Public report — resolve, published 30 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 30-07-2026 @ 02:18 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Reimagined/resolve

42% At Risk

Medium · 76,893 LoC · rebuild ~0.7 person-years · weakest lens: Security (33%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

32/34dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
113findings with an exact file:lineof 124 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
34/112dimensions across the health lenses76893 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

reimagined/resolve carries serious gaps (42%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Accessibility (83%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (33%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (34%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene).

For scale: Medium (~76,893 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.7 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 33% · 46% weightReadiness 34% · 25% weightArchitecture 46% · 14% weightMaturity 68% · 8% weightCode Health 72% · 4% weightAccessibility 83% · 2% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weight

Raise Security 33 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~48.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (90+)

90 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-dev.yml
  • D35 · Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ install.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts
  • D35 · Change coupling: patch-package-json.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/patch-package-json.ts
  • D35 · Change coupling: install.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts
  • D35 · Change coupling: install.ts ↔ patch-package-json.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts
  • D35 · Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts
  • D35 · Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ patch-package-json.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts
  • D35 · Change coupling clique: run.js, run.js, run.js, run.js, run.js tutorial/lesson-1/run.js
  • D36 · Workflow token permissions not restricted
  • D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
  • R10 · Duplicated block (43 lines × 8 locations) functional-tests/app/config.prod.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (41 lines × 9 locations) functional-tests/app/config.dev.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (36 lines × 7 locations) tests/read-model-advanced-sample/config.js
  • R10 · Duplicated block (31 lines × 6 locations) templates/js/react/config.dev.js
  • R2 · Complex function build (cyclomatic 36, cognitive 45) packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-postgresql/src/build.ts
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31, cognitive 41) packages/runtime/runtimes/runtime-aws-serverless/src/lambda-worker.ts
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29, cognitive 59) packages/runtime/adapters/eventstore-adapters/eventstore-postgresql/src/execute-statement.ts
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 29, cognitive 54) packages/runtime/runtimes/runtime-base/src/custom-read-model.ts
  • R4 · No test reaches this file packages/tools/scripts/src/generate_custom_mode.js
  • R7 · Dead file (~116 LoC) packages/modules/module-comments/src/common/index.js
  • R7 · Dead file (~109 LoC) tutorial/lesson-5/client/components/ShoppingList.js
  • R8 · Unused dependency '@resolve-js/readmodel-postgresql'

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €33,000–€170,000
Cost to rebuild€33,000–€170,000 (0.3–1.0 person-years (549–1,741 h), ~1–2 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 42% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code~4471 LoC unreachable (147 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.7 person-years of build effort (about ~€99,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+7.3 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
2
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
+7.3 pts · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
+7.0 pts · Medium effort · Release Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.7 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 33%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.7 person-years rebuild (76,893 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 33%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

At a glance — Code Health · 72% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 46% · Weak · gated by R9

At a glance — Maturity · 68% · Adequate · gated by D34

At a glance — Readiness · 34% · Weak · gated by R8, P3

At a glance — Security · 33% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, D36, D38

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 83% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate static analysis and security scanning into the CI pipeline to fail the build on regressions. Next, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and ensuring type and test-only packages are correctly scoped. Then, enforce versioning in the build manifest to ensure all releases are traceable. After that, expand test coverage to include all unreached production modules. Finally, add and run TypeScript type checking in CI to catch type errors early.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+7.3 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+7.3 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+7.0 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+6.7 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+6.0 ptsMediumTooling
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.+4.2 ptsMediumCircular Imports
Improve Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10.+3.9 ptsMediumSecrets (history)
Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pr-cra.yml (28), pr-dev.yml (22).+3.9 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 10 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 50% mixed · 50% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/pr-cra.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/pr-dev.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
yarn.lock4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts7.4MixedChange Coupling: Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ install.ts
packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts7.8MixedChange Coupling: Change coupling: install.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts
packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/patch-package-json.ts8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: patch-package-json.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts
packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/make-test-environment.ts8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: make-test-environment.ts ↔ make-test-environment.ts
tutorial/lesson-1/run.js8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling clique: run.js, run.js, run.js, run.js, run.js
README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The Getting Started section mentions NodeJS 14.17 but does not state which npm/yarn version it supports or how to upgrade.
tests/README.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The 'Stories' read-model test config shows a default connector but no custom-connector example, which is present in the outline.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 32 of 34 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 34 dimensions across the health lenses
D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AC3AC6AC7DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 113 of 124 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fb0d0-efcd-74cd-9a33-d8bac8d2d335.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 94 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The reSolve documentation is clear and complete for a full-stack functional framework: an engaging README that describes CQRS/DDD event sourcing and the npx create-resolve-app workflow; a focused tests directory covering read-model configuration (App/Dev Config), projection/resolvers code examples, and template projects; and architecture/design docs visible in the outline. The body is clipped mid-test section for the remaining documents.

The Getting Started section mentions NodeJS 14.17 but does not state which npm/yarn version it supports or how to upgrade.README.md
The 'Stories' read-model test config shows a default connector but no custom-connector example, which is present in the outline.tests/README.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The Getting Started section mentions NodeJS 14.17 but does not state… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 The 'Stories' read-model test config shows a default connector but no… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

41 finding(s): 0 critical, 41 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

What to do

  1. Improve Secrets (history) — currently 0.0/10. — 41 finding(s): 0 critical, 41 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 finding(s): 0 critical, 73 high, 7 medium, 13 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×50.github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:12detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pr-cra.yml (28), pr-dev.yml (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

trivy found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

172 of 172 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is docs/getting-started-chart/components/Server.js.

Largest orphaned file · ×3docs/getting-started-chart/components/Server.js
Dormant codebase

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Server.js, build.ts, types.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts↔install.ts 64%; patch-package-json.ts↔print-finish-output.ts 60%; install.ts↔print-finish-output.ts 60%

Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ install.ts · ×7packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts
Change coupling clique: run.js, run.js, run.js, run.js, run.jstutorial/lesson-1/run.js

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Workflow token permissions not restricted
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 finding(s): 13 critical, 42 high, 27 medium, 11 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×35yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×12yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 35 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (35). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (35 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 12 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • An a11y linter is configured (Documented) but there's no automated a11y test or CI gate. Add jest-axe to verify at runtime, then gate it in CI.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 11 of 66 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.3 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 813 typed · 503 plain JS

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • functional-tests/app/config.prod.js:20 · templates/js/react/config.prod.js:19 · templates/ts/react/config.prod.ts:20 · tutorial/lesson-1/config.prod.js:19 — config.prod.js:20
  • functional-tests/app/config.dev.js:17 · functional-tests/app/config.prod.js:16 · templates/js/react/config.prod.js:15 · templates/ts/react/config.prod.ts:16 — config.dev.js:17
  • tests/read-model-advanced-sample/config.js:27 · tests/read-model-comments-sample/config.js:27 · tests/read-model-store-api/config.js:21 · tests/read-model-stories-sample/config.js:27 — config.js:27
  • templates/js/react/config.dev.js:19 · templates/ts/react/config.dev.ts:20 · tutorial/lesson-2/config.dev.js:19 · tutorial/lesson-3/config.dev.js:19 — config.dev.js:19
  • packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-mysql/src/reset.ts:19 · packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-mysql/src/resubscribe.ts:26 · packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-mysql/src/unsubscribe.ts:24 — reset.ts:19
  • packages/runtime/adapters/eventstore-adapters/eventstore-lite/src/index.ts:73 · packages/runtime/adapters/eventstore-adapters/eventstore-mysql/src/index.ts:55 · packages/runtime/adapters/eventstore-adapters/eventstore-postgresql/src/index.ts:85 — index.ts:73
  • packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-lite/src/resubscribe.ts:16 · packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-lite/src/unsubscribe.ts:14 — resubscribe.ts:16
  • packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-mysql/src/resubscribe.ts:19 · packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-mysql/src/unsubscribe.ts:17 — resubscribe.ts:19

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 · Import Boundaries7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • functional-tests/utils/utils.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../app/common/view-models/resolver-failed.resolver) — import the package by name instead. — utils.ts:3
  • functional-tests/utils/utils.ts:4 reaches into another package with a relative path (../app/common/view-models/monitoring.projection) — import the package by name instead. — utils.ts:4
  • functional-tests/utils/utils.ts:6 reaches into another package with a relative path (../app/common/view-models/init-failed.projection) — import the package by name instead. — utils.ts:6
  • functional-tests/utils/utils.ts:8 reaches into another package with a relative path (../app/common/view-models/resolver-failed.projection) — import the package by name instead. — utils.ts:8
  • functional-tests/utils/utils.ts:9 reaches into another package with a relative path (../app/common/view-models/resolver-failed.resolver) — import the package by name instead. — utils.ts:9

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — build.ts:154, update-to-set-expression.ts:10, build.ts:37, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — run.ts, wrap-procedure.ts, config.app.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 20 file(s) (~2811 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package DOES declare main/module/exports — but every declared target is missing from the scanned tree, which is what a build-output entry (dist/, lib/, out/) looks like before the package is built. Point a declared target at the source entry, or build the package before scanning, so reachability can follow it. — react-hooks
  • 55 file(s) (~4057 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package DOES declare main/module/exports — but every declared target is missing from the scanned tree, which is what a build-output entry (dist/, lib/, out/) looks like before the package is built. Point a declared target at the source entry, or build the package before scanning, so reachability can follow it. — runtime-base
  • 122 file(s) (~7574 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package DOES declare main/module/exports — but every declared target is missing from the scanned tree, which is what a build-output entry (dist/, lib/, out/) looks like before the package is built. Point a declared target at the source entry, or build the package before scanning, so reachability can follow it. — scripts
  • Unreachable from the 185 application, 32 tooling and 244 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (185 application, 32 tooling, 244 test roots considered) (×4) — wrap-procedure.ts, replicate.ts, index.js, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in functional-tests/app/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
  • Only test files import it — move it to devDependencies. — benchmark.test.ts:6

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • packages/core/client/src/middleware.ts → packages/core/client/src/middleware/parse-response.ts → packages/core/client/src/middleware.ts — middleware.ts
  • packages/runtime/runtimes/runtime-aws-serverless/src/cloud-service-event-handler.ts → packages/runtime/runtimes/runtime-aws-serverless/src/types.ts → packages/runtime/runtimes/runtime-aws-serverless/src/lambda-worker.ts → packages/runtime/runtimes/runtime-aws-serverless/src/cloud-service-event-handler.ts — cloud-service-event-handler.ts
  • packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/aggregate/as.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/aggregate/command.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/aggregate/as.ts — as.ts
  • packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/aggregate/make-test-environment.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/runtime/get-event-store.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/types.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/aggregate/make-test-environment.ts — make-test-environment.ts
  • packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/as.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/not.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/query.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/as.ts — as.ts
  • packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/read-model.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/with-adapter.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/read-model.ts — read-model.ts
  • packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/saga/allow-side-effects.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/saga/saga.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/saga/allow-side-effects.ts — allow-side-effects.ts
  • packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/saga/make-assertions.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/saga/mock-command-implementation.ts → packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/saga/make-assertions.ts — make-assertions.ts

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 8 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (15%; ≈16% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 47 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 47 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health72%StrongSolid.
Architecture46%Weak — gated by R9Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity68%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness34%Weak — gated by R8, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security33%Weak — gated by D28, D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility83%StrongSolid.
Not included — 78 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No form control/button found in the parsed markup — AC2 not applicable here.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~27108 lines of test source are present (.ts, .js, .tsx) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts, .js, .tsx) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 100 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×50
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:12 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:33 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:42 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:67 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:69 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:74 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:80 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:88 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:120 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:122 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:127 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:133 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:141 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:173 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:175 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:180 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:186 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:194 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:203 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:230 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:232 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-cra.yml:237 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×35
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @angular/common 11.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 20.3.25. This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/common 11.2.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @angular/common 11.2.4 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @angular/compiler 11.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.18. This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against @angular/compiler 11.2.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @angular/compiler 11.2.4 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @angular/core 11.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 19.2.19. This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against @angular/core 11.2.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 20.3.25 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 20.3.25 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of @angular/core 11.2.4 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.18.9: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — adm-zip 0.5.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.6.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — axios 0.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 0.31.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 23 advisories this scan raises against axios 0.25.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.33.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.33.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of axios 0.25.0 clears all 23 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — body-parser 1.19.0: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.19.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of body-parser 1.19.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of brace-expansion 1.1.11 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — browserify-sign 4.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — browserify-sign is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin browserify-sign to 4.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — decode-uri-component 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — decode-uri-component is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin decode-uri-component to 0.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — eta 1.12.3: [GHSA redacted] — eta is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.12.3, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.12.3; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). One upgrade of eta 1.12.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — flatted 3.2.6: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of flatted 3.2.6 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — get-func-name 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — get-func-name is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin get-func-name to 2.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — http-cache-semantics 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — http-cache-semantics is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-cache-semantics to 4.1.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 2.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.0.10 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ip 1.1.8: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace ip if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. One upgrade of ip 1.1.8 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — js-cookie 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.7
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of js-yaml 3.14.1 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — json5 0.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.0.2 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.5.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.5.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — jsonwebtoken 8.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 9.0.0 One upgrade of jsonwebtoken 8.5.1 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — jws 3.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — jws is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin jws to 3.2.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — loader-utils 1.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo already declares loader-utils 2.0.0 directly, at or above the fixed 1.4.2; the vulnerable 1.4.0 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or pin loader-utils with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against loader-utils 1.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of loader-utils 1.4.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — lodash.set 4.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace lodash.set if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
  • + 10 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×12
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — @babel/traverse 7.18.10: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — cipher-base 1.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — cipher-base is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cipher-base to 1.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — crypto-js 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.2.0
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — form-data 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo already declares form-data 4.0.0 directly, at or above the fixed 3.0.4; the vulnerable 3.0.1 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or pin form-data with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 3.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of form-data 3.0.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — loader-utils 0.2.17: [GHSA redacted] — this repo already declares loader-utils 2.0.0 directly, at or above the fixed 1.4.1; the vulnerable 0.2.17 is a second copy resolved for a dependency that requires an older range. Upgrade those dependents, or pin loader-utils with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn) so only one copy resolves.
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — mysql2 2.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.9.7. This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against mysql2 2.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.9.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.9.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of mysql2 2.1.0 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — pbkdf2 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — pbkdf2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin pbkdf2 to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of pbkdf2 3.1.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — sha.js 2.4.11: [GHSA redacted] — sha.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sha.js to 2.4.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of shell-quote 1.7.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — tar 6.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.1.11, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.1.11; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). One upgrade of tar 6.1.11 clears all 13 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — webpack 5.74.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares webpack 4.46.0, but the vulnerable 5.74.0 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own webpack entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or pin webpack to 5.76.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against webpack 5.74.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.104.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.104.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of webpack 5.74.0 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of websocket-driver 0.7.4 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — serialize-javascript 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.1.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.1.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — svgo 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin svgo to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against svgo 2.8.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.8.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.8.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of svgo 2.8.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical vulnerability · ×1
  • Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — elliptic 6.5.4: [GHSA redacted] — elliptic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin elliptic to 6.6.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 6 advisories this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.6.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.6.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of elliptic 6.5.4 clears all 7 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 11 finding(s)
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×7
  • Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ install.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts — `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts` and `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts` change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: patch-package-json.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/patch-package-json.ts — `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/patch-package-json.ts` and `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/print-finish-output.ts` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: install.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts — `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts` and `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/print-finish-output.ts` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: install.ts ↔ patch-package-json.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts — `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/install.ts` and `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/patch-package-json.ts` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ print-finish-output.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts — `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts` and `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/print-finish-output.ts` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: download-resolve-repo.ts ↔ patch-package-json.ts packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts — `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/download-resolve-repo.ts` and `packages/core/create-resolve-app/src/patch-package-json.ts` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: make-test-environment.ts ↔ make-test-environment.ts packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/make-test-environment.ts — `packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/read-model/make-test-environment.ts` and `packages/tools/testing-tools/src/flow/saga/make-test-environment.ts` change together 58% of the time (11 of the 19 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D16 · Bus Factor · dormant codebase · ×1
  • dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 136 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling clique · ×1
  • Change coupling clique: run.js, run.js, run.js, run.js, run.js tutorial/lesson-1/run.js — 5 files — `tutorial/lesson-1/run.js`, `tutorial/lesson-2/run.js`, `tutorial/lesson-3/run.js`, `tutorial/lesson-4/run.js`, `tutorial/lesson-5/run.js` — all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 10 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once — you do not need to break each pair individually.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 75 floating ref(s) across 7 workflow file(s): `actions/checkout@v2` (.github/workflows/resolve-gate.yml:19), `reimagined/github-actions/resolve-gate@v1` (.github/workflows/resolve-gate.yml:26), `actions/setup-node@v2` (.github/workflows/push-master.yml:13), `reimagined/github-actions/publish@v1` (.github/workflows/push-master.yml:21), `reimagined/github-actions/generate-changelog@v1` (.github/workflows/push-master.yml:30), `reimagined/github-actions/git-release@v1` (.github/workflows/push-master.yml:38), `actions/checkout@v2` (.github/workflows/push-dev.yml:30), `reimagined/github-actions/publish@v1` (.github/workflows/push-dev.yml:38), … (+67 more)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted · ×1
  • Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (7 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Recommendation — 11 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×3
  • Largest orphaned file docs/getting-started-chart/components/Server.js — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-postgresql/src/build.ts — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
  • Largest orphaned file packages/runtime/adapters/readmodel-adapters/readmodel-base/src/types.ts — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.ts, .js, .tsx) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The Getting Started section mentions NodeJS 14.17 but does not state which npm/yarn version it supports or how to upgrade. · ×1
  • The Getting Started section mentions NodeJS 14.17 but does not state which npm/yarn version it supports or how to upgrade. README.md — Add a minimal Requirements/Upgrade note linking to nodejs.org and the npx create-resolve-app version specifier.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The 'Stories' read-model test config shows a default connector but no custom-connector example, which is present in the outline. · ×1
  • The 'Stories' read-model test config shows a default connector but no custom-connector example, which is present in the outline. tests/README.md — Add a brief note on how to configure a custom read-model connector (e.g. MySQL) inline with the existing default example.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Dormant codebase · ×1
  • Dormant codebase — 172 of 172 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 172 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cdxgen -t yarn` (or `syft` below) over the yarn workspace — `npm sbom` cannot read `yarn.lock`, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.ts, .js, .tsx) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .41artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .93artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .0artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .93artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fb0d0-efcd-74cd-9a33-d8bac8d2d335 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md