PragmaticCleanArchitecture

Executive summary

Template / example. This repo declares itself a template, kata, sample or demo — code to read or copy, not operate — so the ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A and what remains is judged accordingly.

The system holds an adequate overall standing of 44%, reflecting a workable asset that carries real risk in its core logic. While the code is clean and the architecture is sound, the business value is concentrated in a domain model that is too weak to protect the company’s interests. This small system, comprising roughly 3,700 lines of production code, represents a modest investment of about 0.1 person-years to rebuild. However, its current fragility means that even minor changes could trigger defects or delays, making the cost of inaction higher than the cost of remediation.

The primary risk is an un-encapsulated domain. The business logic is scattered across anemic services rather than being protected by the entities that own the data. This lack of encapsulation invites transposed-argument bugs and allows invariants to be violated, directly threatening data integrity and reliability. Because the domain modeling is the weakest lens, fixing this structural issue offers the highest leverage, resolving multiple findings simultaneously rather than chasing individual defects.

A secondary concern is operational maturity. With a readiness score of 53% and maturity at 54%, the system lacks the robustness needed for safe, independent operation. While the event-driven architecture is strong, the absence of declared bounded contexts and unmeasured test coverage creates uncertainty. New teams may struggle to pick up the code, and the lack of visibility into dependency security increases exposure to supply-chain risks. These gaps mean that maintaining the system will likely require more effort and oversight than anticipated.

On the positive side, the code health, architecture, and security scores are all strong, indicating that the technical foundation is solid and free from critical vulnerabilities. The event-driven design is also well-implemented, providing a reliable backbone for future growth. To maximize value, focus first on enforcing strong typing for aggregate references and moving business rules into the domain entities. This single shift will harden the consistency boundaries and reduce the risk of costly defects, securing the system’s long-term viability.

Code Health 81% Strong Architecture 82% Strong Maturity 54% Adequate · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 53% Adequate · gated by P7 Security 82% Strong Domain Modelling 35% Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM4, DM7 Event-Driven 100% ★ Exemplary Accessibility 40% Adequate · gated by AC4

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Domain Modelling 35% · 45% weightAccessibility 40% · 25% weightReadiness 53% · 14% weightMaturity 54% · 8% weightCode Health 81% · 4% weightArchitecture 82% · 2% weightSecurity 82% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight

Raise Domain Modelling 35 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 44 → ~51.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 4%Plumbing 36%Tests 17%Generated 43%

New since the last scan (26+)

26 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D4 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Domain/Entities/Permission.cs
D4 · Duplicated block (6–11 lines × 2) src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs
D17 · CoverageExclusion REDACTED
D29 · REDACTED
D29 · REDACTED
D29 · REDACTED
D29 · REDACTED
D29 · REDACTED
D30 · REDACTED CVE: REDACTED
D30 · REDACTED CVE: REDACTED
D31 · REDACTED
D31 · REDACTED
D36 · REDACTED
DM10 · One operation mutates 2 aggregates: ApplicationDbContextInitialiser.SeedAsync REDACTED
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectItem.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectItem.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/WorkItem.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/WorkItem.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/UserManager.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/UserManager.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/WorkItems.razor
AC2 · <button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/WorkItems.razor
AC3 · Routed page without a <PageTitle> src/Web/UI/Pages/Authentication.razor

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,100–€10,000

Cost to rebuild	€2,100–€10,000 (0.1 person-years (35–109 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	REDACTED — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 44% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 40% boilerplate · 50% straight-line · 9% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€6,200 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Domain Modelling at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain REDACTED (×1.6) — service/app, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.

+7.9 pts · REDACTED effort · Aggregate boundaries

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

+7.9 pts · REDACTED effort · Strongly-typed ids

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

+7.9 pts · REDACTED effort · Rich vs anemic model

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · REDACTED · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Domain Modelling at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,679 LoC) · weakest lens: Domain Modelling 35%

→ Direct remediation budget at Domain Modelling first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · REDACTED · Root cause

5 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.

Evidence: DM5 setters: 2 · DM4 anemic: 2 · DM2 primitive ids: 1

→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.

Highest-leverage move · REDACTED · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

41 modules, 52 dependencies. Every dependency points down the layering — no cycles.

Showing the 40 most-connected modules; 1 more are not drawn.

Module dependency matrix. The row depends on the column; the number is how many type pairs create the dependency. A cell above the diagonal is part of a dependency cycle.
depends on →	4 ApiServer.ViewModels	7 Application.Projects.Requests	8 Application.WorkItems.Requests	9 Domain.Primitives	13 UI	15 Domain.Events	16 Domain.ValueObjects	18 UI.Components.WorkItems	19 Domain.Entities	21 ApiServer.Mapper	22 Application.Common.Services	28 ApiServer.Controllers	36 Infrastructure.Data.Interceptors
1 (global)
2 ApiServer
3 ApiServer.Filters
4 ApiServer.ViewModels
5 Application
6 Application.Common.Exceptions
7 Application.Projects.Requests
8 Application.WorkItems.Requests
9 Domain.Primitives
10 Infrastructure
11 Infrastructure.Migrations
12 Shared.Identity
13 UI
14 UI.Identity
15 Domain.Events				1
16 Domain.ValueObjects				3
17 UI.Components.Projects					4
18 UI.Components.WorkItems					7
19 Domain.Entities				2			3
20 UI.Pages					27			2
21 ApiServer.Mapper	13								9
22 Application.Common.Services									2
23 Application.Projects.Commands		2		4					4
24 Application.Projects.Queries				1					1
25 Application.WorkItems.Commands			2	3					3
26 Application.WorkItems.Queries				1					1
27 Infrastructure.Data.Configurations									2
28 ApiServer.Controllers	2	2	2						2	2
29 ApiServer.Identity											1
30 Application.Common.Behaviours											1
31 Application.Roles.Commands									2		3
32 Application.Roles.Queries									1		1
33 Application.Users.Command									1		2
34 Application.Users.Queries									2		2
35 Application.WorkItems.Events				1		1			1		1
36 Infrastructure.Data.Interceptors											1
37 Infrastructure.Emails											1
38 Infrastructure.Identity									2		1
39 ApiServer.Controllers.Identity	5								2	2		2
40 Infrastructure.Data				2					4				2

Dependency, pointing down the layeringAbove the diagonal — part of a cycleThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 81% · Strong ·

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.8 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 9.7 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 6.8 X1 · Repo Async correctness 7.4 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 7.9 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.1

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong ·

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 7.7 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

The Ugly

AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.0

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2 ·

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Bad

D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 5.0

The Ugly

D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 53% · Adequate · gated by P7 ·

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 7.3 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 5.5 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 5.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 4.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0

At a glance — Security · 82% · Strong ·

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 9.5 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 6.9 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.4 D43 · .NET / C# Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 C3 · Repo Audit Trail 7.5 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 8.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

The Ugly

D37 · .NET / C# Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 4.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 35% · Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM4, DM7 ·

The Good

DM10 · Repo One transaction, one aggregate 9.7 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 6.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

The Ugly

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 1.0 DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 1.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 10.0 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 10.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 40% · Adequate · gated by AC4 ·

The Good

AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 6.1

The Bad

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 4.5 AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.4 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

The Ugly

AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	8	REDACTED / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	7	REDACTED / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	4	REDACTED / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	1	REDACTED / Critical

Roadmap

First, enforce aggregate independence by referencing other aggregates only via strongly-typed IDs to prevent cross-boundary coupling and transposed-argument bugs. Next, shift business rules into the aggregates themselves and define repositories per aggregate root to ensure invariants are enforced at the source rather than in anemic services. Finally, encapsulate entity state by restricting setters and exposing collections as read-only, ensuring all state changes occur through methods that validate business rules.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.	+7.9 pts	REDACTED	Aggregate boundaries
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.	+7.9 pts	REDACTED	Strongly-typed ids
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.	+7.9 pts	REDACTED	Rich vs anemic model
Define repositories per aggregate root and keep the query handle inside them; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.	+7.9 pts	REDACTED	Repository granularity
Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).	+7.1 pts	REDACTED	Encapsulated state
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.	+5.7 pts	REDACTED	Keyboard semantics
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.	+5.7 pts	REDACTED	A11y enforcement
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.	+5.7 pts	REDACTED	Forms & labels

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 10 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 40% mixed · 60% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	3.4	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: REDACTED IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.4	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): REDACTED: REDACTED
src/Domain/Entities/Permission.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)
src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6–11 lines × 2)
README.md	9.3	Near-clean	Documentation Quality: Documentation: no architecture or design documentation
src/Application/WorkItems/Events/WorkItemAssignedDomainEventHandler.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: misleading comment

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 36

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 37

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 55

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 4

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 95 of 100 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 100 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D37D39D43D44AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX8AX9C2C3DM1DM10DM11DM12DM2DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P7P8S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 70 of 128 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a0c070-7a9a-743d-8ca7-6e1f05225e6a.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (3 contributor(s) across 245 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 99% of the history; the other 2 hold 0.5% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. At 2611 LoC across 10 projects this is a large multi-module codebase that clearly needs explicit bounded contexts. Bounded contexts cannot be inferred from a codebase that is not physically organised by them (D-321), so with none declared there are no boundaries for the coupling pass to measure across. You can widen what we reach: name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/LoggingBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/UnhandledExceptionBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/ValidationBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Exceptions/NotFoundException.cs`, `src/Application/Projects/Commands/CreateProjectCommand.cs`, … (+41 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

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D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)src/Domain/Entities/Permission.cs:5

Duplicated block (6–11 lines × 2)src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:10

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Permission.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (6–11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with WorkItem.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Shared

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 21 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

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D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

74 test methods: 74 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

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D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 4 mock references across 74 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×4

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

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D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

26 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 3 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: MSTest.TestAdapter · ×3

Outdated: MediatR · ×26

What to do

Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 269 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 29 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 221 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D17 · Explicit Debt9.8 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2611 LoC in the .NET projects (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8.

CoverageExclusionREDACTED:9

What to do

Resolve the 1 CoverageExclusion finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 136 source files, 4205 hand-written lines of code (2611 production / 1594 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 4002 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 21 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

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D19 · Documentation QualityAdequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository is a single README with two .NET projects (PragmaticCleanArchitecture and Open Iconic) each having an accompanying CSS/README.md file. The PragmaticCleanArchitecture README is well written: it introduces the project, shows a demo, lists features, and begins outlining installation steps before being clipped mid-sentence. The Open Iconic README is a focused documentation document that describes what it contains, how to get started with SVGs and sprites, and ends with an outline of sections including Bootstrap/Foundation styling; however both documents are thin on the edge of completeness (installation/usage for PragmaticCleanArchitecture, no license in the visible text) and appear to be written as one-document examples rather than a cohesive documentation set. The two projects each have their own READMEs but the shared elements (architecture overview, licensing, contributor guidance) are not present.

Documentation: no architecture or design documentation · ×2README.md

XML-doc coverage: ApiServer · ×6src/Web/ApiServer/ApiServer.csproj

What to do

Resolve the 2 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D24 · Comment ValueExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

62 valuable / 0 redundant across 154 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

misleading commentsrc/Application/WorkItems/Events/WorkItemAssignedDomainEventHandler.cs:19

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

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D27 · Navigability7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 % of calls cross a namespace and 3 % go through an interface, but 57 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Scattered collaborators

What to do

Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged REDACTED. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.5 / 10Adequategated by 6 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 6 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 46 file(s) — `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/LoggingBehaviour.cs` (line 6), `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/UnhandledExceptionBehaviour.cs` (line 3), `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/ValidationBehaviour.cs` (line 5), `src/Application/Common/Exceptions/NotFoundException.cs` (line 3), `src/Application/Projects/Commands/CreateProjectCommand.cs` (line 8), … (+41 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 45 of those file(s) — `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/LoggingBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/UnhandledExceptionBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/ValidationBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Exceptions/NotFoundException.cs`, `src/Application/Projects/Commands/CreateProjectCommand.cs`, … (+40 more) — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them. In 1 of those file(s) — `src/Application/Common/Exceptions/NotFoundException.cs` — the break is at a TYPE DECLARATION (a C# primary constructor semgrep's grammar cannot parse), so the loss is wider than the named lines: rules scoped to that type see no type to scope to and are blind over its whole body, while rules matching statements keep working there. Absence of a type-scoped finding in those types is not evidence of anything. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 6 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 4 REDACTED CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 REDACTED CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security9.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 REDACTED IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 of 5 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityService.cs. Counted over 5 of the 111 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is present but lists no reporting contact.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Vulnerability-disclosure Policy. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 351 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

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D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 10 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels4.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). (×16) — src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/DeleteProjectDialog.razor:6, src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectDialog.razor:6, src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectItem.razor:4, …
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:53
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:77

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC3 · Page structure5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

A route with no <PageTitle> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list — the host's <HeadOutlet /> projects whatever title the routed component supplies, and this one supplies none. Add a <PageTitle> to this component (a literal <title> in the host document would be overwritten by the outlet). — src/Web/UI/Pages/Authentication.razor:3
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:73
user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — src/Web/UI/wwwroot/index.html:6

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: interactive elements plus elements the markup gives a click/key handler or the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer`, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×2) — src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectItem.razor:1, src/Web/UI/Shared/NavMenu.razor:10
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — src/Web/UI/wwwroot/index.html:22

What to do

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC6 · Visual & motion safety6.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

`.modal-header` sets color: #fff on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/WorkItemDialog.razor.css:1

What to do

Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 23 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. Deterministic, type-level.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

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AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

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C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

`Project` references the aggregate root `WorkItem` directly (via `WorkItems`) — hold its `WorkItemId` instead. — src/Domain/Entities/Project.cs:9
`WorkItem` references the aggregate root `Project` directly (via `Project`) — hold its `ProjectId` instead. — src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:9

What to do

Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.

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DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

`ApplicationDbContextInitialiser.SeedAsync` saves `WorkItem`, `IdentityUser` in a single operation. Each is its own consistency boundary, so committing them together makes the second's invariants depend on the first's transaction, holds a lock across both for the whole operation, and means the pair can no longer be separated — into different services, or different databases. Mutate one aggregate here and let the others follow from a domain event. — REDACTED:31

What to do

Mutate one aggregate per operation and let the others follow from a domain event — the second aggregate reaching consistency a moment later is the design, not a compromise.

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DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

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DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. An id wrapper is recognised by VALUE SEMANTICS, not by being a struct — a record struct, a record class (`record ApartmentId(Guid Value)`) or a class declared by a typed-id base (`class MemberId : TypedIdValueBase`) all count, while a plain mutable class (reference equality) and a verb-phrase query record (`GetCustomerById`) do not. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

`WorkItem.ProjectId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:8

What to do

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`Project` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/Domain/Entities/Project.cs:5
`WorkItem` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:6

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

`Project` exposes publicly writable state (Title). — src/Domain/Entities/Project.cs:5
`WorkItem` exposes publicly writable state (ProjectId, Title, Description, Iteration, AssignedTo, StartDate, and 2 more). — src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:6

What to do

Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM7 · Repository granularity1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

`ProjectRepository` is a repository over `Project`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Project` through its owning aggregate instead. — src/Infrastructure/Data/ProjectRepository.cs:6
`WorkItemRepository` is a repository over `WorkItem`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `WorkItem` through its owning aggregate instead. — src/Infrastructure/Data/WorkItemRepository.cs:6

What to do

Define repositories per aggregate root and keep the query handle inside them; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

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ED3 · Event naming10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×5) — src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/ProjectsViewModelMapper.cs:27, src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/RolesViewModelMapper.cs:16, src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/UserDetailsViewModelMapper.cs:18, …

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs6.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`Map` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×5) — src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/ProjectsViewModelMapper.cs:27, src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/RolesViewModelMapper.cs:16, src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/UserDetailsViewModelMapper.cs:18, …

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.

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M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Only 2/10 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P2 · Observability5.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 2/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 4, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.

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X1 · Async correctness7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — src/Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/DomainEventsDispatcherInterceptor.cs:12

What to do

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)

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X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X2 · Cancellation propagation7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 55/85 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×30) — src/Web/ApiServer/Controllers/Identity/RoleController.cs:20, src/Web/ApiServer/Controllers/Identity/RoleController.cs:27, src/Web/ApiServer/Controllers/Identity/RoleController.cs:39, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

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X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

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X5 · Nullable reference types9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

~1.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 44 suppression(s) across the 39346 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics	2.1.1, 2.4.3	Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness	4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 43 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	81%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	82%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	54%	Adequate — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	53%	Adequate — gated by P7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	82%	Strong	Solid.
Domain Modelling	35%	Weak — gated by DM1, DM2, DM4, DM7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Accessibility	40%	Adequate — gated by AC4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo

Not included — 28 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — This is a dotnet-new template — at-rest encryption and key-vaulting are deferred to the application you build from it. Add ASP.NET Data Protection / column encryption + a key vault for your real data store when you productionise.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Cross-context type coupling could not be assessed — this codebase's bounded contexts are neither declared nor inferable.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 46 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 36 finding(s)

AC2 · Forms & labels · <button> with no accessible text · ×16

<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/DeleteProjectDialog.razor:6 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectDialog.razor:6 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectItem.razor:4 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectItem.razor:7 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/CreateWorkItemDialog.razor:6 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/WorkItem.razor:10 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/WorkItem.razor:13 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/WorkItemDialog.razor:8 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:39 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:42 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:58 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:74 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/UserManager.razor:39 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/UserManager.razor:42 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/WorkItems.razor:44 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text src/Web/UI/Pages/WorkItems.razor:47 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×6

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED CVE · ×4

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

AC2 · Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label · ×2

<input> without a programmatic label src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:53 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:77 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate · ×2

Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Project.WorkItems src/Domain/Entities/Project.cs:9 — `Project` references the aggregate root `WorkItem` directly (via `WorkItems`) — hold its `WorkItemId` instead.
Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: WorkItem.Project src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:9 — `WorkItem` references the aggregate root `Project` directly (via `Project`) — hold its `ProjectId` instead.

AC3 · Page structure · Routed page without a <PageTitle> · ×1

Routed page without a <PageTitle> src/Web/UI/Pages/Authentication.razor:3 — A route with no <PageTitle> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list — the host's <HeadOutlet /> projects whatever title the routed component supplies, and this one supplies none. Add a <PageTitle> to this component (a literal <title> in the host document would be overwritten by the outlet).

AC3 · Page structure · Viewport restricts zoom · ×1

Viewport restricts zoom src/Web/UI/wwwroot/index.html:6 — user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Click handler on a non-interactive <li> · ×1

Click handler on a non-interactive <li> src/Web/UI/Components/Projects/ProjectItem.razor:1 — A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Click handler on a non-interactive <div> · ×1

Click handler on a non-interactive <div> src/Web/UI/Shared/NavMenu.razor:10 — A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · REDACTED IaC · ×1

REDACTED

Serious — 37 finding(s)

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code · Unfinished stub · ×5

Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/ProjectsViewModelMapper.cs:27 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/RolesViewModelMapper.cs:16 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/UserDetailsViewModelMapper.cs:18 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/WorkItemMapper.cs:24 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/WorkItemViewModelMapper.cs:13 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Unfinished stub · ×5

Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/ProjectsViewModelMapper.cs:27 — `Map` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/RolesViewModelMapper.cs:16 — `Map` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/UserDetailsViewModelMapper.cs:18 — `Map` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/WorkItemMapper.cs:24 — `Map` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException src/Web/ApiServer/Mapper/WorkItemViewModelMapper.cs:13 — `Map` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×3

Deprecated: MSTest.TestAdapter — MSTest.TestAdapter 3.4.3 — Legacy
Deprecated: MSTest.TestFramework — MSTest.TestFramework 3.4.3 — Legacy
Deprecated: Blazored.FluentValidation — Blazored.FluentValidation 2.2.0 — Legacy

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED CVE · ×3

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · REDACTED IaC · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×2

Anemic entity: Project src/Domain/Entities/Project.cs:5 — `Project` is an aggregate/entity with 2 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
Anemic entity: WorkItem src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:6 — `WorkItem` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.

DM7 · Repository granularity · Repository for a non-root entity · ×2

Repository for a non-root entity: ProjectRepository → Project src/Infrastructure/Data/ProjectRepository.cs:6 — `ProjectRepository` is a repository over `Project`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Project` through its owning aggregate instead.
Repository for a non-root entity: WorkItemRepository → WorkItem src/Infrastructure/Data/WorkItemRepository.cs:6 — `WorkItemRepository` is a repository over `WorkItem`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `WorkItem` through its owning aggregate instead.

AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h1 to h5 · ×1

Heading level jumps from h1 to h5 src/Web/UI/Pages/RoleManager.razor:73 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Anchor without href · ×1

Anchor without href src/Web/UI/wwwroot/index.html:22 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0 · ×1

Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) src/Web/UI/Components/WorkItems/WorkItemDialog.razor.css:1 — `.modal-header` sets color: #fff on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.

AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1

Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 23 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

D17 · Explicit Debt · CoverageExclusion · ×1

CoverageExclusion REDACTED:9 — class ApplicationDbContextInitialiser — this shipped code is lifted out of the coverage measurement, so it is not that the code is reported as untested: it is not reported at all. The excluded lines leave the denominator, which means the percentage the team publishes goes UP when code stops being covered, and the gap is invisible in the artefact that would otherwise disclose it. Nothing here is written by a compiler or a build — the attribute is only ever typed by an author — so it is a standing decision, and the only record of it is this line. Test what it covers and delete the attribute; where the code genuinely cannot be exercised (a debugger display, a platform branch this build cannot reach), narrow the exclusion to the smallest declaration that is really untestable rather than the type around it, so members added later are not silently excluded too. If it is correct as it stands, say why — in the attribute's own Justification, or in a comment above it: that is what turns it from unexplained debt into a recorded decision, and it clears this row.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/Domain/Entities/Permission.cs:5 — src/Domain/Entities/Permission.cs:5-22 | src/Web/Shared/Identity/Permission.cs:3-20 — before extracting anything, compare `src/Domain/Entities/Permission.cs` and `src/Web/Shared/Identity/Permission.cs` as WHOLE FILES: 87% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Domain/Entities/Permission.cs:5` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6–11 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (6–11 lines × 2) src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:10 — src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:10-15 | src/Web/ApiServer/ViewModels/WorkItemDto.cs:9-19 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: Shared — Shared: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.

DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate · One operation mutates 2 aggregates · ×1

One operation mutates 2 aggregates: ApplicationDbContextInitialiser.SeedAsync REDACTED:31 — `ApplicationDbContextInitialiser.SeedAsync` saves `WorkItem`, `IdentityUser` in a single operation. Each is its own consistency boundary, so committing them together makes the second's invariants depend on the first's transaction, holds a lock across both for the whole operation, and means the pair can no longer be separated — into different services, or different databases. Mutate one aggregate here and let the others follow from a domain event.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×1

Outbound HTTP without resilience — The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1

NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.

X1 · Async correctness · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) · ×1

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) src/Infrastructure/Data/Interceptors/DomainEventsDispatcherInterceptor.cs:12 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.

Minor — 19 finding(s)

D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×2

Documentation: no architecture or design documentation README.md — The PragmaticCleanArchitecture README is an architectural example rather than an architecture document; no design or layered-overview documentation exists in the visible text. Add a short Architecture section describing the Clean/Onion layers and how they interact.
Documentation: no licence statement README.md — The README contains license badges but there is no licence statement in the visible text. State the project's MIT license under the heading 'License' or add a LICENSE file.

DM5 · Encapsulated state · Mutable entity · ×2

Mutable entity: Project src/Domain/Entities/Project.cs:5 — `Project` exposes publicly writable state (Title).
Mutable entity: WorkItem src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:6 — `WorkItem` exposes publicly writable state (ProjectId, Title, Description, Iteration, AssignedTo, StartDate, and 2 more).

C3 · Audit Trail · Partial audit-trail evidence · ×1

Partial audit-trail evidence — An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

D24 · Comment Value · misleading comment · ×1

misleading comment src/Application/WorkItems/Events/WorkItemAssignedDomainEventHandler.cs:19 — "replace with real implementation" — delete - this is a stub/Arrange line restating the code; it misnames the comment as 'replace with real implementation' rather than documenting why the call is empty.

D27 · Navigability · Scattered collaborators · ×1

Scattered collaborators — 99 % of calls cross a namespace and only 57 % of collaborators are co-located — group each feature's code into a vertical slice so a call's collaborators sit together.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

REDACTED

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 5 of 5 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 5 of the 111 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: src/Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityService.cs, src/Web/UI/Pages/ProjectBoard.razor.cs, src/Web/UI/Pages/WorkItems.razor.cs, REDACTED, src/Web/ApiServer/Filters/ApiExceptionFilterAttribute.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids · Primitive id on a domain type · ×1

Primitive id on a domain type: WorkItem.ProjectId src/Domain/Entities/WorkItem.cs:8 — `WorkItem.ProjectId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that.

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

M3 · Folder & project structure · Inconsistent root namespaces · ×1

Inconsistent root namespaces — Only 2/10 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1

Logging is not universal — Only 2/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 4, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1

No security response headers detected — No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1

Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 55/85 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1

Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~1.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 44 suppression(s) across the 39346 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

Minor — 36 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×26

Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.2.0 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.Server — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.Server 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Diagnostics.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Diagnostics.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.UI — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.UI 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: NSwag.AspNetCore — NSwag.AspNetCore 14.0.7 → 14.7.1 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: NSwag.MSBuild — NSwag.MSBuild 14.0.7 → 14.7.1 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.6.2 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by ApiServer).
Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.9.1 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 4.0.0 → 4.4.0 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: Serilog.Settings.Configuration — Serilog.Settings.Configuration 8.0.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Console — Serilog.Sinks.Console 5.0.1 → 6.1.1 available (referenced by Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by Infrastructure).
Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 6.12.0 → 8.11.0 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.10.0 → 18.10.1 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
Outdated: Moq — Moq 4.20.70 → 4.20.72 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
Outdated: MSTest.TestAdapter — MSTest.TestAdapter 3.4.3 → 4.4.1 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
Outdated: MSTest.TestFramework — MSTest.TestFramework 3.4.3 → 4.4.1 available (referenced by Application.UnitTests).
Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 11.9.1 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by UI).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by UI).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.Authentication — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.Authentication 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by UI).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.DevServer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.DevServer 8.0.6 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by UI).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http — Microsoft.Extensions.Http 8.0.0 → 10.0.12 available (referenced by UI).
+ 1 more in this group — see findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×6

XML-doc coverage: ApiServer src/Web/ApiServer/ApiServer.csproj — ApiServer: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/89).
XML-doc coverage: Application src/Application/Application.csproj — Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/86).
XML-doc coverage: Domain src/Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/73).
XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure src/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj — Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/52).
XML-doc coverage: UI src/Web/UI/UI.csproj — UI: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/95).
XML-doc coverage: Shared src/Web/Shared/Shared.csproj — Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/15).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×4

Mock framework: Moq — Application.UnitTests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — Domain.UnitTests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — Web.Tests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — Infrastructure.UnitTests references Moq.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ae29768782a9476488d2f97f62c8740f/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ae29768782a9476488d2f97f62c8740f/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	7	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list PragmaticCleanArchitecture.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	7	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	4	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 46 file(s) — `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/LoggingBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/UnhandledExceptionBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Behaviours/ValidationBehaviour.cs`, `src/Application/Common/Exceptions/NotFoundException.cs`, `src/Application/Projects/Commands/CreateProjectCommand.cs`, … (+41 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	dotnet	—	dotnet list PragmaticCleanArchitecture.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	0	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json

Run 01a0c070-7a9a-743d-8ca7-6e1f05225e6a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 2 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 2 field(s)

User.Email src/Domain/Entities/User.cs:9
UserDto.Email src/Web/ApiServer/ViewModels/UserDto.cs:8

Pwoltschk/PragmaticCleanArchitecture

Findings by grade

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 81% · Strong ·

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 54% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 53% · Adequate · gated by P7 ·

At a glance — Security · 82% · Strong ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 35% · Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM4, DM7 ·

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 40% · Adequate · gated by AC4 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts