scalacenter/scaladex

Executive summary

scalacenter/scaladex scores 42 out of 100 and is rated Weak, while five of its seven lenses score higher still: Architecture at 79, Maturity at 52 and Code Health at 51, all rated Adequate, and Production Readiness at 70 and Performance at 66, both rated Strong. The project hasn't declared a stable release yet, so its lenses are rated against a lower bar than a released product's, while the score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The score is lower than those five because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Accessibility, which scores 34 and is rated Weak. Its Keyboard semantics dimension scores 1 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Accessibility can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) and to review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key, and if Accessibility rose to 70, the score would rise from 42 to about 48.

55 findings are critical: 19 in Static Analysis (SAST), 15 in Forms & labels, 11 in Secrets (history), six in ARIA correctness, two in Text alternatives, one in Dependency Vulnerabilities and one in REDACTED Scanning.

Watchdog couldn't measure 7 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Test Reliability and Internal API Consistency, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 12,426 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €14,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 51 Adequate, capped by Structured logging and Nullable reference types Architecture 79 Adequate, capped by Project Cohesion Maturity 52 Adequate, capped by Architecture documentation Production Readiness 70 Strong Security and Compliance 38 Weak, capped by Secrets (history), Static Analysis (SAST) and Web-Security Posture Accessibility 34 Weak, capped by Keyboard semantics and Visual & motion safety Performance 66 Strong

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Accessibility 34 · counts for 46%Security and Compliance 38 · counts for 25%Code Health 51 · counts for 14%Maturity 52 · counts for 8%Performance 66 · counts for 4%Production Readiness 70 · counts for 2%Architecture 79 · counts for 1%

If Accessibility rose from 34 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 42 to about 48.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Product code 76%Tests 24%

New since the last survey: 11 findings

These 11 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 5 October 2026.

REDACTED Scanning · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
Web-Security Posture · Weak hash algorithm modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Sha1.scala
Incompleteness & stubs · Unfinished stub — body is ??? / NotImplementedError modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala
Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement modules/server/src/main/assets/css/partials/_github.scss
Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_buttons.scss
Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_navigation.scss
Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_progress.scss
Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_toggles.scss

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding

This critical or serious finding was in the previous survey, on 5 October 2026, and is gone from this one.

Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED

Rebuild cost: about €14,000 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€4,600 to €23,000, for 77 to 245 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.7 at a score of 42. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 12,426 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (8).

Raises the score by about 3 points · Low effort · Static Analysis (SAST)

Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.

Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

Raises the score by about 4 points · Medium effort · Keyboard semantics

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €14,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Accessibility, at 34 (Weak). Accessibility is about whether the interface is built so that everyone can use it, including people who can't see the screen or can't use a mouse. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Accessibility also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Accessibility grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Accessibility actions in Top priorities.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST). Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 3 points for low effort, because it clears the 8 Static Analysis (SAST) findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

59 modules, with 128 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 6 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 19 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	1 core.model.DiscoveredGroupId	3 core.service.MavenCentralIndexClient	4 core.util	5 infra.config.HttpClientConfig	6 core.model.Artifact	7 infra.config	8 view.Job	9 core.model.ArtifactDependency	10 core.model.Project	11 core.model.search	12 core.model	14 core.api	18 core.model.GithubStatus	20 core.web	21 data.maven	22 infra.github.GithubModel	23 infra.migrations.V7_2__edit_platform_and_language	25 server.config	26 client	28 core.service	29 data.cleanup	35 view	37 infra	38 server.service
1 core.model.DiscoveredGroupId
2 core.model.data
3 core.service.MavenCentralIndexClient
4 core.util
5 infra.config.HttpClientConfig
6 core.model.Artifact											5
7 infra.config			2	3
8 view.Job		3
9 core.model.ArtifactDependency					1						6
10 core.model.Project					2						2
11 core.model.search					3				2		17	2
12 core.model	1		1		14			2	4	1		1
13 infra.elasticsearch					2				2	2
14 core.api					12				9	4	25
15 core.model.Category											76
16 core.model.Env											3
17 core.model.GithubResponse											4
18 core.model.GithubStatus					1						5
19 core.model.MetaCategory											28
20 core.web											2
21 data.maven					1				2		3
22 infra.github.GithubModel			1		1						3
23 infra.migrations.V7_2__edit_platform_and_language					3						4
24 infra.sql					5	1		2			13
25 server.config						7					1
26 client												3
27 client.Autocompletion												1
28 core.service		1	2		13			2	3	9	39		1
29 data.cleanup			1		2										1
30 data.maven.PomsReader									1						1
31 infra.github											1					1
32 infra.migrations					3						3						1
33 server.route					4				1	4	16			2
34 server.route.api			2		1					1	4	5
35 view					2					2	4			1
36 data						3					2									1
37 infra		3	1	2	10	1		2	3	7	32		1			4			1	8
38 server.service		2	1		18		6		1		15				2						1	2
39 server			1		2				2	1	3							1		3			2	2
40 server.service.PublishResult					1																			5

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 51% · Adequate · gated by X4, X5 ·

The Good

D1 · Scala Cyclomatic Complexity 9.5 D2 · Scala Cognitive Complexity 7.2 D3 · Scala God Classes 9.0 D4 · Scala Code Duplication 9.9 D17 · Scala Explicit Debt 9.8 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.9 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0

The Bad

X3 · Repo Exception handling 6.0

The Ugly

X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 2.7 X4 · Repo Structured logging 2.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 79% · Adequate · gated by D26 ·

The Good

D5 · Scala Coupling 8.9 D6 · Scala Cohesion (LCOM4) 9.4 D35 · Scala Change Coupling 9.9 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 8.8 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0

The Bad

AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.7

The Ugly

D26 · Scala Project Cohesion 0.0

At a glance — Maturity · 52% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · Scala Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.9 D16 · Scala Bus Factor 7.3 D19 · Scala Documentation Quality 9.0 D21 · Scala Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · Scala Knowledge Freshness 7.4 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0

The Bad

M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 5.2 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 6.0

The Ugly

D20 · Scala ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 70% · Strong ·

The Good

D9 · Scala Test Distribution 10.0 D12 · Scala Dependency Hygiene 9.6 D14 · Scala License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 8.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 7.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

D13 · Scala REDACTED Scanning 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

At a glance — Security · 38% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, S1 ·

The Good

D30 · Scala Dependency Vulnerabilities 9.4 D43 · Scala Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · Scala Platform End-of-Life 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

The Ugly

D28 · Scala Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · Scala Static Analysis (SAST) 2.1 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 2.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 3.5

At a glance — Accessibility · 34% · Weak · gated by AC4, AC6 ·

The Bad

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 5.7 AC3 · Repo Page structure 5.2 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 5.1

The Ugly

AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 4.3 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 3.9 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

At a glance — Performance · 66% · Strong ·

The Good

PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 7.0

The Bad

PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 6.3

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A05:2025 — Injection	19	High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures	13	High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	1	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, strengthen the web security posture by replacing weak cryptographic hashes with SHA-256 or non-cryptographic alternatives based on their specific use case. Next, address immediate compliance and safety risks by resolving historical secret leaks in the codebase and fixing tainted SQL strings identified by static analysis. Finally, improve accessibility and user experience by ensuring custom controls are fully keyboard-operable, maintaining visible focus styles, and correcting color contrast and animation settings for users with motion sensitivities.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (8).	+3.3 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.	+4.7 pts	Medium	Web-Security Posture
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.	+4.0 pts	Medium	Keyboard semantics
Resolve the 11 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2).	+3.6 pts	Medium	Secrets (history)
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.	+1.5 pts	Low	ADR Quality
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED.	+1.0 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED.	+1.0 pts	Low	Dependency Vulnerabilities
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.	+1.9 pts	Medium	Visual & motion safety

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 33 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 3% slop · 30% mixed · 67% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	2.3	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.0	Mixed	REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.0	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.4	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
modules/server/src/test/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala	6.5	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/PublishProcess.scala	6.7	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html	7.2	Near-clean	Cyclomatic Complexity: main.scala.html.buildCombobox (cyclomatic 17)
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Near-clean	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala	7.3	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
modules/server-it/src/test/scala/scaladex/RelevanceTest.scala	7.3	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala	7.8	Near-clean	Cyclomatic Complexity: ProjectPages.route (cyclomatic 20)
modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala	7.8	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: MavenCentralIndexParser.parseChunk (cognitive 27)
modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/OldSearchApi.scala	7.8	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: OldSearchApi.parseBinaryVersion (cognitive 17)

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 55

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 82

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 52

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 9

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 70 of 74 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 74 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D12D13D14D15D16D17D19D20D21D26D28D29D30D34D35D43D44AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX10AX2AX3AX4AX6AX8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P6P8PF2PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 164 of 189 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a15dfa-9e03-7ec0-a513-c6f9113c1d2c.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.scala) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.scala) and this repository declares an sbt build (repository root, 62 test files), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/api/ProjectSettingsPatch.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/ArtifactDependency.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/GithubStatus.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Version.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/util/ScalaExtensions.scala`, … (+11 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 33 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. Watchdog then boots it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D26, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.5 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ProjectPages.route at 20.

ProjectPages.route (cyclomatic 20)modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala:39

main.scala.html.buildCombobox (cyclomatic 17)modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:190

What to do

Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ProjectPages.route (cyclomatic 20), main.scala.html.buildCombobox (cyclomatic 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.5 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was FrontPage.frontPage at 76.

FrontPage.frontPage (cognitive 76)modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/FrontPage.scala:28

ProjectPages.route (cognitive 40)modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala:39

DiscoveryService.discover (cognitive 32)modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/DiscoveryService.scala:38

Init.run (cognitive 28)modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/init/Init.scala:17

MavenCentralIndexParser.parseChunk (cognitive 27)modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:130

+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Bring the 3 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with FrontPage.frontPage (cognitive 76), ProjectPages.route (cognitive 40), DiscoveryService.discover (cognitive 32). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 7.2 to about 8.2/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: ElasticsearchEnginemodules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:60

MethodTooLong: OldSearchApi.parseBinaryVersionmodules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/OldSearchApi.scala:40

FunctionTooLong: main.scala.html.buildComboboxmodules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:190

What to do

Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with ElasticsearchEngine.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with OldSearchApi.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with main.scala.html. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Stronggated by 4 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 duplicated block group(s) detected. One further row reports members as variants of one another; it aggregates block groups already counted above and is not itself counted.

Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens)modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:89

Duplicated block (11–13 lines × 2)modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:43

Duplicated block (7 lines × 3)modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:143

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:100

What to do

Resolve the 1 Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Artifact.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (11–13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Artifact.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 production modules (sbt), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; a dependsOn spread (deps: _*) and a project whose directory a helper computes are not visible there; 1 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 6 of the 7 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).

Off the main sequence: core

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.4 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 19 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: ElasticsearchEngine (LCOM4 5)modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:60

What to do

Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with ElasticsearchEngine.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

278 test methods: 278 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Scala suite contributes 278 test case(s) across 50 file(s) in a test source set declaring at least one — every `test("…")`, `it("…")`, `property("…")` and `"…" in {…}` registration and every JUnit `@Test`, which is how munit, ScalaTest, utest, ZIO Test and specs2 declare a case; a case registered under a computed name is not counted, so this is a floor. Its tier split is INFERRED from paths and file names, except sbt's src/it source set, which the build declares.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

9 outdated direct sbt declarations. An sbt declaration names an EXACT version, so the remedy is an edit to the build file — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it. Test-, Provided- and it-scoped declarations are excluded, because a consumer of this project never receives them. A version held in a Scala val is read only when the val is one string literal: sbt is a program rather than a manifest, and evaluating a computed version would invent the measurement rather than take it. Whether any artifact is DEPRECATED or ABANDONED is not graded and cannot be — Maven Central publishes no such marker, and release age does not stand in for one: the most widely depended-upon libraries are routinely the stalest, being finished rather than abandoned. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.

Outdated: ch.qos.logback:logback-classic · ×9

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · REDACTED Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 18 declared sbt dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the production coordinates this repository's 7 sbt build file(s) (REDACTED and project/*.scala) declare with a literal version, directly or through a string-literal val — `%%` resolved to the Scala binary suffix Central publishes under, test-scoped declarations excluded — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. sbt has no lockfile a checkout carries, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. 20 further production coordinate(s) are declared with a version the build computes rather than writes as a literal — sbt is a program, and this pass does not run it — and are NOT graded: this verdict covers what the build pins literally or through a string-literal val, not the full graph.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.9 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html (18×17=306); modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala (14×20=280)

Hotspot: modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html · ×2modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:190

What to do

Resolve the 2 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with main.scala.html, ProjectPages.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D16 · Bus Factor7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/sql/DoobieMappings.scala. Counted over 72 of the 193 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×2

Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

What to do

Resolve the 2 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D17 · Explicit Debt9.8 / 10Stronggated by 17 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

17 deducted task-comment markers across 12426 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×17modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Project.scala:6

What to do

Resolve the 17 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala (6), PomsReader.scala (2), ElasticsearchEngine.scala (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D19 · Documentation QualityExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The Scaladex repository's root README (Scaladex) and the modules/loadtest/README describe their respective projects clearly: Scaladex is a Scala library index with CI, discussions, and an overview of how it works; the loadtests harness drive bottlenecks via Gatling. The bintray, github, and stackexchange documentation APIs are thin but well-structured (authentication, repo info, JQ examples). A focused README for Scaladex's visibility and indexing strategy is present.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

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D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 build units (sbt) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion

What to do

Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 11 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)2.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 finding(s): 0 critical, 19 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 10 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 29 file(s) — `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/api/ProjectSettingsPatch.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Version.scala`, `modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/GenerateFeeders.scala`, `modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala`, `modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/SqlDatabase.scala`, … (+24 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 10 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

18 of 72 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/License.scala. Counted over 72 of the 193 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×18modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/License.scala:1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

Resolve the 18 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with License.scala, MetaCategory.scala, Category.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: WebDatabase.scala↔SqlDatabase.scala 95%; SqlDatabase.scala↔REDACTED 52%

Change coupling: WebDatabase.scala ↔ SqlDatabase.scala · ×2modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/WebDatabase.scala:1

What to do

Resolve the 2 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with WebDatabase.scala, SqlDatabase.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.

A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. (×2) — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/insights.scala.html:37, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/project.scala.html:69
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/badges.scala.html:40, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/badges.scala.html:47

What to do

Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC2 · Forms & labels5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×12) — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:75, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:79, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:94, …
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:142
This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/editproject.scala.html:159
A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/versionMatrix.scala.html:70

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC3 · Page structure5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×11) — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:26, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:68, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:163, …
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:18, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/scaladoc.scala.html:7

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×2) — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/artifacts.scala.html:51, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/versions.scala.html:61

What to do

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

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AC5 · ARIA correctness5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

This role is not a valid WAI-ARIA role, so assistive tech ignores it. Use a valid role (or the native element). (×6) — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:113, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:115, modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:116, …

What to do

Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.

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AC6 · Visual & motion safety3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

`.markdown-body .anchor:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — modules/server/src/main/assets/css/partials/_github.scss:46
`.btn.active` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_buttons.scss:31
`.dropdown-toggle:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_navigation.scss:21
`.progress-bar` moves (`transition: width 0.6s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_progress.scss:23
`.switch .switch-track::after` moves (`transition: transform 0.15s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_toggles.scss:39

What to do

Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.

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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 33 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

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AX10 · Code composition5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.

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AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

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AX6 · Interface segregation8.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

`SchedulerDatabase` declares 28 abstract members: `getAllProjects`, `getAllProjectArtifacts`, `insertProject`, `updateProjectCreationDate`, `computeProjectsCreationDates`, `getProjectDependencies`, `computeProjectDependencies`, `insertProjectDependencies`, `deleteProjectDependencies`, `insertArtifacts`, `insertDependencies`, `updateArtifacts`, `updateArtifactReleaseDate`, `getGroupIds`, `getGroupIds`, `getArtifactIds`, `getArtifactRefs`, `getArtifactRefs`, `getArtifactRefs`, `updateLatestVersion`, `insertDiscoveredGroupIds`, `getAllDiscoveredGroupIds`, `getPendingDiscoveredGroupIdsToSync`, `updateDiscoveredGroupIdSync`, `updateDiscoveredGroupIdError`, `getMavenIndexCursor`, `setMavenIndexCursor`, `getProjectRefsByGroupId`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. Those 28 declarations carry 25 distinct name(s), so part of the width is overloading rather than separate responsibilities — but 25 operations clears the >15 bar on its own, so the row is about responsibilities, not signatures. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/SchedulerDatabase.scala:15
`SearchEngine` declares 18 abstract members under just 11 distinct name(s): `insert`, `delete`, `count`, `countByTopics`, `countByLanguages`, `countByPlatforms`, `getMostDependedUpon`, `getLatest`, `find`, `autocomplete`, `countByTopics`, `countByLanguages`, `countByPlatforms`, `find`, `countByLanguages`, `countByPlatforms`, `find`, `findRefs`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. That is an OVERLOAD SET, not 18 separate responsibilities: a caller binds to 11 operation(s) and uses the overload it selected, so the Interface-Segregation harm does NOT apply on the caller's side and splitting this into role-interfaces would scatter one operation without relieving anything. The burden that does remain is the IMPLEMENTER's — all 18 signatures must be written and kept in step. Reduce it by collapsing overloads (optional or default parameters, or an options object) rather than by segregating the interface. — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/SearchEngine.scala:18
`WebDatabase` declares 37 abstract members: `insertArtifact`, `getArtifactVersions`, `getArtifacts`, `getArtifact`, `getLatestArtifact`, `getLatestArtifacts`, `getAllArtifacts`, `countArtifacts`, `getDirectDependencies`, `getReverseDependencies`, `countReverseDependencies`, `insertProjectRef`, `updateProjectSettings`, `getAllProjectsStatuses`, `getProject`, `getProjectArtifactRefs`, `getProjectArtifactRefs`, `getProjectArtifactRefs`, `getProjectArtifacts`, `getProjectArtifacts`, `getProjectLatestArtifacts`, `getFormerReferences`, `countVersions`, `updateGithubInfoAndStatus`, `updateGithubStatus`, `moveProject`, `countProjectDependents`, `getProjectDependencies`, `countProjectDependencies`, `getProjectReverseDependencies`, `getScalaVersionInsights`, `getScala3MigrationInsights`, `insertUser`, `updateUser`, `getUser`, `getAllUsers`, `deleteUser`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. Those 37 declarations carry 34 distinct name(s), so part of the width is overloading rather than separate responsibilities — but 34 operations clears the >15 bar on its own, so the row is about responsibilities, not signatures. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/WebDatabase.scala:9

What to do

Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Where the width is an overload set rather than separate responsibilities, collapse the overloads instead — segregating those relieves no caller.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Scala: methods whose whole body is still `???` or a "not implemented" throw where nothing overrides them, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

`resolveModel` is a shipped member whose whole body is still `???`, and nothing in the repository overrides it — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala:50

What to do

Finish or delete the members whose body is still `???` or a "not implemented" throw where nothing overrides them, and replace placeholder text before shipping.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Scala: methods whose body is `???` or only throws a "not implemented" error, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`resolveModel` is a shipped method whose whole body is `???` (or throws NotImplementedError), and nothing in the repository overrides it — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala:50
A bare `// scalastyle:off`, `// scalafix:off` or `@nowarn` (or Wartremover's `warts.All`) switches every rule or warning off — hidden debt. Suppress the specific rule on the specific line, with a justification, instead. — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CommonAkkaHttpClient.scala:47

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (functions that throw "not implemented", or whose body is empty or a bare constant) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete `ignore`d and `pending` tests, decide whether each empty method or UnsupportedOperationException is deliberate (and say so in a comment), and replace a bare `// scalastyle:off` or `@nowarn` with targeted, justified suppressions.

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M1 · Documentation (README)5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

100 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

CONTRIBUTING.md names `non-standard.json`, but no file or folder `non-standard.json` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — CONTRIBUTING.md:8
CONTRIBUTING.md runs `./server.sh`, but `server.sh` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — CONTRIBUTING.md:197

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: CONTRIBUTING.md names `non-standard.json`, but no file or folder `non-standard.json` exists; CONTRIBUTING.md runs `./server.sh`, but `server.sh` does not exist.

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P1 · CI/CD gates8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

A CI pipeline exists but no build step was matched — changes may merge without the build ever running. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.

What to do

Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is built before merge.

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P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry-java or Micrometer) and a health-check endpoint (Spring Boot Actuator's /actuator/health, or a /health route) for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Dependabot is configured but does not watch `gitsubmodule` — add that `package-ecosystem` entry to REDACTED so those dependencies get the same automatic update and advisory pressure as the ones it already covers.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — in .NET Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit; off .NET, with comments and strings blanked, Go's sync.Pool, preallocated slices/maps, Grow, strconv.Append* and buf[:0] reuse; the JVM's NIO buffer views, MemorySegment, primitive collections, pools and literal presizes (plus Kotlin primitive arrays and value classes, Scala AnyVal and @specialized); Swift's reserveCapacity, ContiguousArray, withUnsafe* access and ~Copyable. Activated off .NET on the same floor (400 lines, and benchmarks or 8 uses); Rust and garbage-collected scripting languages are not applicable. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 8 use(s) across 14,287 production line(s) (~0.6/1k). More of the idioms below on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Scala: on hot paths, make small wrappers value classes (extends AnyVal), @specialized generic code over primitives, use primitive collections, and presize builders.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

`resolve` is async and calls Thread.sleep — a blocking call inside async code stalls the execution-context thread, and every future or fiber scheduled on it for as long as it runs. — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CoursierResolver.scala:42
`waitUntilReady` is async and calls Thread.sleep — a blocking call inside async code stalls the execution-context thread, and every future or fiber scheduled on it for as long as it runs. — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:68

What to do

Scala: compose the Future or effect (map/flatMap, a for-comprehension) instead of Await.result or unsafeRunSync, and wrap unavoidable blocking calls in blocking { } (Future), IO.blocking or ZIO.attemptBlocking.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Read from this repository's Scala source and the Java beside it: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. Markup this repository SHIPS is scored for third-party script integrity whether or not the repository serves it itself, since a page handed to a consumer runs in that consumer’s origin. This repository serves HTTP itself (modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/Server.scala:133 — `newServerAt`), so its Scala source was also read for the server controls: TLS served or HSTS set, security response headers, cookie flags and inbound validation — each credited where its Scala spelling appears in production source, not proven on every route. A Play application is credited the security headers Play's default `SecurityHeadersFilter` sends unless its build or configuration switches that filter off, and its cookies the HttpOnly flag Play sets by default.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Sha1.scala:5
`//cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/emojify.js/1.1.0/js/emojify.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. 3 such include(s) across the repository's markup. — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:158
This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Scala source or committed configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer`/`enableHttps`, an http4s builder's `withTLS`, Jetty's `SslContextFactory`, zio-http's `SSLConfig`, Play's `https.port`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, HSTS middleware or Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read or Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies` for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/Server.scala:133 — `newServerAt`.
None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Scala server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/Server.scala:133 — `newServerAt`.

What to do

Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.
Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`).
Set security response headers on what the server sends — keep Play's `SecurityHeadersFilter` enabled, wrap akka/pekko-http routes in `respondWithHeaders(RawHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff"), …)`, or add an http4s middleware that sets `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.

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X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

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X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

`len` is read from the bytes being parsed at line 174 (`readInt`), then used to size a `new Array[Byte]` at line 175 — and nowhere in its scope is `len` bounded from above — compared to a limit, clamped, or checked against the input that remains (a zero or sign test, or the loop that counts up to it, bounds nothing). Whoever wrote those bytes therefore chooses the allocation directly: a 32-bit length asks for up to 2 GiB before a single byte of the payload is known to exist, which either exhausts the heap with an `OutOfMemoryError` or, negative, throws `NegativeArraySizeException` out of a parser whose failure path was written for malformed input, not for hostile input. Bound `len` against the bytes actually remaining and a maximum the format allows before allocating. — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:175

What to do

Each finding names the read that takes the length from the input and the site that spends it, and states that the value is never compared in between. Confirm from the two, then bound the length against the remaining stream before using it.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

`Files.list(…)` opens something that has to be given back — a file descriptor, a socket, a directory handle — and its only use reads `.iterator` through it and drops it, so this expression both creates the value and is the last place that can release it, and does not. Every call leaks one more open handle until the collector happens to reach it: `Too many open files` under load, and on Windows a file that cannot be replaced or deleted while it is held. Open it with `scala.util.Using.resource(Files.list(…)) { r => … }`, which releases it on every path including a throw, or hold it and call `.close()` in a `finally`. (×2) — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/FilesystemStorage.scala:53, modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/FilesystemStorage.scala:55

What to do

Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `NullPointerException` (Java, Kotlin, Scala), `ArgumentError.notNull` (Dart) or `ArgumentNullException` (F#'s `nullArg`) tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` comprehension or `foreach` leaves the mutable collection it is walking alone — an `ArrayBuffer` or `ListBuffer` counts its changes and its iterator checks the count, an `ArrayDeque` (and `mutable.Queue`/`mutable.Stack`) is walked by index up to its starting length, and a `java.util` collection walked through `asScala` is fail-fast, so a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking makes a later step throw `ConcurrentModificationException` (`IndexOutOfBoundsException` for a deque) and the remaining elements are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

`case _: Throwable` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. — project/Postgres.scala:119

What to do

Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X4 · Structured logging2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

`debug` at line 90 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CommonAkkaHttpClient.scala:90
`debug` at line 91 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CommonAkkaHttpClient.scala:91
`debug` at line 27 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/HttpRequestLogging.scala:27
`debug` at line 29 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/HttpRequestLogging.scala:29

What to do

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

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X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether Scala's null is held to the type system and not undermined by assertions — a file compiled with `-Yexplicit-nulls` is one where `String` excludes null and `String | Null` admits it, a file under WartRemover's `Null` wart or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls` is one whose code cannot write `null` and must say `Option`, and each `.nn`, `import scala.language.unsafeNulls` or null-lint suppression is the author overruling that.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

No build over this repository's 185 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.

What to do

On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.

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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC1 · Text alternatives	1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5	Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics	2.1.1, 2.4.3	Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness	4.1.2	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	51%	Adequate — gated by X4, X5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	79%	Adequate — gated by D26	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity	52%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	70%	Strong	Strongest area.
Security	38%	Weak — gated by D28, D29, S1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility	34%	Weak — gated by AC4, AC6	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance	66%	Strong	Solid.

Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 2 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.

Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control

Not included — 40 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Scala imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named column (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone_number, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, a MongoDB or Cassandra driver, JDBC) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
D10 Test Quality — ~3865 lines of test source are present (.scala) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .scala suite was found but not re-run
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.scala), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 16 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 signals for this style, 2 needed — the count is met but a required primary signal is absent): 169 value object(s); 1 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Scala was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Scala request takes no token: a Future cannot be cancelled, and cats-effect, ZIO and Monix interrupt the fiber that made the request from outside the call, not through a parameter
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 55 finding(s)

AC2 · Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label · ×13

<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:75 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:79 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:94 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:98 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:113 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:117 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:142 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/editproject.scala.html:52 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/editproject.scala.html:163 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/editproject.scala.html:167 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/editproject.scala.html:176 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/editproject.scala.html:180 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/searchinput.scala.html:8 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.

D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×11

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

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AC1 · Text alternatives · <img> without a text alternative · ×2

<img> without a text alternative modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/badges.scala.html:40 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
<img> without a text alternative modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/badges.scala.html:47 — An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.

AC2 · Forms & labels · <label> that labels no control · ×1

<label> that labels no control modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/editproject.scala.html:159 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.

AC2 · Forms & labels · Link with no accessible name · ×1

Link with no accessible name modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/versionMatrix.scala.html:70 — A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label.

AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid ARIA role "project" · ×1

Invalid ARIA role "project" modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:113 — This role is not a valid WAI-ARIA role, so assistive tech ignores it. Use a valid role (or the native element).

AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid ARIA role "artifacts" · ×1

Invalid ARIA role "artifacts" modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:115 — This role is not a valid WAI-ARIA role, so assistive tech ignores it. Use a valid role (or the native element).

AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid ARIA role "versions" · ×1

Invalid ARIA role "versions" modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:116 — This role is not a valid WAI-ARIA role, so assistive tech ignores it. Use a valid role (or the native element).

AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid ARIA role "dependents" · ×1

Invalid ARIA role "dependents" modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:118 — This role is not a valid WAI-ARIA role, so assistive tech ignores it. Use a valid role (or the native element).

AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid ARIA role "badges" · ×1

Invalid ARIA role "badges" modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:119 — This role is not a valid WAI-ARIA role, so assistive tech ignores it. Use a valid role (or the native element).

AC5 · ARIA correctness · Invalid ARIA role "settings" · ×1

Invalid ARIA role "settings" modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/headproject.scala.html:122 — This role is not a valid WAI-ARIA role, so assistive tech ignores it. Use a valid role (or the native element).

D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1

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Serious — 82 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×17

TodoComment modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Project.scala:6 — // TODO: document NewProject fields — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:53 — // TODO move this out — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala:36 — // TODO fix deprecations — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala:73 — // TODO: Try to remove — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:77 — // TODO: rewrite without await — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:482 — // "depends-on" -> "dependencies", TODO fix or remove depends-on query — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/infra/src/test/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngineTests.scala:88 — // todo fix — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server-it/src/test/scala/scaladex/RelevanceTest.scala:76 — // TODO not yet in small-index — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server-it/src/test/scala/scaladex/RelevanceTest.scala:106 — // TODO uncomment — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/PublishApi.scala:60 — // TODO check from database — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/PublishProcess.scala:71 — // TODO: save artifact with no github information — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/test/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala:70 — // TODO this should be not found — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/test/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala:148 — // TODO this should be not found — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/test/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala:198 — // TODO this should be not found — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/test/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala:109 — // TODO should return error message — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/test/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala:115 — // TODO should return error message — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment modules/server/src/test/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImplTests.scala:204 — // TODO return error message — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 · ×5

Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:26 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:68 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/admin/admin.scala.html:163 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/artifacts.scala.html:68 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/versions.scala.html:80 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.

AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 · ×4

Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/frontpage.scala.html:46 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/frontpage.scala.html:76 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/artifact.scala.html:101 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/search/result.scala.html:24 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a · ×3

Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement modules/server/src/main/assets/css/partials/_github.scss:46 — `.markdown-body .anchor:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_buttons.scss:31 — `.btn.active` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_navigation.scss:21 — `.dropdown-toggle:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.

AC1 · Text alternatives · <canvas> without a text alternative · ×2

<canvas> without a text alternative modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/insights.scala.html:37 — A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content.
<canvas> without a text alternative modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/project.scala.html:69 — A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content.

AC3 · Page structure · Page without a main landmark · ×2

Page without a main landmark modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:18 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/scaladoc.scala.html:7 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Anchor without href · ×2

Anchor without href modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/artifacts.scala.html:51 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/versions.scala.html:61 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×2

Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_progress.scss:23 — `.progress-bar` moves (`transition: width 0.6s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard modules/server/src/main/assets/css/base/_toggles.scss:39 — `.switch .switch-track::after` moves (`transition: transform 0.15s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×2

Hotspot: modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:190 — modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html changed 18 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 17 in main.scala.html.buildCombobox at line 190. 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits, and the other 12 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-06-27..2026-09-25, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-27 12:59:15 +02:00' --until='2026-09-25 12:59:15 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala:39 — modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala changed 14 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 20 in ProjectPages.route at line 39. 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits, and the other 8 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-06-27..2026-09-25, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-27 12:59:15 +02:00' --until='2026-09-25 12:59:15 +02:00' --full-history --no-merges -- modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×2

Change coupling: WebDatabase.scala ↔ SqlDatabase.scala modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/WebDatabase.scala:1 — `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/WebDatabase.scala` and `modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/SqlDatabase.scala` change together 95% of the time (41 of the 43 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 41 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `c9510c08` feat: add a Scala 3 migration panel next to the binary-compatibility …; `4da28923` feat: add an Insights page showing Scala version adoption; `02a5e6ff` address review feedback on #1786 — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: SqlDatabase.scala ↔ REDACTED modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/SqlDatabase.scala:1 — `modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/SqlDatabase.scala` and `REDACTED` change together 52% of the time (21 of the 40 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 21 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `396fc96d` perf: DB statement timeout, request timeout and connection-pool tuning; `1d02a3bb` Pre-compute the latest version of each artifact; `836dc531` Revamp project settings page — run `git show` on any of them.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×2

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking · ×2

Sync-over-async blocking modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CoursierResolver.scala:42 — `resolve` is async and calls Thread.sleep — a blocking call inside async code stalls the execution-context thread, and every future or fiber scheduled on it for as long as it runs.
Sync-over-async blocking modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:68 — `waitUntilReady` is async and calls Thread.sleep — a blocking call inside async code stalls the execution-context thread, and every future or fiber scheduled on it for as long as it runs.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness · Disposable created and abandoned in the function that made it · ×2

Disposable created and abandoned in the function that made it modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/FilesystemStorage.scala:53 — `Files.list(…)` opens something that has to be given back — a file descriptor, a socket, a directory handle — and its only use reads `.iterator` through it and drops it, so this expression both creates the value and is the last place that can release it, and does not. Every call leaks one more open handle until the collector happens to reach it: `Too many open files` under load, and on Windows a file that cannot be replaced or deleted while it is held. Open it with `scala.util.Using.resource(Files.list(…)) { r => … }`, which releases it on every path including a throw, or hold it and call `.close()` in a `finally`.
Disposable created and abandoned in the function that made it modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/FilesystemStorage.scala:55 — `Files.list(…)` opens something that has to be given back — a file descriptor, a socket, a directory handle — and its only use reads `.iterator` through it and drops it, so this expression both creates the value and is the last place that can release it, and does not. Every call leaks one more open handle until the collector happens to reach it: `Too many open files` under load, and on Windows a file that cannot be replaced or deleted while it is held. Open it with `scala.util.Using.resource(Files.list(…)) { r => … }`, which releases it on every path including a throw, or hold it and call `.close()` in a `finally`.

AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 · ×1

Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/awesome/awesomeScala.scala.html:57 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.

AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h4 to h6 · ×1

Heading level jumps from h4 to h6 modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/project/artifact.scala.html:130 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.

AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1

Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 33 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ProjectPages.route (cyclomatic 20) · ×1

ProjectPages.route (cyclomatic 20) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala:39 — ProjectPages.route has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · main.scala.html.buildCombobox (cyclomatic 17) · ×1

main.scala.html.buildCombobox (cyclomatic 17) modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:190 — main.scala.html.buildCombobox has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 6 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 5 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 291, renderOption, a function literal at line 309, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · FrontPage.frontPage (cognitive 76) · ×1

FrontPage.frontPage (cognitive 76) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/FrontPage.scala:28 — FrontPage.frontPage has cognitive complexity 76 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 6 (48 pts), loops 7 (28 pts) (nesting depth added 63). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ProjectPages.route (cognitive 40) · ×1

ProjectPages.route (cognitive 40) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/ProjectPages.scala:39 — ProjectPages.route has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 14 (34 pts), match/switch 3 (5 pts), if/else 1 (nesting depth added 22). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · DiscoveryService.discover (cognitive 32) · ×1

DiscoveryService.discover (cognitive 32) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/DiscoveryService.scala:38 — DiscoveryService.discover has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 7 (28 pts), if/else 2 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 23). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Init.run (cognitive 28) · ×1

Init.run (cognitive 28) modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/init/Init.scala:17 — Init.run has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 7 (28 pts) (nesting depth added 21). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MavenCentralIndexParser.parseChunk (cognitive 27) · ×1

MavenCentralIndexParser.parseChunk (cognitive 27) modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:130 — MavenCentralIndexParser.parseChunk has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (13 pts), match/switch 2 (8 pts), loops 2 (4 pts), error handling 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · PublishProcess.publishPom (cognitive 24) · ×1

PublishProcess.publishPom (cognitive 24) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/PublishProcess.scala:63 — PublishProcess.publishPom has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (9 pts), loops 2 (9 pts), match/switch 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 14). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main.scala.html.buildCombobox (cognitive 23) · ×1

main.scala.html.buildCombobox (cognitive 23) modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:190 — main.scala.html.buildCombobox has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (14 pts), loops 3 (6 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 6). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 23 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 5 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 291, renderOption, a function literal at line 309, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · GithubClientImpl.getRepoInfo (cognitive 21) · ×1

GithubClientImpl.getRepoInfo (cognitive 21) modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/GithubClientImpl.scala:68 — GithubClientImpl.getRepoInfo has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 6 (21 pts) (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MavenCentralService.findAndIndexMissingArtifacts (cognitive 21) · ×1

MavenCentralService.findAndIndexMissingArtifacts (cognitive 21) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/MavenCentralService.scala:52 — MavenCentralService.findAndIndexMissingArtifacts has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 5 (13 pts), if/else 3 (4 pts), match/switch 1 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · html.paginationRender (cognitive 18) · ×1

html.paginationRender (cognitive 18) modules/template/src/main/scala/scaladex/view/html/package.scala:102 — html.paginationRender has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (13 pts), match/switch 1 (3 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Server.main (cognitive 17) · ×1

Server.main (cognitive 17) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/Server.scala:48 — Server.main has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 6 (12 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1, error handling 1, if/else 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · OldSearchApi.parseBinaryVersion (cognitive 17) · ×1

OldSearchApi.parseBinaryVersion (cognitive 17) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/OldSearchApi.scala:40 — OldSearchApi.parseBinaryVersion has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 6 (15 pts), if/else 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 9). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · DependencyUpdater.updateDependencies (cognitive 17) · ×1

DependencyUpdater.updateDependencies (cognitive 17) modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/DependencyUpdater.scala:28 — DependencyUpdater.updateDependencies has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 4 (14 pts), if/else 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main.scala.html.document.addEventListener("click") (cognitive 17) · ×1

main.scala.html.document.addEventListener("click") (cognitive 17) modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:423 — main.scala.html.document.addEventListener("click") has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (14 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1

TooManyMethods: ElasticsearchEngine modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:60 — TooManyMethods — 36 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 6 over it, 1.20× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×1

MethodTooLong: OldSearchApi.parseBinaryVersion modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/OldSearchApi.scala:40 — MethodTooLong — parseBinaryVersion runs 104 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 4 over it, 1.04× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.

D3 · God Classes · FunctionTooLong · ×1

FunctionTooLong: main.scala.html.buildCombobox modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:190 — FunctionTooLong — buildCombobox runs 104 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 4 over it, 1.04× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.

D4 · Code Duplication · Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×1

Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:89 — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:89-110 | modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:140-157 | modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:161-169 | modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:172-180 — These 4 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 4 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 4 times.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11–13 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (11–13 lines × 2) modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:43 — modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:43-55 | modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:85-95 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:43` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:143 — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:143-149 | modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:163-169 | modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:174-180 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:143` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:100 — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:100-105 | modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:144-149 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Artifact.scala:100` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: core — core: abstractness 0.10, instability 0.00, distance 0.90 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 5 project(s), so it's rigid to change.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1

Low cohesion: ElasticsearchEngine (LCOM4 5) modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/ElasticsearchEngine.scala:60 — ElasticsearchEngine's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code · Unfinished stub · ×1

Unfinished stub — body is `???` modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala:50 — `resolveModel` is a shipped member whose whole body is still `???`, and nothing in the repository overrides it — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Unfinished stub · ×1

Unfinished stub — body is ??? / NotImplementedError modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala:50 — `resolveModel` is a shipped method whose whole body is `???` (or throws NotImplementedError), and nothing in the repository overrides it — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.

M1 · Documentation (README) · README may be stale · ×1

README may be stale — 100 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · Weak hash algorithm · ×1

Weak hash algorithm modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Sha1.scala:5 — MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · Third-party script without Subresource Integrity · ×1

Third-party script without Subresource Integrity modules/template/src/main/twirl/scaladex/view/main.scala.html:158 — `//cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/emojify.js/1.1.0/js/emojify.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. 3 such include(s) across the repository's markup.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader · Length read from the parsed input is spent without ever being bounded · ×1

Length read from the parsed input is spent without ever being bounded modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/MavenCentralIndexClientImpl.scala:175 — `len` is read from the bytes being parsed at line 174 (`readInt`), then used to size a `new Array[Byte]` at line 175 — and nowhere in its scope is `len` bounded from above — compared to a limit, clamped, or checked against the input that remains (a zero or sign test, or the loop that counts up to it, bounds nothing). Whoever wrote those bytes therefore chooses the allocation directly: a 32-bit length asks for up to 2 GiB before a single byte of the payload is known to exist, which either exhausts the heap with an `OutOfMemoryError` or, negative, throws `NegativeArraySizeException` out of a parser whose failure path was written for malformed input, not for hostile input. Bound `len` against the bytes actually remaining and a maximum the format allows before allocating.

X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) · ×1

Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) project/Postgres.scala:119 — `case _: Throwable` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.

Minor — 43 finding(s)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×18

Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/License.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/MetaCategory.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Category.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Project.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/AuthenticationApi.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/ArtifactModel.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/FilesystemStorage.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/ArtifactService.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/util/ScalaExtensions.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/AwesomePages.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomConvert.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Platform.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/cleanup/GithubRepoExtractor.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/GithubInfo.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/SearchSynchronizer.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/Codecs.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/search/ProjectDocument.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/elasticsearch/ElasticsearchMapping.scala:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.

X4 · Structured logging · Interpolated log message defeats structured logging · ×4

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CommonAkkaHttpClient.scala:90 — `debug` at line 90 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CommonAkkaHttpClient.scala:91 — `debug` at line 91 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/HttpRequestLogging.scala:27 — `debug` at line 27 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/HttpRequestLogging.scala:29 — `debug` at line 29 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.

AX6 · Interface segregation · Fat interface · ×3

Fat interface: SchedulerDatabase (28 abstract members) modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/SchedulerDatabase.scala:15 — `SchedulerDatabase` declares 28 abstract members: `getAllProjects`, `getAllProjectArtifacts`, `insertProject`, `updateProjectCreationDate`, `computeProjectsCreationDates`, `getProjectDependencies`, `computeProjectDependencies`, `insertProjectDependencies`, `deleteProjectDependencies`, `insertArtifacts`, `insertDependencies`, `updateArtifacts`, `updateArtifactReleaseDate`, `getGroupIds`, `getGroupIds`, `getArtifactIds`, `getArtifactRefs`, `getArtifactRefs`, `getArtifactRefs`, `updateLatestVersion`, `insertDiscoveredGroupIds`, `getAllDiscoveredGroupIds`, `getPendingDiscoveredGroupIdsToSync`, `updateDiscoveredGroupIdSync`, `updateDiscoveredGroupIdError`, `getMavenIndexCursor`, `setMavenIndexCursor`, `getProjectRefsByGroupId`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. Those 28 declarations carry 25 distinct name(s), so part of the width is overloading rather than separate responsibilities — but 25 operations clears the >15 bar on its own, so the row is about responsibilities, not signatures. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces.
Fat interface: SearchEngine (18 abstract members) modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/SearchEngine.scala:18 — `SearchEngine` declares 18 abstract members under just 11 distinct name(s): `insert`, `delete`, `count`, `countByTopics`, `countByLanguages`, `countByPlatforms`, `getMostDependedUpon`, `getLatest`, `find`, `autocomplete`, `countByTopics`, `countByLanguages`, `countByPlatforms`, `find`, `countByLanguages`, `countByPlatforms`, `find`, `findRefs`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. That is an OVERLOAD SET, not 18 separate responsibilities: a caller binds to 11 operation(s) and uses the overload it selected, so the Interface-Segregation harm does NOT apply on the caller's side and splitting this into role-interfaces would scatter one operation without relieving anything. The burden that does remain is the IMPLEMENTER's — all 18 signatures must be written and kept in step. Reduce it by collapsing overloads (optional or default parameters, or an options object) rather than by segregating the interface.
Fat interface: WebDatabase (37 abstract members) modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/service/WebDatabase.scala:9 — `WebDatabase` declares 37 abstract members: `insertArtifact`, `getArtifactVersions`, `getArtifacts`, `getArtifact`, `getLatestArtifact`, `getLatestArtifacts`, `getAllArtifacts`, `countArtifacts`, `getDirectDependencies`, `getReverseDependencies`, `countReverseDependencies`, `insertProjectRef`, `updateProjectSettings`, `getAllProjectsStatuses`, `getProject`, `getProjectArtifactRefs`, `getProjectArtifactRefs`, `getProjectArtifactRefs`, `getProjectArtifacts`, `getProjectArtifacts`, `getProjectLatestArtifacts`, `getFormerReferences`, `countVersions`, `updateGithubInfoAndStatus`, `updateGithubStatus`, `moveProject`, `countProjectDependents`, `getProjectDependencies`, `countProjectDependencies`, `getProjectReverseDependencies`, `getScalaVersionInsights`, `getScala3MigrationInsights`, `insertUser`, `updateUser`, `getUser`, `getAllUsers`, `deleteUser`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. Those 37 declarations carry 34 distinct name(s), so part of the width is overloading rather than separate responsibilities — but 34 operations clears the >15 bar on its own, so the row is about responsibilities, not signatures. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces.

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×2

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 12 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/sql/DoobieMappings.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/api/ApiEndpointsImpl.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/DiscoveryService.scala, modules/template/src/main/scala/scaladex/view/html/package.scala, modules/webclient/src/main/scala/scaladex/client/Client.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/ScaladocService.scala, project/Postgres.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/FrontPage.scala (+4 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CommonAkkaHttpClient.scala, modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/sql/ArtifactDependencyTable.scala, modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/Main.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/GithubUpdater.scala, modules/data/src/main/scala/scaladex/data/maven/PomsReader.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/SearchPages.scala. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×2

README/code drift CONTRIBUTING.md:8 — CONTRIBUTING.md names `non-standard.json`, but no file or folder `non-standard.json` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift CONTRIBUTING.md:197 — CONTRIBUTING.md runs `./server.sh`, but `server.sh` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×2

Duplicated predicate modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/util/JsoupUtils.scala:36 — `n != "./" && n != "../" && n != "." && n != ".." && n != "/" && (slashIdx < 0 || slashIdx == n.length - 1)` appears character-identically in 2 files — modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/util/JsoupUtils.scala, scripts/PublishMissingArtifacts.scala. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/ArtifactService.scala:72 — `status.isOk || status.isUnknown || status.isFailed` appears character-identically in 3 files — modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/ArtifactService.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/MavenCentralService.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/SearchSynchronizer.scala. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.

D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1

Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 1 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (19 single-owned of 72 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 72 of the 193 production source files in this repository met that bar). They are anonymized user #3 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above. The files folded here: modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Platform.scala.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D26 · Project Cohesion · Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 1 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 0.0/10. The most over is `(repository root)` (12444 LoC, 521 module-visible types across 32 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

REDACTED

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 18 of 72 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 72 of the 193 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/License.scala, modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/MetaCategory.scala, modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Category.scala, modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Project.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/AuthenticationApi.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/service/ArtifactService.scala, modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/util/ScalaExtensions.scala, modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/route/AwesomePages.scala (and 10 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Blanket warning suppression · ×1

Blanket warning suppression modules/infra/src/main/scala/scaladex/infra/CommonAkkaHttpClient.scala:47 — A bare `// scalastyle:off`, `// scalafix:off` or `@nowarn` (or Wartremover's `warts.All`) switches every rule or warning off — hidden debt. Suppress the specific rule on the specific line, with a justification, instead.

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

P1 · CI/CD gates · CI build step not evidenced · ×1

CI build step not evidenced — A CI pipeline exists but no build step was matched — changes may merge without the build ever running. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.

P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1

No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×1

No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Scala source or committed configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer`/`enableHttps`, an http4s builder's `withTLS`, Jetty's `SslContextFactory`, zio-http's `SSLConfig`, Play's `https.port`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, HSTS middleware or Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read or Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies` for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/Server.scala:133 — `newServerAt`.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1

No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Scala server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: modules/server/src/main/scala/scaladex/server/Server.scala:133 — `newServerAt`.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere · ×1

Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere — No build over this repository's 185 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.

Minor — 9 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×9

Outdated: ch.qos.logback:logback-classic — `ch.qos.logback %% logback-classic` is declared at 1.6.3 in REDACTED, but 1.6.5 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 1.6.3 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: com.github.pjfanning:pekko-http-circe_3 — `com.github.pjfanning %% pekko-http-circe_3` is declared at 3.9.2 in REDACTED, but 3.12.0 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 3.9.2 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: org.endpoints4s:pekko-http-server_3 — `org.endpoints4s %% pekko-http-server_3` is declared at 2.1.0 in REDACTED, but 2.2.0 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 2.1.0 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: org.flywaydb:flyway-core — `org.flywaydb %% flyway-core` is declared at 12.11.0 in REDACTED, but 13.10.3 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 12.11.0 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: org.flywaydb:flyway-database-postgresql — `org.flywaydb %% flyway-database-postgresql` is declared at 12.11.0 in REDACTED, but 13.10.3 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 12.11.0 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: org.jsoup:jsoup — `org.jsoup %% jsoup` is declared at 1.23.1 in REDACTED, but 1.23.2 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 1.23.1 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: org.slf4j:jcl-over-slf4j — `org.slf4j %% jcl-over-slf4j` is declared at 2.0.18 in REDACTED, but 2.0.20 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 2.0.18 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: org.webjars:chartjs — `org.webjars %% chartjs` is declared at 4.5.1 in REDACTED, but 26962ce is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 4.5.1 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.
Outdated: org.webjars:swagger-ui — `org.webjars %% swagger-ui` is declared at 5.20.8 in REDACTED, but 5.34.0 is the current release on Maven Central. An sbt declaration names an exact version, so this repository builds against 5.20.8 until the declaration is edited — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e54db23fbfff45dcad9565e9c9022c21/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	12	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e54db23fbfff45dcad9565e9c9022c21/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	2	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	19	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-237163275bab4040a7cc4ab39648610a	1	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 16 file(s) — `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/api/ProjectSettingsPatch.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/ArtifactDependency.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/GithubStatus.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/model/Version.scala`, `modules/core/shared/src/main/scala/scaladex/core/util/ScalaExtensions.scala`, … (+11 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover them at all.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-237163275bab4040a7cc4ab39648610a	0	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a15dfa-9e03-7ec0-a513-c6f9113c1d2c · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 51% · Adequate · gated by X4, X5 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 79% · Adequate · gated by D26 ·

At a glance — Maturity · 52% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 70% · Strong ·

At a glance — Security · 38% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, S1 ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 34% · Weak · gated by AC4, AC6 ·

At a glance — Performance · 66% · Strong ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts