Public report — aspnetrun-microservices, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 17:54 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Sanjyotagureddy/aspnetrun-Microservices

60% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle

Small · 9,058 LoC · 22 projects · rebuild ~0.3 person-years · weakest lens: Security (50%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

63/67dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
35findings with an exact file:lineof 85 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
67/100dimensions across the health lenses9058 LoC · 22 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

sanjyotagureddy/aspnetrun-microservices is in a workable but fragile state (60%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Code Health (86%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (50%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Performance (64%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); authorization at every handler (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture).

For scale: Small (~9,058 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 50% · 46% weightPerformance 64% · 25% weightReadiness 68% · 14% weightMaturity 72% · 8% weightArchitecture 78% · 4% weightCode Health 86% · 2% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight

Raise Security 50 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 60 → ~68.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 26%Plumbing 41%Tests 33%
New since the last scan (20+)

20 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  • D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Cart/Cart.Api/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Order/Order.Api/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Discount/Discount.Grpc/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €14,000–€70,000
Cost to rebuild€14,000–€70,000 (0.1–0.4 person-years (228–737 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 60% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 38% boilerplate · 23% straight-line · 39% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€42,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 50% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, event-driven integration, high decision density × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql-analysis.yml (4).
+5.7 pts · Low effort · Static Analysis (SAST)
2
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
+9.0 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection
3
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
+9.0 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 50%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.3 person-years rebuild (9,058 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 50%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Cart.Api Api Common.SharedKernel SharedKernel Cart.Api->Common.SharedKernel aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults ServiceDefaults Cart.Api->aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults Common.SharedKernel.Logging Logging Common.SharedKernel.Logging->Common.SharedKernel Common.SharedKernel.Messaging Messaging Common.SharedKernel.Messaging->Common.SharedKernel Common.SharedKernel.Messaging->Common.SharedKernel.Logging Discount.Grpc Grpc Discount.Grpc->aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults Gateway.Yarp Yarp Gateway.Yarp->Common.SharedKernel Gateway.Yarp->aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults Inventory.Api Api Inventory.Api->Common.SharedKernel Inventory.Api->Common.SharedKernel.Logging Inventory.Api->Common.SharedKernel.Messaging Inventory.Api->aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults Order.Api Api Order.Api->Common.SharedKernel Order.Api->aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults Products.Api Api Products.Api->Common.SharedKernel Products.Api->Common.SharedKernel.Logging Products.Api->Common.SharedKernel.Messaging Products.Api->aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost AppHost aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost->Cart.Api aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost->Discount.Grpc aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost->Gateway.Yarp aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost->Inventory.Api aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost->Order.Api aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost->Products.Api

Architecture — module dependency matrix

55 modules, 88 dependencies — 2 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

(global)Cart.ApiCommon.SharedKernel…l.Abstractions.Events…ons.IntegrationEvents….SharedKernel.Logging…Observability.Context….SharedKernel.Results…mmon.SharedKernel.WebDiscount.Grpc…ventory.Api.ContractsProducts.Api.Contracts…Abstractions.Entities…haredKernel.MessagingDiscount.Grpc.Services…ory.Api.Domain.Events…ures.Inventory.Events…ory.Api.Observability…der.Api.Observability…cts.Api.Domain.Events…tures.Products.Events…cts.Api.Observability…Abstractions.Auditing…rnel.Messaging.OutboxInventory.Api.Domain…Infrastructure.OutboxProducts.Api.Domain…Infrastructure.Outbox…structure.Persistence…structure.Persistence….Inventory.Initialize…tures.Products.Update…ry.Api.Infrastructure…ts.Api.Infrastructure…es.Inventory.GetBatch…entory.GetByProductId…tures.Products.Create…tures.Products.Delete…Features.Products.Get…ures.Products.GetById(global)1Cart.Api2Common.SharedKernel3…l.Abstractions.Events4…ons.IntegrationEvents5….SharedKernel.Logging6…Observability.Context7….SharedKernel.Results8…mmon.SharedKernel.Web9Discount.Grpc10…ventory.Api.Contracts11Products.Api.Contracts12…Abstractions.Entities13…haredKernel.Messaging14Discount.Grpc.Services15…ory.Api.Domain.Events16…ures.Inventory.Events17…ory.Api.Observability18…der.Api.Observability19…cts.Api.Domain.Events20…tures.Products.Events21…cts.Api.Observability22…Abstractions.Auditing23…rnel.Messaging.Outbox24Inventory.Api.Domain25…Infrastructure.Outbox26Products.Api.Domain27…Infrastructure.Outbox28…structure.Persistence29…structure.Persistence30….Inventory.Initialize31…tures.Products.Update32…ry.Api.Infrastructure33…ts.Api.Infrastructure34…es.Inventory.GetBatch35…entory.GetByProductId36…tures.Products.Create37…tures.Products.Delete38…Features.Products.Get39…ures.Products.GetById401331162233621121212261212261313311111111112112121121131241111211111111211211111111221112+15 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 86% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 78% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 72% · Strong

At a glance — Readiness · 68% · Adequate

At a glance — Security · 50% · Adequate · gated by C1, C2

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Performance · 64% · Adequate

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components11High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration11Medium
A03:2021 — Injection4High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by encrypting sensitive data at rest and managing keys in a vault, while enforcing authorization at every handler to ensure protected-by-default practices. Next, harden the web-security posture by adding critical security response headers for defense in depth. Finally, address the four high-priority static analysis findings and the nine medium-severity dependency vulnerabilities to complete the security remediation.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql-analysis.yml (4).+5.7 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+9.0 ptsMediumData Protection
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.+9.0 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+7.6 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.+2.7 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.+2.3 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+1.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).+2.6 ptsMediumBenchmark discipline

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 21 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 5% slop · 33% mixed · 62% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml2.7SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Dockerfile7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2
src/Services/Cart/Cart.Api/Dockerfile7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2
src/Services/Order/Order.Api/Dockerfile7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2
src/Services/Discount/Discount.Grpc/Dockerfile7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2
src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Dockerfile7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cyclomatic 22)
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Pipeline/DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.cs7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.Traverse (cognitive 24)
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/DependencyInjection/LoggingBuilder.cs8.0Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: LoggingConfiguration.Validate (cognitive 16)
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Abstractions/LogEnrichmentContext.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: ToReadOnlyDictionary
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Providers/NullMessageConsumer.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: NullMessageConsumer
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Compatibility/MessageContractCompatibility.cs8.5Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: MessageContractCompatibility.IsCompatible (cyclomatic 17)
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/DependencyInjection/MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.Validate (cognitive 21)
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Outbox/OutboxPublisherBase.cs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: OutboxPublisherBase.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 19)
src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (40 lines × 2)
src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Program.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (37 lines × 2)
src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Options/LoggingPolicyOptions.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)
src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/Persistence/InventoryTransactionExecutor.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Observability/InventoryRequestLoggingMiddleware.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Program.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 63 of 67 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 67 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D7D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D20D21D24D25D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2C4ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P7PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 35 of 85 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8c2-f790-72d1-be21-321bc7002ffb.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D20, D21, D24, D25, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync at 22.

RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cyclomatic 22)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:17
MessageContractCompatibility.IsCompatible (cyclomatic 17)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Compatibility/MessageContractCompatibility.cs:5

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync at 34.

RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cognitive 34)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:17
DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.Traverse (cognitive 24)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Pipeline/DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.cs:81
MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.Validate (cognitive 21)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/DependencyInjection/MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs:98
OutboxPublisherBase.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 19)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Outbox/OutboxPublisherBase.cs:23
LoggingConfiguration.Validate (cognitive 16)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/DependencyInjection/LoggingBuilder.cs:240

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cognitive 34) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.Traverse (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.Validate (cognitive 21) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

8 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/Persistence/InventoryTransactionExecutor.cs:32
Duplicated block (40 lines × 2)src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:16
Duplicated block (37 lines × 2)src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Program.cs:15
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Pipeline/DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.cs:347
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Options/LoggingPolicyOptions.cs:44

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

22 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 35 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 3 mechanizable ADRs, 3 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

167 test methods: 153 unit, 14 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 6 mock references across 167 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×6

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

23 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: MessagePack
Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.Kafka · ×23

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 36 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs (3×22=66); src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/DependencyInjection/MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs (4×15=60)

Hotspot: src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs · ×2src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs.

Small-team knowledge concentration

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted debt markers + 2 dead symbols across 9058 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9.

Dead code: ToReadOnlyDictionary · ×2src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Abstractions/LogEnrichmentContext.cs:54

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 projects, 326 source files, 13498 hand-written lines of code (9058 production / 4440 test), 52 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 4 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.5/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

What to do

  1. Improve ADR Quality — currently 8.5/10. — Evaluated 4 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.5/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 valuable / 0 redundant across 55 sampled comments.

What to do

  1. Improve Comment Value — currently 8.0/10. — 16 valuable / 0 redundant across 55 sampled comments.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 conform / 0 violate across 4 ADRs.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 22 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

74 % of calls cross a namespace and 5 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×4.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:41detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codeql-analysis.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 9 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 6 medium, 5 low.

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 · ×6src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×5src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 691 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/DependencyInjection/LoggingBuilder.cs:142

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `MessagingInstrumentation` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_consumerLag; e.g. `_consumerLag` at line 42). — MessagingInstrumentation.cs:6

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.

What to do

  • Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
C4 · Data Retention7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob).

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 20 of 22 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.8 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 4) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Only 8/22 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 6/11 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 11, 7 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 34 use(s) across 9,815 production line(s) (~3.5/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • 7 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

  • Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×7) — ILogger.cs:14, ILogger.cs:17, ILogger.cs:20, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 77/83 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×3) — RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:17, RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:338, RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:382
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×3) — RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:420, KafkaDestinationProvisioner.cs:171, AppCallContextMiddlewareBase.cs:16

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 9 suppression(s) across the 45961 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health86%StrongSolid.
Architecture78%StrongSolid.
Maturity72%StrongSolid.
Readiness68%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Security50%Adequate — gated by C1, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Performance64%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Not included — 33 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 5 domain event(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 7 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×4
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:45 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:59 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/autobuild` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/autobuild` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:72 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1
  • Vulnerable: MessagePack — MessagePack 2.5.192 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Warning — 39 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×9
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×6
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Cart/Cart.Api/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Order/Order.Api/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Services/Discount/Discount.Grpc/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
  • Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:27 — Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×2
  • Hotspot: src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs — src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 22. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
  • Hotspot: src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/DependencyInjection/MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/DependencyInjection/MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs — src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/DependencyInjection/MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs changed 4 times in last 90 days, max complexity 15. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×2
  • Dead code: ToReadOnlyDictionary src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Abstractions/LogEnrichmentContext.cs:54 — Method ToReadOnlyDictionary — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: NullMessageConsumer src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Providers/NullMessageConsumer.cs:3 — NamedType NullMessageConsumer — no references found in solution.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/Persistence/InventoryTransactionExecutor.cs:32 — src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/Persistence/InventoryTransactionExecutor.cs:32-44 | src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Infrastructure/Persistence/ProductTransactionExecutor.cs:32-44 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/Persistence/InventoryTransactionExecutor.cs:32` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Observability/InventoryRequestLoggingMiddleware.cs:25 — src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Observability/InventoryRequestLoggingMiddleware.cs:25-37 | src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Observability/ProductsRequestLoggingMiddleware.cs:25-37 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2
  • Off the main sequence: aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults — aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 6 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Common.SharedKernel — Common.SharedKernel: abstractness 0.26, instability 0.00, distance 0.74 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cyclomatic 22) · ×1
  • RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cyclomatic 22) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:17 — RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · MessageContractCompatibility.IsCompatible (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • MessageContractCompatibility.IsCompatible (cyclomatic 17) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Compatibility/MessageContractCompatibility.cs:5 — MessageContractCompatibility.IsCompatible has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function, or replace a long branch ladder over a single value with a data-driven lookup or dispatch table.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not measured · ×1
  • Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the test run produced no results for any test tier, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. The cause could not be attributed, so it is excluded from the score rather than read as an absence of tests.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1170.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cognitive 34) · ×1
  • RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync (cognitive 34) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Middleware/RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.cs:17 — RequestLoggingMiddlewareBase.InvokeAsync has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.Traverse (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.Traverse (cognitive 24) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Pipeline/DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.cs:81 — DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.Traverse has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.Validate (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.Validate (cognitive 21) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/DependencyInjection/MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.cs:98 — MessagingConfigurationValidationHostedService.Validate has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Of this number, 20 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · OutboxPublisherBase.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • OutboxPublisherBase.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 19) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Messaging/Outbox/OutboxPublisherBase.cs:23 — OutboxPublisherBase.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · LoggingConfiguration.Validate (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • LoggingConfiguration.Validate (cognitive 16) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/DependencyInjection/LoggingBuilder.cs:240 — LoggingConfiguration.Validate has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (40 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (40 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:16 — src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:16-55 | src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Infrastructure/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:17-56 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Infrastructure/GlobalExceptionHandler.cs:16` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Program.cs:15 — src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Program.cs:15-51 | src/Services/Cart/Cart.Api/Program.cs:15-51 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Program.cs:15` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Pipeline/DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.cs:347 — src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Pipeline/DefaultPayloadMaskingEngine.cs:347-363 | src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Redaction/DefaultLogRedactor.cs:148-164 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Options/LoggingPolicyOptions.cs:44 — src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Options/LoggingPolicyOptions.cs:44-58 | src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Options/PayloadProtectionOptions.cs:64-78 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Program.cs:13 — src/Services/Inventory/Inventory.Api/Program.cs:13-24 | src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Program.cs:17-28 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Features/Products/Create/CreateProductCommandValidator.cs:7 — src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Features/Products/Create/CreateProductCommandValidator.cs:7-11 | src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Features/Products/Update/UpdateProductCommandValidator.cs:8-12 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. No coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output anywhere in the repo, or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×5
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Gateway/Gateway.Yarp/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Cart/Cart.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Discount/Discount.Grpc/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Order/Order.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Product/Products.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 8080`, so a request to `localhost:8080` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D16 · Bus Factor · Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
  • Small-team knowledge concentration — 16 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 16 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 7 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Cart.Api.Tests` with 17 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 84 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.28 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 9058 LoC spread over 22 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/DependencyInjection/LoggingBuilder.cs:142 — 1 of 691 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Common.SharedKernel.Logging.LoggingBuilder.Register @ src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/DependencyInjection/LoggingBuilder.cs:142, 264 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 10.0/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
Info — 30 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×23
  • Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.Kafka — Aspire.Hosting.Kafka 13.4.2 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost).
  • Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.PostgreSQL — Aspire.Hosting.PostgreSQL 13.4.2 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost).
  • Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.RabbitMQ — Aspire.Hosting.RabbitMQ 13.4.2 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost).
  • Outdated: Aspire.Hosting.Redis — Aspire.Hosting.Redis 13.4.2 → 13.4.6 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost).
  • Outdated: MessagePack — MessagePack 2.5.192 → 3.1.8 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.AppHost).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience — Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Resilience 10.7.0 → 10.8.0 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.ServiceDiscovery — Microsoft.Extensions.ServiceDiscovery 10.7.0 → 10.8.0 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.16.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting 1.16.0 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.15.2 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.15.1 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Runtime 1.15.1 → 1.17.0 available (referenced by aspnetrun-microservices.ServiceDefaults).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 10.0.8 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Gateway.Yarp).
  • Outdated: Confluent.Kafka — Confluent.Kafka 2.14.2 → 2.15.0 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel.Messaging).
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 14.1.0 → 14.2.0 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel).
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 10.2.1 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel).
  • Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore — Grpc.AspNetCore 2.80.0 → 2.83.0 available (referenced by Discount.Grpc).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 18.6.0 → 18.8.1 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel.Logging.IntegrationTests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Testing.Extensions.CodeCoverage — Microsoft.Testing.Extensions.CodeCoverage 18.8.0 → 18.9.0 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel.Logging.IntegrationTests).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Testing.Extensions.TrxReport — Microsoft.Testing.Extensions.TrxReport 2.2.3 → 2.3.3 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel.Logging.IntegrationTests).
  • Outdated: NSubstitute — NSubstitute 5.3.0 → 6.0.0 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel.Logging.IntegrationTests).
  • Outdated: Testcontainers.Kafka — Testcontainers.Kafka 4.12.0 → 4.13.0 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel.Messaging.IntegrationTests).
  • Outdated: Testcontainers.PostgreSql — Testcontainers.PostgreSql 4.12.0 → 4.13.0 available (referenced by Common.SharedKernel.Messaging.IntegrationTests).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×6
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — Common.SharedKernel.Logging.IntegrationTests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: Moq — Inventory.Api.IntegrationTests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — Common.SharedKernel.Logging.UnitTests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — Common.SharedKernel.Messaging.UnitTests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: Moq — Inventory.Api.Tests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — Products.Api.Tests references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .4artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list aspnetrun-microservices.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json11artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .11artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc8c2-f790-72d1-be21-321bc7002ffb · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 3 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 1 field(s)
  • StrictMaskingFields.EmailFields src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Redaction/Maskers/StrictMaskingFields.cs:66
Financial (card / IBAN) — 1 field(s)
  • StrictMaskingFields.CreditCardFields src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Redaction/Maskers/StrictMaskingFields.cs:30
Phone — 1 field(s)
  • StrictMaskingFields.PhoneFields src/Shared/Common.SharedKernel.Logging/Redaction/Maskers/StrictMaskingFields.cs:75

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md