Public report — StreamingFromFiles, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 16:51 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Sgermosen/StreamingFromFiles

36% At Risk

Small · 2,742 LoC · 3 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (28%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

52/54dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
19findings with an exact file:lineof 56 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
54/96dimensions across the health lenses2742 LoC · 3 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

sgermosen/StreamingFromFiles carries serious risk (36%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (88%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (28%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (32%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).

For scale: Small (~2,742 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 28% · 46% weightAccessibility 32% · 25% weightMaturity 40% · 14% weightCode Health 56% · 8% weightSecurity 60% · 4% weightArchitecture 88% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 28 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 36 → ~43.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 10%Plumbing 59%Generated 32%
New since the last scan (61+)

61 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D5 · Off the main sequence: Transversal
  • D16 · single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AboutController.cs
  • D17 · TodoComment Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AppBaseController.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Startup.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs
  • D17 · CommentedOutCode Src/Transversal/Extensions/CurrentUserFactory.cs
  • D18 · Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored
  • D24 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D29 · Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/BgServicex/BgServicex/Utils/DotEnv.cs
  • D29 · Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • D30 · Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0
  • D30 · Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
  • D30 · High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3
  • D30 · High CVE: AutoMapper 10.1.1
  • D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
  • D30 · High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.10.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MailKit 2.15.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.7.1
  • D30 · Medium CVE: MimeKit 2.15.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.6.3
  • D30 · Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.7.1
  • D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.6.0
  • D30 · Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0
  • D32 · Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs
  • C1 · No data-protection/encryption
  • IC1 · Skeleton type — most members are unfinished Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • IC1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • AC1 · <video> without a captions track Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
  • AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
  • AC2 · <input> without a programmatic label Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
  • AC3 · <html> without a lang Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
  • AC3 · Data table has no header cells Src/EngineAPI/Pages/ResetPassword.cshtml
  • AC3 · <html> without a lang Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
  • AC3 · Document <title> is empty Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
  • AC3 · Page without a main landmark Src/EngineAPI/wwwroot/VideoViewer.html
  • AC7 · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
  • SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs
  • GD1 · Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €660–€3,200
Cost to rebuild€660–€3,200 (0.1 person-years (11–34 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityLow — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 36% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 39% boilerplate · 47% straight-line · 14% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,900 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 28% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Low (×0.9) — service/app, transaction-script/CRUD × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
+7.3 pts · Low effort · Code Coverage
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+7.3 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
+8.0 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 28%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,742 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 28%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch BgServicex BgServicex Domain Domain BgServicex->Domain Transversal Transversal Domain->Transversal EngineAPI EngineAPI EngineAPI->Domain WorkerService WorkerService

Architecture — module dependency matrix

20 modules, 19 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

Domain.MigrationsEngineAPIEngineAPI.BehaviorsEngineAPI.DTOsEngineAPI.ExtensionsEngineAPI.FiltersEngineAPI.ModelsEngineAPI.PagesEngineAPI.ResourcesEngineAPI.ValidationsTransversal.ModelsTransversal.UtilsDomain.HelpersEngineAPI.UtilsTransversal.ExtensionsDomain.EntitiesDomainEngineAPI.MiddlewareEngineAPI.ServicesEngineAPI.ControllersDomain.Migrations1EngineAPI2EngineAPI.Behaviors3EngineAPI.DTOs4EngineAPI.Extensions5EngineAPI.Filters6EngineAPI.Models7EngineAPI.Pages8EngineAPI.Resources9EngineAPI.Validations10Transversal.Models11Transversal.Utils12Domain.Helpers13EngineAPI.Utils14Transversal.Extensions15Domain.Entities16Domain17EngineAPI.Middleware18EngineAPI.Services19EngineAPI.Controllers2011523131110311753232

At a glance — Code Health · 56% · Adequate · gated by X5

At a glance — Architecture · 88% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 40% · Weak · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 28% · Weak · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 60% · Adequate · gated by D30, C1

At a glance — Accessibility · 32% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC2, AC3

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components17High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection2Medium
A04:2021 — Insecure Design1Medium

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow that builds the code and runs the test suite on every push or pull request. Immediately follow this by integrating a security analyzer, such as Semgrep or CodeQL, into that same pipeline to ensure security regressions fail the build. Next, address the single gap in automated testing by resolving the missing test coverage. Then, ensure all code is covered by the test distribution to eliminate any untested areas. Finally, improve observability by adding structured logging and a diagnostics seam to the library projects, while extending structured logging across service-like projects.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+7.3 ptsLowCode Coverage
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+7.3 ptsLowTest Distribution
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+8.0 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+8.0 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.+7.1 ptsMediumObservability
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.+6.1 ptsMediumText alternatives
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.+6.1 ptsMediumForms & labels
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+6.1 ptsMediumPage structure

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 9 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 56% mixed · 44% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs6.5MixedExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs6.9MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
Src/BgServicex/BgServicex/Utils/DotEnv.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: unsafe-path-combine
Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: unsafe-path-combine
Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs7.9MixedData Compliance (PII/GDPR): Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url
Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AboutController.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AppBaseController.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Src/EngineAPI/Startup.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Src/Transversal/Extensions/CurrentUserFactory.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 52 of 54 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D26D27D28D29D30D32D35AC1AC2AC3AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6C1C2C3GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P8S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 19 of 56 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc889-7e3c-7c72-ab21-2998308da4cb.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Transversal

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 34 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

13 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2114 LoC (0.8/KLoC) → score 8.5.

CommentedOutCode · ×12Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AboutController.cs:31
TodoCommentSrc/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:38

What to do

  1. Resolve the 12 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AzureStorageSaver.cs (6), AccountController.cs (2), AboutController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AccountController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 projects, 61 source files, 2114 hand-written lines of code (2114 production / 0 test), plus 1268 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 3 inter-project edges.

Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

This single README describes the project's purpose (uploading video-cam files to Azure storage so they can be viewed) but gives no installation instructions, prerequisites, or architecture details. There are no accompanying architecture or design documents and only 13% XML documentation coverage for EngineAPI.

XML-doc coverage: EngineAPI · ×3Src/EngineAPI/EngineAPI.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 2.0/10. — This single README describes the project's purpose (uploading video-cam files to Azure storage so they can be viewed) but gives no installation instructions, prerequisites, or architecture details. There are no accompanying architecture or design documents and only 13% XML documentation coverage for EngineAPI.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent naming for ViewModel/DTO/Response classes. The codebase mixes suffixes: some use 'ViewModel', some 'Request', some 'Response', and some have no suffix or use 'DTO'. For example, password reset uses both 'ResetPasswordRequest' and 'ResetPasswordViewModel'.
Inconsistent method naming convention in AccountService. Some methods use camelCase (sendVerificationEmail) while others use PascalCase (RegisterUserAsync, ResetPasswordAsync, ConfirmEmailAsync). Additionally, some methods are synchronous (send...) while others are explicitly async (Async suffix).
Inconsistent naming for storage managers. The interface is 'IStorageManager', but the implementations are 'AzureStorageManager' and 'LocalStorageManager'. This is actually consistent with the interface, but the interface name 'IStorageManager' is generic compared to the specific implementations.
Inconsistent method naming for storage operations. 'UploadBlobAsync' is used for uploads, but 'DeleteBlobAsync' and 'DeleteFile' are used for deletions. One uses 'Blob' and the other 'File'.
Inconsistent naming for unique identifiers. Some entities use 'Id' (Account, EventFile), while others use 'Identification' (ApplicationUser). This suggests 'Identification' might be a business key or a different type of ID.

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for ViewModel/DTO/Response classes. The codebase… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent method naming convention in AccountService. Some methods… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for storage managers. The interface is… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 3 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

98 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 18 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Scattered collaborators

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

Medium: unsafe-path-combine · ×2Src/BgServicex/BgServicex/Utils/DotEnv.cs:26detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities2.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

17 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 6 high, 9 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 · ×6detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.10.0 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.

Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-urlSrc/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs:212detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. Add a <track kind="captions"> pointing at a WebVTT file for this video (or confirm captions are provided another way). — VideoViewer.html:8

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — ResetPassword.cshtml:216, ResetPassword.cshtml:224

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — ResetPassword.cshtml:10, VideoViewer.html:2
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — ResetPassword.cshtml:10, VideoViewer.html:2
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — ResetPassword.cshtml:210
  • An empty <title> gives no page name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Put descriptive text in the <title>. — VideoViewer.html:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×6) — LocalStorageSaver.cs:46, LocalStorageSaver.cs:51, LocalStorageSaver.cs:56, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `LocalStorageManager` has 5 unfinished members out of 9 — a scaffolded type that was never implemented. — LocalStorageSaver.cs:10
  • `UploadBlobAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×3) — LocalStorageSaver.cs:44, LocalStorageSaver.cs:49, LocalStorageSaver.cs:54
  • `DeleteBlobAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — LocalStorageSaver.cs:59
  • `GetFileAsync` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — LocalStorageSaver.cs:84
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×24) — ApplicationDataContext.cs:67, ApplicationDataContext.cs:103, AboutController.cs:33, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • The root README is 31 words — likely missing build/run/architecture context.

What to do

  • Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 3 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
  • Only 1/3 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.

What to do

  • Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
  • Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
M4 · Documentation accuracy6.7 / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • claims Azure storage but no project or dependency references it
  • omits the Domain project which handles business logic

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: claims Azure storage but no project or dependency references it; omits the Domain project which handles business logic.
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 1/2 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 2, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 1/18 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×17) — AccountController.cs:39, AccountController.cs:52, AccountController.cs:69, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/3 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 13 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (24%; ≈26% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 42 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 42 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health56%Adequate — gated by X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture88%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity40%Weak — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness28%Weak — gated by D8, D9, P1, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security60%Adequate — gated by D30, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility32%Weak — gated by AC1, AC2, AC3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 42 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 2k LoC the codebase is small and single-purpose despite three projects, so explicit boundaries are not needed.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 9 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×6
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 — Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 (direct) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 10.1.1 — AutoMapper 10.1.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 10.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 — System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely.
Warning — 29 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×12
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AboutController.cs:31 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:96 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AppBaseController.cs:62 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Startup.cs:108 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:23 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:47 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:84 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:99 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:145 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:126 — 10 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AzureStorageSaver.cs:64 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode Src/Transversal/Extensions/CurrentUserFactory.cs:46 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×9
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.10.0 — Azure.Storage.Blobs 12.10.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MailKit 2.15.0 — MailKit 2.15.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.0.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.7.1 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.7.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MimeKit 2.15.0 — MimeKit 2.15.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.6.3 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.6.3 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.7.1 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.7.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.6.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×2
  • Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/BgServicex/BgServicex/Utils/DotEnv.cs:26 — String argument envFileName is used to read or write data from a file via Path.Combine without direct sanitization via Path.GetFileName. If the path is user-supplied data this can lead to path traversal.
  • Medium: unsafe-path-combine Src/EngineAPI/Utils/LocalStorageSaver.cs:37 — String argument container is used to read or write data from a file via Path.Combine without direct sanitization via Path.GetFileName. If the path is user-supplied data this can lead to path traversal.
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 21 commit(s) sampled).
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment Src/EngineAPI/Controllers/AccountController.cs:38 — //TODO: Verify the correct work of this — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D18 · Solution Shape · Monorepo · ×1
  • Monorepo: only 1 of 3 solutions was scored — This repository contains 3 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `Src/EngineAPI/EngineAPI.sln` — the other 2 (`Src/BgServicex/BgServicex.sln`, `Src/WorkerService/WorkerService.sln`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 901.
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · Medium · ×1
  • Medium: watchdog-personal-data-in-url Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs:212 — Personal data appears to be placed in a URL or query string. URLs are recorded in server and proxy access logs, browser history and outbound Referer headers, so the value escapes the system's own retention controls. Move it to a request body or use an opaque identifier.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Transversal — Transversal: abstractness 0.25, instability 0.00, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Recommendation — 12 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for ViewModel/DTO/Response classes. The codebase mixes suffixes · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for ViewModel/DTO/Response classes. The codebase mixes suffixes: some use 'ViewModel', some 'Request', some 'Response', and some have no suffix or use 'DTO'. For example, password reset uses both 'ResetPasswordRequest' and 'ResetPasswordViewModel'. — Standardize on a single suffix per category: 'ViewModel' for UI models, 'Request' for API inputs, 'Response' for API outputs, and 'DTO' for data transfer objects. (symbols: EngineAPI.Models.LoginViewModel, EngineAPI.Models.RegisterViewModel, EngineAPI.Models.ResetPasswordRequest, EngineAPI.Models.ResetPasswordViewModel, EngineAPI.Models.ForgotPasswordRequest, EngineAPI.Models.VerifyEmailRequest, EngineAPI.Models.AuthenticateResponse, EngineAPI.Models.UserManagerResponse, EngineAPI.Models.RefreshToken, EngineAPI.Models.Account, EngineAPI.Models.FileStorageResponse, EngineAPI.Models.Response)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent method naming convention in AccountService. Some methods use camelCase (sendVerificationEmail) while others use PascalCase (RegisterUserAsync, ResetPasswordAsync, ConfirmEmailAsync). Additionally, some methods are synchronous (send...) while others are explicitly async (Async suffix). · ×1
  • Inconsistent method naming convention in AccountService. Some methods use camelCase (sendVerificationEmail) while others use PascalCase (RegisterUserAsync, ResetPasswordAsync, ConfirmEmailAsync). Additionally, some methods are synchronous (send...) while others are explicitly async (Async suffix). — Adhere to a single casing convention (prefer PascalCase for public methods) and consistent async naming (use 'Async' suffix for all asynchronous methods). (symbols: EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.sendVerificationEmail, EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.sendAlreadyRegisteredEmail, EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.sendPasswordResetEmail, EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.generateRefreshToken, EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.removeOldRefreshTokens, EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.RegisterUserAsync, EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.ResetPasswordAsync, EngineAPI.Services.AccountService.ConfirmEmailAsync)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for storage managers. The interface is 'IStorageManager', but the implementations are 'AzureStorageManager' and 'LocalStorageManager'. This is actually consistent with the interface, but the interface name 'IStorageManager' is generic compared to the specific implementations. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for storage managers. The interface is 'IStorageManager', but the implementations are 'AzureStorageManager' and 'LocalStorageManager'. This is actually consistent with the interface, but the interface name 'IStorageManager' is generic compared to the specific implementations. — This is consistent, but consider if 'IStorageManager' is too generic. However, the main inconsistency is in the method names within these classes. (symbols: EngineAPI.Utils.AzureStorageManager, EngineAPI.Utils.LocalStorageManager, EngineAPI.Utils.IStorageManager)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent method naming for storage operations. 'UploadBlobAsync' is used for uploads, but 'DeleteBlobAsync' and 'DeleteFile' are used for deletions. One uses 'Blob' and the other 'File'. · ×1
  • Inconsistent method naming for storage operations. 'UploadBlobAsync' is used for uploads, but 'DeleteBlobAsync' and 'DeleteFile' are used for deletions. One uses 'Blob' and the other 'File'. — Standardize on either 'Blob' or 'File' for all storage operations. Given the Azure context, 'Blob' might be more accurate, but 'File' is more generic. Pick one and apply it consistently. (symbols: EngineAPI.Utils.AzureStorageManager.UploadBlobAsync, EngineAPI.Utils.LocalStorageManager.UploadBlobAsync, EngineAPI.Utils.LocalStorageManager.DeleteBlobAsync, EngineAPI.Utils.LocalStorageManager.DeleteFile)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for unique identifiers. Some entities use 'Id' (Account, EventFile), while others use 'Identification' (ApplicationUser). This suggests 'Identification' might be a business key or a different type of ID. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for unique identifiers. Some entities use 'Id' (Account, EventFile), while others use 'Identification' (ApplicationUser). This suggests 'Identification' might be a business key or a different type of ID. — If 'Identification' is a unique identifier, rename it to 'Id' or 'UniqueKey' consistently. If it's a different concept, ensure the name reflects that (e.g., 'BusinessKey'). (symbols: EngineAPI.Models.Account.Id, Domain.Entities.ApplicationUser.Identification, Domain.Entities.ApplicationUser.StoreCode, Domain.Entities.Image.ImageFullPath, Domain.Entities.Image.TypeId, Domain.Entities.Image.Container, Domain.Entities.ImageType.Name, Domain.Entities.EventFile.Id, Domain.Entities.ApplicationUser.Identification)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for audit fields. Some are simple (Updated, CreatedBy), while others include the entity name (DeletedUser, CreatedUser). Also, 'Deleted' is a boolean or status, while 'DeletedUser' is a string/ID. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for audit fields. Some are simple (Updated, CreatedBy), while others include the entity name (DeletedUser, CreatedUser). Also, 'Deleted' is a boolean or status, while 'DeletedUser' is a string/ID. — Standardize audit field names. Use 'CreatedBy', 'CreatedAt', 'UpdatedBy', 'UpdatedAt' consistently. For soft delete, use 'IsDeleted' or 'DeletedAt' rather than 'Deleted'. (symbols: EngineAPI.Models.Account.Updated, Domain.Helpers.AuditEntity.CreatedBy, Domain.Helpers.AuditEntity.CreatedAt, Domain.Helpers.AuditEntity.Deleted, Domain.Helpers.AuditEntity.DeletedUser, Domain.Helpers.AuditEntity.UpdatedAt, Domain.Helpers.AuditEntity.CreatedUser)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for properties in RegisterViewModel. 'ConfirmPassword' and 'Password' are clear, but 'ImageFile' and 'Identification' are less consistent with the rest of the codebase which often uses 'Id' or 'Identification' for different concepts. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for properties in RegisterViewModel. 'ConfirmPassword' and 'Password' are clear, but 'ImageFile' and 'Identification' are less consistent with the rest of the codebase which often uses 'Id' or 'Identification' for different concepts. — Ensure all view models use consistent property naming. If 'Identification' is a business key, consider 'BusinessKey' or 'Id' if it's a unique identifier. (symbols: EngineAPI.Models.RegisterViewModel.ConfirmPassword, EngineAPI.Models.RegisterViewModel.Password, EngineAPI.Models.RegisterViewModel.ImageFile, EngineAPI.Models.RegisterViewModel.Identification)
D27 · Navigability · Scattered collaborators · ×1
  • Scattered collaborators — 98 % of calls cross a namespace and only 18 % of collaborators are co-located — group each feature's code into a vertical slice so a call's collaborators sit together.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (21 commit(s) sampled).
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Info — 6 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×3
  • XML-doc coverage: EngineAPI Src/EngineAPI/EngineAPI.csproj — EngineAPI: 13 % XML-doc coverage (36/275).
  • XML-doc coverage: Domain Src/Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/50).
  • XML-doc coverage: Transversal Src/Transversal/Transversal.csproj — Transversal: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/13).
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .2artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list Src/EngineAPI/EngineAPI.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json17artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/gdpr.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .1artifacts/raw/semgrep-gdpr.json
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fc889-7e3c-7c72-ab21-2998308da4cb · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 21 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 13 field(s)
  • RecoverPasswordDTO.Email Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/RecoverPasswordDTO.cs:9
  • UserCredentials.Email Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserCredentials.cs:9
  • UserDTO.Email Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:7
  • Account.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/Account.cs:12
  • AuthenticateRequest.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:11
  • AuthenticateResponse.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:23
  • ForgotPasswordRequest.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/ForgotPasswordRequest.cs:9
  • LoginViewModel.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/LoginViewModel.cs:11
  • RegisterViewModel.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/RegisterViewModel.cs:13
  • ResetPasswordViewModel.Email Src/EngineAPI/Models/ResetPasswordViewModel.cs:12
  • AccountService._emailService Src/EngineAPI/Services/AccountService.cs:43
  • AppSettings.EmailFrom Src/EngineAPI/Utils/AppSettings.cs:11
  • CurrentUser.Email Src/Transversal/Models/CurrentUser.cs:7
Name — 8 field(s)
  • ApplicationUser.FullName Src/Domain/Entities/ApplicationUser.cs:10
  • UserCreationDTO.FullName Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserCreationDTO.cs:10
  • UserDTO.FullName Src/EngineAPI/DTOs/UserDTO.cs:9
  • Account.FirstName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Account.cs:10
  • Account.LastName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Account.cs:11
  • AuthenticateResponse.FirstName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:21
  • AuthenticateResponse.LastName Src/EngineAPI/Models/Authenticate.cs:22
  • RegisterViewModel.FullName Src/EngineAPI/Models/RegisterViewModel.cs:31

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md