rb`/`test_helper.rb`, which writes `coverage/.resultset.json` (or lcov via `simplecov-lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rb) and this repository declares a Ruby test suite (RSpec: repository root, 55 spec files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (50 contributor(s) across 660 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 82% of the history; the other 49 hold 0.4% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's source is written only in languages whose packages are published through a manifest, and no manifest in the tree makes a publication act: either there is no package manifest of any ecosystem (no package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py, gemspec, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, build.gradle, composer.json, pubspec.yaml or mix.exs), or every one present declares in its package manager's own terms that it is not published (an npm package marked "private": true, a Cargo package with publish = false, a pubspec with publish_to: none, a Composer "project", a Poetry project with package-mode = false, or the "Private :: Do Not Upload" classifier). With no publication act there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — time="2026-10-25T08:12:06Z" level=warning msg="The \"POSTAL_IMAGE\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." service "postal" has neither an image nor a build context specified: invalid compose project; runtime evidence skipped.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 7 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with Server.run_event_loop (cyclomatic 40), MessagesController.message (cyclomatic 32), Client.rcpt_to (cyclomatic 30). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 7 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 3 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with Server.run_event_loop (cognitive 91), MessagesController.get_messages (cognitive 74), Client.rcpt_to (cognitive 43). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 7.5 to about 8.6/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with config_schema.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20170418200606_initial_schema.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with address_endpoints_controller.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Resolve the 2 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with route.rb, domain.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
32 outdated direct gem(s), 0 pinning defect(s). 50 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, 48 of them against a version resolved in a committed REDACTED. 2 declaration(s) carry a requirement that EXCLUDES the current release; that is a deliberate constraint (a supported-version ceiling or a held-back CI pin) and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
Outdated: autoprefixer-rails · ×32
What to do
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 123 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 123 gem(s) a consumer installs — this repository's runtime declarations closed transitively over its committed REDACTED. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. 3 of them publish no licence on rubygems.org; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted task-comment markers across 11947 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
1 of 1 build units (Bundler) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion
What to do
Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
42 finding(s): 0 critical, 23 high, 19 medium, 0 low. 18 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `doc/config/yaml.yml` — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 18 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no REDACTED is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
Resolve the 8 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.
Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR LEAK scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset: personal data crossing a boundary it should not — reaching a log/console sink, a URL or query string, or unprotected browser storage. Matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. A clean sweep is unscored rather than an unearned 10, and is a statement about the leak paths checked only — this dimension does not inventory the personal data a repository holds (the personal-data map and the C1-C5 compliance cards do that), so it never reports that a repository has no personal-data surface. Reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive over the leak paths, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
1 of 50 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/postal/message_db/migrations/19_convert_database_to_utf8mb4.rb. Counted over 50 of the 217 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 50 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one. (×19) — app/views/address_endpoints/_form.html.haml:3, app/views/credentials/_form.html.haml:3, app/views/domains/new.html.haml:21, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — app/views/ip_pools/_form.html.haml:9
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×4) — app/views/layouts/sub.html.haml:2, public/404.html:2, public/422.html:2, …
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×4) — app/views/layouts/sub.html.haml:2, public/404.html:2, public/422.html:2, …
An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. — app/views/messages/html.html.haml:17
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×4) — app/views/domains/setup.html.haml:108, app/views/ip_addresses/_form.html.haml:24, app/views/users/_form.html.haml:29, …
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
`object` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — app/assets/stylesheets/application/global/_reset.scss:5
`select` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — app/assets/stylesheets/application/global/_reset.scss:94
`.spamRange:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — app/assets/stylesheets/application/elements/_spam_range.scss:21
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.
