Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
sgermosen/StreamingFromFiles carries serious risk (36%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Architecture (88%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (28%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (32%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).
For scale: Small (~2,742 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 28 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 36 → ~43.
New since the last scan (61+)
- D5 · Off the main sequence: Transversal
- D16 · single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AboutController.cs
- D17 · TodoComment Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AppBaseController.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Startup.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
- D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/Transversal/Extensions/CurrentUserFactory.cs
- D18 · Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored
- D24 · LLM evaluation failed
- D29 · Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/BgServicex/BgServicex/Utils/DotEnv.cs
- D29 · Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- D30 · Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0
- D30 · Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
- D30 · High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3
- D30 · High CVE: AutoMapper 10.1.1
- D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1
- D30 · High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
- D30 · High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- D30 · High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1
- D30 · Medium CVE: Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.10.0
- D30 · Medium CVE: MailKit 2.15.0
- D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1
- D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.7.1
- D30 · Medium CVE: MimeKit 2.15.0
- D30 · Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.6.3
- D30 · Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.7.1
- D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.6.0
- D30 · Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0
- D32 · Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs
- C1 · No data-protection/encryption
- IC1 · Skeleton type — most members are unfinished Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- AC1 · <video> without a captions track Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
- AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
- AC3 · <html> without a lang Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
- AC3 · Page without a main landmark Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
- AC3 · Data table has no header cells Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
- AC3 · <html> without a lang Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
- AC3 · Document <title> is empty Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
- AC3 · Page without a main landmark Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
- AC7 · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
- SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked
- GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
- GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €660–€3,200
| Cost to rebuild | €660–€3,200 |
| Domain complexity | Low |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 36% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 39% boilerplate · 47% straight-line · 14% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,900 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 28% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 17 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
| A04:2021 — Insecure Design | 1 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow that builds the code and runs the test suite on every push or pull request. Immediately follow this by integrating a security analyzer, such as Semgrep or CodeQL, into that same pipeline to ensure security regressions fail the build. Next, address the single gap in automated testing by resolving the missing test coverage. Then, ensure all code is covered by the test distribution to eliminate any untested areas. Finally, improve observability by adding structured logging and a diagnostics seam to the library projects, while extending structured logging across service-like projects.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +7.3 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +7.3 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +8.0 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +8.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf. | +7.1 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. | +6.1 pts | Medium | Text alternatives |
| Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label. | +6.1 pts | Medium | Forms & labels |
| Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. | +6.1 pts | Medium | Page structure |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs | 6.5 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs | 6.9 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| Src/BgServicex/BgServicex/Utils/DotEnv.cs | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: unsafe-path-combine |
| Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: unsafe-path-combine |
| Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs | 7.9 | Mixed | Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url |
| Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AboutController.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AppBaseController.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| Src/EngineAPI/Startup.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| Src/Transversal/Extensions/CurrentUserFactory.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 52 of 54 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 19 of 56 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
3 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 34 packages use a banned license.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
13 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2114 LoC (0.8/KLoC) → score 8.5.
What to do
- Resolve the 12 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AzureStorageSaver.cs (6), AccountController.cs (2), AboutController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AccountController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D18 · Solution Shape
3 projects, 61 source files, 2114 hand-written lines of code (2114 production / 0 test), plus 1268 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 3 inter-project edges.
D19 · Documentation Quality
This single README describes the project's purpose (uploading video-cam files to Azure storage so they can be viewed) but gives no installation instructions, prerequisites, or architecture details. There are no accompanying architecture or design documents and only 13% XML documentation coverage for EngineAPI.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 2.0/10. — This single README describes the project's purpose (uploading video-cam files to Azure storage so they can be viewed) but gives no installation instructions, prerequisites, or architecture details. There are no accompanying architecture or design documents and only 13% XML documentation coverage for EngineAPI.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
7 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for ViewModel/DTO/Response classes. The codebase… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent method naming convention in AccountService. Some methods… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for storage managers. The interface is… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 3 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
98 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 18 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
17 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 6 high, 9 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
- Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. Add a <track kind="captions"> pointing at a WebVTT file for this video (or confirm captions are provided another way). — VideoViewer.html:8
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — ResetPassword.cshtml:216, ResetPassword.cshtml:224
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — ResetPassword.cshtml:10, VideoViewer.html:2
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — ResetPassword.cshtml:10, VideoViewer.html:2
- A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — ResetPassword.cshtml:210
- An empty <title> gives no page name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Put descriptive text in the <title>. — VideoViewer.html:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
AX1 · Captive dependencies
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX5 · Architecture & structure
AX6 · Interface segregation
C1 · Data Protection
- No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls
C3 · Audit Trail
- An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.
What to do
- Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
- A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×6) — LocalStorageSaver.cs:46, LocalStorageSaver.cs:51, LocalStorageSaver.cs:56, …
What to do
- Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `LocalStorageManager` has 5 unfinished members out of 9 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — LocalStorageSaver.cs:10
- `UploadBlobAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×3) — LocalStorageSaver.cs:44, LocalStorageSaver.cs:49, LocalStorageSaver.cs:54
- `DeleteBlobAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — LocalStorageSaver.cs:59
- `GetFileAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — LocalStorageSaver.cs:84
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×24) — ApplicationDataContext.cs:67, ApplicationDataContext.cs:103, AboutController.cs:33, …
What to do
- Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)
- The root README is 31 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.
What to do
- Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 3 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
- Only 1/3 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
- Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
- Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- claims Azure storage but no project or dependency references it
- omits the Domain project which handles business logic
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: claims Azure storage but no project or dependency references it; omits the Domain project which handles business logic.
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability
- Only 1/2 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 2, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
- Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P8 · Schema migrations
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 1/18 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×17) — AccountController.cs:39, AccountController.cs:52, AccountController.cs:69, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/3 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 56% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 88% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 40% | Weak — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 28% | Weak — gated by D8, D9, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 60% | Adequate — gated by D30, C1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 32% | Weak — gated by AC1, AC2, AC3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 42 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 2k LoC the codebase is small and single-purpose despite three projects, so explicit boundaries are not needed.
- D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 9 finding(s)
- High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3
- High CVE: AutoMapper 10.1.1
- High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1
- High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
- High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1
- Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0
- Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
- No automated tests
Warning — 29 finding(s)
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AboutController.cs:31
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:96
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AppBaseController.cs:62
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Startup.cs:108
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:23
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:47
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:84
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:99
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:145
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:126
- CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:64
- CommentedOutCode Src/Transversal/Extensions/CurrentUserFactory.cs:46
- Medium CVE: Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.10.0
- Medium CVE: MailKit 2.15.0
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.7.1
- Medium CVE: MimeKit 2.15.0
- Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.6.3
- Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.7.1
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.6.0
- Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0
- Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/BgServicex/BgServicex/Utils/DotEnv.cs:26
- Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs:37
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- TodoComment Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:38
- Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored
- LLM evaluation failed
- Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs:212
- Off the main sequence: Transversal
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
- Test reliability not included
- No ADRs found
- Inconsistent naming for ViewModel/DTO/Response classes. The codebase mixes suffixes: some use 'ViewModel', some 'Request', some 'Response', and some have no suffix or use 'DTO'. For example, password reset uses both 'ResetPasswordRequest' and 'ResetPasswordViewModel'.
- Inconsistent method naming convention in AccountService. Some methods use camelCase (sendVerificationEmail) while others use PascalCase (RegisterUserAsync, ResetPasswordAsync, ConfirmEmailAsync). Additionally, some methods are synchronous (send...) while others are explicitly async (Async suffix).
- Inconsistent naming for storage managers. The interface is 'IStorageManager', but the implementations are 'AzureStorageManager' and 'LocalStorageManager'. This is actually consistent with the interface, but the interface name 'IStorageManager' is generic compared to the specific implementations.
- Inconsistent method naming for storage operations. 'UploadBlobAsync' is used for uploads, but 'DeleteBlobAsync' and 'DeleteFile' are used for deletions. One uses 'Blob' and the other 'File'.
- Inconsistent naming for unique identifiers. Some entities use 'Id' (Account, EventFile), while others use 'Identification' (ApplicationUser). This suggests 'Identification' might be a business key or a different type of ID.
- Inconsistent naming for audit fields. Some are simple (Updated, CreatedBy), while others include the entity name (DeletedUser, CreatedUser). Also, 'Deleted' is a boolean or status, while 'DeletedUser' is a string/ID.
- Inconsistent naming for properties in RegisterViewModel. 'ConfirmPassword' and 'Password' are clear, but 'ImageFile' and 'Identification' are less consistent with the rest of the codebase which often uses 'Id' or 'Identification' for different concepts.
- Scattered collaborators
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- No tests found
Info — 6 finding(s)
- XML-doc coverage: EngineAPI Src/EngineAPI/EngineAPI.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Domain Src/Domain/Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Transversal Src/Transversal/Transversal.csproj
- git history depth insufficient
- No exposed public API
- git history depth insufficient
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list Src/EngineAPI/EngineAPI.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 17 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/gdpr.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 1 | artifacts/raw/semgrep-gdpr.json |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Email — 13 field(s)
- RecoverPasswordDTO.Email Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/RecoverPasswordDTO.cs:9
- UserCredentials.Email Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserCredentials.cs:9
- UserDTO.Email Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:7
- Account.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/Account.cs:12
- AuthenticateRequest.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:11
- AuthenticateResponse.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:23
- ForgotPasswordRequest.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/ForgotPasswordRequest.cs:9
- LoginViewModel.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/LoginViewModel.cs:11
- RegisterViewModel.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/RegisterViewModel.cs:13
- ResetPasswordViewModel.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/ResetPasswordViewModel.cs:12
- AccountService._emailService Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs:43
- AppSettings.EmailFrom Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AppSettings.cs:11
- CurrentUser.Email Src/Transversal/Models/CurrentUser.cs:7
Name — 8 field(s)
- ApplicationUser.FullName Src/Domain/Entities/ApplicationUser.cs:10
- UserCreationDTO.FullName Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserCreationDTO.cs:10
- UserDTO.FullName Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:9
- Account.FirstName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Account.cs:10
- Account.LastName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Account.cs:11
- AuthenticateResponse.FirstName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:21
- AuthenticateResponse.LastName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:22
- RegisterViewModel.FullName Src/EngineAPI/Models/RegisterViewModel.cs:31