Public report — RestSharp, published 5 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 05-08-2026 @ 12:44 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Restsharp/RestSharp

bounded contexts not declared
57% At Risk
Architecture 99% Exemplary Code Health 83% Strong Performance 83% Strong Security 64% Adequate Maturity 60% Adequate Readiness 44% Weak

Small · 11,039 LoC · 61 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (44%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

54/56dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
37findings with an exact file:lineof 97 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
56/97dimensions across the health lenses11039 LoC · 61 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

restsharp/RestSharp is sound in substance but carries real gaps (57%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (99%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (83%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (44%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (60%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Give consumers a diagnostics seam rather than taking a logging… (Observability); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback).

For scale: Small (~11,039 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (99%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 83% Strong Architecture 99% ★ Exemplary Maturity 60% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 44% Weak · gated by P2 Security 64% Adequate · gated by D29, D30, D36 Performance 83% Strong
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 44% · 46% weightMaturity 60% · 25% weightSecurity 64% · 14% weightPerformance 83% · 8% weightCode Health 83% · 4% weightArchitecture 99% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 44 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 57 → ~66.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 10%Plumbing 43%Tests 45%Analyzers 1%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6,900–€34,000
Cost to rebuild€6,900–€34,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (114–360 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityLow — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 57% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 67% boilerplate · 13% straight-line · 20% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€21,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 44% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×0.9) — library/CLI × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+6.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Give consumers a diagnostics seam rather than taking a logging dependency: emit through an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` (or `DiagnosticSource`) the host can subscribe to, accept an optional logger/handler on your options object, or document the hook you already expose.
+11.9 pts · Medium effort · Observability
3
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+11.9 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 44%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (11,039 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 44%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Give consumers a diagnostics seam rather than taking a logging dependency: emit through an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` (or `DiagnosticSource`) the host can subscribe to, accept an optional logger/handler on your options object, or document the hook you already expose. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Give consumers a diagnostics seam rather than taking a logging dependency: emit through an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` (or `DiagnosticSource`) the host can subscribe to, accept an optional logger/handler on your options object, or document the hook you already expose.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch RestSharp RestSharp RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection DependencyInjection RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection->RestSharp RestSharp.Serializers.CsvHelper CsvHelper RestSharp.Serializers.CsvHelper->RestSharp RestSharp.Serializers.NewtonsoftJson NewtonsoftJson RestSharp.Serializers.NewtonsoftJson->RestSharp RestSharp.Serializers.Xml Xml RestSharp.Serializers.Xml->RestSharp

Architecture — module dependency matrix

21 modules, 21 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

(global)….Authenticators.OAuth…p.Benchmarks.RequestsSourceGeneratorSystem…gnostics.CodeAnalysis…time.CompilerServices…Expressions.Generated…tSharp.Authenticators…tors.OAuth.ExtensionsRestSharp.InterceptorsRestSharp.SerializersRestSharp…Authenticators.OAuth2RestSharp.Extensions…s.DependencyInjection…Serializers.CsvHelper…harp.Serializers.Json…lizers.NewtonsoftJson…Sharp.Serializers.Xml…enchmarks.Serializers(global)1….Authenticators.OAuth2…p.Benchmarks.Requests3SourceGenerator4System5…gnostics.CodeAnalysis6…time.CompilerServices7…Expressions.Generated8…tSharp.Authenticators9…tors.OAuth.Extensions10RestSharp.Interceptors11RestSharp.Serializers12RestSharp13…Authenticators.OAuth214RestSharp.Extensions15…s.DependencyInjection16…Serializers.CsvHelper17…harp.Serializers.Json18…lizers.NewtonsoftJson19…Sharp.Serializers.Xml20…enchmarks.Serializers216101313233461105555551171

At a glance — Code Health · 83% · Strong

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 8.7 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 7.8 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 9.2 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.2 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 9.8 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 7.1
The Bad
X1 · Repo Async correctness 6.9

At a glance — Architecture · 99% · Exemplary

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.9 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.3 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 60% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 5.0
The Ugly
D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 3.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 44% · Weak · gated by P2

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 9.9 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 8.6 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 6.5 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 4.0

At a glance — Security · 64% · Adequate · gated by D29, D30, D36

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.9 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 S1 · Repo Cryptographic Hygiene 8.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 1.5 D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Performance · 83% · Strong

The Good
PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 9.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 7.7 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 8.5

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components26High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection11High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration3Medium

