Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
shixiangxi0/Cobweb carries serious gaps (50%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (95%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (43%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them… (Tooling); Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript (Type Safety).
For scale: Small (~19,470 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
43%
Weak · gated by D3, R1
Architecture
95% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
76%
Strong
Readiness
32%
Weak · gated by R6, P1, P3
Security
90% ★
Exemplary
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 32% · 46% weightCode Health 43% · 25% weightMaturity 76% · 14% weightSecurity 90% · 8% weightArchitecture 95% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 32 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~62.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (10+)
- D3 · FileTooLong: animation/battleAnimator.js clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) clients/phaser/scenes/reward/rewardScene.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 3 locations) games/sts/src/session/index.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) clients/ink-cli/App.jsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleViews.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js
- R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 51, cognitive 73) clients/ink-cli/App.jsx
- R2 · Complex function App (cyclomatic 28, cognitive 25) clients/ink-cli/App.jsx
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €7,100–€36,000
| Cost to rebuild | €7,100–€36,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 50% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€21,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
2
Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
3
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Domain Modelling
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 6 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration pipeline that builds and tests every push or pull request to ensure immediate feedback. Next, enforce code quality by integrating linting and type-checking scripts into the build process. Then, migrate all remaining JavaScript files to TypeScript to improve type safety. After that, refactor large components by splitting them into smaller, more focused units. Finally, reduce cyclomatic complexity by breaking down deeply nested or branch-heavy functions to improve maintainability.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +15.8 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +15.8 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript. | +11.1 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones. | +10.7 pts | Medium | Large Files |
| Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5. | +10.7 pts | Medium | Cyclomatic Complexity |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +8.2 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components. | +4.3 pts | Medium | Code Duplication |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +2.5 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| pnpm-lock.yaml | 3.9 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: playClip (cyclomatic 20) |
| clients/shared/viewStateBuilder.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) |
| clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: buildMessageSpec (cyclomatic 18) |
| packages/core/src/State.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: _normalizeBinding (cyclomatic 16) |
| games/sts/src/session/builder.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: buildBattleStore (cyclomatic 22) |
| games/sts/src/session/index.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: play (cyclomatic 17) |
| clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleViews.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: updateActorNode (cyclomatic 16) |
| clients/ink-cli/summarize.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: summarizeResolution (cyclomatic 53) |
| clients/phaser/scenes/battle/state/battleState.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: applyBattleRenderPatch (cyclomatic 49) |
| clients/shared/content/index.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: applyContentOverlay (cyclomatic 28) |
| games/sts/src/bindings/lifecycle.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: afterFire (cyclomatic 23) |
| games/sts/src/shared/content/catalog.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: buildDisplayMapsFromContent (cyclomatic 19) |
| clients/ink-cli/cli.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: runJsonMode (cyclomatic 18) |
| clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/phaseUi/ShopPhaseController.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: renderShopMarket (cyclomatic 17) |
| packages/core/src/Scheduler.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) |
| clients/shared/renderStepInterpreter.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: buildRenderStepsFromTimeline (cyclomatic 28) |
| clients/phaser/scenes/battle/state/battleUiState.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: refreshCardVisualState (cognitive 28) |
| clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleSkin.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: drawArtMotif (cognitive 24) |
| clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleRelics.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: syncRelicBar (cognitive 21) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 29 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 29 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D21D28D29D33D35D38DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 58 of 65 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
22 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was summarizeResolution at 53. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being drawStatusIconMotif at 17 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
summarizeResolution (cyclomatic 53)clients/ink-cli/summarize.js:49
applyBattleRenderPatch (cyclomatic 49)clients/phaser/scenes/battle/state/battleState.js:85
buildRenderStepsFromTimeline (cyclomatic 28)clients/shared/renderStepInterpreter.js:414
applyContentOverlay (cyclomatic 28)clients/shared/content/index.js:7
afterFire (cyclomatic 23)games/sts/src/bindings/lifecycle.js:42
What to do
- Resolve the 1 summarizeResolution (cyclomatic 53) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with summarize.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 applyBattleRenderPatch (cyclomatic 49) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with battleState.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 buildRenderStepsFromTimeline (cyclomatic 28) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with renderStepInterpreter.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
24 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was summarizeResolution at 46.
(anonymous) (cognitive 18) clients/shared/viewStateBuilder.js:242
summarizeResolution (cognitive 46)clients/ink-cli/summarize.js:49
applyBattleRenderPatch (cognitive 46)clients/phaser/scenes/battle/state/battleState.js:85
afterFire (cognitive 40)games/sts/src/bindings/lifecycle.js:42
applyContentOverlay (cognitive 34)clients/shared/content/index.js:7
What to do
- Resolve the 2 (anonymous) (cognitive 18) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with viewStateBuilder.js, Scheduler.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 summarizeResolution (cognitive 46) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with summarize.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 applyBattleRenderPatch (cognitive 46) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with battleState.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D3 · God Classes
6 god class(es) detected.
FileTooLong: flow/FlowScreen.js clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:0
TooManyMethods: BattleAnimator clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js:16
What to do
- Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with FlowScreen.js, battleAnimator.js, battleViews.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with battleAnimator.js, CobwebSessionHost.js, battleScene.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate God Classes in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
6 finding(s): 1 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 1 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]pnpm-lock.yaml
Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]pnpm-lock.yaml
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — application code, tests and tooling are mixed at the repository root.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected (CodeQL, or your ecosystem's scanner — CodeQL's csharp pack (which analyses VB.NET too — F# is not a CodeQL language, so an F# project's option is `semgrep --config=auto`) or a security analyzer package for .NET, cargo-audit/cargo-deny (or clippy) for Rust, sobelow for Elixir/Phoenix, brakeman for Ruby/Rails, spotbugs/find-sec-bugs for Java/Kotlin, scalafix/scapegoat for Scala/sbt, bandit or `semgrep --config=p/python` (or CodeQL's python pack) for Python, phpstan/psalm for PHP, gosec/govulncheck (or golangci-lint) for Go, dialyzer/elvis for Erlang/OTP, CodeQL's Swift pack for Swift/Xcode, CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack or eslint-plugin-security for JS/TS, semgrep for any).
What to do
- Add a SAST step running whatever your ecosystem ships: CodeQL, semgrep, CodeQL's csharp pack (C#/VB.NET, with `semgrep --config=auto` for F#), `cargo audit`/`cargo deny` or `cargo clippy -- -D warnings` (Rust), sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix), brakeman (Ruby/Rails), spotbugs/find-sec-bugs (Java/Kotlin), scalafix/scapegoat (Scala/sbt), bandit or `semgrep --config=p/python` (Python), phpstan/psalm (PHP), gosec/govulncheck or golangci-lint (Go), dialyzer/elvis via rebar3_lint (Erlang/OTP), CodeQL's Swift pack (Swift/Xcode), or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 135 plain JS
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- games/sts/src/session/index.js:463 · games/sts/src/session/index.js:509 — index.js:463
- clients/phaser/scenes/battle/runtime/BattleSessionActionBridge.js:71 · clients/phaser/scenes/battle/runtime/BattleSessionActionBridge.js:91 — BattleSessionActionBridge.js:71
- clients/phaser/scenes/reward/rewardScene.js:21 · clients/phaser/scenes/shop/shopScene.js:21 — rewardScene.js:21
- clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:784 · clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:881 — FlowScreen.js:784
- games/sts/src/session/index.js:725 · games/sts/src/session/index.js:746 · games/sts/src/session/index.js:788 — index.js:725
- clients/ink-cli/App.jsx:709 · clients/ink-cli/App.jsx:736 — App.jsx:709
- clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleViews.js:348 · clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleViews.js:497 — battleViews.js:348
- clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:761 · clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:962 — FlowScreen.js:761
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R11 · Import Boundaries
- games/sts/src/session/index.js:22 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../../packages/core/src/Engine.js) — import the package by name instead. — index.js:22
- games/sts/tools/dev-events.js:9 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../packages/core/src/Registry.js) — import the package by name instead. — dev-events.js:9
What to do
- Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — summarize.js:49, App.jsx:695, battleState.js:85, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
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R3 · Large Files
- 13 file(s) over 400 lines
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
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R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — App.jsx, battleViews.js, battleScene.js, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code
- Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×8) — battleActorState.js:91, battleActorState.js:95, battleDebug.js:8, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
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R9 · Circular Imports
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 43% | Weak — gated by D3, R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 95% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 76% | Strong | Solid. |
| Readiness | 32% | Weak — gated by R6, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 90% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 83 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (8 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (8 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (8 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (8 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (8 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (8 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (8 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~0 lines of test source are present (.js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference (.NET: C#, VB.NET and F# alike), lcov — `swift test --enable-code-coverage` or `xcodebuild -enableCodeCoverage YES` then `xcrun llvm-cov export -format=lcov` (Swift/Xcode), `cargo llvm-cov --lcov`, `go test -coverprofile`, `rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` or covertool (Erlang/BEAM), `flutter test --coverage` or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov` (Dart/Flutter), `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport` via sbt-scoverage (Scala/sbt), jest/nyc, JaCoCo/Cobertura XML, coverage.py … most ecosystems' coverage tools can emit one) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 5 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
Warning — 53 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: flow/FlowScreen.js clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:0
- FileTooLong: animation/battleAnimator.js clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js:0
- FileTooLong: view/battleViews.js clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleViews.js:0
D3 · God Classes
- TooManyMethods: BattleAnimator clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js:16
- TooManyMethods: CobwebSessionHost clients/phaser/scenes/shared/CobwebSessionHost.js:12
- TooManyMethods: BattleScene clients/phaser/scenes/battle/battleScene.js:45
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- (anonymous) (cognitive 18) clients/shared/viewStateBuilder.js:242
- (anonymous) (cognitive 18) packages/core/src/Scheduler.js:150
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- summarizeResolution (cyclomatic 53) clients/ink-cli/summarize.js:49
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- applyBattleRenderPatch (cyclomatic 49) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/state/battleState.js:85
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- buildRenderStepsFromTimeline (cyclomatic 28) clients/shared/renderStepInterpreter.js:414
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- applyContentOverlay (cyclomatic 28) clients/shared/content/index.js:7
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- afterFire (cyclomatic 23) games/sts/src/bindings/lifecycle.js:42
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) clients/shared/viewStateBuilder.js:180
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- buildBattleStore (cyclomatic 22) games/sts/src/session/builder.js:75
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- playClip (cyclomatic 20) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js:38
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- buildRunProgressView (cyclomatic 19) clients/shared/viewStateBuilder.js:52
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 19) clients/shared/viewStateBuilder.js:242
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- buildDisplayMapsFromContent (cyclomatic 19) games/sts/src/shared/content/catalog.js:94
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- runJsonMode (cyclomatic 18) clients/ink-cli/cli.js:150
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- buildMessageSpec (cyclomatic 18) clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:1149
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- syncFlowScreen (cyclomatic 18) clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:1398
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- play (cyclomatic 17) games/sts/src/session/index.js:381
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- renderShopMarket (cyclomatic 17) clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/phaseUi/ShopPhaseController.js:107
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- _normalizeBinding (cyclomatic 16) packages/core/src/State.js:85
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- _inheritContext (cyclomatic 16) packages/core/src/State.js:127
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) packages/core/src/Scheduler.js:150
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- enterBattlePhase (cyclomatic 16) games/sts/src/session/index.js:191
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- buildRunState (cyclomatic 16) games/sts/src/session/builder.js:141
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- updateActorNode (cyclomatic 16) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleViews.js:124
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- summarizeResolution (cognitive 46) clients/ink-cli/summarize.js:49
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- applyBattleRenderPatch (cognitive 46) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/state/battleState.js:85
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- afterFire (cognitive 40) games/sts/src/bindings/lifecycle.js:42
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- applyContentOverlay (cognitive 34) clients/shared/content/index.js:7
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- animateZoneBatch (cognitive 31) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js:618
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- refreshCardVisualState (cognitive 28) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/state/battleUiState.js:33
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- buildMessageSpec (cognitive 26) clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/FlowScreen.js:1149
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- renderShopMarket (cognitive 26) clients/phaser/scenes/shared/flow/phaseUi/ShopPhaseController.js:107
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- drawArtMotif (cognitive 24) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleSkin.js:52
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- buildBattleStore (cognitive 22) games/sts/src/session/builder.js:75
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- syncRelicBar (cognitive 21) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleRelics.js:473
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- drawDungeonBase (cognitive 21) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleEnvironment.js:84
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- buildDisplayMapsFromContent (cognitive 20) games/sts/src/shared/content/catalog.js:94
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _inheritContext (cognitive 19) packages/core/src/State.js:127
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- use (cognitive 19) packages/core/src/Engine.js:106
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- refreshLayout (cognitive 19) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/input/battleInput.js:282
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- mergeModule (cognitive 18) packages/core/src/State.js:266
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- runJsonMode (cognitive 17) clients/ink-cli/cli.js:150
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- updateActorNode (cognitive 17) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/view/battleViews.js:124
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- setPaused (cognitive 17) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/animationQueue.js:34
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- play (cognitive 16) games/sts/src/session/index.js:381
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- animateCardMoved (cognitive 16) clients/phaser/scenes/battle/animation/battleAnimator.js:663
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 6 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |