Public report of qdanik/react-clean-architecture-boilerplate, published 21 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 21 October 2026, 23:19 UTC · Survey ID cd_e85981543c6943969e5cb35f2f3de7ed

qdanik/react-clean-architecture-boilerplate

Measured 21 October 2026, 23:14 UTC, at code version 70de87c

Code coverage: not measuredTest reliability: not measuredSupply-chain provenance & signing: not measured

Code coverage is not measured: JavaScript/TypeScript suite (CouldNotMeasureRepoBuildError).

Test reliability is not measured: The JS/TS suite's lockfile was refused.

Supply-chain provenance & signing is not measured: Supply-chain provenance is not scored (this pipeline releases no artifact), but its build steps or GitHub Actions workflows have integrity defects, or nothing watches its dependency set for published advisories.

CAI score 48out of 100 At risk Down 6 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Domain Modelling 100 Exemplary Performance 85 Exemplary Architecture 76 Strong Security and Compliance 73 Adequate Code Health 64 Adequate Maturity 41 Adequate Production Readiness 37 Adequate

A small codebase: 2,838 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 37

Findings by how serious they are

44 critical 119 serious 48 minor

8 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
21 October 2026, 23:14 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

69of 71 dimensions measured by tools. The other 2 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
180of 211 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 31 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
71dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 2,838 lines of product code in 1 project.
Chapters

Executive summary

qdanik/react-clean-architecture-boilerplate scores 48 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged. Watchdog judged it as a template, sample or demo, meant to be read or copied, so the dimensions about building, releasing and running a product don't apply, and its lenses are rated against a lower bar. The score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 37 and is rated Adequate. Its Security & performance tooling dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning and to resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 48 to about 57.

44 findings are critical: 28 in Dependency Vulnerabilities, six in Static Analysis (SAST), three in IaC & Container Security, two in Circular Imports, two in Dependency Hygiene, one in REDACTED Scanning, one in Secrets (history) and one in Test Reliability.

Watchdog couldn't measure 7 dimensions in this code, among them Documentation Quality, Internal API Consistency and Navigability, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 2,838 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €2,700, to rebuild.

Code Health 64 Adequate, capped by Dead Code and Nullable reference types Architecture 76 Strong Maturity 41 Adequate, capped by Knowledge Freshness and Documentation accuracy Production Readiness 37 Adequate, capped by Dependency Hygiene and Security & performance tooling Security and Compliance 73 Adequate, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities Domain Modelling 100 ★ Exemplary Performance 85 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 37 · counts for 46%Maturity 41 · counts for 25%Code Health 64 · counts for 14%Security and Compliance 73 · counts for 8%Architecture 76 · counts for 4%Performance 85 · counts for 2%Domain Modelling 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 37 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 48 to about 57.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 98%Tests 2%
New since the last survey: 8 findings

These 8 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 36 findings

These 36 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
  • Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/domain/route/route.constants.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/domain/route/services/route.service.container.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/data/repositories/endpoints.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/domain/route/services/route.service.impl.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/presentation/mobile/index.tsx
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/presentation/web/index.tsx
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.container.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/domain/notification/notification.types.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/domain/auth/entities/auth-form-fields.entity.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/domain/date/date.types.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file setup/jest/setup-after-env.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/domain/auth/auth.types.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/core/validators/index.ts
  • Test Coverage · No test reaches this file src/presentation/web/modules/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~3 LoC) src/domain/route/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~3 LoC) src/domain/route/services/route.service.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~2 LoC) src/core/http/endpoint/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~2 LoC) src/domain/auth/entities/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~2 LoC) src/domain/date/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~2 LoC) src/presentation/web/components/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/data/dao/notification/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/data/dto/auth/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/auth/services/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/date/entities/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/error/entities/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/error/services/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/notification/entities/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/notification/services/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/route/entities/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) src/domain/route/services/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~0 LoC) src/core/validators/index.ts
  • Dead Code · Dead file (~0 LoC) src/presentation/web/modules/index.ts
Rebuild cost: about €2,700 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€880 to €4,400, for 15 to 47 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 48. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 2,838 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 7 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning
2
Resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with eslint.config.js, axios.adapter.ts.
Raises the score by about 7 points · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness
3
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Raises the score by about 4 points · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €2,700 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 37 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 7 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 REDACTED Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

85 modules, with 70 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 45 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 setup.vite.config_types2 src.containers.config3 src.core.form.form-api4 src.core.http.http-client5 src.core.i18n.i18n_types6 src.core.logger.logger7 src.core.storage.storage8 src.domain.auth.entities.auth-form-fields_entity9 src.domain.auth.entities.auth-token_entity10 src.domain.error.error_types11 src.domain.notification.notification_types12 src.presentation.web.components.common.button.button_types13 setup.vite14 src.core.adapters.browser-cookie.browser-cookie_adapter15 src.core.i18n.i18n16 src.data.dto.auth.auth-token_dto17 src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo18 src.domain.auth.services.auth_service19 src.domain.error.entities.error_entity20 src.domain.notification.entities.notification_entity21 src.presentation.forms.base_form22 src.presentation.shared.components.ioc.ioc_types23 src.core.adapters.axios.axios_adapter24 src.core.adapters.i18next.i18next_adapter25 src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store26 src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao27 src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo_impl28 src.domain.auth.services.auth_service_impl29 src.domain.notification.services.notification_service30 src.presentation.forms.base_form_impl31 src.core.mobx-store.mobx_store32 src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store_impl33 src.data.repositories.auth.token-axios.token-axios_adapter34 src.domain.error.services.error_service_impl35 src.domain.notification.services.notification_service_impl36 src.presentation.forms.auth.auth_form37 src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao_impl38 src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter39 src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter_impl40 src.presentation.web.modules.auth.auth_types
1 setup.vite.config_types
2 src.containers.config
3 src.core.form.form-api
4 src.core.http.http-client
5 src.core.i18n.i18n_types
6 src.core.logger.logger
7 src.core.storage.storage
8 src.domain.auth.entities.auth-form-fields_entity
9 src.domain.auth.entities.auth-token_entity
10 src.domain.error.error_types
11 src.domain.notification.notification_types
12 src.presentation.web.components.common.button.button_types
13 setup.vite5
14 src.core.adapters.browser-cookie.browser-cookie_adapter1
15 src.core.i18n.i18n1
16 src.data.dto.auth.auth-token_dto1
17 src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo1
18 src.domain.auth.services.auth_service1
19 src.domain.error.entities.error_entity1
20 src.domain.notification.entities.notification_entity1
21 src.presentation.forms.base_form1
22 src.presentation.shared.components.ioc.ioc_types1
23 src.core.adapters.axios.axios_adapter111
24 src.core.adapters.i18next.i18next_adapter11
25 src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store1
26 src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao1
27 src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo_impl1111
28 src.domain.auth.services.auth_service_impl111
29 src.domain.notification.services.notification_service1
30 src.presentation.forms.base_form_impl11
31 src.core.mobx-store.mobx_store1
32 src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store_impl11
33 src.data.repositories.auth.token-axios.token-axios_adapter11
34 src.domain.error.services.error_service_impl111
35 src.domain.notification.services.notification_service_impl1111
36 src.presentation.forms.auth.auth_form111
37 src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao_impl111
38 src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter111
39 src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter_impl11111
40 src.presentation.web.modules.auth.auth_types1
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 setup.vite.config_types2 src.containers.config3 src.core.form.form-api4 src.core.http.http-client5 src.core.i18n.i18n_types6 src.core.logger.logger7 src.core.storage.storage8 src.domain.auth.entities.auth-form-fields_entity9 src.domain.auth.entities.auth-token_entity10 src.domain.error.error_types11 src.domain.notification.notification_types12 src.presentation.web.components.common.button.button_types13 setup.vite14 src.core.adapters.browser-cookie.browser-cookie_adapter15 src.core.i18n.i18n16 src.data.dto.auth.auth-token_dto17 src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo18 src.domain.auth.services.auth_service19 src.domain.error.entities.error_entity20 src.domain.notification.entities.notification_entity21 src.presentation.forms.base_form22 src.presentation.shared.components.ioc.ioc_types23 src.core.adapters.axios.axios_adapter24 src.core.adapters.i18next.i18next_adapter25 src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store26 src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao27 src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo_impl28 src.domain.auth.services.auth_service_impl29 src.domain.notification.services.notification_service30 src.presentation.forms.base_form_impl31 src.core.mobx-store.mobx_store32 src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store_impl33 src.data.repositories.auth.token-axios.token-axios_adapter34 src.domain.error.services.error_service_impl35 src.domain.notification.services.notification_service_impl36 src.presentation.forms.auth.auth_form37 src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao_impl38 src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter39 src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter_impl40 src.presentation.web.modules.auth.auth_typessetup.vite.config_types1src.containers.config2src.core.form.form-api3src.core.http.http-client4src.core.i18n.i18n_types5src.core.logger.logger6src.core.storage.storage7src.domain.auth.entities.auth-form-fields_entity8src.domain.auth.entities.auth-token_entity9src.domain.error.error_types10src.domain.notification.notification_types11src.presentation.web.components.common.button.button_types12setup.vite13src.core.adapters.browser-cookie.browser-cookie_adapter14src.core.i18n.i18n15src.data.dto.auth.auth-token_dto16src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo17src.domain.auth.services.auth_service18src.domain.error.entities.error_entity19src.domain.notification.entities.notification_entity20src.presentation.forms.base_form21src.presentation.shared.components.ioc.ioc_types22src.core.adapters.axios.axios_adapter23src.core.adapters.i18next.i18next_adapter24src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store25src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao26src.data.repositories.auth.auth_repo_impl27src.domain.auth.services.auth_service_impl28src.domain.notification.services.notification_service29src.presentation.forms.base_form_impl30src.core.mobx-store.mobx_store31src.core.mobx-store.notification-store.notification_store_impl32src.data.repositories.auth.token-axios.token-axios_adapter33src.domain.error.services.error_service_impl34src.domain.notification.services.notification_service_impl35src.presentation.forms.auth.auth_form36src.data.dao.notification.notification_dao_impl37src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter38src.presentation.presenters.auth.auth_presenter_impl39src.presentation.web.modules.auth.auth_types40511111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111+45 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 64% · Adequate · gated by R7, X5 ·

The Good
D1 · TypeScript Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · TypeScript Cognitive Complexity 9.8 D3 · TypeScript God Classes 10.0 D17 · TypeScript Explicit Debt 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 9.2 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0
The Ugly
R7 · React / TS Dead Code 3.2 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 76% · Strong ·

The Good
D6 · TypeScript Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · TypeScript Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · TypeScript Change Coupling 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 R11 · React / TS Import Boundaries 9.4
The Bad
AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.4 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 6.2

At a glance — Maturity · 41% · Adequate · gated by D34, M4 ·

The Good
D15 · TypeScript Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · TypeScript Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0
The Ugly
D34 · TypeScript Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 37% · Adequate · gated by R8, P3 ·

The Good
D9 · TypeScript Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · TypeScript Test Quality 10.0 D12 · TypeScript Dependency Hygiene 8.6 D14 · TypeScript License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 5.3 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 7.8 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0
The Bad
D13 · TypeScript REDACTED Scanning 5.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 1.0

At a glance — Security · 73% · Adequate · gated by D30 ·

The Good
D28 · TypeScript Secrets (history) 9.0 D29 · TypeScript Static Analysis (SAST) 7.1 D31 · TypeScript IaC & Container Security 8.9 D43 · TypeScript Malicious Dependencies 10.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 8.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0
The Bad
D44 · TypeScript Platform End-of-Life 6.0
The Ugly
D30 · TypeScript Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good
DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

At a glance — Performance · 85% · Exemplary ·

The Good
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 8.5

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures46High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection14High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration5High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures3High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the leaked secret in REDACTED and address orphaned files in eslint.config.js and axios.adapter.ts to secure the codebase. Reconcile documentation discrepancies in README.md and docs/SCRIPTS.md to ensure they accurately reflect the current project structure and available scripts. Finally, integrate a static analysis security step into the CI pipeline to prevent future security regressions from reaching production.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED.+7.2 ptsLowREDACTED Scanning
Resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with eslint.config.js, axios.adapter.ts.+7.2 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+4.2 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 2 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (2).+3.4 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Reconcile the README with reality: README.md links to `LICENSE.md`, but `LICENSE.md` does not exist; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:[type]`, but no package.json declares a `start:[type]` script; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run build:[web`, but no package.json declares a `build:[web` script; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:stage`, but no package.json declares a `start:stage` script; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run generator`, but no package.json declares a `generator` script.+6.0 ptsMediumDocumentation accuracy
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json.+2.1 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+4.2 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+3.6 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 11 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 18% slop · 27% mixed · 55% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.0SlopREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED0.8SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
package.json5.7MixedPlatform End-of-Life: End-of-life runtime: Node.js 20
REDACTED5.8MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
setup/vite/plugins/react-svg/index.ts8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: index.default.transform (cognitive 16)
REDACTED9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: REDACTED
REDACTED9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 44

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 119

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 48

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 8

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 69 of 71 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 71 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D21D26D28D29D30D31D34D35D43D44AX10AX3AX4AX6DM6DM9GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6PF3R1R10R11R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X21X22X23X24X25X28X29X3X30X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 180 of 211 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a160be-3c5f-76ce-b056-0e74a0f842f7.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 72 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 99% of the history; the other 1 hold 1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (package.json), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
  • D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository's container is InversifyJS, whose lifetimes are not modelled yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — nginx-proxy Pulling nginx Pulling nginx-proxy Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden nginx Warning Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: nginx Pulling nginx-proxy Pulling nginx-proxy Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden nginx Warning Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden WARNING: Some service image(s) must be built from source by running: docker compose build nginx Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.
  • DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Arm two tells a construction that PRODUCES a measurement from one that merely passes it along, and this repository's frontend does not compute that fact. A measurement built independently in two places would not appear above.
  • M3 Folder & project structure — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Whether the tests sit apart from production code is not visible here, because the suite is not in a form this pass reads. The test-separation credit is granted rather than withheld: this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about the repository's tests. You can widen what we reach: keep the test surface somewhere a reader can find it without opening a binary — an exported/checked-in test source tree beside the production code makes the suite reviewable, diffable and discoverable by tooling.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • R4 Test Coverage — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 14 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 54.
  • R7 Dead Code — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 27 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 67.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP log through no library that carries a message's values as fields (pino, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr; Python's logging, structlog; PHP's PSR-3 loggers), so its log calls cannot be judged, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.8 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was index.default.transform at 16.

index.default.transform (cognitive 16)setup/vite/plugins/react-svg/index.ts:53

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with index.default.transform (cognitive 16). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.9 to about 10.0/10.
  2. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 7 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 test methods: 9 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 9 `it`/`test` case(s) across 4 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 9 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

19 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 21 graded, 0 pinning defect(s), across 1 package.json (1 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded for currency: that grade is about what SHIPS. 1 direct dependency(ies) — production, development or optional — are marked DEPRECATED by their publisher (the registry's per-version mark, or the lockfile's copy of it when the registry could not be asked); deprecated transitive packages are listed but not charged. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — the registry publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.

Deprecated: eslintpackage.json:90
Outdated (npm): i18next · ×2package.json:43
Outdated (npm): ahooks · ×17

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 21 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 21 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 1 product package.json manifest(s). Its 59 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted task-comment markers across 2814 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 build units (npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.1 / 10Adequategated by 6 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 6 medium, 2 low. 6 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `index.html` (line 11, line 17) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 6 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

46 finding(s): 2 critical, 26 high, 15 medium, 3 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 26 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (26). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (14). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.9 / 10Adequategated by 3 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 1 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 of 2 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is eslint.config.js. Counted over 2 of the 200 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×2eslint.config.js:1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with eslint.config.js, axios.adapter.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 21 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life runtime: Node.js 20package.json:9

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with package.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions whose whole body still throws a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings and JSX of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions that only throw a "not implemented" error, functions that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, async functions that never await, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy0.0 / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README.md links to `LICENSE.md`, but `LICENSE.md` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:59
  • docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:[type]`, but no package.json declares a `start:[type]` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/SCRIPTS.md:11
  • docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run build:[web`, but no package.json declares a `build:[web` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/SCRIPTS.md:15
  • docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:stage`, but no package.json declares a `start:stage` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/SCRIPTS.md:19
  • docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run generator`, but no package.json declares a `generator` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/SCRIPTS.md:39

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README.md links to `LICENSE.md`, but `LICENSE.md` does not exist; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:[type]`, but no package.json declares a `start:[type]` script; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run build:[web`, but no package.json declares a `build:[web` script; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:stage`, but no package.json declares a `start:stage` script; docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run generator`, but no package.json declares a `generator` script.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `setup/vite/env.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 25 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — setup/vite/env.ts:25
  • `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 12 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:12
  • `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 20 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:20
  • `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 29 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:29
  • `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 38 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:38
  • `src/core/utils/app-version.util.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 4 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/core/utils/app-version.util.ts:4
  • `src/presentation/shared/components/ioc/hooks/injection.hook.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 12 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/presentation/shared/components/ioc/hooks/injection.hook.ts:12

What to do

  • Route service-code `console.*` output through the module's structured logger (with named fields), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (@opentelemetry/sdk-node) and a health-check endpoint (@godaddy/terminus or a /health route) for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1291 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • `readFileSync` in `transform` blocks the event loop until it finishes — a blocking call inside async code stalls the event loop — every other request waits for as long as it runs. — setup/vite/plugins/react-svg/index.ts:71

What to do

  • TypeScript/JavaScript: use the promise APIs (fs/promises, a promisified child_process.execFile, the async zlib/crypto functions) and await them instead of the *Sync variants.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

  • src/core/adapters/local-storage/local-storage.adapter.ts:4 · src/core/adapters/session-storage/session-storage.adapter.ts:4 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/core/adapters/local-storage/local-storage.adapter.ts:4
  • setup/plopjs/entity.ts:37 · setup/plopjs/repo.ts:23 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — setup/plopjs/entity.ts:37
  • setup/plopjs/entity.ts:68 · setup/plopjs/service.ts:62 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — setup/plopjs/entity.ts:68
  • src/core/adapters/form/react-hook-form.adapter.ts:17 · src/core/form/form-api.ts:12 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 80 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/core/adapters/form/react-hook-form.adapter.ts:17
  • src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts:73 · src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts:85 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts:73
  • REDACTED:1 · REDACTED:12 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — REDACTED:1

What to do

  • Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R11 · Import Boundaries9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • src/containers/config.ts:4 imports inversify/lib/annotation/lazy_service_identifier, reaching past a declared dependency's public entry into its build output — that path is the package's toolchain layout, not its API, and a minor version bump can relocate it with no semver signal. Import from the package's documented entry point instead. — src/containers/config.ts:4

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage5.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×40) — setup/plopjs/entity.ts:1, setup/vite/plugins/react-svg/index.ts:1, setup/plopjs/service.ts:1, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness7.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code3.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 8 application, 5 tooling and 4 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 3 in-repo import(s) from 3 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/entities/index.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/error/entities/error.entity.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/entities/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/route/entities/route.entity.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.adapter.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/entities/index.ts, src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/notification/entities/notification.entity.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 3 in-repo import(s) from 3 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/entities/index.ts, src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.impl.ts, src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/auth/entities/auth-token.entity.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/services/error.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.impl.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/date/entities/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/date/entities/date.entity.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/core/http/endpoint/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/core/http/endpoint/endpoint.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.impl.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dto/auth/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.container.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dao/notification/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.container.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.container.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 4 in-repo import(s) from 4 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/entities/error.entity.ts, src/domain/error/index.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts and 1 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/error/error.types.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/error/services/error.service.container.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/route/route.constants.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/route/services/route.service.container.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×5) — src/data/repositories/endpoints.ts, src/presentation/mobile/index.tsx, src/domain/auth/index.ts, …
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/services/route.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/route/services/route.service.impl.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts, src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it (×2) — src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.response.ts, src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.container.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.container.ts, src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 3 in-repo import(s) from 3 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/entities/notification.entity.ts, src/domain/notification/index.ts, src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/notification/notification.types.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.container.ts, src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/core/http/endpoint/endpoint.ts, src/core/http/endpoint/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/core/http/endpoint/endpoint.types.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/entities/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/auth/entities/auth-form-fields.entity.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/services/error.service.container.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/error/services/error.service.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.container.ts, src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/date/entities/date.entity.ts, src/domain/date/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/date/date.types.ts
  • no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/domain/auth/auth.types.ts

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene1.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported only as a TYPE and declared in no reachable package.json. The import is erased at compile time, so nothing is installed and no runtime resolution depends on it — but type-checking a clean clone will fail. Declare the typings it resolves through (or the package itself) in the owning package.json. — setup/jest/config.ts:1
  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — setup/plopjs/index.ts:1, setup/plopjs/service.ts:1
  • Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts → src/data/repositories/auth/index.ts → src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts → src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts → src/data/dto/auth/index.ts → src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts — src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts:1
  • src/presentation/shared/hoc/error-boundary.hoc.tsx → src/presentation/shared/index.ts → src/presentation/shared/hoc/index.ts → src/presentation/shared/hoc/error-boundary.hoc.tsx — src/presentation/shared/hoc/error-boundary.hoc.tsx:4

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Read from this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. This repository commits the configuration that serves its own HTTP surface, so that configuration was read in full for the security response headers it sets. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. This is reported because `REDACTED` is committed to this repository and declares the server that serves it, so the configuration that would carry these headers is in this repository and was read in full. (−2.0 on this card.) — REDACTED:1

What to do

  • Set security response headers on the surface this repository serves: an `add_header` directive per header in the nginx/Caddy/Apache config, a `_headers` / `vercel.json` / `netlify.toml` entry for a static host, or `helmet()` in the HTTP server. `Content-Security-Policy` is the one that pays for itself first — it is what contains an injected script once one reaches the page — followed by `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and a frame policy (`X-Frame-Options: DENY`, or CSP `frame-ancestors`). Where the app is served from a build container, the header configuration belongs in the image beside the built assets, so it ships with them rather than depending on where it lands.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether strict null checking is enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` assertion — TypeScript's `strictNullChecks` (which `strict` turns on) is what makes `string` exclude `null` and `undefined`, and the postfix `!` is the operator that silences it.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/2 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.

What to do

  • The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health64%Adequate — gated by R7, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture76%StrongSolid.
Maturity41%Adequate — gated by D34, M4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness37%Adequate — gated by R8, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security73%Adequate — gated by D30Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Performance85%ExemplarySolid.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 67 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (16 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (16 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (16 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (16 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (16 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (16 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (16 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — nginx-proxy Pulling nginx Pulling nginx-proxy Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden nginx Warning Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: nginx Pulling nginx-proxy Pulling nginx-proxy Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden nginx Warning Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden WARNING: Some service image(s) must be built from source by running: docker compose build nginx Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript suite's dependency install refused the committed lockfile, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised — the dependency install for the repository root refused the committed lockfile (npm error code ERESOLVE), so the suite never ran. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a defect; a lockfile in sync with package.json is what lets the suite be re-run.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.js,.ts,.tsx), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the dependency install for the repository root refused the committed lockfile (npm error code ERESOLVE), so the suite never ran. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan. Alternatively, commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and it is read without a re-run.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
  • P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `jest --coverage --coverageReporters=lcovonly`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 44 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×26
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • + 1 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D11 · Test Reliability · Test suite cannot be installed from its own lockfile · ×1
  • Test suite cannot be installed from its own lockfile: the repository root — The jest suite in the repository root was never exercised because its dependency install refused the committed lockfile — the dependency install for the repository root refused the committed lockfile (npm error code ERESOLVE), so the suite never ran. The suite is declared and committed but cannot be installed from what the repository ships, so neither this scan nor a new contributor can run it. The ask is the one the owner performs: run the install locally and commit the lockfile it writes.
D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • REDACTED
D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unlisted import 'minimist' · ×1
  • Unlisted import 'minimist' setup/plopjs/index.ts:1 — Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unlisted import 'node-plop' · ×1
  • Unlisted import 'node-plop' setup/plopjs/service.ts:1 — Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident.
R9 · Circular Imports · Import cycle (5 files) · ×1
  • Import cycle (5 files) src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts:1 — src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts → src/data/repositories/auth/index.ts → src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts → src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts → src/data/dto/auth/index.ts → src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts
R9 · Circular Imports · Import cycle (3 files) · ×1
  • Import cycle (3 files) src/presentation/shared/hoc/error-boundary.hoc.tsx:4 — src/presentation/shared/hoc/error-boundary.hoc.tsx → src/presentation/shared/index.ts → src/presentation/shared/hoc/index.ts → src/presentation/shared/hoc/error-boundary.hoc.tsx
Serious — 119 finding(s)
R4 · Test Coverage · No test reaches this file · ×40
  • No test reaches this file setup/plopjs/entity.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/vite/plugins/react-svg/index.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/plopjs/service.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/plopjs/repo.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/plopjs/domain.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/plopjs/constants.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/vite/plugins.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/vite/config.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/vite/build.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/jest/config.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/domain/error/entities/error.entity.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/domain/route/entities/route.entity.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.adapter.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/domain/notification/entities/notification.entity.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/presentation/web/styles/index.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/presentation/web/routes/routes.component.tsx:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/vite/env.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/jest/plugins/fileTransformer.js:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/domain/auth/entities/auth-token.entity.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file setup/plopjs/index.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.impl.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file src/domain/date/entities/date.entity.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • + 15 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×14
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R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~12 LoC) · ×6
  • Dead file (~12 LoC) src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.container.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dao/notification/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~12 LoC) src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.container.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~12 LoC) src/domain/error/error.types.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 4 in-repo import(s) from 4 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/entities/error.entity.ts, src/domain/error/index.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts and 1 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~12 LoC) src/domain/error/services/error.service.container.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~12 LoC) src/domain/route/route.constants.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~12 LoC) src/domain/route/services/route.service.container.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~3 LoC) · ×4
  • Dead file (~3 LoC) src/domain/auth/auth.types.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~3 LoC) src/domain/auth/index.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
  • Dead file (~3 LoC) src/domain/error/index.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
  • Dead file (~3 LoC) src/domain/notification/index.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~13 LoC) · ×3
  • Dead file (~13 LoC) src/data/dto/auth/auth-token.dto.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dto/auth/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~13 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~13 LoC) src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.container.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/services/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~10 LoC) · ×3
  • Dead file (~10 LoC) src/data/repositories/endpoints.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
  • Dead file (~10 LoC) src/domain/route/services/route.service.impl.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/services/route.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~10 LoC) src/presentation/mobile/index.tsx — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~9 LoC) · ×3
  • Dead file (~9 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.response.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts, src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~9 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.container.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~9 LoC) src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.container.ts, src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~6 LoC) · ×3
  • Dead file (~6 LoC) src/core/http/endpoint/endpoint.types.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/core/http/endpoint/endpoint.ts, src/core/http/endpoint/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~6 LoC) src/domain/auth/entities/auth-form-fields.entity.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/entities/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~6 LoC) src/domain/error/services/error.service.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/services/error.service.container.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~36 LoC) · ×2
  • Dead file (~36 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.adapter.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/token-axios/token-axios.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~36 LoC) src/domain/notification/entities/notification.entity.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/entities/index.ts, src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~22 LoC) · ×2
  • Dead file (~22 LoC) src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.impl.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~22 LoC) src/domain/date/entities/date.entity.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/date/entities/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~5 LoC) · ×2
  • Dead file (~5 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts, src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~5 LoC) src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.container.ts, src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not measured · ×1
  • Test reliability not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite install refused the lockfile — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript suite's dependency install refused the committed lockfile, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised — the dependency install for the repository root refused the committed lockfile (npm error code ERESOLVE), so the suite never ran. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a defect; a lockfile in sync with package.json is what lets the suite be re-run.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×1
  • Deprecated: eslint package.json:90 — eslint 9.6.0, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This version is no longer supported. Please see https://eslint.org/version-support for other options.". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · index.default.transform (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • index.default.transform (cognitive 16) setup/vite/plugins/react-svg/index.ts:53 — index.default.transform has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (12 pts), boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×1
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D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×1
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D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life runtime · ×1
  • End-of-life runtime: Node.js 20 package.json:9 — package.json declares Node.js 20 as this project's engines.node, and Node.js 20, support ended 2026-04-30. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2026-04-30 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the dependency install for the repository root refused the committed lockfile (npm error code ERESOLVE), so the suite never ran. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan. Alternatively, commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and it is read without a re-run.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking · ×1
  • Sync-over-async blocking setup/vite/plugins/react-svg/index.ts:71 — `readFileSync` in `transform` blocks the event loop until it finishes — a blocking call inside async code stalls the event loop — every other request waits for as long as it runs.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (43 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (43 lines × 2 locations) src/core/adapters/local-storage/local-storage.adapter.ts:4 — src/core/adapters/local-storage/local-storage.adapter.ts:4 · src/core/adapters/session-storage/session-storage.adapter.ts:4 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) setup/plopjs/entity.ts:37 — setup/plopjs/entity.ts:37 · setup/plopjs/repo.ts:23 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) setup/plopjs/entity.ts:68 — setup/plopjs/entity.ts:68 · setup/plopjs/service.ts:62 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (13 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block with local edits (13 matched lines × 2 locations) src/core/adapters/form/react-hook-form.adapter.ts:17 — src/core/adapters/form/react-hook-form.adapter.ts:17 · src/core/form/form-api.ts:12 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 80 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts:73 — src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts:73 · src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts:85 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) REDACTED:1 — REDACTED:1 · REDACTED:12 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
R11 · Import Boundaries · Boundary violation [package · ×1
  • Boundary violation [package:third-party-deep-import] src/containers/config.ts:4 — src/containers/config.ts:4 imports inversify/lib/annotation/lazy_service_identifier, reaching past a declared dependency's public entry into its build output — that path is the package's toolchain layout, not its API, and a minor version bump can relocate it with no semver signal. Import from the package's documented entry point instead.
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~46 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~46 LoC) src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~39 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~39 LoC) src/domain/error/entities/error.entity.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 3 in-repo import(s) from 3 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/entities/index.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts, src/domain/error/services/error.service.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~37 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~37 LoC) src/domain/route/entities/route.entity.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/route/entities/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~29 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~29 LoC) src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.impl.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/data/repositories/auth/auth.repo.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~24 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~24 LoC) src/domain/auth/entities/auth-token.entity.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 3 in-repo import(s) from 3 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/entities/index.ts, src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.impl.ts, src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~23 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~23 LoC) src/domain/error/services/error.service.impl.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/error/services/error.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~19 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~19 LoC) src/core/http/endpoint/endpoint.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/core/http/endpoint/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~14 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~14 LoC) src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.impl.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/auth/services/auth.service.container.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~8 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~8 LoC) src/domain/notification/notification.types.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 3 in-repo import(s) from 3 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/notification/entities/notification.entity.ts, src/domain/notification/index.ts, src/domain/notification/services/notification.service.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~7 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~7 LoC) src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.container.ts, src/data/dao/notification/notification.dao.impl.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~4 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~4 LoC) src/domain/date/date.types.ts — no import path from any entry point (8 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/domain/date/entities/date.entity.ts, src/domain/date/index.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unlisted import '@jest/types' · ×1
  • Unlisted import '@jest/types' setup/jest/config.ts:1 — Imported only as a TYPE and declared in no reachable package.json. The import is erased at compile time, so nothing is installed and no runtime resolution depends on it — but type-checking a clean clone will fail. Declare the typings it resolves through (or the package itself) in the owning package.json.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@commitlint/config-conventional' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@commitlint/config-conventional' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'ahooks' · ×1
  • Unused dependency 'ahooks' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'i18next-resources-to-backend' · ×1
  • Unused dependency 'i18next-resources-to-backend' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Minor — 31 finding(s)
P2 · Observability · Console output used as the logging channel · ×7
  • Console output used as the logging channel setup/vite/env.ts:25 — `setup/vite/env.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 25 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:12 — `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 12 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:20 — `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 20 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:29 — `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 29 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts:38 — `src/core/adapters/logger/logger.adapter.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 38 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel src/core/utils/app-version.util.ts:4 — `src/core/utils/app-version.util.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 4 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel src/presentation/shared/components/ioc/hooks/injection.hook.ts:12 — `src/presentation/shared/components/ioc/hooks/injection.hook.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 12 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×5
  • README/code drift README.md:59 — README.md links to `LICENSE.md`, but `LICENSE.md` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/SCRIPTS.md:11 — docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:[type]`, but no package.json declares a `start:[type]` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/SCRIPTS.md:15 — docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run build:[web`, but no package.json declares a `build:[web` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/SCRIPTS.md:19 — docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run start:stage`, but no package.json declares a `start:stage` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/SCRIPTS.md:39 — docs/SCRIPTS.md runs `npm run generator`, but no package.json declares a `generator` script. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×2
  • Outdated (npm): i18next package.json:43 — i18next is pinned at 23.11.5; registry.npmjs.org publishes 26.5.4 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): react-i18next package.json:55 — react-i18next is pinned at 14.1.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 17.1.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×2
  • Orphaned file eslint.config.js:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 2 of 2 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 2 of the 200 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: eslint.config.js, src/core/adapters/axios/axios.adapter.ts. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1291 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1
  • No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1
  • No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1
  • No security response headers detected REDACTED:1 — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. This is reported because `REDACTED` is committed to this repository and declares the server that serves it, so the configuration that would carry these headers is in this repository and was read in full. (−2.0 on this card.)
X5 · Nullable reference types · Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks · ×1
  • Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks — 0/2 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.
Minor — 17 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×17
  • Outdated (npm): ahooks — ahooks is pinned at 3.8.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 3.10.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): axios — axios is pinned at 1.7.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.20.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): date-fns — date-fns is pinned at 3.6.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 4.4.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): i18next-browser-languagedetector — i18next-browser-languagedetector is pinned at 8.0.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.2.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): i18next-http-backend — i18next-http-backend is pinned at 2.5.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 4.0.4 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): i18next-resources-to-backend — i18next-resources-to-backend is pinned at 1.2.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.2.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): inversify — inversify is pinned at 6.0.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.2.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): lodash — lodash is pinned at 4.17.21; registry.npmjs.org publishes 4.18.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): mobx — mobx is pinned at 6.13.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.1.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): mobx-react — mobx-react is pinned at 9.1.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 10.0.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): react — react is pinned at 18.3.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 19.3.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): react-dom — react-dom is pinned at 18.3.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 19.3.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): react-hook-form — react-hook-form is pinned at 7.52.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.90.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): react-router — react-router is pinned at 6.24.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.5.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): react-router-dom — react-router-dom is pinned at 6.24.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.18.4 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): styled-components — styled-components is pinned at 6.1.11; registry.npmjs.org publishes 6.6.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
  • Outdated (npm): yup — yup is pinned at 1.4.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.7.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-090d0dd445094ed085d0a6a0ee4fe54d/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-090d0dd445094ed085d0a6a0ee4fe54d/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .14artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update46artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .5artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a160be-3c5f-76ce-b056-0e74a0f842f7 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 44 · Warnings: 119 · Recommendations: 31 · Info: 17 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 21-10-2026 @ 23:14 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md