No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 103 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / REDACTED Manager, HashiCorp Vault — kms_encrypted or vault-rails, not only the master key beside credentials.yml.enc) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (encrypts, lockbox) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (config.force_ssl = true in config/environments/production.rb, or Rack::SSL in a Rack application) so data in transit is always encrypted.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
Name the access rules — Pundit or Action Policy classes (a PostPolicy), a CanCanCan Ability, or rolify roles — and consult them where access is checked (authorize @record, load_and_authorize_resource, authorize!), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: an expiry limit — a declared maximum age / TTL after which the data is no longer kept, a scheduled purge / cleanup job (a job or rake task that deletes rows past their retention — where(created_at < N.days.ago).delete_all, PurgeOld… / DeleteExpired…).
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (ActiveRecord/Sequel/ROM) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
`AddressEndpoint` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — REDACTED:16
`Credential` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/credential.rb:20
`Domain` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/domain.rb:43
`HTTPEndpoint` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/http_endpoint.rb:26
`Organization` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/organization.rb:26
`QueuedMessage` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/queued_message.rb:29
`Server` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/server.rb:45
`SMTPEndpoint` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/smtp_endpoint.rb:21
`UserInvite` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — REDACTED:19
What to do
Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + mapper; leave the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Ruby: methods whose whole body still raises NotImplementedError where nothing overrides them, or a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Ruby: methods that only raise NotImplementedError or a "not implemented" error where nothing overrides them, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if false` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
The root README is 60 words, against a bar of 120. Of the three newcomer-critical sections this check looks for by heading, it found no a build/run or getting-started section, no a testing section, no an architecture or project-map section. Sections are matched on HEADING text only, so material written under a heading this check does not recognise — or with no heading at all — is not seen and this row may understate what the document covers.
What to do
Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add brakeman for Rails apps, otherwise `semgrep --config=auto` or CodeQL's ruby pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 5432 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: brakeman for Rails apps, otherwise `semgrep --config=auto` or CodeQL's ruby pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.
What to do
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
`HTTP.post` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — app/senders/http_sender.rb:28
What to do
Set `open_timeout` and `read_timeout` explicitly on every client (Net::HTTP, Faraday `request: { timeout: }`, HTTParty `timeout:`), add Faraday's `:retry` middleware (faraday-retry) or `retriable`, and a breaker (`circuitbox`, `stoplight`) around dependencies that fail.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.
Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Security — Read from this repository's Ruby source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are NOT assessed for Ruby: this reading covers the code's own cryptography and the TLS connections it opens as a client, and a Rails, Rack or Sinatra application's transport, header and validation settings are not modelled. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
`OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE` as the verify mode is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the override so OpenSSL verifies the peer — `OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER` is what Net::HTTP, Faraday, HTTParty and rest-client use when nothing is set. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: give the client its CA (`http.ca_file = …` or `cert_store` on Net::HTTP, `ssl: { ca_file: … }` on Faraday, `ssl_ca_file:` on rest-client, or `SSL_CERT_FILE`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. (×2) — REDACTED:161, REDACTED:44
MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. (×6) — REDACTED:74, REDACTED:9, REDACTED:247, …
What to do
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE` / `verify: false` / `verify_ssl: false` so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by giving the client its CA (`ca_file`, `cert_store`) — never by switching verification off. This repository constructs a TLS client that accepts any certificate at 2 sites, not one: `REDACTED:161` (`OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE` as the verify mode), `REDACTED:44` (`OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE` as the verify mode). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key. This repository constructs a collision-broken hash (MD5/SHA1) at 6 sites, not one: `REDACTED:74` (Digest::SHA1.hexdigest), `REDACTED:9` (OpenSSL::Digest.new("md5")), `REDACTED:247` (Digest::SHA1.hexdigest), `REDACTED:33` (Digest::MD5.hexdigest), `REDACTED:490` (Digest::SHA1.hexdigest), `lib/postal/signer.rb:55` (OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA1")). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.
Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a walk over a `Hash` or `Set` (`each`, `each_pair`, `map`, `for … in` and the other block walks) leaves it alone — Ruby refuses `rehash`, `replace`, `compare_by_identity` and `transform_keys!` on a Hash, and `reset`, `replace`, `compare_by_identity` and `map!` on a Set, while it is being iterated: the call raises `RuntimeError` at once and the remaining entries are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
`rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×16) — lib/postal/message_inspectors/clamav.rb:44, lib/postal/message_inspectors/spam_assassin.rb:50, config/initializers/mail_extensions.rb:54, …
What to do
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)
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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether Ruby's type checker checks nil and is not undermined by assertions — a file Sorbet reads at `# typed: true` or above, or a Steep target `check`s under its default or strict diagnostics, is one where a method call on a `T.nilable(String)` / `String?` is an error, and each `T.must`, `#: as !nil` or `# steep:ignore NoMethod` is the author telling the checker a value cannot be nil.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 215 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.
What to do
Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive.
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model, a change-history gem on the models — paper_trail's has_paper_trail, audited, Logidze's has_logidze, public_activity's tracked — or an ActiveRecord callback or Sequel hook that records each change) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 43 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Ruby imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — time="2026-10-25T08:12:06Z" level=warning msg="The \"POSTAL_IMAGE\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." service "postal" has neither an image nor a build context specified: invalid compose project; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
D10 Test Quality — ~7586 lines of test source are present (.rb) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rb suite was found but not re-run
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — No runnable or published unit to look for an example in, and no multi-project root README to look for a map in; the other documentation kinds are withheld (see the gaps), so documentation quality is not applicable here.
D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# only; Ruby not measured.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (models), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C# and Visual Basic comments only — this repository's production source is .rb, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.rb), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this RubyGems build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.rb) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 4 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 100 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (path 2, environment variable 98); M4 checks only links and versions.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (SimpleCov — `require "simplecov"` in your `spec_helper.rb`/`test_helper.rb`, which writes `coverage/.resultset.json` (or lcov via `simplecov-lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `x.report(…)` entries in a `Benchmark.ips`/`bm`/`bmbm`/`benchmark`/`memory` block, `benchmark:` entries in a benchmark-driver YAML under a bench* directory, rspec-benchmark `perform_*` expectations where the gem is installed, or benchmark-ips, benchmark-memory, rspec-benchmark or benchmark-driver in a Gemfile or gemspec, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Ruby runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Ruby has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Ruby was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Ruby request takes no token: Net::HTTP, Faraday and async-http are stopped from outside the call (Async::Task#stop, Thread#raise, Timeout), not through a parameter
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Ruby was read, and it logs through none: the standard library's Logger, which Rails.logger is, takes one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. The console gem (`Console.info`), SemanticLogger, Ougai and dry-logger would be judged.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: AddressEndpoint REDACTED:16— `AddressEndpoint` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: Credential app/models/credential.rb:20— `Credential` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: Domain app/models/domain.rb:43— `Domain` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: HTTPEndpoint app/models/http_endpoint.rb:26— `HTTPEndpoint` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: Organization app/models/organization.rb:26— `Organization` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: QueuedMessage app/models/queued_message.rb:29— `QueuedMessage` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: Server app/models/server.rb:45— `Server` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: SMTPEndpoint app/models/smtp_endpoint.rb:21— `SMTPEndpoint` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: UserInvite REDACTED:19— `UserInvite` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
<html> without a lang app/views/layouts/sub.html.haml:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang public/404.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang public/422.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang public/500.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
TLS certificate validation disabled REDACTED:161— `OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE` as the verify mode is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the override so OpenSSL verifies the peer — `OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER` is what Net::HTTP, Faraday, HTTParty and rest-client use when nothing is set. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: give the client its CA (`http.ca_file = …` or `cert_store` on Net::HTTP, `ssl: { ca_file: … }` on Faraday, `ssl_ca_file:` on rest-client, or `SSL_CERT_FILE`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on.
TLS certificate validation disabled REDACTED:44— `OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE` as the verify mode is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the override so OpenSSL verifies the peer — `OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER` is what Net::HTTP, Faraday, HTTParty and rest-client use when nothing is set. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: give the client its CA (`http.ca_file = …` or `cert_store` on Net::HTTP, `ssl: { ca_file: … }` on Faraday, `ssl_ca_file:` on rest-client, or `SSL_CERT_FILE`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on.
AC3 · Page structure· <iframe> without a title · ×1
<iframe> without a title app/views/messages/html.html.haml:17— An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <fieldset> without a <legend> · ×19
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/address_endpoints/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/credentials/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/domains/new.html.haml:21— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/http_endpoints/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/ip_addresses/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/ip_pool_rules/_form.html.haml:4— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/ip_pool_rules/_form.html.haml:22— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/ip_pools/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/organizations/edit.html.haml:15— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/organizations/new.html.haml:10— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/routes/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/servers/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/servers/advanced.html.haml:11— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/servers/advanced.html.haml:71— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/smtp_endpoints/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/track_domains/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/user/edit.html.haml:8— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/users/_form.html.haml:37— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
<fieldset> without a <legend> app/views/webhooks/_form.html.haml:3— A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) lib/postal/message_inspectors/clamav.rb:44— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) lib/postal/message_inspectors/spam_assassin.rb:50— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) config/initializers/mail_extensions.rb:54— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) config/initializers/mail_extensions.rb:59— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) config/initializers/mail_extensions.rb:64— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) config/initializers/mail_extensions.rb:84— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) config/initializers/mail_extensions.rb:95— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/util/health_server.rb:48— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/lib/smtp_server/server.rb:142— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/lib/smtp_server/server.rb:155— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/lib/smtp_server/server.rb:253— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/lib/smtp_server/server.rb:269— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/lib/smtp_server/server.rb:275— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) REDACTED:130— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/lib/message_dequeuer/state.rb:20— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/controllers/messages_controller.rb:236— `rescue StandardError` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:74— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:9— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:247— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:33— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:490— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Weak hash algorithm lib/postal/signer.rb:55— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×4
Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/sub.html.haml:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark public/404.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark public/422.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark public/500.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Anchor without href · ×4
Anchor without href app/views/domains/setup.html.haml:108— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href app/views/ip_addresses/_form.html.haml:24— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href app/views/users/_form.html.haml:29— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href app/views/webhooks/_form.html.haml:17— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Focus outline removed in CSS without a · ×3
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/application/global/_reset.scss:5— `object` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/application/global/_reset.scss:94— `select` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/application/elements/_spam_range.scss:21— `.spamRange:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
TooManyMethods: Message REDACTED:5— TooManyMethods — 62 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 32 over it, 2.07× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Database REDACTED:5— TooManyMethods — 32 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 2 over it, 1.07× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Low cohesion: Route (LCOM4 8) app/models/route.rb:25— Route's methods fall into 8 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 8 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Low cohesion: Domain (LCOM4 7) app/models/domain.rb:43— Domain's methods fall into 7 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 7 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
AC3 · Page structure· Data table has no header cells · ×1
Data table has no header cells app/views/ip_pools/_form.html.haml:9— A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope).
AC7 · A11y enforcement· Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1
Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 103 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
Server.run_event_loop (cyclomatic 40) app/lib/smtp_server/server.rb:97— Server.run_event_loop has cyclomatic complexity 40 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
MessagesController.message (cyclomatic 32) REDACTED:17— MessagesController.message has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Client.rcpt_to (cyclomatic 30) REDACTED:305— Client.rcpt_to has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
MessagesController.get_messages (cyclomatic 21) app/controllers/messages_controller.rb:168— MessagesController.get_messages has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Client.data (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:409— Client.data has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
HTTP.request (cyclomatic 18) lib/postal/http.rb:18— HTTP.request has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
OutgoingMessagePrototype.validate (cyclomatic 16) app/models/outgoing_message_prototype.rb:108— OutgoingMessagePrototype.validate has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Server.run_event_loop (cognitive 91) app/lib/smtp_server/server.rb:97— Server.run_event_loop has cognitive complexity 91 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19 (44 pts), error handling 11 (35 pts), loops 2 (7 pts), ternaries 1 (3 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 56). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
MessagesController.get_messages (cognitive 74) app/controllers/messages_controller.rb:168— MessagesController.get_messages has cognitive complexity 74 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18 (59 pts), error handling 2 (12 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 51). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
Client.rcpt_to (cognitive 43) REDACTED:305— Client.rcpt_to has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 24 (33 pts), boolean chains 6, ternaries 1 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
MessagesController.message (cognitive 29) REDACTED:17— MessagesController.message has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 18, if/else 10, error handling 1. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
HTTP.request (cognitive 23) lib/postal/http.rb:18— HTTP.request has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: error handling 4 (10 pts), if/else 6, boolean chains 5, ternaries 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Client.data (cognitive 21) REDACTED:409— Client.data has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (17 pts), boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
DomainsController.verify (cognitive 20) app/controllers/domains_controller.rb:53— DomainsController.verify has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (19 pts), match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
OutgoingMessagePrototype.validate (cognitive 20) app/models/outgoing_message_prototype.rb:108— OutgoingMessagePrototype.validate has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (17 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FileTooLong: postal/config_schema.rb lib/postal/config_schema.rb— FileTooLong — 510 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 10 over it, 1.02× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) app/controllers/messages_controller.rb:56— app/controllers/messages_controller.rb:56-66 | app/controllers/messages_controller.rb:70-80 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) db/migrate/20170418200606_initial_schema.rb:88— db/migrate/20170418200606_initial_schema.rb:88-96 | db/migrate/20170418200606_initial_schema.rb:235-243 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) app/controllers/address_endpoints_controller.rb:19— app/controllers/address_endpoints_controller.rb:19-25 | app/controllers/http_endpoints_controller.rb:19-25 | app/controllers/smtp_endpoints_controller.rb:18-24 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 3 call sites, so a change lands once.
Outbound HTTP without resilience app/senders/http_sender.rb:28— `HTTP.post` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Duplicated predicate app/models/incoming_message_prototype.rb:39— `attachment[:content_type] || "application/octet-stream"` appears character-identically in 2 files — app/models/incoming_message_prototype.rb, app/models/outgoing_message_prototype.rb. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate app/models/route.rb:182— `domain && ![server, server.organization].include?(domain.owner)` appears character-identically in 2 files — app/models/route.rb, app/models/track_domain.rb. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
C2 · Access Controls· No named authorization policies · ×1
No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
C4 · Data Retention· Partial data-retention evidence · ×1
Partial data-retention evidence — A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: an expiry limit — a declared maximum age / TTL after which the data is no longer kept, a scheduled purge / cleanup job (a job or rake task that deletes rows past their retention — where(created_at < N.days.ago).delete_all, PurgeOld… / DeleteExpired…).
No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.
D26 · Project Cohesion· Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 1 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 0.0/10. The most over is `(repository root)` (11947 LoC, 325 module-visible types across 26 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 1 of 50 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated, example/demo and scaffolding-template trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 50 of the 217 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: lib/postal/message_db/migrations/19_convert_database_to_utf8mb4.rb. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
Orphaned file lib/postal/message_db/migrations/19_convert_database_to_utf8mb4.rb:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Thin README — The root README is 60 words, against a bar of 120. Of the three newcomer-critical sections this check looks for by heading, it found no a build/run or getting-started section, no a testing section, no an architecture or project-map section. Sections are matched on HEADING text only, so material written under a heading this check does not recognise — or with no heading at all — is not seen and this row may understate what the document covers.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation· No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add brakeman for Rails apps, otherwise `semgrep --config=auto` or CodeQL's ruby pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 5432 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback· No rollback/health safety · ×1
No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
No release approval gate — Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.
X5 · Nullable reference types· Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere · ×1
Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere — This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 215 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.
Silent fallback default in rescue app/util/health_server.rb:48— `hostname` rescues every error into `"unknown-hostname"` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it raise. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment on the rescue or above the method, and the row stops firing.
Outdated: autoprefixer-rails — `autoprefixer-rails` is resolved to 10.4.13.0 in the committed REDACTED but 10.6.1.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update autoprefixer-rails` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: bcrypt — `bcrypt` is resolved to 3.1.20 in the committed REDACTED but 3.1.22 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update bcrypt` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: domain_name — `domain_name` is resolved to 0.6.20240107 in the committed REDACTED but 0.7.20261007 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update domain_name` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: dotenv — `dotenv` is resolved to 3.0.2 in the committed REDACTED but 3.2.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update dotenv` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: dynamic_form — `dynamic_form` is resolved to 1.2.0 in the committed REDACTED but 1.3.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update dynamic_form` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: factory_bot_rails — `factory_bot_rails` is resolved to 6.4.3 in the committed REDACTED but 6.5.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update factory_bot_rails` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: haml — `haml` is resolved to 6.3.0 in the committed REDACTED but 7.5.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update haml` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: hashie — `hashie` is resolved to 5.0.0 in the committed REDACTED but 5.2.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update hashie` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: highline — `highline` is resolved to 2.1.0 in the committed REDACTED but 3.1.2 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update highline` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: jquery-rails — `jquery-rails` is resolved to 4.5.1 in the committed REDACTED but 4.6.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update jquery-rails` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: jwt — `jwt` is resolved to 2.8.1 in the committed REDACTED but 3.3.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update jwt` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: kaminari — `kaminari` is resolved to 1.2.2 in the committed REDACTED but 1.3.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update kaminari` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: klogger-logger — `klogger-logger` is resolved to 1.4.0 in the committed REDACTED but 1.5.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update klogger-logger` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: mail — `mail` is resolved to 2.9.0 in the committed REDACTED but 2.9.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update mail` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: mysql2 — `mysql2` is resolved to 0.5.6 in the committed REDACTED but 0.5.7 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update mysql2` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: nilify_blanks — `nilify_blanks` is resolved to 1.4.0 in the committed REDACTED but 2.0.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update nilify_blanks` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: omniauth-rails_csrf_protection — `omniauth-rails_csrf_protection` is resolved to 1.0.1 in the committed REDACTED but 2.0.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update omniauth-rails_csrf_protection` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: omniauth_openid_connect — `omniauth_openid_connect` is resolved to 0.7.1 in the committed REDACTED but 0.8.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update omniauth_openid_connect` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: prometheus-client — `prometheus-client` is resolved to 4.2.2 in the committed REDACTED but 5.0.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update prometheus-client` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: puma — `puma` is resolved to 7.0.4 in the committed REDACTED but 8.0.2 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update puma` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: resolv — `resolv` is resolved to 0.6.2 in the committed REDACTED but 0.8.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update resolv` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: rspec — `rspec` is resolved to 3.13.1 in the committed REDACTED but 3.13.2 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update rspec` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: rspec-rails — `rspec-rails` is resolved to 6.1.1 in the committed REDACTED but 8.0.4 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update rspec-rails` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: rubocop — `rubocop` is resolved to 1.48.1 in the committed REDACTED but 1.92.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update rubocop` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: rubocop-rails — `rubocop-rails` is resolved to 2.18.0 in the committed REDACTED but 2.38.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update rubocop-rails` and commit the updated REDACTED.
+ 7 more in this group — see findings.md.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1721d-e428-7bc9-82f6-1a88b06f53d9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 60 · Warnings: 111 · Recommendations: 23 · Info: 32 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 25-10-2026 @ 08:12 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.