Public report — reckon-db, published 2 Oct 2026.
Concrete security findings (which rule fired, in which file, on which line; CVE IDs, secret matches,
dependency versions) are REDACTED in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Public
Codebase surveyMeasured under the Code Assurance Index · rubric rubric-2026.10.1 (frozen) · signed but not filed — the package verifies offline, the public register has no record of it. Check a packageSigned · not filedcd_3027dd0c95324367979a0bc662f46b3a
Signed 2 October 2026, 20:41 UTC
Public
Small · 19,417 LoC · 6 projects · rebuild ~0.3 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (52%)
Findings by grade
10 critical59 serious34 minor33 could not be resolved — could be critical — see Limitations
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
2 October 2026, 20:38 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index does not certify,
approve or guarantee this codebase; it records a reproducible number and the evidence it was computed from. The
standard is authored by Canine Development, who also build Watchdog — its only implementation today. That is said
here so the number is checked rather than believed.
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
94findings with an exact file:lineof 103 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
44/121dimensions across the health lenses19417 LoC · 6 projects — wide & deep
Band capped at Weak: the weakest category (Dependencies, 17%) reads Critical — the cover never out-promises the category table.
This system presents a fragile operational standing despite strong underlying code quality, scoring 69% overall. While the architecture is robust and the codebase is clean, the low production readiness score signals that the system is not yet safe to operate at scale. For leadership, this means the asset is small and cheap to replace, but its current instability poses a disproportionate risk to delivery speed and reliability. The value tied up here is modest, with a rebuild cost of approximately €42,000, yet the immediate exposure to outages and security gaps threatens customer trust and operational continuity.
The primary risk lies in operational fragility. With a readiness score of 52%, the system lacks the necessary safeguards for safe deployment and monitoring. This gap increases the likelihood of defects reaching production and extends downtime during incidents. Without proper release protections and atomic transaction handling, a single crash could result in lost data or phantom events, directly impacting business integrity and requiring costly manual intervention to resolve.
A secondary concern is dependency management. The absence of automated update gates leaves the system vulnerable to known security vulnerabilities and compatibility issues. While the code itself is healthy, relying on manual updates is unsustainable and introduces unnecessary security exposure. This is the highest-leverage area for improvement, as addressing it requires minimal effort but significantly reduces long-term maintenance costs and security risks.
On the positive side, the code health and architecture scores are excellent, indicating that the core logic is maintainable and well-structured. The team has built a solid foundation that is easy for new engineers to understand. However, this strength is undermined by the lack of operational maturity. To focus first, the team should enable automated dependency updates and review release protection rules. These actions offer the greatest return on investment by stabilizing the system without requiring significant architectural changes. Confidence in this assessment is high, though some areas like domain modeling and performance were not measured, leaving a partial picture of the total risk profile.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
1.0× (at 69% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€42,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 52% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 1.0× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 52%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
8
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
2
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, enable automated dependency scanning and review gates to strengthen security and performance. Second, verify that deployment protection rules are correctly configured or use draft releases to prevent bad builds from reaching users. Third, implement the transactional outbox pattern to ensure database writes and message publishing remain consistent during crashes. Finally, organize architecture decision records in a standard directory structure and update the README to accurately reflect the current infrastructure.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Resolve the 9 TooManyFunctions finding(s) in God Classes — start with reckon_db_consistency_checker.erl, reckon_db_filter_nif.erl, reckon_db_archive_nif.erl.
God Classes: TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_filter_nif
src/reckon_db_health_prober.erl
8.5
Near-clean
God Classes: TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_health_prober
src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl
8.5
Near-clean
God Classes: TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_store_healer
src/reckon_db_dcb.erl
8.5
Near-clean
God Classes: TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_dcb
src/reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl
8.5
Near-clean
God Classes: TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_resource_monitor
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 10
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 59
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 34
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 33
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 39 of 44 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 44 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 94 of 103 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.erl) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.erl) and this repository declares a rebar3 project (repository root, 40 test files, 21 Common Test suites), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its crate dependencies. Nothing was read about its Rebar dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 212 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 100% of the history; the other 1 hold 0% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (rebar.config), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# or JavaScript/TypeScript was found, and this repository's Erlang, Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# or JavaScript/TypeScript was found, and this repository's Erlang, Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
PF1 Benchmark discipline — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, PHP and Ruby source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, PHP or Ruby was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Ruby, PHP and Python source only, and no C# was loaded, no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Ruby, PHP or Python was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java and Ruby source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java or Ruby was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby or Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala, JavaScript, TypeScript, Java or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, and TypeScript source and its tsconfig files only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin and PHP), and its Erlang source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D26, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
2 function(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was reckon_db_gateway_worker.handle_call at 73. A further 2 function(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being reckon_db_filters.matches at 19 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 2 files carry no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of their over-threshold functions was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: src/reckon_db_filters.erl (reckon_db_filters.matches at 19), src/reckon_db_telemetry.erl (reckon_db_telemetry.handle_event at 19). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.
Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with reckon_db_gateway_worker.handle_call (cyclomatic 73). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.2 to about 9.1/10.
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_sum_field (cognitive 28), reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_aggregation_stats (cognitive 17), reckon_db_aggregate_nif::state_to_term (cognitive 16). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D3 · God Classes7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 9 TooManyFunctions finding(s) in God Classes — start with reckon_db_consistency_checker.erl, reckon_db_filter_nif.erl, reckon_db_archive_nif.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with reckon_db_streams.erl, reckon_db_subscriptions.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
30 duplicated block group(s) detected. A further 3 rows report members as variants of one another; they aggregate block groups already counted above and are not themselves counted.
+ 15 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 5 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with lib.rs (2), reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl, reckon_db_scavenge.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with lib.rs (2), reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with reckon_db_scavenge.erl, reckon_db_streams_reader.erl, lib.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
6 production modules (Cargo+OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 1 of the 6 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
All 1 mechanizable ADR(s) are enforced: 1 by analyzers, 0 by tests. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
1 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. 2 of 12 direct crates were graded against crates.io (0 not published there, 10 not resolved by a committed REDACTED). Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
Outdated: regex
What to do
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 17 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository's REDACTED closed over its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]`. Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's crate dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Top hotspots: src/reckon_db_gateway_worker.erl (5×73=365) Repeated repair below the complexity floor: src/reckon_db_store_coordinator.erl (5 of 7 changes were fixes); src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl (5 of 6 changes were fixes); src/reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl (5 of 5 changes were fixes)
Resolve the 6 Repeated repair finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with reckon_db_store_coordinator.erl, reckon_db_store_healer.erl, reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with reckon_db_gateway_worker.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
1 deducted task-comment markers across 19417 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with reckon_db_capability_verifier.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The repository's root README (reckon-db) is a clear project overview with an Overview section describing event-sourced Raft consensus, features like DCB conditional append, and the architecture. The benchmarks/README documents the benchmarks directory; guides/README documents the guides directory. dialyzer-backlog.md is a focused policy document on dialyzer warnings for reckoned-db. All four READMEs are well-structured with headings, an overview, and cross-referenced features.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.0/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.
What to do
Improve ADR Quality — currently 8.0/10. — Evaluated 1 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.0/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
1 of 6 build units (Cargo, rebar3) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion
What to do
Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 8 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `scripts/is_hex_serving_what_git_says.sh` (line 22) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
REDACTED
What to do
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 8 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Low vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 80 of the 85 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
`reckon_db_subscriptions` clause `store_and_setup/6#152` PERSISTS state AND BROADCASTS a domain event as two independent side effects in the same clause, with no shared transaction or outbox. A crash between the two — or a redelivered message — diverges the store from what subscribers saw (state committed, broadcast lost) or emits a phantom event (broadcast sent, state rolled back). Record the event alongside the state in the SAME write and dispatch it from there afterwards (a transactional outbox); where the store is mnesia, wrapping both in one `mnesia:transaction` achieves the same atomicity directly. Divergence blast-radius: MEDIUM. — src/reckon_db_subscriptions.erl:153
What to do
Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the event-sourcing replay fold reconstructs state purely from the event (no wall clock, UUID or randomness) so replay is reproducible.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events stay immutable (never rewritten in place).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a README to the 5 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.7 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
1 ADR-shaped document(s) detected by content — `plans/PLAN_DCB_IMPLEMENTATION.md`. They are not under a conventional ADR folder (docs/adr/) and are not named NNNN-title.md, and this check found them by their decision signature rather than by where they live — so a reader who does not already know these paths has no route to them. Detected by content signature only: records kept outside the repository, or written without a Status/Decision/Consequences shape, are not visible to this check and are not counted here.
What to do
Move ADRs under docs/adr/ (or docs/adrs/) and name them NNNN-title.md so they're easy to find.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists — searched for: `kubernetes`, `k8s`, `helm`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` loop leaves the `RefCell` it is walking alone — safe Rust rejects a body that changes the collection its loop borrows at compile time, except through interior mutability: a `RefCell` borrowed in the loop's header stays borrowed until the loop ends, so a `borrow_mut()` of it inside the body panics with `already borrowed: BorrowMutError` and the remaining elements are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
X31 Test-only surface in a production module — 25 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes; Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Erlang processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. Rust's compiler refuses unsynchronised shared mutation — a value shared across threads must be Sync — so the race this check looks for cannot be written.
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~13584 lines of test source are present (.erl) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .erl suite was found but not re-run
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — none of 1 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.erl) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (142 value object(s))
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# and JavaScript/TypeScript, and neither was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — This repository's Erlang, Rust source (6 module(s), 79 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Erlang, Rust source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Benchmark discipline was not assessed: this repository is written in Erlang, whose benchmark frameworks this check does not search yet. That is a gap in the analyzer's language reach, not a finding about your code.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Erlang runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on. Rust spells out every heap allocation and makes borrowed slices (&[T], &str) its ordinary parameter types, so the allocation-aware style this card rewards elsewhere is the language's baseline rather than a rung to climb.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Erlang has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X12 Unreachable branch — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X13 Undrained process stream — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X22 Contradicted release guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X25 Inert configuration knob — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Erlang processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. Rust's compiler refuses the unsynchronised version: a collection shared between a callback's thread and the waiting body must be `Sync`, which a `Vec`, `VecDeque` or `HashMap` is only behind a `Mutex`/`RwLock`, so the race this check looks for cannot be written in safe Rust. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Dual write (no outbox): reckon_db_subscriptions.store_and_setup/6#152 src/reckon_db_subscriptions.erl:153— `reckon_db_subscriptions` clause `store_and_setup/6#152` PERSISTS state AND BROADCASTS a domain event as two independent side effects in the same clause, with no shared transaction or outbox. A crash between the two — or a redelivered message — diverges the store from what subscribers saw (state committed, broadcast lost) or emits a phantom event (broadcast sent, state rolled back). Record the event alongside the state in the SAME write and dispatch it from there afterwards (a transactional outbox); where the store is mnesia, wrapping both in one `mnesia:transaction` achieves the same atomicity directly. Divergence blast-radius: MEDIUM.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_consistency_checker src/reckon_db_consistency_checker.erl:31— TooManyFunctions — 49 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 19 over it, 1.63× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_filter_nif src/reckon_db_filter_nif.erl:40— TooManyFunctions — 45 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 15 over it, 1.50× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_archive_nif src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:42— TooManyFunctions — 43 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 13 over it, 1.43× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_health_prober src/reckon_db_health_prober.erl:33— TooManyFunctions — 40 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 10 over it, 1.33× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_store_healer src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl:40— TooManyFunctions — 39 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 9 over it, 1.30× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_dcb src/reckon_db_dcb.erl:40— TooManyFunctions — 38 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 8 over it, 1.27× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_resource_monitor src/reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl:24— TooManyFunctions — 36 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 6 over it, 1.20× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_aggregate_nif src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:43— TooManyFunctions — 35 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 5 over it, 1.17× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: reckon_db_store_coordinator src/reckon_db_store_coordinator.erl:13— TooManyFunctions — 34 functions. The bar is 30 functions; this is 4 over it, 1.13× the bar. The counted members are a module's functions — a module holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group them by and no type to move them onto. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no single module carries every responsibility.
Repeated repair: src/reckon_db_store_coordinator.erl src/reckon_db_store_coordinator.erl:184— src/reckon_db_store_coordinator.erl changed 7 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 6 (its worst body is reckon_db_store_coordinator.post_join_result at line 184), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: emitter pools left down on subscription reconnect, contained restart, and leader failover (5.11.8)”; “fix: guard all noproc-throwing supervisor/gen_server calls (5.11.2)”; “fix: coordinator health check is wedge-proof too (5.8.3)”; “fix: recover from interrupted khepri join-reset (store-cluster convergence)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 21:12:35 +02:00' --until='2026-09-28 21:12:35 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/reckon_db_store_coordinator.erl`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl:399— src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl changed 6 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 7 (its worst body is reckon_db_store_healer.recycle_local at line 399), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: emitter pools left down on subscription reconnect, contained restart, and leader failover (5.11.8)”; “fix: read_all_global/3's cache still cost O(N) per page at real scale (5.11.3)”; “fix: healer must not wedge on the server it heals (5.8.2)”; “fix: healer orphan-detection keys on local view, not majority's list”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 21:12:35 +02:00' --until='2026-09-28 21:12:35 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: src/reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl src/reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl:251— src/reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl changed 5 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 8 (its worst body is reckon_db_resource_monitor.with_data_dir at line 251), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: read_all_global/3's cache still cost O(N) per page at real scale (5.11.3)”; “fix: resolve data dir from the store registry, not app env (5.10.4)”; “fix: disk sampling tracks the event-store disk, not the overlay root (5.10.3)”; “fix: disk sampling filters to real filesystems (5.10.2)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 21:12:35 +02:00' --until='2026-09-28 21:12:35 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/reckon_db_resource_monitor.erl`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: src/reckon_db_streams.erl src/reckon_db_streams.erl:706— src/reckon_db_streams.erl changed 6 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 7 (its worst body is reckon_db_streams.filter_events_by_tags at line 706), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: two single-node health-check bugs found via macula-realm's founding-write incident”; “fix: read_all_global/3 could page past the wrong bound and mix generations mid-page”; “fix: read_all_global/3's cache still cost O(N) per page at real scale (5.11.3)”; “fix: read_all_global/3 rescanned and re-sorted the whole store on every paginated call”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 21:12:35 +02:00' --until='2026-09-28 21:12:35 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/reckon_db_streams.erl`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: src/reckon_db_leader.erl src/reckon_db_leader.erl:243— src/reckon_db_leader.erl changed 4 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 5 (its worst body is reckon_db_leader.start_emitter_for_subscription at line 243), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: the DCB re-index runs off the leader loop; force re-run; rollback documented”; “fix: DCB events get secondary-index entries; a one-time re-index for older ones (#2)”; “fix: guard all noproc-throwing supervisor/gen_server calls (5.11.2)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 21:12:35 +02:00' --until='2026-09-28 21:12:35 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/reckon_db_leader.erl`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: src/reckon_db_store.erl src/reckon_db_store.erl:327— src/reckon_db_store.erl changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 6 (its worst body is reckon_db_store.await_store_ready at line 327), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: read_all_global/3's cache still cost O(N) per page at real scale (5.11.3)”; “fix: healer must not wedge on the server it heals (5.8.2)”; “fix: recover from interrupted khepri join-reset (store-cluster convergence)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 21:12:35 +02:00' --until='2026-09-28 21:12:35 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/reckon_db_store.erl`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:352— src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:352-356 | src/reckon_db_aggregator.erl:125-130 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_scavenge.erl:277— src/reckon_db_scavenge.erl:277-281 | src/reckon_db_streams.erl:1098-1102 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_consistency_checker.erl:235— src/reckon_db_consistency_checker.erl:235-239 | src/reckon_db_memory.erl:201-205 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:41— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:41-46 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:192-196 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:202— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:202-206 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:215-219 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_sum_field (cognitive 28) native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:217— reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_sum_field has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (17 pts), match/switch 1 (6 pts), loops 2 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 21). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_aggregation_stats (cognitive 17) native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:342— reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_aggregation_stats has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (12 pts), loops 2 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
reckon_db_aggregate_nif::state_to_term (cognitive 16) native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:120— reckon_db_aggregate_nif::state_to_term has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (10 pts), match/switch 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_count_where (cognitive 16) native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:255— reckon_db_aggregate_nif::nif_count_where has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 3 (10 pts), loops 2 (5 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D4 · Code Duplication· Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×3
Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:108— src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:108-119 | src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:121-132 | src/reckon_db_crypto_nif.erl:98-111 | src/reckon_db_filter_nif.erl:127-138 | src/reckon_db_hash_nif.erl:110-123 — These 5 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 5 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 5 times.
Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:55— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:55-72 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:102-119 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:153-173 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:238-302 | native/reckon_db_crypto_nif/src/lib.rs:151-171 — These 5 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 5 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 5 times.
Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:42— native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:42-64 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:75-103 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:139-176 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:319-360 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:371-407 — These 5 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 5 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 5 times.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_scavenge.erl:116— src/reckon_db_scavenge.erl:116-124 | src/reckon_db_scavenge.erl:173-181 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:62— src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:62-70 | src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl:55-63 — before extracting anything, compare `src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl` and `src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:88— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:88-96 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:139-147 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:360— src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:360-365 | src/reckon_db_aggregator.erl:134-139 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_snapshots_store.erl:151— src/reckon_db_snapshots_store.erl:151-156 | src/reckon_db_subscriptions_store.erl:182-187 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_telemetry.erl:106— src/reckon_db_telemetry.erl:106-111 | src/reckon_db_telemetry.erl:126-131 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_cluster.erl:83— src/reckon_db_cluster.erl:83-89 | src/reckon_db_store_healer.erl:491-497 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:218— native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:218-224 | native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:256-262 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_crypto_nif/src/lib.rs:113— native/reckon_db_crypto_nif/src/lib.rs:113-119 | native/reckon_db_crypto_nif/src/lib.rs:134-140 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
FileTooLong: src/reckon_db_streams.erl src/reckon_db_streams.erl— FileTooLong — 773 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), declaring 62 functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 273 over it, 1.55× the bar. In this language a module is exactly one source file, so its length cannot be moved into sibling files of the same module. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no one module has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/reckon_db_subscriptions.erl src/reckon_db_subscriptions.erl— FileTooLong — 520 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), declaring 55 functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 20 over it, 1.04× the bar. In this language a module is exactly one source file, so its length cannot be moved into sibling files of the same module. To reduce it, extract each cohesive family of functions into a new module of its own and have this one delegate to it, so no one module has to be read whole to change one of them.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:187— native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:187-191 | native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:294-298 | native/reckon_db_aggregate_nif/src/lib.rs:323-327 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:134— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:134-139 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:211-215 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:328-332 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
reckon_db_gateway_worker.handle_call (cyclomatic 73) src/reckon_db_gateway_worker.erl:64— reckon_db_gateway_worker.handle_call has cyclomatic complexity 73 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
reckon_db_store_registry.handle_call (cyclomatic 17) src/reckon_db_store_registry.erl:158— reckon_db_store_registry.handle_call has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
Hotspot: src/reckon_db_gateway_worker.erl src/reckon_db_gateway_worker.erl:64— src/reckon_db_gateway_worker.erl changed 5 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 73 in reckon_db_gateway_worker.handle_call at line 64. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 4 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 21:12:35 +02:00' --until='2026-09-28 21:12:35 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/reckon_db_gateway_worker.erl`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
TodoComment src/reckon_db_capability_verifier.erl:127— %% TODO: Implement gossip-based revocation check — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `% REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:160— src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:160-178 | src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl:148-166 — before extracting anything, compare `src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl` and `src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12–14 lines × 5) src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:108— src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:108-119 | src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:121-132 | src/reckon_db_crypto_nif.erl:98-111 | src/reckon_db_filter_nif.erl:127-138 | src/reckon_db_hash_nif.erl:110-123 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 5 call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:469— src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:469-477 | src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:501-510 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_streams.erl:1026— src/reckon_db_streams.erl:1026-1033 | src/reckon_db_streams.erl:1288-1295 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 5) src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:122— src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:122-129 | src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:135-142 | src/reckon_db_crypto_nif.erl:114-121 | src/reckon_db_filter_nif.erl:141-148 | src/reckon_db_hash_nif.erl:126-133 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 5 call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 9) src/reckon_db_cluster_sup.erl:61— src/reckon_db_cluster_sup.erl:61-69 | src/reckon_db_cluster_sup.erl:73-81 | src/reckon_db_cluster_sup.erl:85-93 | src/reckon_db_core_sup.erl:88-96 | src/reckon_db_leader_sup.erl:61-69 | src/reckon_db_leader_sup.erl:73-81 | src/reckon_db_notification_sup.erl:88-96 | src/reckon_db_persistence_sup.erl:90-99 | src/reckon_db_system_sup.erl:110-118 — there are 9 copies across 6 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 9 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 8) src/reckon_db_core_sup.erl:64— src/reckon_db_core_sup.erl:64-72 | src/reckon_db_core_sup.erl:76-84 | src/reckon_db_notification_sup.erl:64-72 | src/reckon_db_notification_sup.erl:76-84 | src/reckon_db_persistence_sup.erl:78-86 | src/reckon_db_system_sup.erl:83-91 | src/reckon_db_system_sup.erl:95-103 | src/reckon_db_system_sup.erl:122-130 — there are 8 copies across 4 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 8 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:122— src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:122-135 | src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl:110-123 — before extracting anything, compare `src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl` and `src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:87— src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl:87-99 | src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl:80-92 — before extracting anything, compare `src/reckon_db_streams_reader.erl` and `src/reckon_db_streams_writer.erl` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 55 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (15–17 lines × 5) native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:46— native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:46-62 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:82-96 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:144-158 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:324-338 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:376-390 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (14–16 lines × 7) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:58— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:58-72 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:105-119 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:159-173 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:243-256 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:261-274 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:282-295 | native/reckon_db_crypto_nif/src/lib.rs:156-171 — there are 7 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 7 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:161— native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:161-176 | native/reckon_db_filter_nif/src/lib.rs:196-211 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9–11 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:134— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:134-144 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:211-219 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6–7 lines × 2) native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:87— native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:87-93 | native/reckon_db_archive_nif/src/lib.rs:201-206 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Minor — 33 finding(s)
X31 · Test-only surface in a production module· Test-only surface in a production module · ×25
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:nif_aggregate_events/3` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:nif_sum_field/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:nif_count_where/3` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:nif_merge_tagged_batch/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:nif_finalize/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:nif_aggregation_stats/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:erlang_aggregate_events/3` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:erlang_sum_field/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:erlang_count_where/3` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:erlang_merge_tagged_batch/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:erlang_finalize/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_aggregate_nif.erl:62— `reckon_db_aggregate_nif:erlang_aggregation_stats/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_compress_lz4/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_decompress_lz4/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_compress_zstd/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_decompress_zstd/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_compress_zlib/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_decompress_zlib/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_compress/3` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_decompress/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:nif_compression_stats/3` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:erlang_compress_lz4/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:erlang_decompress_lz4/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:erlang_compress_zstd/2` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
Test-only surface in a production module src/reckon_db_archive_nif.erl:68— `reckon_db_archive_nif:erlang_decompress_zstd/1` is exported unconditionally, and the comment directly above the `-export` on this line says the exports below it are for testing. Erlang has no visibility below `-export`, so this is part of the module's public contract: it cannot be changed without a compatibility argument. This arm read the comment, not the call graph: if the comment is right and only tests call it, wrapping the attribute in `-ifdef(TEST). … -endif.` keeps the test's access and removes it from the shipped module. If production code calls it, the comment is stale and wrapping the export would break the build — delete the comment and document the function as part of the module's API.
D26 · Project Cohesion· Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 6 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 6.7/10. The most over is `(repository root)` (17181 LoC, 215 module-visible types across 2 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
M2 · Architecture documentation· ADRs not easily discoverable · ×1
ADRs not easily discoverable — 1 ADR-shaped document(s) detected by content — `plans/PLAN_DCB_IMPLEMENTATION.md`. They are not under a conventional ADR folder (docs/adr/) and are not named NNNN-title.md, and this check found them by their decision signature rather than by where they live — so a reader who does not already know these paths has no route to them. Detected by content signature only: records kept outside the repository, or written without a Status/Decision/Consequences shape, are not visible to this check and are not counted here.
README/code drift — README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists — searched for: `kubernetes`, `k8s`, `helm`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
Outdated: regex — `regex` is locked at 1.12.2 but 1.13.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.11"` requirement declared in native/reckon_db_filter_nif/Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p regex` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a0fe56-e8ed-73eb-904c-7b2b652d65a7 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 10 · Warnings: 59 · Recommendations: 33 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 02-10-2026 @ 20:38 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.