Public report — ruflo, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 20:29 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Ruvnet/ruflo

No baseline yet — first run no automated tests
38% At Risk
Maturity 88% Strong Code Health 44% Weak Security 36% Weak Readiness 29% Weak

— · weakest lens: Readiness (29%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

48/52dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
707findings with an exact file:lineof 717 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
52/102dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

ruvnet/ruflo carries serious gaps (38%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Maturity (88%) — it's well-documented and easy to pick up.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (29%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (36%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Maturity foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 44% Weak · gated by D2, D3, R3, R7 Maturity 88% Strong Readiness 29% Weak · gated by D8, D9, R8, P2 Security 36% Weak · gated by D28, D29, D36, D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 29% · 50% weightSecurity 36% · 27% weightCode Health 44% · 15% weightMaturity 88% · 8% weight

Raise Readiness 29 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 38 → ~48.

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+11.0 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+11.0 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+13.3 pts · Medium effort · Observability

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.

At a glance — Code Health · 44% · Weak · gated by D2, D3, R3, R7

The Good
D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 8.8 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 9.5 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 8.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 5.2
The Ugly
D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 3.9 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 0.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 0.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 1.6

At a glance — Architecture · — · —

The Good
D7 · .NET / C# Architectural Integrity 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9
The Ugly
R11 · React / TS Import Boundaries 0.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 2.5

At a glance — Maturity · 88% · Strong

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.7 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 9.0 D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 9.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D25 · .NET / C# ADR Conformance 9.7 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

At a glance — Readiness · 29% · Weak · gated by D8, D9, R8, P2

The Good
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 10.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 10.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 7.3 R6 · React / TS Tooling 10.0
The Bad
P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0
The Ugly
D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 4.5 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 36% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, D36, D38

The Good
D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 D37 · .NET / C# Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 10.0
The Bad
D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 5.5
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures51High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components50High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration29High / Critical

Roadmap

First, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to establish baseline observability. Next, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring imports. Then, expand test coverage to include all unreached modules and resolve the single gap in automated code coverage. Finally, address the missing test distribution findings to ensure comprehensive test execution.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+11.0 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+11.0 ptsLowTest Distribution
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+13.3 ptsMediumObservability
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+13.3 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+11.7 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+11.0 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.+7.6 ptsMediumLarge Files
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.+7.6 ptsMediumDead Code

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 423 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 12% mixed · 88% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml0.0SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs2.8SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: detect-child-process
.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs4.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: detect-child-process
verification/macos/manifest.md.json4.4MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/workflows/ci.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
ruflo/src/ruvocal/package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
verification/linux/manifest.md.json4.4MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
verification/windows/manifest.md.json4.4MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
pnpm-lock.yaml4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml4.5MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/dependabot.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
.github/workflows/cve-audit.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/all-plugins-smoke.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/business-pods-smoke.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/codeql.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/cost-tracker-smoke.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
ruflo/src/ruvocal/.devcontainer/Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
ruflo/src/ruvocal/Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0017

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 48 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D7D8D9D12D13D15D16D19D20D21D25D26D27D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D37D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6R1R10R11R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 707 of 717 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fddea-5860-76dc-82d9-526d074c00f3.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

54 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was generateStatusline at 74.

main (cyclomatic 17) · ×3.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:1012
generateStatusline (cyclomatic 74) · ×2.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:908
stats (cyclomatic 51) · ×2.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:912
consolidate (cyclomatic 38) · ×2.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:710
executeGoapSearch (cyclomatic 37) · ×2ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:694

+ 28 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 main (cyclomatic 17) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with learning-service.mjs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 generateStatusline (cyclomatic 74) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with statusline.cjs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 stats (cyclomatic 51) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with intelligence.cjs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

72 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was generateStatusline at 88.

_searchGraph (cognitive 24) · ×3.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:296
syncMetrics (cognitive 23) · ×3.claude/helpers/metrics-db.mjs:262
generateStatusline (cognitive 88) · ×2.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:908
stats (cognitive 67) · ×2.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:912
getModelName (cognitive 65) · ×2.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:680

+ 36 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 _searchGraph (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with learning-service.mjs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 syncMetrics (cognitive 23) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with metrics-db.mjs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 generateStatusline (cognitive 88) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with statusline.cjs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: mcp-bridge/index.js · ×16ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 16 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with learning-service.mjs (3), metrics-db.mjs (3), hook-handler.cjs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Improve Coupling — currently 6.9/10. — 0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 259 mechanizable ADRs, 176 are prevented by analyzers, 83 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — the solution has no test code.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test projects found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts (25×69=1725); v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/hooks.ts (18×90=1620); .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs (20×74=1480)

Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts · ×10v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

This is an exemplary documentation set: the README and verification/README.md together present a clear, well-structured architecture with a visible ecosystem strip plus a dedicated 'Ruflo Verification System' doc that explains three-layer regression protection (behavioral smoke tests, cryptographic witness manifest, temporal history), why it exists, folder layout, and a tutorial. The v3 Claude Flow README is also rich in metadata and an architectural overview.

The top-level 'Ruflo' banner is a static asset link (ruflo-small.jpeg) and the ecosystem strip, but there is no branding or usage note for the reader about how to install/ruflo.README.md

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 365 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 9.0/10 (consistently complete and clear). 1 flagged with a specific gap.

Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are both absent from the visible text; only implementation status and related ADRs appearv3/docs/adr/ADR-322-metaharness-flywheel-integration.md
ADR lacks an enforcement field · ×364docs/dream-cycle/2026-06-15-performance-sota.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 364 ADR lacks an enforcement field finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with ADR-029-HUGGINGFACE-CHAT-UI-CLOUD-RUN.md (2), ADR-033-RUVECTOR-RUFLO-MCP-INTEGRATION.md (2), ADR-034-OPTIONAL-MCP-BACKENDS.md (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (364 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are both absent from the… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with ADR-322-metaharness-flywheel-integration.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

69 conform / 2 violate across 365 ADRs.

ADR not followed: ADR-034: Optional MCP Backends — Claude Code, Gemini, Codex · ×2ruflo/docs/adr/ADR-034-OPTIONAL-MCP-BACKENDS.md

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

114 finding(s): 0 critical, 114 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: private-key · ×50scripts/smoke-helper-signing-security.mjs:74detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with manifest.md.json (48), smoke-helper-signing-security.mjs, witness.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

381 finding(s): 0 critical, 371 high, 4 medium, 6 low.

High: detect-child-process · ×50.claude-plugin/scripts/ruflo-hook.cjs:80detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (14), adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml (6), dependabot.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

29 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 5 medium, 13 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×11ruflo/src/nginx/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×5ruflo/src/chat-ui/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×13ruflo/src/chat-ui/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 13 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (7), deployment.yaml (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (8), deployment.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (4), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: auto-memory-hook.mjs↔helpers-generator.ts 60%; auto-memory-hook.mjs↔hook-handler.cjs 60%; task-tools.ts↔workflow-tools.ts 54%

Change coupling: auto-memory-hook.mjs ↔ helpers-generator.ts · ×8v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

255 finding(s): 7 critical, 89 high, 139 medium, 20 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×43package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×7plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 43 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (35), pnpm-lock.yaml (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (43 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6), pnpm-lock.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

M2 · Architecture documentation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P5 · DR & Backup10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:1084 · ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:1266 — index.js:1084
  • ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:428 · ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:433 — index.js:428
  • scripts/audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:55 · scripts/audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:83 · scripts/audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:127 · scripts/audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:202 — audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:55
  • plugins/ruflo-business-pods/scripts/pod-tick.mjs:91 · scripts/audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:55 · scripts/audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:82 · scripts/audit-env-var-precedence.mjs:125 — pod-tick.mjs:91
  • ruflo/src/scripts/generate-config.js:129 · ruflo/src/scripts/generate-config.js:174 — generate-config.js:129
  • ruflo/src/ruvocal/src/lib/components/RufloHelpModal.svelte:28 · scripts/audit-fix-invariants.mjs:47 · scripts/audit-fix-invariants.mjs:67 · scripts/audit-fix-invariants.mjs:89 — RufloHelpModal.svelte:28
  • ruflo/src/ruvocal/static/wasm/rvagent_wasm.js:67 · ruflo/src/ruvocal/static/wasm/rvagent_wasm.js:317 · ruflo/src/ruvocal/static/wasm/rvagent_wasm.js:653 · ruflo/src/ruvocal/static/wasm/rvagent_wasm.js:832 — rvagent_wasm.js:67
  • plugins/ruflo-neural-trader/src/signed-artifact.ts:49 · plugins/ruflo-neural-trader/src/signed-attribution.ts:66 — signed-artifact.ts:49

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R11 · Import Boundaries0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/adapters/knowledge-graph-adapter.ts:133 imports @claude-flow/cli/src/memory/graph-edge-writer.js, which the target package's package.json `exports` does not declare — use a declared entry or declare the subpath. — knowledge-graph-adapter.ts:133
  • plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/application/federation-client.ts:9 imports plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/infrastructure/witness-signer.ts against the layered-src rules. — federation-client.ts:9
  • plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/application/federation-client.ts:10 imports plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/infrastructure/solver-bridge.ts against the layered-src rules. — federation-client.ts:10
  • plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/application/federation-server.ts:13 imports plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/infrastructure/witness-signer.ts against the layered-src rules. — federation-server.ts:13
  • plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/application/federation-server.ts:14 imports plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/infrastructure/solver-bridge.ts against the layered-src rules. — federation-server.ts:14
  • plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/application/streaming-bridge.ts:17 imports plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/src/infrastructure/solver-bridge.ts against the layered-src rules. — streaming-bridge.ts:17
  • scripts/smoke-router-regex.mjs:30 reaches into another package with a relative path (../v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/init/helpers-generator.ts) — import the package by name instead. — smoke-router-regex.mjs:30
  • tests/rvf-backend.test.ts:6 reaches into another package with a relative path (../v3/@claude-flow/memory/src/rvf-backend.js) — import the package by name instead. — rvf-backend.test.ts:6

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — hooks.ts:2491, quantization.ts:263, neural.ts:2806, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

  • 477 file(s) over 400 lines

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — gnn.ts, self-learning.ts, quantization.ts, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 148 application, 95 tooling and 570 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (148 application, 95 tooling, 570 test roots considered) (×7) — rvagent_wasm.js, cli-commands.ts, hooks-tools.ts, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — generate-welcome.js:42, generate-welcome.js:44, hooks.server.ts:1
  • Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/neural-tools.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/memory/intelligence.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/memory/memory-bridge.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/memory/memory-initializer.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/memory/rabitq-index.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/neural-tools.ts — neural-tools.ts
  • v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/model-router.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/neural-router.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/model-router.ts — model-router.ts
  • v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/router-trajectory.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/run-transcript-recorder.ts → v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/router-trajectory.ts — router-trajectory.ts
  • v3/@claude-flow/neural/src/modes/balanced.js → v3/@claude-flow/neural/src/modes/batch.js → v3/@claude-flow/neural/src/modes/edge.js → v3/@claude-flow/neural/src/modes/index.js → v3/@claude-flow/neural/src/modes/real-time.js → v3/@claude-flow/neural/src/modes/research.js → v3/@claude-flow/neural/src/modes/balanced.js — balanced.js

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health44%Weak — gated by D2, D3, R3, R7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity88%StrongStrongest area.
Readiness29%Weak — gated by D8, D9, R8, P2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security36%Weak — gated by D28, D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 51 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
  • AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 165 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×50
  • Secret: private-key scripts/smoke-helper-signing-security.mjs:74 — matched rule 'private-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/linux/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/windows/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/linux/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/windows/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/linux/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/windows/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/linux/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/windows/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/linux/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/windows/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/linux/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/windows/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/linux/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/windows/manifest.md.json:957 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key docs/benchmarks/submission/witness.json:18 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:962 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key verification/macos/manifest.md.json:962 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×50
  • High: detect-child-process .claude-plugin/scripts/ruflo-hook.cjs:80 — Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `cmd`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
  • High: detect-child-process .claude-plugin/scripts/ruflo-hook.cjs:108 — Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `bin`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
  • High: detect-child-process .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:88 — Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `subcommand`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
  • High: detect-child-process .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:158 — Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `args`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
  • High: detect-child-process .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:606 — Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `cmd`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:4 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:21 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:44 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:65 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:82 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml:33 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml:43 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml:44 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml:58 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/adr-166-mcp-bridge-security.yml:87 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/all-plugins-smoke.yml:35 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/all-plugins-smoke.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/all-plugins-smoke.yml:89 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/business-pods-smoke.yml:33 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/business-pods-smoke.yml:34 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/business-pods-smoke.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:64 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×43
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — adm-zip 0.5.16: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.6.0 (in 5 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — agentic-flow 2.0.12-fix.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.14 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — axios 1.16.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.18.0 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 5.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.7 (in 13 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 5.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.8 (in 13 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — brace-expansion 5.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.9 (in 13 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3 (in 6 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.5 (in 7 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4 (in 7 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — ip-address 10.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.3.1 (in 7 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — js-yaml 5.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.2.2 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — postcss 8.5.16: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.5.18 (in 20 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — sharp 0.32.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.35.0 (in 7 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json — undici 8.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.9.0 (in 7 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger 2.7.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.9.0 (in 4 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — hono 4.12.19: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.12.25 (in 5 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — protobufjs 6.11.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.6 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — protobufjs 6.11.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.6 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — protobufjs 6.11.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.6 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — protobufjs 6.11.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.6 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — protobufjs 6.11.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.6.1 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — undici 7.27.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.28.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — undici 7.27.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.28.0 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — undici 7.27.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.28.0 (in 5 lockfiles)
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml — @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.14.4 (in 3 lockfiles)
  • + 18 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×11
  • High IaC: DS-0002 ruflo/src/nginx/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 ruflo/src/ruvocal/.devcontainer/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 ruflo/src/ruvocal/.devcontainer/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0017 ruflo/src/ruvocal/Dockerfile — 'RUN <package-manager> update' instruction alone
  • High IaC: DS-0029 ruflo/src/ruvocal/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: DS-0002 tests/docker-regression/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 tests/docker-regression/Dockerfile — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 v3/@claude-flow/browser/docker/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×7
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/package-lock.json — protobufjs 6.11.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.5 (in 2 lockfiles)
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] ruflo/src/ruvocal/package-lock.json — @vitest/browser 3.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.5
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] ruflo/src/ruvocal/package-lock.json — @vitest/browser 3.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.7
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] ruflo/src/ruvocal/package-lock.json — form-data 4.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.4
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] ruflo/src/ruvocal/package-lock.json — handlebars 4.7.8: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.7.9
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] ruflo/src/ruvocal/package-lock.json — vitest 3.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.2.6 (in 13 lockfiles)
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] v3/pnpm-lock.yaml — tar 6.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.5.19
D25 · ADR Conformance · ADR not followed · ×2
  • ADR not followed: ADR-034: Optional MCP Backends — Claude Code, Gemini, Codex ruflo/docs/adr/ADR-034-OPTIONAL-MCP-BACKENDS.md — The summary shows no optional MCP backends, contradicting the decision that Claude Code, Gemini, and Codex be added as disabled-by-default opt-in backends. (ruflo/docs/adr/ADR-034-OPTIONAL-MCP-BACKENDS.md)
  • ADR not followed: ADR-034: Optional MCP Backends — Claude Code, Gemini, Codex ruflo/src/ruvocal/docs/adr/ADR-034-OPTIONAL-MCP-BACKENDS.md — The summary shows no optional MCP backends, contradicting the ADR's decision that Claude Code, Gemini, and Codex be added as disabled-by-default opt-ins. (ruflo/src/ruvocal/docs/adr/ADR-034-OPTIONAL-MCP-BACKENDS.md)
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — no .NET solution found at target path
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — the solution has no test code. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 167 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×16
  • FileTooLong: mcp-bridge/index.js ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1780 lines.
  • FileTooLong: mcp-bridge/index.js ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1995 lines.
  • FileTooLong: wasm/rvagent_wasm.js ruflo/src/ruvocal/static/wasm/rvagent_wasm.js:0 — FileTooLong — 1539 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/metrics-db.mjs .claude/helpers/metrics-db.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 503 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/learning-service.mjs .claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 1144 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 2001 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/metrics-db.mjs v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/metrics-db.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 503 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/learning-service.mjs v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 1144 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/metrics-db.mjs v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/metrics-db.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 503 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/learning-service.mjs v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:0 — FileTooLong — 1144 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/statusline.cjs .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 1215 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/intelligence.cjs .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 1136 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/hook-handler.cjs .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 595 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/statusline.cjs v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 1223 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/intelligence.cjs v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 1136 lines.
  • FileTooLong: helpers/hook-handler.cjs v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 595 lines.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×10
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts — v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts changed 25 times in last 90 days, max complexity 69. 12 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/hooks.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/hooks.ts — v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/hooks.ts changed 18 times in last 90 days, max complexity 90. 10 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs — .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs changed 20 times in last 90 days, max complexity 74. 15 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/init.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/init.ts — v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/init.ts changed 21 times in last 90 days, max complexity 61. 13 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/memory/memory-bridge.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/memory/memory-bridge.ts — v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/memory/memory-bridge.ts changed 27 times in last 90 days, max complexity 45. 19 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: plugins/ruflo-metaharness/scripts/test-mcp-tools.mjs plugins/ruflo-metaharness/scripts/test-mcp-tools.mjs — plugins/ruflo-metaharness/scripts/test-mcp-tools.mjs changed 20 times in last 90 days, max complexity 52. 8 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs — v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs changed 14 times in last 90 days, max complexity 74. 11 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/memory.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/memory.ts — v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/memory.ts changed 17 times in last 90 days, max complexity 53. 9 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts — v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts changed 21 times in last 90 days, max complexity 40. 13 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/neural.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/neural.ts — v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/neural.ts changed 9 times in last 90 days, max complexity 87. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×8
  • Change coupling: auto-memory-hook.mjs ↔ helpers-generator.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs — `v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs` and `v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/init/helpers-generator.ts` change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: auto-memory-hook.mjs ↔ hook-handler.cjs v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs — `v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs` and `v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs` change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: task-tools.ts ↔ workflow-tools.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/task-tools.ts — `v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/task-tools.ts` and `v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/workflow-tools.ts` change together 54% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: hooks-tools.ts ↔ workflow-tools.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts — `v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/hooks-tools.ts` and `v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/workflow-tools.ts` change together 54% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: executor.ts ↔ mcp-generator.ts v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/init/executor.ts — `v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/init/executor.ts` and `v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/init/mcp-generator.ts` change together 54% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: auto-memory-hook.mjs ↔ hook-handler.cjs .claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs — `.claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs` and `.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs` change together 50% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: config-toml.ts ↔ index.ts v3/@claude-flow/codex/src/generators/config-toml.ts — `v3/@claude-flow/codex/src/generators/config-toml.ts` and `v3/@claude-flow/codex/src/migrations/index.ts` change together 50% of the time (5 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: config-toml.ts ↔ initializer.ts v3/@claude-flow/codex/src/generators/config-toml.ts — `v3/@claude-flow/codex/src/generators/config-toml.ts` and `v3/@claude-flow/codex/src/initializer.ts` change together 50% of the time (5 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×5
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 ruflo/src/chat-ui/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Runs as root user
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Seccomp policies disabled
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0125 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Restrict container images to trusted registries
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · main (cyclomatic 17) · ×3
  • main (cyclomatic 17) .claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:1012 — main has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
  • main (cyclomatic 17) v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:1012 — main has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
  • main (cyclomatic 17) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:1012 — main has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · _searchGraph (cognitive 24) · ×3
  • _searchGraph (cognitive 24) .claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:296 — _searchGraph has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • _searchGraph (cognitive 24) v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:296 — _searchGraph has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
  • _searchGraph (cognitive 24) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/learning-service.mjs:296 — _searchGraph has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · syncMetrics (cognitive 23) · ×3
  • syncMetrics (cognitive 23) .claude/helpers/metrics-db.mjs:262 — syncMetrics has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • syncMetrics (cognitive 23) v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/metrics-db.mjs:262 — syncMetrics has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • syncMetrics (cognitive 23) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/metrics-db.mjs:262 — syncMetrics has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · generateStatusline (cyclomatic 74) · ×2
  • generateStatusline (cyclomatic 74) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:908 — generateStatusline has cyclomatic complexity 74 (threshold 15).
  • generateStatusline (cyclomatic 74) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:916 — generateStatusline has cyclomatic complexity 74 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · stats (cyclomatic 51) · ×2
  • stats (cyclomatic 51) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:912 — stats has cyclomatic complexity 51 (threshold 15).
  • stats (cyclomatic 51) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:912 — stats has cyclomatic complexity 51 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · consolidate (cyclomatic 38) · ×2
  • consolidate (cyclomatic 38) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:710 — consolidate has cyclomatic complexity 38 (threshold 15).
  • consolidate (cyclomatic 38) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:710 — consolidate has cyclomatic complexity 38 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · executeGoapSearch (cyclomatic 37) · ×2
  • executeGoapSearch (cyclomatic 37) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:694 — executeGoapSearch has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15).
  • executeGoapSearch (cyclomatic 37) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:783 — executeGoapSearch has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getLocalSecurity (cyclomatic 34) · ×2
  • getLocalSecurity (cyclomatic 34) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:459 — getLocalSecurity has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15).
  • getLocalSecurity (cyclomatic 34) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:463 — getLocalSecurity has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · route (cyclomatic 32) · ×2
  • route (cyclomatic 32) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:367 — route has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15).
  • route (cyclomatic 32) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:367 — route has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · init (cyclomatic 25) · ×2
  • init (cyclomatic 25) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:453 — init has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • init (cyclomatic 25) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:453 — init has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getGitInfo (cyclomatic 23) · ×2
  • getGitInfo (cyclomatic 23) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:633 — getGitInfo has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • getGitInfo (cyclomatic 23) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:637 — getGitInfo has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · buildEdges (cyclomatic 23) · ×2
  • buildEdges (cyclomatic 23) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:276 — buildEdges has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • buildEdges (cyclomatic 23) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:276 — buildEdges has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getPromoRow (cyclomatic 22) · ×2
  • getPromoRow (cyclomatic 22) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:1092 — getPromoRow has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
  • getPromoRow (cyclomatic 22) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:1100 — getPromoRow has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getModelName (cyclomatic 21) · ×2
  • getModelName (cyclomatic 21) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:680 — getModelName has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
  • getModelName (cyclomatic 21) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:684 — getModelName has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · main (cyclomatic 21) · ×2
  • main (cyclomatic 21) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:314 — main has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
  • main (cyclomatic 21) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:314 — main has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · handleAutopilot (cyclomatic 20) · ×2
  • handleAutopilot (cyclomatic 20) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:1395 — handleAutopilot has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
  • handleAutopilot (cyclomatic 20) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:1591 — handleAutopilot has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible (cyclomatic 20) · ×2
  • firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible (cyclomatic 20) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:126 — firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
  • firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible (cyclomatic 20) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:126 — firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:1605 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:1815 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getContext (cyclomatic 18) · ×2
  • getContext (cyclomatic 18) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:581 — getContext has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
  • getContext (cyclomatic 18) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:581 — getContext has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · (anonymous) (cyclomatic 18) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 18) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:352 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cyclomatic 18) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:352 — (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · computePageRank (cyclomatic 17) · ×2
  • computePageRank (cyclomatic 17) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:224 — computePageRank has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
  • computePageRank (cyclomatic 17) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:224 — computePageRank has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · saveSnapshot (cyclomatic 17) · ×2
  • saveSnapshot (cyclomatic 17) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:870 — saveSnapshot has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
  • saveSnapshot (cyclomatic 17) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:870 — saveSnapshot has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · generateStatusline (cognitive 88) · ×2
  • generateStatusline (cognitive 88) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:908 — generateStatusline has cognitive complexity 88 (threshold 15).
  • generateStatusline (cognitive 88) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:916 — generateStatusline has cognitive complexity 88 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · stats (cognitive 67) · ×2
  • stats (cognitive 67) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:912 — stats has cognitive complexity 67 (threshold 15).
  • stats (cognitive 67) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:912 — stats has cognitive complexity 67 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getModelName (cognitive 65) · ×2
  • getModelName (cognitive 65) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:680 — getModelName has cognitive complexity 65 (threshold 15).
  • getModelName (cognitive 65) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:684 — getModelName has cognitive complexity 65 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · consolidate (cognitive 56) · ×2
  • consolidate (cognitive 56) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:710 — consolidate has cognitive complexity 56 (threshold 15).
  • consolidate (cognitive 56) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:710 — consolidate has cognitive complexity 56 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getLocalSecurity (cognitive 50) · ×2
  • getLocalSecurity (cognitive 50) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:459 — getLocalSecurity has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15).
  • getLocalSecurity (cognitive 50) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:463 — getLocalSecurity has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · executeGoapSearch (cognitive 47) · ×2
  • executeGoapSearch (cognitive 47) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:694 — executeGoapSearch has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15).
  • executeGoapSearch (cognitive 47) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:783 — executeGoapSearch has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · route (cognitive 47) · ×2
  • route (cognitive 47) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:367 — route has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15).
  • route (cognitive 47) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:367 — route has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getGitInfo (cognitive 38) · ×2
  • getGitInfo (cognitive 38) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:633 — getGitInfo has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15).
  • getGitInfo (cognitive 38) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:637 — getGitInfo has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · buildEdges (cognitive 36) · ×2
  • buildEdges (cognitive 36) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:276 — buildEdges has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15).
  • buildEdges (cognitive 36) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:276 — buildEdges has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · computePageRank (cognitive 29) · ×2
  • computePageRank (cognitive 29) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:224 — computePageRank has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
  • computePageRank (cognitive 29) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:224 — computePageRank has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · init (cognitive 29) · ×2
  • init (cognitive 29) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:453 — init has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
  • init (cognitive 29) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:453 — init has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · handleAutopilot (cognitive 28) · ×2
  • handleAutopilot (cognitive 28) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:1395 — handleAutopilot has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
  • handleAutopilot (cognitive 28) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:1591 — handleAutopilot has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 28) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 28) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:1605 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 28) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:1815 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getPromoRow (cognitive 25) · ×2
  • getPromoRow (cognitive 25) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:1092 — getPromoRow has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
  • getPromoRow (cognitive 25) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:1100 — getPromoRow has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main (cognitive 23) · ×2
  • main (cognitive 23) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:314 — main has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
  • main (cognitive 23) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:314 — main has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 22) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 22) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:352 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 22) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:352 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · (anonymous) (cognitive 21) · ×2
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 21) ruflo/src/nginx/static/welcome.js:148 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
  • (anonymous) (cognitive 21) ruflo/src/ruvocal/static/chatui/welcome.js:148 — (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getLocalIntegration (cognitive 20) · ×2
  • getLocalIntegration (cognitive 20) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:384 — getLocalIntegration has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
  • getLocalIntegration (cognitive 20) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:388 — getLocalIntegration has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getPkgVersion (cognitive 20) · ×2
  • getPkgVersion (cognitive 20) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:830 — getPkgVersion has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
  • getPkgVersion (cognitive 20) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:834 — getPkgVersion has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getLocalHooks (cognitive 19) · ×2
  • getLocalHooks (cognitive 19) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:359 — getLocalHooks has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
  • getLocalHooks (cognitive 19) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:363 — getLocalHooks has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · resolveWorktreeMainRoot (cognitive 19) · ×2
  • resolveWorktreeMainRoot (cognitive 19) .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:798 — resolveWorktreeMainRoot has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
  • resolveWorktreeMainRoot (cognitive 19) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:802 — resolveWorktreeMainRoot has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getContext (cognitive 19) · ×2
  • getContext (cognitive 19) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:581 — getContext has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
  • getContext (cognitive 19) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:581 — getContext has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible (cognitive 19) · ×2
  • firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible (cognitive 19) .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:126 — firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
  • firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible (cognitive 19) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs:126 — firstRunAutoEnableIfEligible has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · deduplicateByContent (cognitive 18) · ×2
  • deduplicateByContent (cognitive 18) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:172 — deduplicateByContent has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
  • deduplicateByContent (cognitive 18) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:172 — deduplicateByContent has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · saveSnapshot (cognitive 18) · ×2
  • saveSnapshot (cognitive 18) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:870 — saveSnapshot has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
  • saveSnapshot (cognitive 18) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:870 — saveSnapshot has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · boostConfidence (cognitive 17) · ×2
  • boostConfidence (cognitive 17) .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:678 — boostConfidence has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
  • boostConfidence (cognitive 17) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs:678 — boostConfidence has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · loadMemoryPackage (cognitive 16) · ×2
  • loadMemoryPackage (cognitive 16) .claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs:167 — loadMemoryPackage has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
  • loadMemoryPackage (cognitive 16) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs:167 — loadMemoryPackage has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · publishRegistry (cyclomatic 46) · ×1
  • publishRegistry (cyclomatic 46) v3/@claude-flow/cli/cloud-functions/publish-registry/index.js:193 — publishRegistry has cyclomatic complexity 46 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · executeTool (cyclomatic 30) · ×1
  • executeTool (cyclomatic 30) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:789 — executeTool has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · estimateContextTokens (cyclomatic 27) · ×1
  • estimateContextTokens (cyclomatic 27) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1415 — estimateContextTokens has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · executeTool (cyclomatic 26) · ×1
  • executeTool (cyclomatic 26) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:960 — executeTool has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · buildCompactInstructions (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • buildCompactInstructions (cyclomatic 21) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1130 — buildCompactInstructions has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · retrieveContextSmart (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • retrieveContextSmart (cyclomatic 21) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1234 — retrieveContextSmart has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · getUserInfo (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • getUserInfo (cyclomatic 21) v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:68 — getUserInfo has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · doStatus (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • doStatus (cyclomatic 18) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1853 — doStatus has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · geminiGroundedSearch (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • geminiGroundedSearch (cyclomatic 17) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:653 — geminiGroundedSearch has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · autoOptimize (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • autoOptimize (cyclomatic 17) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1309 — autoOptimize has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · executeGoapSearchGemini (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • executeGoapSearchGemini (cyclomatic 16) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:864 — executeGoapSearchGemini has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · generateStatusline (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • generateStatusline (cyclomatic 16) v3/@claude-flow/cli/.claude/helpers/statusline.js:260 — generateStatusline has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · generateSafeStatusline (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • generateSafeStatusline (cyclomatic 16) v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:422 — generateSafeStatusline has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · publishRegistry (cognitive 67) · ×1
  • publishRegistry (cognitive 67) v3/@claude-flow/cli/cloud-functions/publish-registry/index.js:193 — publishRegistry has cognitive complexity 67 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · getUserInfo (cognitive 45) · ×1
  • getUserInfo (cognitive 45) v3/@claude-flow/mcp/.claude/helpers/statusline.cjs:68 — getUserInfo has cognitive complexity 45 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · estimateContextTokens (cognitive 42) · ×1
  • estimateContextTokens (cognitive 42) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1415 — estimateContextTokens has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · executeTool (cognitive 37) · ×1
  • executeTool (cognitive 37) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:960 — executeTool has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · executeTool (cognitive 34) · ×1
  • executeTool (cognitive 34) ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/index.js:789 — executeTool has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · buildCompactInstructions (cognitive 32) · ×1
  • buildCompactInstructions (cognitive 32) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1130 — buildCompactInstructions has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · retrieveContextSmart (cognitive 29) · ×1
  • retrieveContextSmart (cognitive 29) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1234 — retrieveContextSmart has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · autoOptimize (cognitive 27) · ×1
  • autoOptimize (cognitive 27) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1309 — autoOptimize has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · executeGoapSearchGemini (cognitive 23) · ×1
  • executeGoapSearchGemini (cognitive 23) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:864 — executeGoapSearchGemini has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · doStatus (cognitive 23) · ×1
  • doStatus (cognitive 23) .claude/helpers/context-persistence-hook.mjs:1853 — doStatus has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · geminiGroundedSearch (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • geminiGroundedSearch (cognitive 17) ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/index.js:653 — geminiGroundedSearch has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · __wbg_load (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • __wbg_load (cognitive 17) ruflo/src/ruvocal/static/wasm/rvagent_wasm.js:1458 — __wbg_load has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D20 · ADR Quality · Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are both absent from the visible text; only implementation status and related ADRs appear · ×1
  • Context/problem and consequences/trade-offs are both absent from the visible text; only implementation status and related ADRs appear v3/docs/adr/ADR-322-metaharness-flywheel-integration.md — Add a Context section explaining why plugging in @metaharness/{flywheel,darwin} is needed (the gap they claim to fill) and a Consequences section covering trade-offs such as dependency pinning, runtime materialization cost, and the unactivated dream-cycle/promotion path
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
Recommendation — 384 finding(s)
D20 · ADR Quality · ADR lacks an enforcement field · ×364
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycle/2026-06-15-performance-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycle/2026-06-21-security-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycle/2026-07-08-memory-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-03-memory-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-19-swarm-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-20-performance-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-21-security-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-22-intelligence-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-23-memory-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-24-swarm-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-25-performance-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-27-intelligence-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field docs/dream-cycles/2026-07-30-performance-sota.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-adr/docs/adrs/0001-adr-plugin-pattern.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-adr/docs/adrs/0002-reconcile-deleted-adrs.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-agent/docs/adrs/0001-wasm-contract.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-agentdb/docs/adrs/0001-agentdb-optimization.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-agntcy/docs/adrs/ADR-380-agntcy-outshift-runtime-integration.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-aidefence/docs/adrs/0001-aidefence-contract.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-arena/docs/adrs/0001-arena-contract.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-autopilot/docs/adrs/0001-autopilot-contract.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-browser/docs/adrs/0001-browser-skills-architecture.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-core/docs/adrs/0001-core-contract.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-cost-tracker/docs/adrs/0001-cost-tracker-contract.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • ADR lacks an enforcement field plugins/ruflo-cost-tracker/docs/adrs/0002-agentic-flow-and-agent-booster-integration.md — Add an `enforcement:` frontmatter field or a plain `Enforcement:` header line (prose/test/analyzer/not-applicable) to make the rung explicit — the other ADRs in this repo already declare one.
  • + 339 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×13
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 ruflo/src/chat-ui/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 ruflo/src/mcp-bridge/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 ruflo/src/nginx/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 ruflo/src/ruvocal/.devcontainer/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 ruflo/src/ruvocal/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all
  • Low IaC: KSV-0004 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop any
  • Low IaC: KSV-0020 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Runs with UID <= 10000
  • Low IaC: KSV-0021 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Runs with GID <= 10000
  • Low IaC: KSV-0030 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Runtime/Default Seccomp profile not set
  • Low IaC: KSV-0106 ruflo/src/ruvocal/chart/templates/deployment.yaml — Container capabilities must only include NET_BIND_SERVICE
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 ruflo/src/ruvocal/mcp-bridge/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 v3/@claude-flow/browser/docker/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The top-level 'Ruflo' banner is a static asset link (ruflo-small.jpeg) and the ecosystem strip, but there is no branding or usage note for the reader about how to install/ruflo. · ×1
  • The top-level 'Ruflo' banner is a static asset link (ruflo-small.jpeg) and the ecosystem strip, but there is no branding or usage note for the reader about how to install/ruflo. README.md — Add a brief one-line install instruction under the banner so readers can skip past the assets.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .114artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .381artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet (no .NET solution)—dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .29artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .255artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019fddea-5860-76dc-82d9-526d074c00f3 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 165 · Warnings: 167 · Recommendations: 384 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 20:29 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md