Roadmap

First, implement observability by exposing a diagnostics seam, such as an EventSource or ActivitySource, to enable proper logging and health checks. Next, integrate a static application security testing (SAST) step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions. Then, add a manual approval gate or draft release status to prevent bad builds from being published. Finally, ensure releases are traceable by stamping a version number in the build manifest and resolving the single deprecated dependency finding.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+6.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Give consumers a diagnostics seam rather than taking a logging dependency: emit through an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` (or `DiagnosticSource`) the host can subscribe to, accept an optional logger/handler on your options object, or document the hook you already expose.+11.9 ptsMediumObservability
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+11.9 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+11.6 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+11.6 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with IRestClientFactory.cs, RestClientConfigOptions.cs.+4.1 ptsLowComment Value
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.+4.3 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+4.3 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 21 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 43% mixed · 57% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/pull-request.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/build-dev.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs6.9MixedCyclomatic Complexity: XmlDeserializer.Map (cyclomatic 44)
.github/dependabot.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
test/RestSharp.Tests.Serializers.Xml/SampleClasses/twitter.cs7.3MixedExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
test/Directory.Build.props7.6MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/Directory.Build.props7.6MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlSerializer.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: XmlSerializer.Map (cyclomatic 19)
test/RestSharp.Tests/Parameters/ParameterValidationTests.cs7.8MixedTest Quality: No assertions: RestRequest_AlwaysMultipartFormData_IsAllowed
src/RestSharp/Polyfills/Range.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/RestSharp/RestClient.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
test/RestSharp.Tests.Serializers.Xml/SampleClasses/Lastfm.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
test/RestSharp.Tests.Serializers.Xml/SampleClasses/ListSamples.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
test/RestSharp.Tests/Auth/OAuth1Tests.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BarePragmaDisable
src/RestSharp/Request/PropertyCache.Populator.cs8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: Populator
src/RestSharp/RestClient.Async.cs8.5Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: RestClient
src/RestSharp/Authenticators/OAuth/OAuthWorkflow.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
test/RestSharp.Tests/Headers/HostHeaderTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Can_Set_Valid_Host_Header
.devcontainer/Dockerfile8.8Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0002
src/RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection/IRestClientFactory.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: misleading comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 54 of 56 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 56 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D36D39AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 37 of 97 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd1f4-2b0b-7d3d-8b78-b89d345b47cc.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was XmlDeserializer.Map at 44. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being OAuth1Authenticator.AddOAuthData at 16 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

XmlDeserializer.Map (cyclomatic 44)src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:96
XmlSerializer.Map (cyclomatic 19)src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlSerializer.cs:109

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 XmlDeserializer.Map (cyclomatic 44) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with XmlDeserializer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 XmlSerializer.Map (cyclomatic 19) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with XmlSerializer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was XmlDeserializer.Map at 97.

XmlDeserializer.Map (cognitive 97)src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:96
XmlSerializer.Map (cognitive 40)src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlSerializer.cs:109
XmlDeserializer.TryFindElementsByNameVariations (cognitive 18)src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:379

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 XmlDeserializer.Map (cognitive 97) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with XmlDeserializer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 XmlSerializer.Map (cognitive 40) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with XmlSerializer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 XmlDeserializer.TryFindElementsByNameVariations (cognitive 18) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with XmlDeserializer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: Populator · ×2src/RestSharp/Request/PropertyCache.Populator.cs:0

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)src/RestSharp/Authenticators/OAuth/OAuthWorkflow.cs:56

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

61 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: RestSharp(netstandard2.0)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 22 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 30.7%.

Per-file coverage withheld — the coverage run did not finish

What to do

  1. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1854 test methods: 1854 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 3 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 462 tests.

No assertions: Can_Set_Valid_Host_Header · ×3test/RestSharp.Tests/Headers/HostHeaderTests.cs:33
Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

20 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: xunit
Outdated: JetBrains.Annotations · ×20

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 15 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 11039 LoC (0.4/KLoC) → score 9.2.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×2test/Directory.Build.props:8
BarePragmaDisable · ×7src/RestSharp/Polyfills/Range.cs:7

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

61 projects, 1274 source files, 20053 hand-written lines of code (11039 production / 9014 test), 97 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 0 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

misleading comment · ×2src/RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection/IRestClientFactory.cs:7

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with IRestClientFactory.cs, RestClientConfigOptions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 15 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

54 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 93 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×11.github/dependabot.yml:3detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with pull-request.yml (7), build-dev.yml (3), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 vulnerable package(s): 3 critical, 16 high, 7 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 · ×16detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 · ×3detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 · ×7detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 3 low.

Low IaC: DS-0002 · ×3.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 648 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:97

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — OAuthTools.cs:232

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — HttpBasicAuthenticator.cs:34

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • 32 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 11 of 15 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.5 pts.
  • Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No logging or diagnostics emission found. This codebase ships libraries rather than a process it operates, so structured logging itself is the HOST application's to configure — but a library that emits nothing at all gives its consumers no way to see what it did.

What to do

  • Give consumers a diagnostics seam rather than taking a logging dependency: emit through an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` (or `DiagnosticSource`) the host can subscribe to, accept an optional logger/handler on your options object, or document the hook you already expose.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

PF2 · Allocation hygiene7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 34 use(s) across 10,115 production line(s) (~3.4/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
S1 · Cryptographic Hygiene8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Cryptographic hygiene (weak hash/cipher, password key-derivation). This codebase has no web surface, so transport/header/cookie/CSRF controls are N/A and only crypto is scored.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. — OAuthTools.cs:250

What to do

  • Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (`System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32`) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key or a mutex name.
X1 · Async correctness6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — AsyncHelpers.cs:30

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 40/41 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. — HttpResponseExtensions.cs:30

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 5/6 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~2.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 79 suppression(s) across the 34127 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health83%StrongSolid.
Architecture99%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity60%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness44%Weak — gated by P2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security64%Adequate — gated by D29, D30, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance83%StrongSolid.
Not included — 41 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (18 value object(s))
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 32 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×16
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×11
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 2 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-dev.yml:29 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-dev.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build-dev.yml:40 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: NuGet/login@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `NuGet/login@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/NuGet/login/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pull-request.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pull-request.yml:31 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pull-request.yml:33 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pull-request.yml:49 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pull-request.yml:65 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pull-request.yml:67 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pull-request.yml:83 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×3
  • Critical CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.2.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core 2.2.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×2
  • NoWarnInCsproj test/Directory.Build.props:8 — xUnit1033 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
  • NoWarnInCsproj src/Directory.Build.props:18 — 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
Warning — 29 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×7
  • BarePragmaDisable src/RestSharp/Polyfills/Range.cs:7 — #pragma warning disable CS3019 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable src/RestSharp/RestClient.cs:23 — #pragma warning disable 618 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable test/RestSharp.Tests.Serializers.Xml/SampleClasses/Lastfm.cs:5 — #pragma warning disable CS8981 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable test/RestSharp.Tests.Serializers.Xml/SampleClasses/ListSamples.cs:2 — #pragma warning disable CS8981 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable test/RestSharp.Tests.Serializers.Xml/SampleClasses/twitter.cs:7 — #pragma warning disable CS8981 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable test/RestSharp.Tests.Serializers.Xml/SampleClasses/twitter.cs:11 — #pragma warning disable CS8981 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
  • BarePragmaDisable test/RestSharp.Tests/Auth/OAuth1Tests.cs:6 — #pragma warning disable CS8618 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×7
  • Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 — Scriban.Signed 5.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 — Scriban.Signed 2.1.4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×3
  • No assertions: Can_Set_Valid_Host_Header test/RestSharp.Tests/Headers/HostHeaderTests.cs:33 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: RestRequest_AlwaysMultipartFormData_IsAllowed test/RestSharp.Tests/Parameters/ParameterValidationTests.cs:4 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: RestRequest_AlwaysSingleFileAsContent_IsAllowed test/RestSharp.Tests/Parameters/ParameterValidationTests.cs:10 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×2
  • TooManyMethods: Populator src/RestSharp/Request/PropertyCache.Populator.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 237 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 42 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: RestClient src/RestSharp/RestClient.Async.cs:0 — TooManyMethods — 354 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 33 methods, declared across 2 files: RestSharp/RestClient.Async.cs (20), RestSharp/RestClient.cs (13). To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · XmlDeserializer.Map (cyclomatic 44) · ×1
  • XmlDeserializer.Map (cyclomatic 44) src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:96 — XmlDeserializer.Map has cyclomatic complexity 44 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · XmlSerializer.Map (cyclomatic 19) · ×1
  • XmlSerializer.Map (cyclomatic 19) src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlSerializer.cs:109 — XmlSerializer.Map has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×1
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].docPath | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1369.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · XmlDeserializer.Map (cognitive 97) · ×1
  • XmlDeserializer.Map (cognitive 97) src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:96 — XmlDeserializer.Map has cognitive complexity 97 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · XmlSerializer.Map (cognitive 40) · ×1
  • XmlSerializer.Map (cognitive 40) src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlSerializer.cs:109 — XmlSerializer.Map has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · XmlDeserializer.TryFindElementsByNameVariations (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • XmlDeserializer.TryFindElementsByNameVariations (cognitive 18) src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:379 — XmlDeserializer.TryFindElementsByNameVariations has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 11 floating ref(s) across 3 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/RestSharp/Authenticators/OAuth/OAuthWorkflow.cs:56 — src/RestSharp/Authenticators/OAuth/OAuthWorkflow.cs:56-69 | src/RestSharp/Authenticators/OAuth/OAuthWorkflow.cs:85-98 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/RestSharp/Authenticators/OAuth/OAuthWorkflow.cs:56` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: RestSharp(netstandard2.0) — RestSharp(netstandard2.0): abstractness 0.15, instability 0.00, distance 0.85 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 4 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Recommendation — 13 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×3
  • Low IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • Low IaC: DS-0010 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — RUN using 'sudo'
  • Low IaC: DS-0029 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
D24 · Comment Value · misleading comment · ×2
  • misleading comment src/RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection/IRestClientFactory.cs:7 — "http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0" — delete - the comment is a license link; the actual header already states this
  • misleading comment src/RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection/RestClientConfigOptions.cs:4 — "you may not use this file except in compliance with the License." — delete - repeated license boilerplate; the header already states it
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test reliability not included — no test tier completed within its budget.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 13 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs, src/RestSharp/RestClient.Async.cs, src/RestSharp/Authenticators/OAuth/OAuth1Authenticator.cs, src/RestSharp/RestClient.cs, src/RestSharp/Request/RequestContent.cs, src/RestSharp/Request/RestRequestExtensions.cs, src/RestSharp/RestClient.Extensions.cs, src/RestSharp/Request/RestRequestExtensions.Headers.cs (+5 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 11039 LoC spread over 61 projects the codebase is both large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Scanner failed to run · ×1
  • Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv-scanner exited 128 with no findings — the advisory database was likely unreachable. The scanner exited non-zero and produced no findings (typically the advisory DB was unreachable), so this is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:97 — 1 of 648 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: RestSharp.Serializers.Xml.XmlDeserializer.Map @ src/RestSharp.Serializers.Xml/XmlDeserializer.cs:97, 555 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 10.0/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 23 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×20
  • Outdated: JetBrains.Annotations — JetBrains.Annotations 2024.3.0 → 2026.2.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http — Microsoft.Extensions.Http 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.SourceLink.GitHub — Microsoft.SourceLink.GitHub 8.0.0 → 10.0.301 available (referenced by RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection).
  • Outdated: MinVer — MinVer 6.0.0 → 7.0.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Extensions.DependencyInjection).
  • Outdated: System.Text.Json — System.Text.Json 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by RestSharp).
  • Outdated: BenchmarkDotNet — BenchmarkDotNet 0.14.0 → 0.15.8 available (referenced by RestSharp.Benchmarks).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp — Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp 4.12.0 → 5.6.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Benchmarks).
  • Outdated: CsvHelper — CsvHelper 33.0.1 → 33.1.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Serializers.CsvHelper).
  • Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — Newtonsoft.Json 13.0.3 → 13.0.4 available (referenced by RestSharp.Serializers.NewtonsoftJson).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Analyzers — Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Analyzers 3.11.0 → 5.6.0 available (referenced by SourceGenerator).
  • Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 7.0.0 → 8.10.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.InteractiveTests).
  • Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 → 2.9.3 available (referenced by RestSharp.InteractiveTests).
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.2 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests.DependencyInjection).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.12.0 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests.DependencyInjection).
  • Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.8.2 → 3.1.5 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests.DependencyInjection).
  • Outdated: HttpMultipartParser — HttpMultipartParser 8.4.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests.Integrated).
  • Outdated: Polly — Polly 8.5.0 → 8.7.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests.Integrated).
  • Outdated: PolySharp — PolySharp 1.15.0 → 1.16.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests.Integrated).
  • Outdated: WireMock.Net — WireMock.Net 1.16.0 → 2.13.0 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests.Integrated).
  • Outdated: System.Net.Http.Json — System.Net.Http.Json 9.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by RestSharp.Tests).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — RestSharp.Tests(net48) references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D8 · Code Coverage · Per-file coverage withheld · ×1
  • Per-file coverage withheld — the coverage run did not finish — At least one `dotnet test` target was stopped at its time budget, so the gathered reports cover only part of the suite. The overall 30.7% is a FLOOR (everything the completed runs covered really is covered), but a per-file figure from a partial gather cannot tell an untested file from one whose test project never ran — so per-file and CRAP rows are withheld rather than published as measurements. Re-run with a longer coverage budget, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, to get per-file rows.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .11artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list RestSharp.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json26artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .3artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fd1f4-2b0b-7d3d-8b78-b89d345b47cc · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 32 · Warnings: 29 · Recommendations: 13 · Info: 23 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 05-08-2026 @ 12:44 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md