restaurant — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

profjordanov/restaurant carries serious risk (34%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (88%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (26%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Domain Modelling (32%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); Keep the changelog current (Release Hygiene); missing tooling (eslint (Tooling).

For scale: Small (~5,731 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 42% Weak · gated by R1, R7 Architecture 88% Strong Maturity 44% Weak · gated by M2 Readiness 26% Weak · gated by R4, R6, P3, P6 Security 62% Adequate · gated by C1 Domain Modelling 32% Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM4

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 26% · 46% weightDomain Modelling 32% · 25% weightCode Health 42% · 14% weightMaturity 44% · 8% weightSecurity 62% · 4% weightArchitecture 88% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 26 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 34 → ~41.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 9%Plumbing 61%Tests 11%Generated 19%

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,500–€12,000

Cost to rebuild	€2,500–€12,000 (0.1 person-years (41–128 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 34% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 48% boilerplate · 40% straight-line · 12% branching logic
Dead frontend code	~233 LoC unreachable (3 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 26% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.

+6.1 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

+8.3 pts · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.

+8.3 pts · Medium effort · Release Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 26%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (5,731 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 26%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause

18 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.

Evidence: DM5 setters: 5 · DM4 anemic: 5 · DM2 primitive ids: 8

→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory

The headline is improving steadily (+11.5 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.

Evidence: trajectory: +11.5 pts/run over 5 runs

Trajectory

The Ugly

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 1.0 DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	10	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	6	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, address the critical lack of test coverage by adding tests for all unreached modules. Next, maintain release hygiene by ensuring the changelog is updated with versioned entries for every release. Then, implement missing tooling by adding eslint and tsc as scripts and integrating them into CI. After that, extend structured logging to all service-like projects to ensure full observability. Finally, improve deployment safety by adding readiness and liveness probes with an automatic rollback strategy.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.	+6.1 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).	+8.3 pts	Medium	Test Coverage
Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.	+8.3 pts	Medium	Release Hygiene
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.	+8.2 pts	Medium	Tooling
Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.	+7.6 pts	Medium	Observability
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.	+7.6 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.	+7.6 pts	Medium	Dependency Hygiene
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.	+6.9 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 19 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 58% mixed · 42% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.json	4.4	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile.original	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/Dockerfile	4.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj	5.5	Mixed	Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/ReportContext/Utils/ExcelWriter.cs	6.3	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue (cyclomatic 17)
client/Dockerfile	6.5	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile	6.5	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.Development.json	7.2	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.Development.json	7.2	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.json	7.2	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/_Base/HttpFile.cs	7.7	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/AuthContext/CommandHandlers/LoginHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/GlobalSuppressions.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
server/src/server/Restaurant.Persistence/GlobalSuppressions.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/Business/AuthContext/LoginHandlerTests.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/RestaurantContext/QueryHandlers/GetAllRestaurantsByTownHandler.cs	9.4	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: ObsoleteWithoutCallers
server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/SliceFixture.cs	9.4	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: ObsoleteWithoutCallers
server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/ReportContext/Generators/UserLoginsReportGenerator.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: redundant comment
server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Entities/Meal.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 66 of 69 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 69 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D31D33D34D35AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6P8R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 37 of 49 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1572-9a40-771d-9f3f-4039076d18eb.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue at 17.

ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue (cyclomatic 17)server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/ReportContext/Utils/ExcelWriter.cs:362

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue at 21.

ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue (cognitive 21)server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/ReportContext/Utils/ExcelWriter.cs:362

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

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D5 · Coupling8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Restaurant.Persistence

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 26 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: ExcelWriter (LCOM4 4)server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/ReportContext/Utils/ExcelWriter.cs:12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 test methods: 15 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

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D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 15 tests.

Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keyserver/src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.json:20

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 42 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

Small-team knowledge concentration

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D17 · Explicit Debt8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

11 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 5009 LoC (0.8/KLoC) → score 8.3.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×4server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj:7

TodoComment · ×3server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/AuthContext/CommandHandlers/LoginHandler.cs:81

BareSuppressMessage · ×2server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/GlobalSuppressions.cs:7

ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×2server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/RestaurantContext/QueryHandlers/GetAllRestaurantsByTownHandler.cs:41

What to do

Resolve the 4 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Restaurant.Api.csproj (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with HttpFile.cs, LoginHandler.cs, LoginHandlerTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 BareSuppressMessage finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with GlobalSuppressions.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 projects, 164 .cs files, 5870 hand-written lines of code (5009 production / 861 test), plus 1587 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 12 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).

Build status unknown

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The Restaurant project has strong README documentation: an overview image plus a clear description of technology stack (ASP.NET Core API, EF Core Code First, PostgreSQL), the main functionalities for anonymous visitors and registered users, and a list of eight features. The client README is excellent at showing available scripts (`npm start`, `npm test`, `npm run build`, `npm eject`) with full command output plus a note about ejecting (one-way) and customization options. Both docs are well written and complete for their audiences; the XML-doc coverage is low (<20%) across four packages, so that gap must be addressed separately.

XML-doc coverage: Restaurant.Api · ×5server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The Restaurant project has strong README documentation: an overview image plus a clear description of technology stack (ASP.NET Core API, EF Core Code First, PostgreSQL), the main functionalities for anonymous visitors and registered users, and a list of eight features. The client README is excellent at showing available scripts (`npm start`, `npm test`, `npm run build`, `npm eject`) with full command output plus a note about ejecting (one-way) and customization options. Both docs are well written and complete for their audiences; the XML-doc coverage is low (<20%) across four packages, so that gap must be addressed separately.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 3 redundant across 99 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×3server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/ReportContext/Generators/UserLoginsReportGenerator.cs:19

What to do

Resolve the 3 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with HttpFile.cs, Meal.cs, UserLoginsReportGenerator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 % of calls cross a namespace and 7 % go through an interface, but 43 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Scattered collaborators

What to do

Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×4server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.Development.json:20detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.Development.json (2), appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 2 medium, 4 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×4client/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×2server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile.originaldetected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×4client/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3), Dockerfile.original. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3), Dockerfile.original. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile, Dockerfile.original. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX10 · Code composition6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

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AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

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AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

`Meal` references the aggregate root `Restaurant` directly (via `Restaurant`) — hold its `RestaurantId` instead. — Meal.cs:24
`Meal` references the aggregate root `Order` directly (via `Orders`) — hold its `OrderId` instead. — Meal.cs:28
`Order` references the aggregate root `Meal` directly (via `Meal`) — hold its `MealId` instead. — Order.cs:24
`Order` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Order.cs:26
`Rating` references the aggregate root `Restaurant` directly (via `Restaurant`) — hold its `RestaurantId` instead. — Rating.cs:21
`Rating` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Rating.cs:22
`Restaurant` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Owner`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Restaurant.cs:20
`Restaurant` references the aggregate root `Rating` directly (via `Ratings`) — hold its `RatingId` instead. — Restaurant.cs:24
`Restaurant` references the aggregate root `Meal` directly (via `Meals`) — hold its `MealId` instead. — Restaurant.cs:26
`User` references the aggregate root `Rating` directly (via `GivenRatings`) — hold its `RatingId` instead. — User.cs:17
`User` references the aggregate root `Order` directly (via `MadeOrders`) — hold its `OrderId` instead. — User.cs:19
`User` references the aggregate root `Restaurant` directly (via `OwnedRestaurants`) — hold its `RestaurantId` instead. — User.cs:21

What to do

Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

`Meal.RestaurantId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct RestaurantId { Guid Value }`). — Meal.cs:19
`Meal.TypeId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TypeId { Guid Value }`). — Meal.cs:21
`Order.MealId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct MealId { Guid Value }`). — Order.cs:17
`Order.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). — Order.cs:21
`Rating.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). — Rating.cs:16
`Rating.RestaurantId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct RestaurantId { Guid Value }`). — Rating.cs:18
`Restaurant.TownId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct TownId { Guid Value }`). — Restaurant.cs:15
`Restaurant.OwnerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OwnerId { Guid Value }`). — Restaurant.cs:17

What to do

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`Meal` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Meal.cs:9
`Order` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Order.cs:8
`Rating` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Rating.cs:8
`Restaurant` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Restaurant.cs:8
`User` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — User.cs:9

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM5 · Encapsulated state6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

`Meal` exposes public setter(s) (Id, Name, Price, RestaurantId, TypeId, Restaurant, …). — Meal.cs:9
`Order` exposes public setter(s) (Id, OrderStatus, CreatedOn, MealId, Quantity, UserId, …). — Order.cs:8
`Rating` exposes public setter(s) (Id, Stars, UserId, RestaurantId, Restaurant, User). — Rating.cs:8
`Restaurant` exposes public setter(s) (Id, Name, TownId, OwnerId, Owner, Town, …). — Restaurant.cs:8
`User` exposes public setter(s) (FirstName, LastName, RegistrationDate, GivenRatings, MadeOrders, OwnedRestaurants). — User.cs:9

What to do

Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

`IAsyncLogger` (domain layer) references `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/web). — IAsyncLogger.cs:8

What to do

Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`AddCommonServices` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — DependenciesConfiguration.cs:164
`OnActionExecuted` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — ModelStateFilter.cs:10
`Handle` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — UserLoginsReportHandler.cs:20
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — DependenciesConfiguration.cs:202

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

The root README is 117 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.

What to do

Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

JWT authentication/authorization claimed but no JWT dependency present

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: JWT authentication/authorization claimed but no JWT dependency present.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (dotnet test / npm test / pytest / a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
A CI pipeline exists but no build invocation (dotnet build / dotnet publish / a build step) was matched — changes may merge without being compiled.

What to do

Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (e.g. `dotnet test`) and gate merges on it.
Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline (e.g. dotnet build / dotnet publish) so every change is compiled before merge.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 1/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P6 · Release Hygiene3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.

What to do

Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

0 typed · 27 plain JS

What to do

Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R10 · Code Duplication8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

client/src/components/common/Input.js:35 · client/src/components/common/SelectInput.js:33 — Input.js:35
client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:1 · client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:11 — actionTypes.js:1

What to do

Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — serviceWorker.js, apiClient.js, LoginPage.js, …

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

Do you agree with this assessment?

R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Unreachable from the 1 application, 0 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (1 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×3) — serviceWorker.js, SelectInput.js, RregisterRestaurantForm.js

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R8 · Dependency Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — history.js:1
Declared in client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. — Startup.cs:114

What to do

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 15/52 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — AuthConfiguration.cs:13, AuthConfiguration.cs:41, DatabaseConfiguration.cs:15, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	42%	Weak — gated by R1, R7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	88%	Strong	Strongest area.
Maturity	44%	Weak — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	26%	Weak — gated by R4, R6, P3, P6	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	62%	Adequate — gated by C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	32%	Weak — gated by DM1, DM2, DM4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 43 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): a message-bus package; 19 CQRS handler(s)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); 5 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 13 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×4

NoWarnInCsproj server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj:7 — 1701
NoWarnInCsproj server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj:7 — 1702
NoWarnInCsproj server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj:7 — 1705
NoWarnInCsproj server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj:7 — 1591

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×4

Secret: generic-api-key server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.Development.json:20 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.json:20 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.Development.json:20 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.json:20 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×4

High IaC: DS-0002 client/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile.original — Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

Leaked secret: signing-key server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/appsettings.json:20 — signing-key detected.

Warning — 12 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×3

TodoComment server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/AuthContext/CommandHandlers/LoginHandler.cs:81 — // TODO: This is duplicated in BaseHandler.cs — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/_Base/HttpFile.cs:73 — // todo: this should not be here — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/Business/AuthContext/LoginHandlerTests.cs:41 — // TODO: Validate subject, claims, etc. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D17 · Explicit Debt · BareSuppressMessage · ×2

BareSuppressMessage server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/GlobalSuppressions.cs:7 — System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage
BareSuppressMessage server/src/server/Restaurant.Persistence/GlobalSuppressions.cs:7 — System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2

Medium IaC: DS-0001 server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile.original — ':latest' tag used
Medium IaC: DS-0001 server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue (cyclomatic 17) · ×1

ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue (cyclomatic 17) server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/ReportContext/Utils/ExcelWriter.cs:362 — ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue (cognitive 21) · ×1

ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue (cognitive 21) server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/ReportContext/Utils/ExcelWriter.cs:362 — ExcelWriter.SetCellTypeAndValue has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: Restaurant.Persistence — Restaurant.Persistence: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1

Low cohesion: ExcelWriter (LCOM4 4) server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/ReportContext/Utils/ExcelWriter.cs:12 — ExcelWriter's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.

Recommendation — 16 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×4

Low IaC: DS-0026 client/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Dockerfile.original — No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×3

redundant comment server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/ReportContext/Generators/UserLoginsReportGenerator.cs:19 — "Constants" —
redundant comment server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Entities/Meal.cs:23 — "Relations" —
redundant comment server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/_Base/HttpFile.cs:29 — "Constructors" —

D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×2

ObsoleteWithoutCallers server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/RestaurantContext/QueryHandlers/GetAllRestaurantsByTownHandler.cs:41 — [Obsolete] ParseReaderResult
ObsoleteWithoutCallers server/tests/Restaurant.Business.Tests/SliceFixture.cs:15 — [Obsolete] SliceFixture

D11 · Test Reliability · No tests discovered · ×1

No tests discovered — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) built and ran but no tests were discovered, so reliability couldn't be exercised.

D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1

Small-team knowledge concentration — 0 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 0 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1

Bounded contexts not declared — At 5009 LoC spread over 6 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.

D27 · Navigability · Scattered collaborators · ×1

Scattered collaborators — 93 % of calls cross a namespace and only 43 % of collaborators are co-located — group each feature's code into a vertical slice so a call's collaborators sit together.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Scanner failed to run · ×1

Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv-scanner exited 128 with no findings — the advisory database was likely unreachable. The scanner exited non-zero and produced no findings (typically the advisory DB was unreachable), so this is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass.

Info — 8 finding(s)

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×5

XML-doc coverage: Restaurant.Api server/src/server/Restaurant.Api/Restaurant.Api.csproj — Restaurant.Api: 18 % XML-doc coverage (15/85).
XML-doc coverage: Restaurant.Business server/src/server/Restaurant.Business/Restaurant.Business.csproj — Restaurant.Business: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/50).
XML-doc coverage: Restaurant.Core server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/Restaurant.Core.csproj — Restaurant.Core: 6 % XML-doc coverage (7/118).
XML-doc coverage: Restaurant.Domain server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Restaurant.Domain.csproj — Restaurant.Domain: 5 % XML-doc coverage (12/227).
XML-doc coverage: Restaurant.Persistence server/src/server/Restaurant.Persistence/Restaurant.Persistence.csproj — Restaurant.Persistence: 2 % XML-doc coverage (1/65).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1

Mock framework: Moq — Restaurant.Business.Tests references Moq.

D18 · Solution Shape · Build status unknown · ×1

Build status unknown — The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	4	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	10	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	0	—

Run 019f1572-9a40-771d-9f3f-4039076d18eb · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 11 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 8 field(s)

Register.FirstName server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Register.cs:7
Register.LastName server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Register.cs:9
User.FirstName server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Entities/User.cs:11
User.LastName server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Entities/User.cs:13
UserRegistered.FirstName server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Events/User/UserRegistered.cs:10
UserRegistered.LastName server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Events/User/UserRegistered.cs:12
UserView.FirstName server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Views/Auth/UserView.cs:11
UserView.LastName server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Views/Auth/UserView.cs:13

Email — 3 field(s)

Login.Email server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Login.cs:8
Register.Email server/src/server/Restaurant.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Register.cs:11
UserView.Email server/src/server/Restaurant.Domain/Views/Auth/UserView.cs:9

Profjordanov/restaurant

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Trajectory

Architecture — module dependency graph

At a glance — Code Health · 42% · Weak · gated by R1, R7

At a glance — Architecture · 88% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 44% · Weak · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 26% · Weak · gated by R4, R6, P3, P6

At a glance — Security · 62% · Adequate · gated by C1

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 32% · Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts