Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
quangdangfit/goshop is sound in substance but carries real gaps (59%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (51%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (56%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); 20 High finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)); approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~19,581 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
85%
Strong
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
69%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
56%
Adequate · gated by R4
Security
51%
Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
Accessibility
68%
Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 51% · 46% weightReadiness 56% · 25% weightAccessibility 68% · 14% weightMaturity 69% · 8% weightCode Health 85% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight
Raise Security 51 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 59 → ~65.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (43+)
- D4 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) internal/order/port/http/handlers.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/order/port/grpc/server.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) internal/product/port/http/handlers.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/order/port/grpc/handlers.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) pkg/redis/redis.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/order/repository/product.go
- D19 · LLM evaluation failed
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
- D36 · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) web/src/api/auth.ts
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/CheckoutPage.tsx
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/CheckoutPage.tsx
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/CheckoutPage.tsx
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/CheckoutPage.tsx
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/CheckoutPage.tsx
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/CheckoutPage.tsx
- AC2 · <textarea> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/ProductDetailPage.tsx
- AC2 · <textarea> without a programmatic label web/src/pages/ProductDetailPage.tsx
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €15,000–€74,000
| Cost to rebuild | €15,000–€74,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 59% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€44,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 51% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
2
Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (11), cd.yml (9).
3
Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6).
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 51%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Accessibility
The Good
The Bad
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 23 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 20 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by increasing test coverage by adding tests for the 42 production files that are currently unreachable from the single test file. Next, address the 20 high-priority static analysis findings, focusing first on the issues in ci.yml and cd.yml. Then, implement an approval gate to require reviewer sign-off before promoting to production. After that, resolve the six high-severity OSV dependency vulnerabilities, starting with package-lock.json. Finally, ensure every form control and button has a proper programmatic label to improve accessibility.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +5.0 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (11), cd.yml (9). | +4.5 pts | Medium | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6). | +2.0 pts | Low | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion. | +3.7 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). | +1.5 pts | Low | IaC & Container Security |
| Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +1.5 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
| Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +1.5 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
| Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. | +1.5 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| web/package-lock.json | 0.0 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| go.mod | 1.7 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| .github/workflows/cd.yml | 2.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| web/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| pkg/utils/generator.go | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: math-random-used |
| internal/order/port/http/handlers.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) |
| internal/order/port/grpc/server.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| internal/product/port/http/handlers.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) |
| internal/order/port/grpc/handlers.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| internal/order/repository/order.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) |
| pkg/redis/redis.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) |
| internal/order/repository/product.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) |
| web/nginx.conf | 9.3 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Low: header-redefinition |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 33 of 34 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 34 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D13D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AC1AC2AC3AC6AC7DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 54 of 66 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D4 · Code Duplication
7 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/order/port/grpc/handlers.go:52
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)internal/order/port/http/handlers.go:119
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)internal/order/port/grpc/server.go:28
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3)internal/product/port/http/handlers.go:122
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)pkg/redis/redis.go:93
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
23 finding(s): 0 critical, 20 high, 2 medium, 1 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:47
Medium: workflow-run-target-code-checkout .github/workflows/cd.yml:47
Low: header-redefinitionweb/nginx.conf:10
What to do
- Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (11), cd.yml (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with cd.yml, generator.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with nginx.conf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 2 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
Unpinned build actions
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
20 finding(s): 2 critical, 7 high, 10 medium, 1 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]go.mod
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod, package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
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AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label htmlFor> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×16) — CheckoutPage.tsx:185, CheckoutPage.tsx:193, CheckoutPage.tsx:202, …
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×6) — CheckoutPage.tsx:274, OrdersPage.tsx:53, ProductDetailPage.tsx:291, …
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, assert with vitest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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R1 · Type Safety
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R10 · Code Duplication
- web/src/pages/LoginPage.tsx:89 · web/src/pages/RegisterPage.tsx:118 — LoginPage.tsx:89
- web/src/pages/admin/AdminCategoriesPage.tsx:240 · web/src/pages/admin/AdminProductsPage.tsx:271 — AdminCategoriesPage.tsx:240
- web/src/pages/admin/AdminCouponsPage.tsx:206 · web/src/pages/admin/AdminProductsPage.tsx:225 — AdminCouponsPage.tsx:206
- web/src/pages/ProfilePage.tsx:412 · web/src/pages/ProfilePage.tsx:425 — ProfilePage.tsx:412
- web/src/pages/ProfilePage.tsx:435 · web/src/pages/RegisterPage.tsx:115 — ProfilePage.tsx:435
- web/src/App.tsx:32 · web/src/App.tsx:48 · web/src/App.tsx:72 — App.tsx:32
- web/src/api/addresses.ts:12 · web/src/api/categories.ts:16 · web/src/api/products.ts:26 — addresses.ts:12
- web/src/api/auth.ts:5 · web/src/api/orders.ts:4 — auth.ts:5
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×7) — PaymentPage.tsx:46, ProfilePage.tsx:51, CheckoutPage.tsx:13, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
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R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
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R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — ProfilePage.tsx, ProductDetailPage.tsx, CheckoutPage.tsx, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
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R6 · Tooling
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R7 · Dead Code
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
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R9 · Circular Imports
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 85% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 69% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 56% | Adequate — gated by R4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 51% | Adequate — gated by D29, D36, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Accessibility | 68% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not included — 78 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~16736 lines of test source are present (.go, .ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .ts, .tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go, .ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not gated in TS source-only: aggregate-vs-value-object classification is not 0-FP-separable (every class-holding-class reads alike) — advisory (the Swift/Dart/Rust parity)
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the branded-type idiom (`type Id = string & {__brand}`) is idiom-rare in TS (4 calibration carriers), so a bare-string-id gap is advisory — Stage-E diversification target (tsjs-stageC.md LESSON-A)
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not gated in TS source-only: a cross-package domain leak is not 0-FP-separable from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most calibration repos are single-package — advisory (candidate-demote)
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the anemic-vs-rich gate is candidate-DETERMINISTIC for TS (behaviour + the component/DTO/readonly-VO exemptions) but the calibration corpus is high-quality (0 witnesses) — advisory, settled at the Stage-E holdout (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: TS idiom favours #private/private/readonly (idiom-rare public-mutable break), so DM5 is advisory pending Stage-E messier-repo witnesses (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
- DM7 Repository granularity — not gated in TS source-only: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable; the softest gated dim — advisory
- ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 2 integration event(s); 1 event-sourced shape(s) (event folds / event-recording aggregates)
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — only 1/3 markers (1 Go aggregate(s) recording domain events (own events-slice append / raise-record))
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 31 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:47
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:55
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:58
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:66
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:83
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:110
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:116
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:119
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cd.yml:127
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:13
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:15
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:20
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:27
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:40
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:42
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:54
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:63
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:65
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:74
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 web/Dockerfile
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
Warning — 23 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5158 go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod
- Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
- Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod
- Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5932 go.mod
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: workflow-run-target-code-checkout .github/workflows/cd.yml:47
- Medium: math-random-used pkg/utils/generator.go:5
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/order/port/grpc/handlers.go:52
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) internal/order/repository/order.go:121
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Unpinned build actions
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) internal/order/port/http/handlers.go:119
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) internal/order/port/grpc/server.go:28
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) internal/product/port/http/handlers.go:122
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) pkg/redis/redis.go:93
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) internal/order/repository/product.go:50
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 web/Dockerfile
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: header-redefinition web/nginx.conf:10
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No build provenance
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] web/package-lock.json
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 23 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 4 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 20 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |