Public report — go-monolith-example, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 29-07-2026 @ 21:45 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Powerman/go-Monolith-Example

dormant codebase
46% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate
Architecture 100% Exemplary Domain Modelling 100% Exemplary Code Health 99% Exemplary Maturity 74% Adequate Readiness 35% Adequate Security 27% Weak

Small · 6,053 LoC · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (27%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

22/23dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 1 LLM-assisted, advisory
43findings with an exact file:lineof 59 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
23/102dimensions across the health lenses6053 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

powerman/go-monolith-example carries serious gaps (46%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (27%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (35%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 5 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); 21 High finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)).

For scale: Small (~6,053 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 99% ★ Exemplary Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 74% Adequate · gated by D34 Readiness 35% Adequate · gated by D13, P5 Security 27% Weak · gated by D28, D29, D36 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 27% · 46% weightReadiness 35% · 25% weightMaturity 74% · 14% weightCode Health 99% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight

Raise Security 27 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 46 → ~59.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (25+)

25 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) pkg/repo/repo-mysql.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) pkg/migrate/goose-mysql.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) ms/auth/internal/config/testing.go
  • D19 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Generate-TOC.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Generate-TOC.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Lint-PR-name.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Lint-PR-name.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D36 · Build action pinned to a mutable branch
  • D36 · Workflow token permissions not restricted
  • D36 · Secret passed as a command-line argument

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,800–€14,000
Cost to rebuild€2,800–€14,000 (0.1 person-years (46–146 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 46% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€8,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 27% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.yml, postgres.key, ms-auth.key.
+13.5 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+13.5 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup
3
Resolve the 9 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with postgres.key (2), ca.key (2), ms-auth.key (2).
+6.8 pts · Low effort · Secrets (history)

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 27%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (6,053 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 27%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.yml, postgres.key, ms-auth.key. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.yml, postgres.key, ms-auth.key.

At a glance — Code Health · 99% · Exemplary

The Good
D1 · Go Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · Go Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · Go God Classes 10.0 D4 · Go Code Duplication 9.6

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D35 · Go Change Coupling 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 74% · Adequate · gated by D34

The Good
D15 · Go Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · Go Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Ugly
D34 · Go Knowledge Freshness 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 35% · Adequate · gated by D13, P5

The Good
P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.5 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 7.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 10.0
The Ugly
D13 · Go Secret Scanning 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 27% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, D36

The Good
D31 · Go IaC & Container Security 9.7
The Ugly
D28 · Go Secrets (history) 1.0 D29 · Go Static Analysis (SAST) 0.3 D36 · Go Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection21High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures15High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration1High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the 5 leaked secrets in configuration files and the 9 historical secret findings to eliminate immediate security risks. Next, address the 21 high-severity static analysis issues in the CI/CD pipelines to improve code quality and security. Then, establish a comprehensive disaster recovery plan by codifying backups and documenting recovery procedures. Finally, integrate secret scanning tools into the CI process to prevent future secret leaks.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.yml, postgres.key, ms-auth.key.+13.5 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+13.5 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Resolve the 9 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with postgres.key (2), ca.key (2), ms-auth.key (2).+6.8 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Resolve the 21 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with CI&CD.yml (7), codeql-analysis.yml (4), Create-GitHub-Release.yml (3).+7.8 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.+7.6 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+3.5 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.+2.3 ptsLowIaC & Container Security
Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.3 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 24 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 46% mixed · 54% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.circleci/config.yml4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/postgres.key4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ms-auth.key4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ms-auth-int.key4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ca.key4.4MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key
.github/workflows/CI&CD.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
pkg/migrate/goose-mysql.go5.7MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: string-formatted-query
.github/workflows/Generate-TOC.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/Lint-PR-name.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
configs/pki/private/postgres.key7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: private-key
configs/pki/private/ca.key7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: private-key
configs/pki/private/ms-auth.key7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: private-key
configs/pki/private/ms-auth-int.key7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: private-key
.github/dependabot.yml7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
.github/workflows/Update-Go-doc.yml7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
Dockerfile7.2Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
ms/auth/internal/dal/dal.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
pkg/repo/repo-mysql.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 22 of 23 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 23 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D21D28D29D31D34D35D36DM5DM7DM8M1M3M4P1P3P4P5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 43 of 59 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fafd6-a906-76a7-948e-7089681dbba6.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — evaluation did not complete — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete) — excluded from the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being grpcx.logHandler at 18 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2ms/example/internal/config/config.go:115
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)ms/auth/internal/dal/dal.go:37
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)pkg/repo/repo-mysql.go:71
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)pkg/migrate/goose-mysql.go:65
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)ms/auth/internal/srv/grpc/srv.go:29

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: private-key · ×5.circleci/config.yml:70

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with config.yml, postgres.key, ms-auth.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: private-key · ×9.circleci/config.yml:70detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with postgres.key (2), ca.key (2), ms-auth.key (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

21 finding(s): 0 critical, 21 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×21.github/dependabot.yml:3detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 21 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with CI&CD.yml (7), codeql-analysis.yml (4), Create-GitHub-Release.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High IaC: DS-0002Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

18 of 18 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is pkg/grpcx/middlewares.go.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Build action pinned to a mutable branch
Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
Secret passed as a command-line argument
No build provenance

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`go test ./...` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health99%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity74%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness35%Adequate — gated by D13, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security27%Weak — gated by D28, D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplarySolid.
Not included — 79 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~2042 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete)
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 37 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×21
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 3 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml:67 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml:71 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml:93 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml:132 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml:136 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml:139 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: softprops/turnstyle@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `softprops/turnstyle@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/softprops/turnstyle/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/CI&CD.yml:145 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: metcalfc/changelog-generator@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `metcalfc/changelog-generator@v1.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/metcalfc/changelog-generator/commits/v1.0.0 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/create-release@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/create-release@latest`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/create-release/commits/latest --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Generate-TOC.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: softprops/turnstyle@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `softprops/turnstyle@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/softprops/turnstyle/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Generate-TOC.yml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: technote-space/toc-generator@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `technote-space/toc-generator@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/technote-space/toc-generator/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Lint-PR-name.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Lint-PR-name.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: JulienKode/pull-request-name-linter-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `JulienKode/pull-request-name-linter-action@v0.2.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/JulienKode/pull-request-name-linter-action/commits/v0.2.0 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/Update-Go-doc.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: andrewslotin/go-proxy-pull-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `andrewslotin/go-proxy-pull-action@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/andrewslotin/go-proxy-pull-action/commits/master --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:62 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: string-formatted-query pkg/migrate/goose-mysql.go:58 — String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×9
  • Secret: private-key .circleci/config.yml:70 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/pki/private/postgres.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/pki/private/ca.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/pki/private/ms-auth.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/pki/private/ms-auth-int.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ca.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ms-auth.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ms-auth-int.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/postgres.key:1 — matched rule 'private-key'
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×5
  • Leaked secret: private-key .circleci/config.yml:70 — private-key detected.
  • Leaked secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/postgres.key:1 — private-key detected.
  • Leaked secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ms-auth.key:1 — private-key detected.
  • Leaked secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ms-auth-int.key:1 — private-key detected.
  • Leaked secret: private-key configs/insecure-dev-pki/private/ca.key:1 — private-key detected.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Build action pinned to a mutable branch · ×1
  • Build action pinned to a mutable branch — 2 CI action reference(s) point at a mutable BRANCH rather than a version tag or a commit SHA, 1 of them on a THIRD-PARTY action: `andrewslotin/go-proxy-pull-action@master` (.github/workflows/Update-Go-doc.yml:14), `actions/create-release@latest` (.github/workflows/Create-GitHub-Release.yml:23). A branch re-points on every upstream push, so whatever its tip holds when the job runs executes inside your pipeline with that job's secrets — a version tag at least moves only when the publisher cuts a release. Pin these to a full commit SHA first; the remaining tag refs are the same control at a lower blast radius.
Warning — 12 finding(s)
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) ms/example/internal/config/config.go:115 — ms/example/internal/config/config.go:115-120 | ms/example/internal/config/config.go:140-145 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) ms/auth/internal/config/testing.go:32 — ms/auth/internal/config/testing.go:32-37 | ms/example/internal/config/testing.go:33-38 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 12 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected depth to be zero at the end of the JSON payload. There is an open JSON object or array that should be closed. Path: $.findings[1] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1114.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 19 floating ref(s) across 6 workflow file(s), 2 of them mutable BRANCH refs (reported separately, pin those first): `actions/checkout@v2` (.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:28), `github/codeql-action/init@v1` (.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:41), `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v1` (.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:48), `github/codeql-action/analyze@v1` (.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:62), `actions/checkout@v2` (.github/workflows/Lint-PR-name.yml:14), `JulienKode/pull-request-name-linter-action@v0.2.0` (.github/workflows/Lint-PR-name.yml:19), `softprops/turnstyle@v1` (.github/workflows/Generate-TOC.yml:18), `technote-space/toc-generator@v4` (.github/workflows/Generate-TOC.yml:24), … (+9 more)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (6 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
  • Secret passed as a command-line argument — 1 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): CI&CD.yml: docker login ghcr.io -u '${{ secrets.CR_USER }}' -p '${{ secrets.CR_PAT }}'. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) ms/auth/internal/dal/dal.go:37 — ms/auth/internal/dal/dal.go:37-49 | ms/example/internal/dal/dal.go:39-51 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) pkg/repo/repo-mysql.go:71 — pkg/repo/repo-mysql.go:71-81 | pkg/repo/repo-postgres.go:78-88 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) pkg/migrate/goose-mysql.go:65 — pkg/migrate/goose-mysql.go:65-74 | pkg/migrate/goose-postgres.go:62-71 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) ms/auth/internal/srv/grpc/srv.go:29 — ms/auth/internal/srv/grpc/srv.go:29-36 | ms/auth/internal/srv/grpc/srv.go:45-52 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) ms/auth/internal/config/config.go:120 — ms/auth/internal/config/config.go:120-126 | ms/auth/internal/config/config.go:151-157 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 18 of 18 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it. None is large enough to schedule a dedicated read-through on its own, so they are folded into the freshness score rather than raised individually — largest first: pkg/grpcx/middlewares.go, ms/auth/internal/config/config.go, cmd/mono/main.go (and 15 more).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images, `rpmsign --addsign` for RPMs / `debsign` plus a signed apt `Release.gpg` for DEBs) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-gomod` over the module graph — or Go's own build info, which already records the module set in the binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete) · ×1
  • OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities not included (check did not complete) — OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.go) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .9artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .21artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .1artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fafd6-a906-76a7-948e-7089681dbba6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 37 · Warnings: 12 · Recommendations: 8 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 21:45 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md