Public report — sequin, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
204findings with an exact file:lineof 217 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
43/106dimensions across the health lenses60958 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
sequinstream/sequin carries serious gaps (39%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Security (30%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (34%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 5 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Medium (~60,958 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.6 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 39% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.6 person-years of build effort (about ~€94,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 30% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with playground.yml, test.exs, runtime.exs.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.6 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 30%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with playground.yml, test.exs, runtime.exs. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with playground.yml, test.exs, runtime.exs.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
111 modules, 36 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
49
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
30
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
19
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
8
High / Critical
Roadmap
Immediately resolve the five leaked secrets in the codebase, starting with playground.yml, test.exs, and runtime.exs. Integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to prevent future regressions. Expand test coverage to include all production modules to ensure reliability. Finally, document disaster recovery procedures and update outdated dependencies to reduce technical debt.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with playground.yml, test.exs, runtime.exs.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
God Classes: FileTooLong: runtime/slot_message_store.ex
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 41 of 43 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 204 of 217 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 10 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
5 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Transforms.from_external_sink_consumer at 54. A further 9 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being OidDatabase.name_for_type_id at 139 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
Resolve the 1 Transforms.from_external_sink_consumer (cyclomatic 54) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with transforms.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ConsumerForm.handle_event (cyclomatic 43) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with consumer_form.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Bench.run (cyclomatic 21) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with bench.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Transforms.from_external_sink_consumer (cognitive 41) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with transforms.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ConsumerForm.handle_event (cognitive 29) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with consumer_form.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Bench.run (cognitive 20) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with bench.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 17 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with show.ex, consumers.ex, transforms.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
Resolve the 16 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with consumers.ex, accounts.ex, postgres.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with playground.yml, test.exs, runtime.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
13 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/sequin/runtime/wal_pipeline_server.ex.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×2
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Sequin's documentation is comprehensive and well-organized across READMEs, a dedicated docs/README, and deployment directories. It includes an excellent performance benchmark table comparing Sequin to Debezium on AWS, a Docker setup guide covering Compose files, CI integration, and the `include` feature, a production deployment guide for Terraform infrastructure (both ECS EC2 and Fargate), end-to-end test documentation with Make commands, a user-specific webhooks example, and physical/logical replication Docker setups. The READMEs are well written and cross-linked; the only gap is an architecture/design doc that would clarify how Sequin's CDC model differs from traditional methods.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2config/bench.exs:25detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with bench.exs, consumers.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×41.github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:26detected by semgrep finding
Medium: use-of-md5 · ×8cli/chisel/client/client.go:226detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 41 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml (15), docker-build.yml (8), docker-cloud-build.yml (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (41 issue-level).
Resolve the 8 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with alb.tf (4), vpc.tf (2), client.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0029 · ×13Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: AWS-0054 · ×6deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/alb.tfdetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 13 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with alb.tf (4), Dockerfile.postgres (2), ec2.tf (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with alb.tf (3), sg.tf (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
7 of 209 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×16mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]cli/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] · ×12mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]assets/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 16 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (8), package-lock.json (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level).
Resolve the 12 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (5), go.mod (4), package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×19) — Index.svelte:129, CodeWithSecret.svelte:30, Datetime.svelte:8, …
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×6) — Datetime.svelte:54, SchemaTableSelector.svelte:118, SchemaTableSelector.svelte:228, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. — TableWithDrawer.svelte:112
A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — ShowMessages.svelte:580
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — AccountSettings.svelte:27
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A click handler on a plain element with no role and no tabindex: even where another element's key handler can reach it, assistive tech can neither focus it nor announce what it is. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0". (×2) — TableWithDrawer.svelte:44, Messages.svelte:58
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
This element's Tailwind text/background colour utilities fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Pick a darker or lighter shade. (×2) — TableWithDrawer.svelte:116, Messages.svelte:164
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-svelte (a11y rules are built in)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-svelte (a11y rules are built in), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 1 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.4 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
assets/svelte/components/SequenceSelector.svelte:181 · assets/svelte/components/TableOrSchemaSelector.svelte:203 · assets/svelte/components/TableSelector.svelte:181 — the 3 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — SequenceSelector.svelte:181
assets/svelte/components/TableWithDrawer.svelte:138 · assets/svelte/consumers/ShowMessages.svelte:96 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — TableWithDrawer.svelte:138
assets/svelte/components/ui/sheet/index.ts:59 · assets/svelte/components/ui/sheet/index.ts:83 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.ts:59
assets/svelte/components/MessageExamples.svelte:26 · assets/svelte/components/TransformExamples.svelte:29 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — MessageExamples.svelte:26
assets/svelte/components/MessageExamples.svelte:76 · assets/svelte/components/TransformExamples.svelte:99 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — MessageExamples.svelte:76
assets/svelte/components/Sidenav.svelte:119 · assets/svelte/settings/AccountSettings.svelte:148 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — Sidenav.svelte:119
assets/svelte/consumers/types.ts:95 · assets/svelte/consumers/types.ts:209 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — types.ts:95
assets/svelte/settings/AccountSettings.svelte:129 · assets/svelte/settings/AccountSettings.svelte:262 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — AccountSettings.svelte:129
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×4) — Edit.svelte:559, HealthSummary.svelte:67, ShowMessages.svelte:357, …
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 242 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
250 file(s) (~11793 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: assets/js/app.js imports '../svelte/**/*.svelte', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — assets
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in assets/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 63 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~30550 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex, .ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs, .go, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, .go, .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 4 value object(s)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (2 CQRS handler(s))
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (21 Elixir aggregate(s) emitting domain events (%Event{} from execute/2))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:26— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:29— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/configure-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/configure-pages@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/configure-pages/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:38— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:38— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:43— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:59— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:67— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: Warpbuilds/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `Warpbuilds/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/Warpbuilds/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:91— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:94— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:109— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/docker-build.yml:115— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with a workflow input in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. A workflow input is not bounded by this step and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-cloud-build.yml:15— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-cloud-build.yml:18— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-cloud-build.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-cloud-build.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: aws-actions/amazon-ecr-login@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `aws-actions/amazon-ecr-login@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/aws-actions/amazon-ecr-login/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-cloud-build.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker-cloud-build.yml:74— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:33— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:88— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:113— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:116— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:130— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: Warpbuilds/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `Warpbuilds/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/Warpbuilds/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:157— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
+ 16 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×16
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— bandit 1.5.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.1. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against bandit 1.5.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.11.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.11.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against bandit 1.5.5: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— cowlib 2.13.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowlib 2.13.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.19.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.19.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.13.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— glob 10.4.5: [GHSA redacted] — glob is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin glob to 10.5.0 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— hackney 1.24.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against hackney 1.24.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— js-cookie 3.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — js-cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-cookie to 3.0.7 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares lodash ^4.17.21, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 4.18.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so lodash moves onto 4.18.0 or later; if the flagged 4.17.21 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin lodash with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— lodash-es 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash-es is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash-es to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash-es 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— minimatch 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 9.0.7 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 9.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 9.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 9.0.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— mint 1.7.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.9.0. This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mint 1.7.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against mint 1.7.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— nodejs 2.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— phoenix 1.7.18: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.7.22. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against phoenix 1.7.18, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.7.24 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.7.24 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against phoenix 1.7.18: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— plug 1.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.19.2. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.19.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.19.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.19.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares postcss ^8.4.41, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 8.5.12, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so postcss moves onto 8.5.12 or later; if the flagged 8.5.6 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin postcss with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock— postgrex 0.19.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.22.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postgrex 0.19.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.22.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.22.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postgrex 0.19.3: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.postgres— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 Dockerfile.postgres— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: AWS-0052 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/alb.tf— Load balancers should drop invalid headers
High IaC: AWS-0053 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/alb.tf— Load balancer is exposed to the internet.
High IaC: AWS-0131 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/ec2.tf— Instance with unencrypted block device.
High IaC: AWS-0107 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/sg.tf— Security groups should not allow unrestricted ingress to SSH or RDP from any IP address.
High IaC: AWS-0096 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/sqs.tf— Unencrypted SQS queue.
High IaC: AWS-0164 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/vpc.tf— Instances in a subnet should not receive a public IP address by default.
High IaC: AWS-0052 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2/infra/alb.tf— Load balancers should drop invalid headers
High IaC: AWS-0053 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2/infra/alb.tf— Load balancer is exposed to the internet.
High IaC: AWS-0131 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2/infra/ec2.tf— Instance with unencrypted block device.
High IaC: AWS-0107 deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2/infra/sg.tf— Security groups should not allow unrestricted ingress to SSH or RDP from any IP address.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential docker/playground.yml:7— hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/test.exs:70— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/runtime.exs:168— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/dev.exs:49— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/bench.exs:25— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
FileTooLong: sink_consumers/show.ex lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1458 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: consumers/consumers.ex lib/sequin/consumers/consumers.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1415 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: transforms/transforms.ex lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1291 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: components/consumer_form.ex lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1235 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: postgres/postgres.ex lib/sequin/postgres/postgres.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1113 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: runtime/slot_message_store.ex lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:0— FileTooLong — 969 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: sequin/yaml_loader.ex lib/sequin/yaml_loader.ex:0— FileTooLong — 907 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: health/health.ex lib/sequin/health/health.ex:0— FileTooLong — 844 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: runtime/table_reader_server.ex lib/sequin/runtime/table_reader_server.ex:0— FileTooLong — 808 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: accounts/accounts.ex lib/sequin/accounts/accounts.ex:0— FileTooLong — 772 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: functions/edit.ex lib/sequin_web/live/functions/edit.ex:0— FileTooLong — 677 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tasks/bench.ex lib/mix/tasks/bench.ex:0— FileTooLong — 633 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: components/core_components.ex lib/sequin_web/components/core_components.ex:0— FileTooLong — 621 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: runtime/slot_processor_server.ex lib/sequin/runtime/slot_processor_server.ex:0— FileTooLong — 593 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: slot_producer/slot_producer.ex lib/sequin/runtime/slot_producer/slot_producer.ex:0— FileTooLong — 582 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: runtime/slot_message_store_state.ex lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store_state.ex:0— FileTooLong — 567 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: runtime/wal_pipeline_server.ex lib/sequin/runtime/wal_pipeline_server.ex:0— FileTooLong — 535 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
TooManyMethods: Consumers lib/sequin/consumers/consumers.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 123 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Accounts lib/sequin/accounts/accounts.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 71 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Postgres lib/sequin/postgres/postgres.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 60 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: YamlLoader lib/sequin/yaml_loader.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 57 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Show lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 56 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ConsumerForm lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 49 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: SlotMessageStore lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 47 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Databases lib/sequin/databases/databases.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Replication lib/sequin/replication/replication.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Health lib/sequin/health/health.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 41 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Transforms lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 40 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Prometheus lib/sequin/metrics/prometheus.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 39 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: State lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store_state.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 38 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: BenchmarkSource lib/sequin/postgres/benchmark_source.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 36 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: WalPipelineServer lib/sequin/runtime/wal_pipeline_server.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 33 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ConfigParser lib/sequin/config_parser.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 31 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×12
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— decimal 2.3.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.0
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] cli/go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.38.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.55.0. This one row stands for the 10 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.38.0: [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 cli/go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.31.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C cli get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line cli/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 cli/go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.23.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C cli get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line cli/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— hpax 0.2.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1ba4bb2dc91e80089cf89c73970ac3ded76f17eb
Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] mix.lock— req: [CVE redacted] — upgrade to 36a82523e864739787340604f65ecce26699a0a9. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against req , and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against req : [CVE redacted], [CVE redacted].
Medium CVE: GO-2025-3563 cli/go.mod— stdlib 1.24.1 (net/http/internal): GO-2025-3563 — fixed in Go 1.24.2; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 45 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.24.1: GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3749, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— svelte 4.2.19: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares svelte >=4.2.19, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.51.5, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so svelte moves onto 5.51.5 or later; if the flagged 4.2.19 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin svelte with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against svelte 4.2.19, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.55.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.55.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against svelte 4.2.19: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— swoosh 1.16.9: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.26.3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— uuid 10.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 11.1.1
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— yaml 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin yaml to 2.8.3 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock— ymlr 5.1.3: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 5.1.6
Change coupling: dynamicRoutingDocs.ts ↔ routing.ex assets/svelte/consumers/dynamicRoutingDocs.ts— `assets/svelte/consumers/dynamicRoutingDocs.ts` and `lib/sequin/runtime/routing/routing.ex` change together 100% of the time (11 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: types.ts ↔ routing.ex assets/svelte/consumers/types.ts— `assets/svelte/consumers/types.ts` and `lib/sequin/runtime/routing/routing.ex` change together 100% of the time (11 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: Edit.svelte ↔ routing.ex assets/svelte/functions/Edit.svelte— `assets/svelte/functions/Edit.svelte` and `lib/sequin/runtime/routing/routing.ex` change together 100% of the time (11 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: routing_function.ex ↔ routing.ex lib/sequin/consumers/routing_function.ex— `lib/sequin/consumers/routing_function.ex` and `lib/sequin/runtime/routing/routing.ex` change together 100% of the time (11 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: dynamicRoutingDocs.ts ↔ edit.ex assets/svelte/consumers/dynamicRoutingDocs.ts— `assets/svelte/consumers/dynamicRoutingDocs.ts` and `lib/sequin_web/live/functions/edit.ex` change together 82% of the time (14 of the 17 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: types.ts ↔ routing_function.ex assets/svelte/consumers/types.ts— `assets/svelte/consumers/types.ts` and `lib/sequin/consumers/routing_function.ex` change together 71% of the time (12 of the 17 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: stream.go ↔ stream_command.go cli/api/stream.go— `cli/api/stream.go` and `cli/cli/stream_command.go` change together 69% of the time (9 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: Show.svelte ↔ show.ex assets/svelte/databases/Show.svelte— `assets/svelte/databases/Show.svelte` and `lib/sequin_web/live/databases/show.ex` change together 61% of the time (17 of the 28 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: Edit.svelte ↔ edit.ex assets/svelte/functions/Edit.svelte— `assets/svelte/functions/Edit.svelte` and `lib/sequin_web/live/functions/edit.ex` change together 60% of the time (30 of the 50 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: Index.svelte ↔ edit.ex assets/svelte/functions/Index.svelte— `assets/svelte/functions/Index.svelte` and `lib/sequin_web/live/functions/edit.ex` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Medium: use-of-md5 cli/chisel/client/client.go:226— Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/alb.tf:16— Detected an AWS load balancer with an insecure TLS version. TLS versions less than 1.2 are considered insecure because they can be broken. To fix this, set your `ssl_policy` to `"ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-Res-2021-06"`, or include a default action to redirect to HTTPS.
Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/alb.tf:43— Detected an AWS load balancer with an insecure TLS version. TLS versions less than 1.2 are considered insecure because they can be broken. To fix this, set your `ssl_policy` to `"ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-Res-2021-06"`, or include a default action to redirect to HTTPS.
Medium: aws-ec2-has-public-ip deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/ec2.tf:1— EC2 instances should not have a public IP address attached in order to block public access to the instances. To fix this, set your `associate_public_ip_address` to `"false"`.
Medium: aws-subnet-has-public-ip-address deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/vpc.tf:12— Resources in the AWS subnet are assigned a public IP address. Resources should not be exposed on the public internet, but should have access limited to consumers required for the function of your application. Set `map_public_ip_on_launch` to false so that resources are not publicly-accessible. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: aws-subnet-has-public-ip-address deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2-sqs/infra/vpc.tf:25— Resources in the AWS subnet are assigned a public IP address. Resources should not be exposed on the public internet, but should have access limited to consumers required for the function of your application. Set `map_public_ip_on_launch` to false so that resources are not publicly-accessible. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2/infra/alb.tf:16— Detected an AWS load balancer with an insecure TLS version. TLS versions less than 1.2 are considered insecure because they can be broken. To fix this, set your `ssl_policy` to `"ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-Res-2021-06"`, or include a default action to redirect to HTTPS.
Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version deployment/terraform-ecs-ec2/infra/alb.tf:43— Detected an AWS load balancer with an insecure TLS version. TLS versions less than 1.2 are considered insecure because they can be broken. To fix this, set your `ssl_policy` to `"ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-Res-2021-06"`, or include a default action to redirect to HTTPS.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/mix/tasks/bench.ex:778— lib/mix/tasks/bench.ex:778-789 | lib/mix/tasks/bench.ex:793-803 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/sequin/replication/replication.ex:138— lib/sequin/replication/replication.ex:138-148 | lib/sequin/replication/replication.ex:154-164 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:292— lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:292-302 | lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:328-338 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:679— lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:679-689 | lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:713-723 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/sequin/sinks/meilisearch/client.ex:143— lib/sequin/sinks/meilisearch/client.ex:143-153 | lib/sequin/sinks/meilisearch/client.ex:189-199 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:474— lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:474-484 | lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:495-505 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/sequin/aws/sns.ex:90— lib/sequin/aws/sns.ex:90-100 | lib/sequin/aws/sns.ex:108-116 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/sequin/loops.ex:56— lib/sequin/loops.ex:56-64 | lib/sequin/loops.ex:73-81 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/slot_producer/processor.ex:168— lib/sequin/runtime/slot_producer/processor.ex:168-176 | lib/sequin/runtime/slot_producer/processor.ex:199-207 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/table_reader_server.ex:506— lib/sequin/runtime/table_reader_server.ex:506-514 | lib/sequin/runtime/table_reader_server.ex:610-618 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/sequin_web/live/databases/form.ex:539— lib/sequin_web/live/databases/form.ex:539-547 | lib/sequin_web/live/http_endpoints/form.ex:229-237 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex:42— lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex:42-50 | lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex:161-169 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/http_push_sqs_pipeline.ex:342— lib/sequin/runtime/http_push_sqs_pipeline.ex:342-360 | lib/sequin/runtime/http_push_sqs_pipeline.ex:364-382 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:1470— lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:1470-1488 | lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:1513-1531 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/http_push_pipeline.ex:225— lib/sequin/runtime/http_push_pipeline.ex:225-238 | lib/sequin/runtime/http_push_sqs_pipeline.ex:372-385 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/sequin/sinks/typesense/client.ex:47— lib/sequin/sinks/typesense/client.ex:47-60 | lib/sequin/sinks/typesense/client.ex:118-131 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) lib/sequin/aws/kinesis.ex:12— lib/sequin/aws/kinesis.ex:12-23 | lib/sequin/aws/sns.ex:89-100 | lib/sequin/aws/sqs.ex:251-262 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) lib/sequin/sinks/typesense/client.ex:239— lib/sequin/sinks/typesense/client.ex:239-250 | lib/sequin/sinks/typesense/client.ex:268-279 | lib/sequin/sinks/typesense/client.ex:300-311 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/sequin/consumers/filter_function.ex:19— lib/sequin/consumers/filter_function.ex:19-28 | lib/sequin/consumers/transform_function.ex:19-28 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/sequin/key.ex:48— lib/sequin/key.ex:48-57 | lib/sequin/key.ex:80-89 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/sequin/consumers/consumers.ex:582— lib/sequin/consumers/consumers.ex:582-589 | lib/sequin/replication/replication.ex:425-432 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:803— lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:803-810 | lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:817-824 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:284— lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:284-290 | lib/sequin/runtime/slot_message_store.ex:320-326 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) scripts/test_loop.exs:154— scripts/test_loop.exs:154-160 | scripts/test_loop.exs:178-184 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:1486— lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:1486-1491 | lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:1582-1587 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:200— lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:200-205 | lib/sequin_web/live/wal_pipelines/form.ex:131-136 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/sequin/accounts/accounts.ex:315— lib/sequin/accounts/accounts.ex:315-319 | lib/sequin/accounts/accounts.ex:489-493 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/sequin_web/live/user_settings_live.ex:42— lib/sequin_web/live/user_settings_live.ex:42-46 | lib/sequin_web/live/user_settings_live.ex:60-64 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Transforms.from_external_sink_consumer (cyclomatic 54) lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:842— Transforms.from_external_sink_consumer has cyclomatic complexity 54 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
ConsumerForm.handle_event (cyclomatic 43) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:228— ConsumerForm.handle_event has cyclomatic complexity 43 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
Bench.run (cyclomatic 21) lib/mix/tasks/bench.ex:77— Bench.run has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ReplicationConnection.handle (cyclomatic 20) lib/sequin/postgres/replication_connection.ex:559— ReplicationConnection.handle has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
Transforms.from_external_http_endpoint (cyclomatic 19) lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:716— Transforms.from_external_http_endpoint has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
Transforms.from_external_sink_consumer (cognitive 41) lib/sequin/transforms/transforms.ex:842— Transforms.from_external_sink_consumer has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 23, if/else 18 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
ConsumerForm.handle_event (cognitive 29) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:228— ConsumerForm.handle_event has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 29 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Bench.run (cognitive 20) lib/mix/tasks/bench.ex:77— Bench.run has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, match/switch 4, boolean chains 2. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
CheckSystemHealth.check (cognitive 18) lib/sequin/check_system_health.ex:12— CheckSystemHealth.check has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, match/switch 5, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
CheckPostgresReplicationSlotWorker.check_database (cognitive 17) lib/sequin/health/check_postgres_replication_slot_worker.ex:67— CheckPostgresReplicationSlotWorker.check_database has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
NetworkUtils.test_tcp_reachability (cognitive 17) lib/sequin/network_utils.ex:27— NetworkUtils.test_tcp_reachability has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 10, if/else 7 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
ConsumerLifecycleEventWorker.handle_backfill_event (cognitive 16) lib/sequin/runtime/consumer_lifecycle_event_worker.ex:118— ConsumerLifecycleEventWorker.handle_backfill_event has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8, match/switch 8 (nesting depth added 8). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
ConsumerForm.test_sqs_connection (cognitive 16) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:320— ConsumerForm.test_sqs_connection has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 13, if/else 3 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
ConsumerForm.test_sns_connection (cognitive 16) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:362— ConsumerForm.test_sns_connection has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 13, if/else 3 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
ConsumerForm.test_kinesis_connection (cognitive 16) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:404— ConsumerForm.test_kinesis_connection has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 13, if/else 3 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 40 floating ref(s) across 6 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 1 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (signoff-commit.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 3 sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×1
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— esbuild 0.16.17: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.25.0
Duplicated block (17 lines × 3) lib/sequin/runtime/slot_processor_server.ex:321— lib/sequin/runtime/slot_processor_server.ex:321-342 | lib/sequin/runtime/slot_processor_server.ex:343-359 | lib/sequin/runtime/slot_processor_server.ex:382-403 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 3) lib/sequin/sinks/meilisearch/client.ex:120— lib/sequin/sinks/meilisearch/client.ex:120-134 | lib/sequin/sinks/meilisearch/client.ex:159-173 | lib/sequin/sinks/meilisearch/client.ex:205-219 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/sequin/consumers/redis_stream_sink.ex:55— lib/sequin/consumers/redis_stream_sink.ex:55-69 | lib/sequin/consumers/redis_string_sink.ex:39-53 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/sequin/consumers/meilisearch_sink.ex:53— lib/sequin/consumers/meilisearch_sink.ex:53-65 | lib/sequin/consumers/typesense_sink.ex:51-63 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/sequin/sinks/elasticsearch/client.ex:39— lib/sequin/sinks/elasticsearch/client.ex:39-50 | lib/sequin/sinks/elasticsearch/client.ex:93-104 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) lib/sequin/sinks/kafka/connection_cache.ex:116— lib/sequin/sinks/kafka/connection_cache.ex:116-126 | lib/sequin/sinks/nats/connection_cache.ex:117-127 | lib/sequin/sinks/redis/connection_cache.ex:126-136 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) lib/sequin/sinks/kafka/connection_cache.ex:49— lib/sequin/sinks/kafka/connection_cache.ex:49-58 | lib/sequin/sinks/nats/connection_cache.ex:49-58 | lib/sequin/sinks/rabbitmq/connection_cache.ex:49-58 | lib/sequin/sinks/redis/connection_cache.ex:53-62 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 4 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 4 times.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) lib/sequin/sinks/s2/client.ex:81— lib/sequin/sinks/s2/client.ex:81-90 | lib/sequin/sinks/s2/client.ex:97-106 | lib/sequin/sinks/s2/client.ex:122-131 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 5) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:812— lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:812-820 | lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:829-837 | lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:842-850 | lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:855-863 | lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:869-877 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:501— lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:501-509 | lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:516-524 | lib/sequin_web/live/sink_consumers/show.ex:531-539 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 4) lib/sequin/sinks/kafka/connection_cache.ex:202— lib/sequin/sinks/kafka/connection_cache.ex:202-209 | lib/sequin/sinks/nats/connection_cache.ex:222-229 | lib/sequin/sinks/rabbitmq/connection_cache.ex:248-255 | lib/sequin/sinks/redis/connection_cache.ex:213-220 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 4 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 4 times.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:704— lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:704-711 | lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:814-821 | lib/sequin_web/live/components/consumer_form.ex:857-864 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex:64— lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex:64-69 | lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex:93-98 | lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex:124-129 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 9 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/sequin/runtime/wal_pipeline_server.ex, lib/sequin/postgres/benchmark_source.ex, lib/sequin/benchmark/stats.ex, lib/sequin/databases/connection_cache.ex, lib/mix/tasks/buildpush.ex, lib/sequin/runtime/slot_producer/processor.ex, lib/sequin/havoc.ex, lib/sequin/debounced_logger.ex (+1 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/sequin/sinks/kafka/client.ex, scripts/load_postgres.exs, lib/sequin/runtime/trace.ex, lib/sequin_web/controllers/backfill_controller.ex. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 7 of 209 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: lib/sequin_web/live/settings/account_settings_live.ex, lib/sequin/sinks/azure/event_hub.ex, lib/sequin/consumers/kinesis_sink.ex (and 4 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex, .ts) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`), or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fd487-35c9-7508-aa74-977c3b29e8a9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 84 · Warnings: 122 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 00:44 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.