sentemon/MessagingPlatform

Executive summary

sentemon/MessagingPlatform scores 36 out of 100 and is rated Weak, while seven of its eight lenses score higher still: Performance at 100, rated Exemplary, Architecture at 76 and Code Health at 72, both rated Strong, Domain Modelling at 50, Accessibility at 46 and Security and Compliance at 40, all rated Weak, and Maturity at 50, rated Adequate.

The score is lower than those seven because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 25 and is rated Critical. Its REDACTED Scanning dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning and to resolve the 12 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 36 to about 46.

86 findings are critical: 55 in Dependency Vulnerabilities, six in Aggregate boundaries, six in Static Analysis (SAST), five in Keyboard semantics, three in IaC & Container Security, three in REDACTED Scanning, two in Forms & labels, two in Secrets (history), one in Coupling, one in Dependency direction, one in Explicit Debt and one in Project dependency cycles.

Watchdog couldn't measure Test Reliability and Runtime accessibility in this code, so those dimensions are left out of the score. The product code is 3,453 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €5,500, to rebuild.

Code Health 72 Strong Architecture 76 Strong Maturity 50 Adequate, capped by Knowledge Freshness and Architecture documentation Production Readiness 25 ⚠ Critical, capped by REDACTED Scanning, Tooling, Observability, Security & performance tooling and DR & Backup Security and Compliance 40 Weak, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities, Supply-chain Provenance & Signing and Data Protection Domain Modelling 50 Weak, capped by Aggregate boundaries, Strongly-typed ids and Repository granularity Accessibility 46 Weak, capped by Keyboard semantics Performance 100 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Production Readiness 25 · counts for 45%Security and Compliance 40 · counts for 25%Accessibility 46 · counts for 14%Domain Modelling 50 · counts for 8%Maturity 50 · counts for 4%Code Health 72 · counts for 2%Architecture 76 · counts for 1%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 25 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 36 to about 46.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Business logic 12%Supporting code 61%Tests 16%Generated by tools 11%

New since the last survey: 43 findings

These 43 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit backend/tests/MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests/MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests.csproj
Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit REDACTED
REDACTED Scanning · REDACTED
REDACTED Scanning · REDACTED
Explicit Debt · Dead code: MarkRead backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: UpdateUsername backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: SetOnlineStatus backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: ExtractClaimsValues backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IJwtProvider.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: GetUsersByIdsAsync backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IUserRepository.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: GetChatDto backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/ChatDTOs/GetChatDto.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: UpdateChatDto backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/ChatDTOs/UpdateChatDto.cs
Explicit Debt · Dead code: GetUserByIdAsync backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Interfaces/IUserService.cs
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Change Coupling · Change coupling: ChatController.cs ↔ ChatRepository.cs backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs
Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/DeleteChat/DeleteChatCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/UpdateChat/UpdateChatCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Queries/GetChatById/GetChatByIdQueryHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Queries/GetChats/GetChatsQueryHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Messages/Commands/AddMessage/AddMessageCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Messages/Commands/DeleteMessage/DeleteMessageCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Messages/Commands/UpdateMessage/UpdateMessageCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Messages/Queries/GetAllMessages/GetAllMessagesQueryHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/AddUserToChat/AddUserToChatCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/RemoveUserFromChat/RemoveUserFromChatCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/UpdateUserPermissions/UpdateUserPermissionsCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Queries/GetUserInChat/GetUserInChatQueryHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Queries/GetUsersInChat/GetUsersInChatQueryHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/DeleteUser/DeleteUserCommandHandler.cs
Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/SignIn/SignInCommandHandler.cs
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommandHandler.cs
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/SignIn/SignInCommandHandler.cs
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommandHandler.cs
Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement web/src/styles.css

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 6 findings

These 6 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: xunit
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED
Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application.Tests (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure)

Rebuild cost: about €5,500 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€1,800 to €9,200, for 31 to 97 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	High, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.7 at a score of 36. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 3,453 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED.

Raises the score by about 10 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning

Resolve the 12 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (8).

Raises the score by about 8 points · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene

Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (3).

Raises the score by about 2 points · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €5,500 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 25 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 10 points for low effort, because it clears the 3 REDACTED Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

67 modules, with 157 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 2 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 27 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	1 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Models.MessageDTOs	2 MessagingPlatform.Domain.Enums	3 web.src.app.models.responses.userdto	4 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common	5 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Models.UserChatDTOs	6 MessagingPlatform.Domain.Entities	7 web.src.app.models.responses.chatdto	9 MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions	10 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Interfaces	11 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Models.ChatDTOs	12 MessagingPlatform.Domain.Interfaces	13 MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Interfaces	14 web.src.app.services.chat.chat_service	15 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.CreateChat	16 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.DeleteChat	17 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.UpdateChat	18 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Queries.GetChatById	19 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Queries.GetChats	20 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Commands.AddMessage	21 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Commands.DeleteMessage	22 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Commands.UpdateMessage	23 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Queries.GetAllMessages	24 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.AddUserToChat	25 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.RemoveUserFromChat	26 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.UpdateUserPermissions	27 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Queries.GetUserInChat	28 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Queries.GetUsersInChat	29 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.AddUser	30 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.DeleteUser	31 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.SignIn	32 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.UpdateUser	33 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Queries.GetAllUsers	34 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Queries.GetUserById	35 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Queries.GetUserByUsername
1 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Models.MessageDTOs
2 MessagingPlatform.Domain.Enums
3 web.src.app.models.responses.userdto
4 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common								1
5 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Models.UserChatDTOs		2
6 MessagingPlatform.Domain.Entities		5
7 web.src.app.models.responses.chatdto			1
8 web.src.app.services.auth.auth_service			1
9 MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions				2
10 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Interfaces						1
11 MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Models.ChatDTOs	1	1			1
12 MessagingPlatform.Domain.Interfaces						4
13 MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Interfaces						1
14 web.src.app.services.chat.chat_service							1
15 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.CreateChat		1		1		1		3	1		2
16 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.DeleteChat				1				3			1
17 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.UpdateChat				1				3			1
18 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Queries.GetChatById				1		1		3			1
19 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Queries.GetChats				1				3		1	1
20 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Commands.AddMessage	1			1		1		3			1
21 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Commands.DeleteMessage	1			1				3			1
22 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Commands.UpdateMessage	1			1		1		3			1
23 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Messages.Queries.GetAllMessages				1		1		3			1
24 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.AddUserToChat		3		1		1		3			2
25 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.RemoveUserFromChat				1		1		3			1
26 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.UpdateUserPermissions				1	1	1		3			1
27 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Queries.GetUserInChat				1		1		4			1
28 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Queries.GetUsersInChat				1		1		3			1
29 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.AddUser				1				3				1
30 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.DeleteUser				1				3			1
31 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.SignIn				1				3				1
32 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.UpdateUser				1				3				1
33 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Queries.GetAllUsers				1		1		3			1
34 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Queries.GetUserById				1		1		3			1
35 MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Queries.GetUserByUsername				1		1		3			1
36 MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Repositories						3					4
37 MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Services						2			3		5	4
38 web.src.app.components.main-layout.chat.chat_component							1						1
39 MessagingPlatform.Api.Controllers	2				1					1		1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
40 MessagingPlatform.Api.Hubs	1																		1

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 72% · Strong ·

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 8.1 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.8 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 7.9 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 8.5 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.4

The Bad

R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 6.9

The Ugly

X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.0

At a glance — Architecture · 76% · Strong ·

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 8.6 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.6 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 9.9 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

The Bad

AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 5.2

The Ugly

AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.0

At a glance — Maturity · 50% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2 ·

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 9.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.0

The Bad

M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7

The Ugly

D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 4.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 25% · Critical · gated by D13, R6, P2, P3, P5 ·

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 7.2 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 9.5 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 8.8 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 9.5

The Bad

P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

D13 · .NET / C# REDACTED Scanning 0.0 P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 3.4

At a glance — Security · 40% · Weak · gated by D30, D36, C1 ·

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 8.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 9.5 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.4 D43 · .NET / C# Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 0.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 50% · Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM7 ·

The Good

DM10 · Repo One transaction, one aggregate 10.0 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 9.6 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

The Ugly

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 1.0 DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 3.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 2.7

At a glance — Accessibility · 46% · Weak · gated by AC4 ·

The Good

AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 10.0 AC3 · Repo Page structure 10.0

The Bad

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 6.3 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 5.0

The Ugly

AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	87	High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration	10	High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection	7	High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures	6	High / Critical

Roadmap

Immediately resolve the three leaked secrets in configuration and lock files, then update the twelve outdated npm dependencies to reduce vulnerability exposure. Strengthen operational resilience by adopting structured logging across services and codifying disaster recovery procedures with clear recovery objectives. Finally, integrate automated security scanning into the continuous integration pipeline to prevent security regressions from reaching production.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED.	+9.9 pts	Low	REDACTED Scanning
Resolve the 12 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (8).	+7.9 pts	Medium	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (3).	+2.2 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.	+4.0 pts	Medium	Observability
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+4.0 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+4.0 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).	+2.8 pts	Medium	Data Protection
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED.	+1.3 pts	Low	Supply-chain Provenance & Signing

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 34 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 21% slop · 35% mixed · 44% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	2.0	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	2.0	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.0	Slop	REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.3	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.4	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.7	Slop	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.8	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.7	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: Dead code: UpdateUsername
backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs	6.7	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED	7.2	Mixed	Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/ChatDTOs/UpdateChatDto.cs	7.3	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/UserService.cs	7.3	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Persistence/Configurations/UserConfiguration.cs	7.7	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 86

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 114

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 99

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 5

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 103 of 108 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 108 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D39D43D44AC1AC2AC3AC4AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2DM1DM10DM11DM12DM2DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6P8PF3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 236 of 299 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a161e5-7b6f-7a29-bb82-264f2b7fe51c.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 20 test(s) behind this row are the ones the C# collector could read, and this repository also carries at least 15 test source file(s) (.ts) that it cannot: it parses C# syntax and matches C# test attributes, so a vitest/jest/JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability NOT SCORED: this repository's production source spans .cs, .ts, and the built-in reliability runner cannot re-run the .ts test suite(s) — so reliability was not measured for the repository as a whole. The .NET suite did build and re-run, and came back with 0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s) (unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky)) — but that is a figure for one half of the product, and we do not publish a partial one as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — test reliability is excluded from the score rather than counted.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its NuGet package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 192 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 10 deducted marker(s) and the 0.9/KLoC density on this row were taken over this repository's .NET projects ALONE: .ts (852 lines, 25% of production source) went unread, because every marker collector on this path is reached through a C# workspace. A read-only sweep of that source finds at least 3 task marker(s) (TODO/FIXME/HACK/XXX) across 3 file(s) that this score does not count — a floor, since only line comments are read there and D17's other eight marker kinds (suppressions, NoWarn, editorconfig severities, empty catches, commented-out code, Obsolete, dead code, preprocessor branches) need a compiler we do not have for that language. The debt in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the score above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code carries none.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D27 Navigability — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites, and all 1059 sampled here came from .cs files. This repository's .ts source is a material share of its production lines and contributed none, so the score above is a verdict about the part that was read. Not a finding that the unread half navigates well — it is unmeasured.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Abstractions/ICommand.cs`, `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Abstractions/IQuery.cs` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — postgres Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: backend Skipped - No image to be pulled web Skipped - No image to be pulled postgres Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.
X2 Cancellation propagation — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 34 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 74.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected. Measured on part of this repository only: .ts (25% of production source) was not exposed to THIS dimension's token comparison and is not in this count; duplication there is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream.

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/RemoveUserFromChat/RemoveUserFromChatCommandHandler.cs:20

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/ChatService.cs:39

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with RemoveUserFromChatCommandHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ChatService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Application → InfrastructureREDACTED:11

What to do

Resolve the 1 Layer violation finding(s) in Coupling — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 of 17 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 7) · ×2backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:5

What to do

Resolve the 2 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with User.cs, AccountController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

37 test methods: 32 unit, 5 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 17 `it`/`test` case(s) across 15 test file(s) declaring at least one beside 20 .NET test method(s); its tier split is read from package names and paths only.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 20 tests. Measured on the C# suite only — at least 15 test source file(s) (.ts) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

22 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages. Those are the NuGet packages; this repository's npm dependencies were read too — 25 outdated of 32 package(s) across 1 lockfile(s).

Deprecated: xunit · ×2backend/tests/MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests/MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests.csproj:13

Outdated (npm): @angular/animations · ×12web/package.json:13

Deprecated: glob · ×3REDACTED:7471

Outdated: Auth0.ManagementApiREDACTED:16

Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi · ×21

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 12 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests.csproj, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · REDACTED Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Enforce REDACTED Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 256 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 23 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 227 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's NuGet package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt8.1 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 deducted debt markers + 8 dead symbols across 2601 LoC in the .NET projects (0.9/KLoC) → score 8.1. Measured on the .NET source only: .ts (25% of production source) was not read, and carries at least 3 uncounted task marker(s) in 3 file(s).

WriteOnlyPrivateFieldbackend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs:12

TodoComment · ×8backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:44

Dead code: MarkRead · ×8backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:52

BarePragmaDisablebackend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Result.cs:9

What to do

Resolve the 1 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with CreateChatCommandHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 8 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with UserService.cs (2), AccountController.cs, MessageController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 8 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with User.cs (2), Message.cs, IJwtProvider.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 projects, 113 source files, 2974 hand-written lines of code (2601 production / 373 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), plus 446 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 8 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README gives a strong overview of what the Messaging Platform is (a real-time messaging app built with Clean Architecture/DDD), lists the tech stack, and describes the architecture. The web/README documents the web directory rather than the project as a whole, so its coverage falls under the per-directory scope it claims. There are no installation/build or usage examples for the root document, which is consistent with the repository-wide summary (no install/usage guidance).

XML-doc coverage: MessagingPlatform.Api · ×4REDACTED

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — The repository's root README gives a strong overview of what the Messaging Platform is (a real-time messaging app built with Clean Architecture/DDD), lists the tech stack, and describes the architecture. The web/README documents the web directory rather than the project as a whole, so its coverage falls under the per-directory scope it claims. There are no installation/build or usage examples for the root document, which is consistent with the repository-wide summary (no install/usage guidance).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent naming for the user authentication/account management service. The command handler for adding a user injects a dependency named `_accountService` (referring to `IAccountService`/`AccountService`), while the sign-in command and the service itself use the term 'Account'. However, in the `UserService` and `IUserService` interfaces, the same logical domain concept (managing user identity, passwords, and profile) is referred to as 'User' (`UserService`, `IUserService`, `UserRepository`). This creates a split between 'Account' and 'User' terminology for what appears to be the same core identity management domain, potentially causing confusion about whether 'Account' and 'User' are distinct entities or synonyms.

Inconsistent namespace structure for user-chat relationship commands. Commands related to modifying the relationship between a user and a chat (adding, removing, updating permissions) are placed in `MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.*`, whereas commands related to the Chat entity itself (create, delete, update) are in `MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.*`. While this distinguishes between 'Chat' and 'UserChat' entities, it creates a parallel structure where `UserChats` is treated as a separate aggregate root namespace rather than a sub-resource of `Chats` or `Users`. This is a minor structural inconsistency in how the CQRS namespaces are organized for related entities.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D24 · Comment ValueWeak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 valuable / 1 redundant across 12 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentbackend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/UpdateUserDto.cs:10

What to do

Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with UpdateUserDto.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 % of calls cross a namespace and 7 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated. Measured over the .cs source only — this repository's .ts was not sampled for call sites, so this score covers part of the tree, not all of it.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.5 / 10Adequategated by 6 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 6 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Abstractions/ICommand.cs` (line 3), `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Abstractions/IQuery.cs` (line 3) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 6 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

79 finding(s): 5 critical, 50 high, 15 medium, 9 low.

REDACTED

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 49 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (43), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (49 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.4 / 10Adequategated by 3 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 5 medium, 2 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 of 11 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs. Counted over 11 of the 105 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×11backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

Resolve the 11 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with AccountController.cs, ChatController.cs, UserChatController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: ChatController.cs↔ChatRepository.cs 64%

Change coupling: ChatController.cs ↔ ChatRepository.csbackend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:1

What to do

Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with ChatController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D39 · IL Efficiency9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 of 227 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 2 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetbackend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Persistence/Configurations/UserConfiguration.cs:11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 6 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.

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AC2 · Forms & labels6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — web/src/app/components/main-layout/chat/chat.component.html:37, web/src/app/components/main-layout/sidebar/sidebar.component.html:4

What to do

Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

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AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

The repo's own CSS styles .pill with `cursor: pointer`, so this <span> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×3) — web/src/app/components/account/account.component.html:11, web/src/app/components/account/account.component.html:15, web/src/app/components/account/account.component.html:19
The repo's own CSS styles .user with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — web/src/app/components/main-layout/sidebar/sidebar.component.html:17
The repo's own CSS styles .sign-out with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — web/src/app/components/settings/settings.component.html:5

What to do

Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC6 · Visual & motion safety5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

`.sign-out` sets color: #fff on background-color: #f44336 — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — web/src/app/components/settings/settings.component.css:20
`*` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — web/src/styles.css:25

What to do

Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 10 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add @angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.

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AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX10 · Code composition5.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

The namespaces MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions ↔ MessagingPlatform.Application.Common depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is MessagingPlatform.Application.Common → MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions (MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Result → MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions.IResult, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Result.cs:2

What to do

Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

`MessagingPlatform.Application` is a Application project but references `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one. — REDACTED:11
This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`: it names `MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Interfaces`, `IChatService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 14, 16. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs:3
This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`: it names `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Interfaces`, `IAccountService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 10, 12. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. (×2) — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommandHandler.cs:3, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/SignIn/SignInCommandHandler.cs:3
This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`: it names `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Interfaces`, `IUserService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 10, 12. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommandHandler.cs:3

What to do

Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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C1 · Data Protection0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

`Chat` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `_messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Chat.cs:10
`Chat` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `Messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Chat.cs:29
`Message` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Sender`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:24
`Message` references the aggregate root `Chat` directly (via `Chat`) — hold its `ChatId` instead. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:28
`User` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `_messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:8
`User` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `Messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:43

What to do

Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

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DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

`User` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Create`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:45

What to do

Pass the instant into the domain method that needs it, or inject `TimeProvider` (BCL, .NET 8+) and read it there — then a test can choose the moment a rule is evaluated at.

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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. An id wrapper is recognised by VALUE SEMANTICS, not by being a struct — a record struct, a record class (`record ApartmentId(Guid Value)`) or a class declared by a typed-id base (`class MemberId : TypedIdValueBase`) all count, while a plain mutable class (reference equality) and a verb-phrase query record (`GetCustomerById`) do not. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

`Message.SenderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:22
`Message.ChatId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:26

What to do

Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM7 · Repository granularity2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

`IMessageRepository` returns `IQueryable` from `GetAllAsync`. That hands the caller the persistence engine rather than an aggregate: query composition, and with it the shape of what gets loaded, moves out of the repository and out of the aggregate's reach — and the contract can no longer be implemented by anything that is not that ORM. Return the aggregate (or a list of them) from methods that name the question being asked. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IMessageRepository.cs:5
`IUserRepository` returns `IQueryable` from `GetAllAsync`. That hands the caller the persistence engine rather than an aggregate: query composition, and with it the shape of what gets loaded, moves out of the repository and out of the aggregate's reach — and the contract can no longer be implemented by anything that is not that ORM. Return the aggregate (or a list of them) from methods that name the question being asked. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IUserRepository.cs:5

What to do

Define repositories per aggregate root and keep the query handle inside them; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`GetAllAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/MessageRepository.cs:17
`GetByContentAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/MessageRepository.cs:66
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:56

What to do

Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

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M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No logging call was found in the 120 `.cs` file(s) this check read. Each was searched for the framework names `ILogger`, `Serilog`, `NLog` and `log4net`; for a call on a receiver whose name ends in `Logger`; for a `System.Diagnostics` write; for a level-gated log facade; and for the builder spellings that CONFIGURE logging for everyone else (`AddLogging(`, `ConfigureLogging(`, `UseSerilog(`, `UseNLog(`, `.Logging.Add…(`); and for emission through an `EventSource`, `ActivitySource` or `DiagnosticSource` (`WriteEvent(`, `StartActivity(`, `.Write("event", …)`). That walk sees only `.cs` documents from projects the workspace loaded, so it cannot see logging in source that did not load, in another language, or through a repo-local wrapper whose name does not end in `Logger` — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 5031 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

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P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

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R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

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R10 · Code Duplication8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

web/src/app/components/account/signin/signin.component.ts:12 · web/src/app/components/account/signup/signup.component.ts:12 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — web/src/app/components/account/signin/signin.component.ts:12
web/src/app/services/authguard/authguard.service.ts:7 · web/src/app/services/nonauthguard/nonauthguard.service.ts:7 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — web/src/app/services/authguard/authguard.service.ts:7
web/src/app/services/auth/auth.service.ts:26 · web/src/app/services/auth/auth.service.ts:34 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — web/src/app/services/auth/auth.service.ts:26

What to do

Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.

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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

normalizeMessage has cyclomatic complexity 35 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — web/src/app/components/main-layout/chat/chat.component.ts:171
normalizeUser has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — web/src/app/components/main-layout/chat/chat.component.ts:227

What to do

Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.

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R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

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R4 · Test Coverage9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. — web/src/main.ts:1

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

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R5 · Dependency Freshness8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.

What to do

Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.

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R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

What to do

Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

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R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Declared in web/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

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R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

`ValidateAudience`, `ValidateIssuer` are all set to `false`, which means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:46
None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Program.cs:9
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it. — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Program.cs:9

What to do

Re-enable token validation — `ValidateAudience` is set to `false`. If it was switched off because the expected value was wrong or absent, supply that value instead (`ValidAudiences`/`ValidIssuers`, or `IssuerSigningKeys`/`IssuerSigningKeyResolver` for the signature) rather than skipping the check: a disabled check accepts every token, not just the one that was failing.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.

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X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

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X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 0/73 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×39) — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:44, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:59, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:77, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

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X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

~0.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 13 suppression(s) across the 17303 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC1 · Text alternatives	1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5	Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics	2.1.1, 2.4.3	Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety	1.4.3, 2.4.7	Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	72%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	76%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	50%	Adequate — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	25%	Critical — gated by D13, R6, P2, P3, P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	40%	Weak — gated by D30, D36, C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	50%	Weak — gated by DM1, DM2, DM7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility	46%	Weak — gated by AC4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.

Not included — 30 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — postgres Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: backend Skipped - No image to be pulled web Skipped - No image to be pulled postgres Pulling postgres Error Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden Error response from daemon: Get "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/": Forbidden; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not scored — polyglot repository, one half has no runner
D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (2,601 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (MessagingPlatform.Domain), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 2 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the .NET half could not be measured — the repository wires up no coverage collector for `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` to use; the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — web/ (karma) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. This repository's production source spans both ecosystems, and no partial figure is published as if it were the whole: coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan. Alternatively, commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and it is read without a re-run.
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (23 CQRS handler(s))
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HttpClient/IHttpClientFactory/AddHttpClient in source, and no Refit/RestSharp/Flurl.Http namespace or package reference
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 86 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×49

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+ 24 more in this group — see findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate · ×6

Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Chat._messages backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Chat.cs:10 — `Chat` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `_messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead.
Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Chat.Messages backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Chat.cs:29 — `Chat` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `Messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead.
Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Message.Sender backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:24 — `Message` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Sender`) — hold its `UserId` instead.
Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Message.Chat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:28 — `Message` references the aggregate root `Chat` directly (via `Chat`) — hold its `ChatId` instead.
Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: User._messages backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:8 — `User` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `_messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead.
Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: User.Messages backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:43 — `User` references the aggregate root `Message` directly (via `Messages`) — hold its `MessageId` instead.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable · ×5

Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable web/src/app/components/account/account.component.html:11 — The repo's own CSS styles .pill with `cursor: pointer`, so this <span> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable web/src/app/components/account/account.component.html:15 — The repo's own CSS styles .pill with `cursor: pointer`, so this <span> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable web/src/app/components/account/account.component.html:19 — The repo's own CSS styles .pill with `cursor: pointer`, so this <span> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable web/src/app/components/main-layout/sidebar/sidebar.component.html:17 — The repo's own CSS styles .user with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable web/src/app/components/settings/settings.component.html:5 — The repo's own CSS styles .sign-out with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×5

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D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×3

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D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3

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D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×2

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AC2 · Forms & labels · <textarea> without a programmatic label · ×1

<textarea> without a programmatic label web/src/app/components/main-layout/chat/chat.component.html:37 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.

AC2 · Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label · ×1

<input> without a programmatic label web/src/app/components/main-layout/sidebar/sidebar.component.html:4 — This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles · Namespace dependency cycle · ×1

Namespace dependency cycle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Result.cs:2 — The namespaces MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions ↔ MessagingPlatform.Application.Common depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is MessagingPlatform.Application.Common → MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions (MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Result → MessagingPlatform.Application.Abstractions.IResult, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.

AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×1

Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) REDACTED:11 — `MessagingPlatform.Application` is a Application project but references `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.

D17 · Explicit Debt · WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×1

WriteOnlyPrivateField backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs:12 — private IChatRepository _chatRepository — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1

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D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×1

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure REDACTED:11 — MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) references MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).

Serious — 114 finding(s)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×39

Async method without CancellationToken: GetAll backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:44 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Get backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:59 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetByUsername backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:77 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SignUp backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:92 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SignIn backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:109 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Update backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:139 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Delete backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:172 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetChats backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:34 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:50 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: CreateChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:66 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: UpdateChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:83 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: DeleteChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:98 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetAll backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:33 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Add backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:47 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Update backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:67 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Delete backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:84 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetUserChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs:35 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetUserChats backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs:49 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AddUserChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs:63 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: UpdateUserPermissions backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs:77 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RemoveUserChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs:91 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SendMessageToChat backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Hubs/ChatHub.cs:19 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs:23 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/DeleteChat/DeleteChatCommandHandler.cs:18 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Handle backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/UpdateChat/UpdateChatCommandHandler.cs:18 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
+ 14 more in this group — see findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×13

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D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×8

TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:44 — // ToDo: only for admins — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:31 — // ToDo: use instead of navigation property "Messages" in Chat entity for better productivity — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs:13 — // ToDo — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/ChatDTOs/UpdateChatDto.cs:5 — // ToDo: add more fields — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Persistence/Configurations/UserConfiguration.cs:50 — // ToDo: create index for email — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/Repository.cs:7 — // ToDo: replace all repositories with this — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/UserService.cs:8 — // ToDo: fix this (перенести всю логику в AccountService) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/UserService.cs:55 — // ToDo: fix logic — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×8

Dead code: MarkRead backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:52 — Method MarkRead — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: UpdateUsername backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:64 — Method UpdateUsername — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: SetOnlineStatus backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:84 — Method SetOnlineStatus — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: ExtractClaimsValues backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IJwtProvider.cs:8 — Method ExtractClaimsValues — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: GetUsersByIdsAsync backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IUserRepository.cs:7 — Method GetUsersByIdsAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: GetChatDto backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/ChatDTOs/GetChatDto.cs:6 — NamedType GetChatDto — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Application, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: UpdateChatDto backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/ChatDTOs/UpdateChatDto.cs:3 — NamedType UpdateChatDto — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Application, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
Dead code: GetUserByIdAsync backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Interfaces/IUserService.cs:9 — Method GetUserByIdAsync — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×5

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×4

Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Chats/Commands/CreateChat/CreateChatCommandHandler.cs:3 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`: it names `MessagingPlatform.Application.Common.Interfaces`, `IChatService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 14, 16. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.
Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommandHandler.cs:3 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`: it names `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Interfaces`, `IAccountService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 10, 12. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.
Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/SignIn/SignInCommandHandler.cs:3 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`: it names `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Interfaces`, `IAccountService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 10, 12. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.
Dependency-rule violation: MessagingPlatform.Application (Application) → MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommandHandler.cs:3 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure`: it names `MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Interfaces`, `IUserService`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on lines 10, 12. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×3

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2

Deprecated: xunit backend/tests/MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests/MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests.csproj:13 — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
Deprecated: xunit REDACTED:13 — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×2

Low cohesion: User (LCOM4 7) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:5 — User's methods fall into 7 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 7 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Low cohesion: AccountController (LCOM4 5) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:16 — AccountController's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.

DM7 · Repository granularity · Repository contract exposes a live query handle · ×2

Repository contract exposes a live query handle: IMessageRepository backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IMessageRepository.cs:5 — `IMessageRepository` returns `IQueryable` from `GetAllAsync`. That hands the caller the persistence engine rather than an aggregate: query composition, and with it the shape of what gets loaded, moves out of the repository and out of the aggregate's reach — and the contract can no longer be implemented by anything that is not that ORM. Return the aggregate (or a list of them) from methods that name the question being asked.
Repository contract exposes a live query handle: IUserRepository backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Interfaces/IUserRepository.cs:5 — `IUserRepository` returns `IQueryable` from `GetAllAsync`. That hands the caller the persistence engine rather than an aggregate: query composition, and with it the shape of what gets loaded, moves out of the repository and out of the aggregate's reach — and the contract can no longer be implemented by anything that is not that ORM. Return the aggregate (or a list of them) from methods that name the question being asked.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Fake-async · ×2

Fake-async — async method never awaits backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/MessageRepository.cs:17 — `GetAllAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.
Fake-async — async method never awaits backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/MessageRepository.cs:66 — `GetByContentAsync` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7 · ×1

Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) web/src/app/components/settings/settings.component.css:20 — `.sign-out` sets color: #fff on background-color: #f44336 — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a · ×1

Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement web/src/styles.css:25 — `*` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1

Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 10 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

C1 · Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption · ×1

No data-protection/encryption — No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

D17 · Explicit Debt · BarePragmaDisable · ×1

BarePragmaDisable backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Result.cs:9 — #pragma warning disable CS8766 — the disable is closed again below, so its scope is not the problem; what it records is no reason: there is nothing on the directive line, and no ordinary comment attached to it either side. A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited and it outlives the code it was written for. Put the reason on the directive line — what makes this site legitimately different — or fix what the rule is pointing at and delete the pair. A rationale in the member's documentation comment does not clear this row and is not meant to: it explains the member to its callers, and the next person to touch the suppression is not reading it for that.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1

Change coupling: ChatController.cs ↔ ChatRepository.cs backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:1 — `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs` and `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/ChatRepository.cs` change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in different directories, but in this ecosystem the namespace is declared in the FILE, not by the folder — so the two may well share one namespace and reference each other with no import for this pass to see. Read the pair before acting: if one derives from or overrides the other, the dependency is explicit in the type declaration and the co-change is definitional; if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE and the thing to add is a comment saying so; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if none of these holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `07633ac3` Refactor chat endpoint; `7916b7fd` Create new functionality with type of chat; `67c7b4b9` fix bugs in chat logic — run `git show` on any of them.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/RemoveUserFromChat/RemoveUserFromChatCommandHandler.cs:20 — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/RemoveUserFromChat/RemoveUserFromChatCommandHandler.cs:20-33 | backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/UpdateUserPermissions/UpdateUserPermissionsCommandHandler.cs:21-34 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/UserChats/Commands/RemoveUserFromChat/RemoveUserFromChatCommandHandler.cs:20` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: the declarations holding them bind `command` to `RemoveUserFromChatCommand` in one and `UpdateUserPermissionsCommand` in another, and the duplicated lines use it. The extracted unit therefore needs a parameter type that fits BOTH — their common supertype where they have one, or a new abstraction over them where they do not — and settling that is the step that comes BEFORE the extraction above. Where the two types are deliberately unrelated, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/ChatService.cs:39 — backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/ChatService.cs:39-43 | backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/ChatService.cs:57-61 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/ChatService.cs:39` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — .NET and JavaScript/TypeScript suite — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the .NET half could not be measured — the repository wires up no coverage collector for `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` to use; the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — web/ (karma) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. This repository's production source spans both ecosystems, and no partial figure is published as if it were the whole: coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan. Alternatively, commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and it is read without a re-run.

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain · Domain type reads the wall clock · ×1

Domain type reads the wall clock: User backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:45 — `User` reads `DateTime.UtcNow` inside `Create`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.

P2 · Observability · No structured logging · ×1

No structured logging — No logging call was found in the 120 `.cs` file(s) this check read. Each was searched for the framework names `ILogger`, `Serilog`, `NLog` and `log4net`; for a call on a receiver whose name ends in `Logger`; for a `System.Diagnostics` write; for a level-gated log facade; and for the builder spellings that CONFIGURE logging for everyone else (`AddLogging(`, `ConfigureLogging(`, `UseSerilog(`, `UseNLog(`, `.Logging.Add…(`); and for emission through an `EventSource`, `ActivitySource` or `DiagnosticSource` (`WriteEvent(`, `StartActivity(`, `.Write("event", …)`). That walk sees only `.cs` documents from projects the workspace loaded, so it cannot see logging in source that did not load, in another language, or through a repo-local wrapper whose name does not end in `Logger` — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.

P5 · DR & Backup · No DR/backup evidence · ×1

No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (20 lines × 2 locations) web/src/app/components/account/signin/signin.component.ts:12 — web/src/app/components/account/signin/signin.component.ts:12 · web/src/app/components/account/signup/signup.component.ts:12 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) web/src/app/services/authguard/authguard.service.ts:7 — web/src/app/services/authguard/authguard.service.ts:7 · web/src/app/services/nonauthguard/nonauthguard.service.ts:7 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) web/src/app/services/auth/auth.service.ts:26 — web/src/app/services/auth/auth.service.ts:26 · web/src/app/services/auth/auth.service.ts:34 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function normalizeMessage (cyclomatic 35, cognitive 28) · ×1

Complex function normalizeMessage (cyclomatic 35, cognitive 28) web/src/app/components/main-layout/chat/chat.component.ts:171 — normalizeMessage has cyclomatic complexity 35 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function normalizeUser (cyclomatic 18, cognitive 10) · ×1

Complex function normalizeUser (cyclomatic 18, cognitive 10) web/src/app/components/main-layout/chat/chat.component.ts:227 — normalizeUser has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R4 · Test Coverage · No test reaches this file · ×1

No test reaches this file web/src/main.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.

R6 · Tooling · No lint or typecheck script · ×1

No lint or typecheck script — test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'tslib' · ×1

Unused dependency 'tslib' — Declared in web/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · Token validation disabled · ×1

Token validation disabled backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:46 — `ValidateAudience`, `ValidateIssuer` are all set to `false`, which means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent.

SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1

NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.

Minor — 61 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×12

Outdated (npm): @angular/animations web/package.json:13 — @angular/animations 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): @angular/common web/package.json:14 — @angular/common 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): @angular/compiler web/package.json:15 — @angular/compiler 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): @angular/core web/package.json:16 — @angular/core 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): @angular/forms web/package.json:17 — @angular/forms 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): @angular/platform-browser web/package.json:18 — @angular/platform-browser 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): @angular/platform-browser-dynamic web/package.json:19 — @angular/platform-browser-dynamic 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): @angular/router web/package.json:20 — @angular/router 18.2.1 → 22.2.3 available.
Outdated (npm): eventsource — eventsource 2.0.2 → 5.1.3 available.
Outdated (npm): tr46 — tr46 0.0.3 → 7.0.0 available.
Outdated (npm): webidl-conversions — webidl-conversions 3.0.1 → 8.0.1 available.
Outdated (npm): whatwg-url — whatwg-url 5.0.0 → 17.3.0 available.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×11

Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Chat.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/MessageRepository.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/ChatService.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Hubs/ChatHub.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Security/JwtProvider.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×9

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×3

Deprecated: glob REDACTED:7471 — glob 7.2.3 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Old versions of glob are not supported, and contain widely publicized security vulnerabilities, which have been fixed in the current version. Please update. Support for old versions may be purchased (at exorbitant rates) by contacting i@izs.me". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: inflight REDACTED:8026 — inflight 1.0.6 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This module is not supported, and leaks memory. Do not use it. Check out lru-cache if you want a good and tested way to coalesce async requests by a key value, which is much more comprehensive and powerful.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: rimraf REDACTED:11627 — rimraf 3.0.2 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Rimraf versions prior to v4 are no longer supported". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids · Primitive id on a domain type · ×2

Primitive id on a domain type: Message.SenderId backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:22 — `Message.SenderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.
Primitive id on a domain type: Message.ChatId backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Message.cs:26 — `Message.ChatId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×2

No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No security response headers detected backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Program.cs:9 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×2

No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Program.cs:9 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×1

Outdated: Auth0.ManagementApi REDACTED:16 — Auth0.ManagementApi 7.43.0 → 10.5.0 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for the user authentication/account management service. The command handler for adding a user injects a dependency named `_accountService` (referring to `IAccountService`/`AccountService`), while the sign-in command and the service itself use the term 'Account'. However, in the `UserService` and `IUserService` interfaces, the same logical domain concept (managing user identity, passwords, and profile) is referred to as 'User' (`UserService`, `IUserService`, `UserRepository`). This creates a split between 'Account' and 'User' terminology for what appears to be the same core identity management domain, potentially causing confusion about whether 'Account' and 'User' are distinct entities or synonyms. · ×1

Inconsistent naming for the user authentication/account management service. The command handler for adding a user injects a dependency named `_accountService` (referring to `IAccountService`/`AccountService`), while the sign-in command and the service itself use the term 'Account'. However, in the `UserService` and `IUserService` interfaces, the same logical domain concept (managing user identity, passwords, and profile) is referred to as 'User' (`UserService`, `IUserService`, `UserRepository`). This creates a split between 'Account' and 'User' terminology for what appears to be the same core identity management domain, potentially causing confusion about whether 'Account' and 'User' are distinct entities or synonyms. — Standardize on either 'Account' or 'User' for the identity management domain. Given the prevalence of 'User' in `UserRepository`, `UserService`, and `UserDTOs`, consider renaming `AccountService` and related interfaces to `UserService` or `IUserService` (if not conflicting with the existing `IUserService` which seems to handle profile updates) to align with the rest of the codebase. Alternatively, if 'Account' is the preferred term for authentication-specific operations, rename `UserService` and `UserRepository` to `AccountService`/`AccountRepository`. (symbols: MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.AddUser.AddUserCommandHandler._accountService, MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Users.Commands.SignIn.SignInCommand, MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Services.AccountService.SignIn)

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent namespace structure for user-chat relationship commands. Commands related to modifying the relationship between a user and a chat (adding, removing, updating permissions) are placed in `MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.*`, whereas commands related to the Chat entity itself (create, delete, update) are in `MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.*`. While this distinguishes between 'Chat' and 'UserChat' entities, it creates a parallel structure where `UserChats` is treated as a separate aggregate root namespace rather than a sub-resource of `Chats` or `Users`. This is a minor structural inconsistency in how the CQRS namespaces are organized for related entities. · ×1

Inconsistent namespace structure for user-chat relationship commands. Commands related to modifying the relationship between a user and a chat (adding, removing, updating permissions) are placed in `MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.*`, whereas commands related to the Chat entity itself (create, delete, update) are in `MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.*`. While this distinguishes between 'Chat' and 'UserChat' entities, it creates a parallel structure where `UserChats` is treated as a separate aggregate root namespace rather than a sub-resource of `Chats` or `Users`. This is a minor structural inconsistency in how the CQRS namespaces are organized for related entities. — Consider consolidating user-chat relationship commands under the `Chats` namespace (e.g., `MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.AddUserToChat`) if the `UserChat` entity is strictly a link table and not a primary aggregate, or ensure that `UserChats` is consistently treated as a top-level aggregate if it has independent lifecycle management. The current split suggests `UserChat` is a first-class citizen in the namespace hierarchy, which may be intentional but differs from the `Chats` command structure. (symbols: MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.AddUserToChat.AddUserToChatCommand, MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.UpdateUserPermissions.UpdateUserPermissionsCommand, MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.UserChats.Commands.RemoveUserFromChat, MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.CreateChat.CreateChatCommand, MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.DeleteChat.DeleteChatCommand, MessagingPlatform.Application.CQRS.Chats.Commands.UpdateChat.UpdateChatCommand)

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1

redundant comment backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/UpdateUserDto.cs:10 — "public string Username { get; set; }" — delete - restates the property declaration

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

REDACTED

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 11 of 11 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 11 of the 105 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/Chat.cs, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/ChatController.cs, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/UserChatController.cs, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Repositories/MessageRepository.cs, backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Services/ChatService.cs (and 3 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1

IL efficiency: 2 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Persistence/Configurations/UserConfiguration.cs:11 — 2 of 227 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure.Persistence.Configurations.UserConfiguration.Configure @ backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure/Persistence/Configurations/UserConfiguration.cs:11, 418 IL instructions; that pulled this dimension to 9.8/10. These bodies are far past the JIT's inline budget, so splitting them does not make them inlinable — what moves the number is emitting less: collapsing LINQ chains and closures on hot paths, and interpolation built eagerly where it is only sometimes used.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Commented-out code · ×1

Commented-out code backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Api/Controllers/MessageController.cs:56 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1

No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 5031 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1

No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1

Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 0/73 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.

X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1

Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~0.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 13 suppression(s) across the 17303 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

Minor — 38 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×21

Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Api).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Api).
Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design 10.0.1 → 10.0.2 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Api).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 10.1.0 → 10.3.1 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Api).
Outdated: Auth0.AuthenticationApi — Auth0.AuthenticationApi 7.43.0 → 7.49.0 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: BCrypt.Net-Next — BCrypt.Net-Next 4.0.3 → 4.2.0 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 12.1.1 → 12.2.0 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 12.1.1 → 12.2.0 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Abstractions 2.3.0 → 2.3.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Cookies — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Cookies 2.3.0 → 2.3.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core — Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Options — Microsoft.Extensions.Options 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.Identity.Client — Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.79.2 → 4.91.1 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 10.0.1 → 10.0.13 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 10.0.0 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 18.0.1 → 18.11.0 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests).
Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 3.1.5 → 4.0.1 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Domain.Tests).
Outdated: Testcontainers.PostgreSql — Testcontainers.PostgreSql 3.9.0 → 4.16.0 available (referenced by MessagingPlatform.Application.Tests).

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×13

Outdated (npm): @microsoft/signalr — @microsoft/signalr 8.0.7 → 10.0.11 available.
Outdated (npm): event-target-shim — event-target-shim 5.0.1 → 6.0.2 available.
Outdated (npm): fetch-cookie — fetch-cookie 2.2.0 → 3.2.0 available.
Outdated (npm): iconv-lite — iconv-lite 0.6.3 → 0.7.3 available.
Outdated (npm): node-fetch — node-fetch 2.7.0 → 3.3.2 available.
Outdated (npm): psl — psl 1.9.0 → 1.15.0 available.
Outdated (npm): rxjs — rxjs 7.8.1 → 7.8.2 available.
Outdated (npm): set-cookie-parser — set-cookie-parser 2.7.0 → 3.2.1 available.
Outdated (npm): tough-cookie — tough-cookie 4.1.4 → 6.0.2 available.
Outdated (npm): tslib — tslib 2.6.3 → 2.8.1 available.
Outdated (npm): universalify — universalify 0.2.0 → 2.0.1 available.
Outdated (npm): ws — ws 7.5.10 → 8.22.0 available.
Outdated (npm): zone.js — zone.js 0.14.10 → 0.16.3 available.

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×4

XML-doc coverage: MessagingPlatform.Api REDACTED — MessagingPlatform.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/37).
XML-doc coverage: MessagingPlatform.Domain backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/MessagingPlatform.Domain.csproj — MessagingPlatform.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/73).
XML-doc coverage: MessagingPlatform.Application REDACTED — MessagingPlatform.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/157).
XML-doc coverage: MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure REDACTED — MessagingPlatform.Infrastructure: 1 % XML-doc coverage (1/83).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-6971930d36e7481caa077d6917a80bed/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	1	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-6971930d36e7481caa077d6917a80bed/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	1	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	7	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list MessagingPlatform.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	79	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	10	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 2 file(s) — `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Abstractions/ICommand.cs`, `backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Abstractions/IQuery.cs` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a161e5-7b6f-7a29-bb82-264f2b7fe51c · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 16 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 11 field(s)

AddUserCommand.FirstName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommand.cs:6
AddUserCommand.LastName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommand.cs:7
UpdateUserCommand.FirstName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:7
UpdateUserCommand.LastName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:8
GetMessageDto.SenderFullName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/MessageDTOs/GetMessageDto.cs:5
GetUserDto.FirstName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/GetUserDto.cs:5
GetUserDto.LastName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/GetUserDto.cs:6
UpdateUserDto.FirstName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/UpdateUserDto.cs:6
UpdateUserDto.LastName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/UpdateUserDto.cs:8
User.FirstName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:25
User.LastName backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:27

Email — 5 field(s)

AddUserCommand.Email backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/AddUser/AddUserCommand.cs:9
UpdateUserCommand.Email backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/CQRS/Users/Commands/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:9
GetUserDto.Email backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/GetUserDto.cs:8
UpdateUserDto.Email backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Application/Common/Models/UserDTOs/UpdateUserDto.cs:12
User.Email backend/src/MessagingPlatform.Domain/Entities/User.cs:31

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 72% · Strong ·

At a glance — Architecture · 76% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 50% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 25% · Critical · gated by D13, R6, P2, P3, P5 ·

At a glance — Security · 40% · Weak · gated by D30, D36, C1 ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 50% · Weak · gated by DM1, DM2, DM7 ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 46% · Weak · gated by AC4 ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts