Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
redhat-developer-demos/eda-tutorial carries serious gaps (31%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (100%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (100%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Security (18%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (21%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 3 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Hobby (~1,724 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
100% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
53%
Adequate · gated by D34, M1
Readiness
21%
Weak · gated by D13, P3
Security
18% ⚠
Critical · gated by D28, D29, D31, D36
Domain Modelling
92% ★
Exemplary
Accessibility
41%
Adequate · gated by AC6
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 18% · 46% weightReadiness 21% · 25% weightAccessibility 41% · 14% weightMaturity 53% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 92% · 4% weightCode Health 100% · 2% weightArchitecture 100% · 1% weight
Raise Security 18 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 31 → ~40.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (4+)
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €600–€3,000
| Cost to rebuild | €600–€3,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 31% quality) |
| Size & shape | Hobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,800 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 18% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application.properties (3).
2
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
3
Resolve the 7 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with application.properties (7).
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application.properties (3). The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 50 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 11 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 11 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Immediately resolve the three leaked secrets in application.properties to eliminate critical exposure risks. Integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to fail builds containing vulnerabilities, while simultaneously adding readiness probes and rollback strategies to ensure safe, automated deployments. Finally, enforce test gates in CI to prevent regressions and update UI styles to meet accessibility standards for focus states and color contrast.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application.properties (3). | +10.0 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +10.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 7 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with application.properties (7). | +4.4 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +8.0 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +3.3 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 8 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with AccountController.java (4), TransactionController.java (3), BalanceController.java. | +3.3 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`mvn test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it. | +6.4 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1. | +5.0 pts | Medium | Visual & motion safety |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| code/enmasse/enmasse-sender/src/main/resources/application.properties | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| code/bank/transaction/src/main/resources/application.properties | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| code/bank/account/src/main/resources/application.properties | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| code/bank/account/Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/bank/transaction/Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/enmasse/enmasse-receiver/Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/http/account-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/http/transaction-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/account/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/kafka-qreceiver/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/kafka-qsender/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/kafka-receiver/Dockerfile | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/bank/debezium-transaction-transformer/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/enmasse/enmasse-sender/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/http/account-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/http/transaction-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/account/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/kafka-qreceiver/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/kafka-qsender/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| code/kafka/kafka-sender/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 27 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 27 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D21D28D29D31D34D35D36AC2AC3AC6AC7DM1DM4DM5DM8M1M3M4P1P3P4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 71 of 86 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
3 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential code/enmasse/enmasse-sender/src/main/resources/application.properties:7
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application.properties (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key projects/bank/account/src/main/resources/application.properties:9
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 7 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with application.properties (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
11 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 8 medium, 0 low.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/code.yml:16
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/account/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/account/AccountController.java:33
What to do
- Resolve the 8 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with AccountController.java (4), TransactionController.java (3), BalanceController.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docs.yml (2), code.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D31 · IaC & Container Security
52 finding(s): 0 critical, 22 high, 19 medium, 11 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 code/bank/account/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/bank/account/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 code/bank/account/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 22 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9), Dockerfile.jvm (6), Dockerfile.native (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
- Resolve the 19 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (7), Dockerfile.jvm (6), Dockerfile.native (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 warning-level).
- Resolve the 9 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.native (5), Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
2 of 2 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is code/bank/account/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/account/AccountController.java.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
Build action pinned to a mutable branch
Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No artifact signing
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Build action pinned to a mutable branch finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC2 · Forms & labels
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×6) — index.html:2, index.html:2, index.html:2, …
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `.banner` sets color: white on background-color: #00A1E2 — 2.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×6) — index.html:6, index.html:6, index.html:6, …
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no accessibility linting at author time and no automated accessibility check in tests or CI. Add your UI toolkit's own accessibility assertion to the test suite (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in the pipeline.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain your project already uses: assert accessibility in your UI test suite with your toolkit's own matcher (Flutter `meetsGuideline`, Espresso `AccessibilityChecks`, XCTest `performAccessibilityAudit`), then gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `Transaction` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Transaction.java:12
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM5 · Encapsulated state
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM8 · Value-object opportunities
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
- The root README is 24 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.
What to do
- Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 13 of 13 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was found — changes may merge without the suite running.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`mvn test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 53% | Adequate — gated by D34, M1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 21% | Weak — gated by D13, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 18% | Critical — gated by D28, D29, D31, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 92% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Accessibility | 41% | Adequate — gated by AC6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~116 lines of test source are present (.java) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.java) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .java, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 36 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/bank/account/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/bank/debezium-transaction-transformer/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/bank/transaction/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/enmasse/enmasse-receiver/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/enmasse/enmasse-sender/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/http/account-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/http/account-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/http/transaction-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/http/transaction-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/account/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/account/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/kafka-qreceiver/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/kafka-qreceiver/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/kafka-qsender/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/kafka-qsender/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/kafka-receiver/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/kafka-sender/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/transaction/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- High IaC: DS-0002 code/kafka/transaction/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- High IaC: KSV-0053 config-files/ClusterRole-strimzi-pod-exec-and-portforward.yaml
- High IaC: DS-0002 container-images/mysql/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0022 container-images/mysql/Dockerfile
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key projects/bank/account/src/main/resources/application.properties:9
- Secret: generic-api-key projects/bank/transaction/src/main/resources/application.properties:9
- Secret: generic-api-key projects/enmasse/enmasse-sender/src/main/resources/application.properties:7
- Secret: generic-api-key projects/enmasse/enmasse-sender/src/main/resources/application.properties:7
- Secret: generic-api-key code/bank/account/src/main/resources/application.properties:9
- Secret: generic-api-key code/bank/transaction/src/main/resources/application.properties:9
- Secret: generic-api-key code/enmasse/enmasse-sender/src/main/resources/application.properties:7
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential code/enmasse/enmasse-sender/src/main/resources/application.properties:7
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential code/bank/transaction/src/main/resources/application.properties:9
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential code/bank/account/src/main/resources/application.properties:9
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/code.yml:16
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:16
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:22
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Build action pinned to a mutable branch
Warning — 31 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/bank/account/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/bank/debezium-transaction-transformer/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/bank/transaction/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/enmasse/enmasse-receiver/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/enmasse/enmasse-sender/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/http/account-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/http/account-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/http/transaction-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/http/transaction-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/account/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/account/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/kafka-qreceiver/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/kafka-qreceiver/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/kafka-qsender/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/kafka-qsender/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/kafka-receiver/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/kafka-sender/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/transaction/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.jvm
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 code/kafka/transaction/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/account/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/account/AccountController.java:33
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/account/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/account/AccountController.java:39
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/account/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/account/AccountController.java:44
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/account/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/account/AccountController.java:53
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/account/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/account/BalanceController.java:22
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/transaction/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/transaction/TransactionController.java:30
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/transaction/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/transaction/TransactionController.java:39
- Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping code/bank/transaction/src/main/java/com/redhat/developers/transaction/TransactionController.java:48
D16 · Bus Factor
- dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Unpinned build actions
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- Workflow token permissions not restricted
Recommendation — 17 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/bank/account/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/bank/transaction/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/enmasse/enmasse-receiver/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/http/account-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/http/transaction-sync/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/kafka/account/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/kafka/kafka-qreceiver/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/kafka/kafka-qsender/src/main/docker/Dockerfile.native
- Low IaC: DS-0026 code/kafka/kafka-receiver/Dockerfile
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No build provenance
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 7 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 11 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 52 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |