Public report — shortlink, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
154findings with an exact file:lineof 162 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
54/116dimensions across the health lenses28843 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
shortlink-org/shortlink carries serious gaps (45%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Domain Modelling (90%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (28%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (49%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
208 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-30) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.
D20 · Context and consequences are both cited to an external source (Michael Nygard's blog + adr-tools repo), leaving the ADR itself uninformative and its own rationale buried in links docs/ADR/decisions/0001-record-architecture-decisions.md
D20 · Informative title ("3. Observability") is generic rather than naming the observable problem or decision; trade-offs of adding HTTP endpoints and probes are not stated docs/ADR/decisions/0003-observability-health-check.md
D20 · Decision and consequences are present but the visible text clips mid-context before any trade-offs (e.g. storage overhead, lookup cost) can be assessed docs/ADR/decisions/0004-use-uuid-as-primary-keys.md
D20 · Informative title (uninformative) plus thin context (only one sentence about CODEOWNERS purpose) with no trade-offs; the decision is a bulleted example linked to an external blog post but there are no consequences in text form docs/ADR/decisions/0006-codeowner.md
D20 · The decision (what change was proposed) and its trade-offs are not visible before the stub clip docs/ADR/decisions/0007-optimization-network.md
D20 · Context is 'We want to know product metrics by each services.' and Decision is 'We made grafana dashboard for product-metrics by each services.' with Consequences only beginning ('1. Requirements dashboard') docs/ADR/decisions/0008-product-metrics-by-services.md
D20 · Context is a one-line rationale ('We use tracing and logging systems to track application events') with no trade-offs; consequences are citations rather than real consequences docs/ADR/decisions/0009-naming-spans-and-attributes.md
D20 · Consequences are thin ('We use next material for made our logger format') rather than trade-offs such as OTel integration cost or operational complexity docs/ADR/decisions/0010-logger-format.md
D20 · Consequences are restatements rather than trade-offs (e.g. learning curve for PlantUML/C4-PlantUML vs existing tools) docs/ADR/decisions/0011-application-architecture-documentation.md
D20 · Context and decision are identical ('We want to have a monorepository...') with no context/problem and no consequences; only one sentence in body docs/ADR/decisions/0012-use-monorepository.md
D20 · Context is a single sentence ('We want to use integration tests to verify the correctness of our code.') and decision restates 'We will use k6' with no rationale; consequences are boilerplate install commands (go install + xk6 build) plus one plugin link docs/ADR/decisions/0020-k6.md
D20 · Uninformative title and thin context (only one sentence) with only the decision and an ADR template present docs/ADR/decisions/0021-microservice-structure.md
D20 · Context is thin ("This ADR addresses the need to standardize our code style tool, considering efficiency and developer experience."), decision is a one-line rationale with no trade-offs or alternatives considered docs/ADR/decisions/0032-python-code-style-selection.md
D20 · Consequences are thin: only one bullet stating the outcome and no trade-offs (e.g. performance cost of reduced transparency) docs/ADR/decisions/0039-ui-accessibility.md
D20 · Consequences section is sparse and only lists benefits with no trade-offs (e.g. vendor lock-in to Storybook tools, component quality vs. third-party alternatives) docs/ADR/decisions/0040-ui-kit.md
D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/notification/bot.Dockerfile
D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/csi.Dockerfile
D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/bff.Dockerfile
D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/ui.Dockerfile
D31 · High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shortdb/shortdb.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: DS-0001 .clusterfuzzlite/Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: DS-0001 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/landscape.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/proxy/ops/proxy/templates/observability/grafana-dashboard.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/metadata/ops/metadata/templates/observability/grafana-dashboard.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/grafana-user.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/configmap.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/grafana/postgres-datasources.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/grafana/postgres-dashboard.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/observability/grafana/shortlink-dashboard.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/bff/ops/bff/templates/observability/grafana-dashboard.yaml
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/backstage.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/csi.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/ui.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/support/support.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_9 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/notification/bot.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/notification/bot.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/bff.Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/landscape.Dockerfile
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 45% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code
~1886 LoC unreachable (45 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€50,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 28% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.6) — DDD/clean architecture, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with registry-auth.key, nginx.key, shortlink.json.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 28%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with registry-auth.key, nginx.key, shortlink.json. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with registry-auth.key, nginx.key, shortlink.json.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
79 modules, 57 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
28
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
26
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
21
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the three leaked secrets in the registry-auth.key, nginx.key, and shortlink.json files. Next, codify backups and geo-recovery in your infrastructure as code, ensuring you document RTO/RPO and restore procedures rather than relying solely on persistence guards. Then, improve dependency hygiene by removing unused packages, explicitly declaring imports, and demoting type- and test-only dependencies. Finally, add tests for the 43.8% of production files currently unreachable from your test suite, and implement semantic versioning in your build manifests to ensure traceable releases.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with registry-auth.key, nginx.key, shortlink.json.
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 54 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 154 of 162 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 13 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
Of 15 mechanizable ADRs, 13 are prevented by analyzers, 2 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with registry-auth.key, nginx.key, shortlink.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
53 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is boundaries/ui/src/app/add-link/page.tsx.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
Evaluated 63 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.6/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 15 flagged with a specific gap.
Context and consequences are both cited to an external source (Michael Nygard's blog + adr-tools repo), leaving the ADR itself uninformative and its own rationale buried in linksdocs/ADR/decisions/0001-record-architecture-decisions.md
Informative title ("3. Observability") is generic rather than naming the observable problem or decision; trade-offs of adding HTTP endpoints and probes are not stateddocs/ADR/decisions/0003-observability-health-check.md
Decision and consequences are present but the visible text clips mid-context before any trade-offs (e.g. storage overhead, lookup cost) can be assesseddocs/ADR/decisions/0004-use-uuid-as-primary-keys.md
Informative title (uninformative) plus thin context (only one sentence about CODEOWNERS purpose) with no trade-offs; the decision is a bulleted example linked to an external blog post but there are no consequences in text formdocs/ADR/decisions/0006-codeowner.md
The decision (what change was proposed) and its trade-offs are not visible before the stub clipdocs/ADR/decisions/0007-optimization-network.md
+ 10 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Context and consequences are both cited to an external source (Michael… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-record-architecture-decisions.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Informative title ("3. Observability") is generic rather than naming the… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0003-observability-health-check.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Decision and consequences are present but the visible text clips… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0004-use-uuid-as-primary-keys.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
24 finding(s): 0 critical, 24 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×17ops/Helm/boundaries/shop/common/templates/store/grafana-user.yaml:9detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 17 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with values.yaml (7), nx.json (3), grafana-user.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×20.github/dependabot.yml:10detected by semgrep finding
Medium: use-tls · ×6boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/graphql/infrastructure/server/graphql.go:100detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (9), release.yml (4), pnpm-workspace.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with graphql.go, server.go, ws.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×5ops/dockerfile/boundaries/notification/bot.Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×20.clusterfuzzlite/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×3ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/support/support.Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 20 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with grafana-dashboard.yaml (3), landscape.Dockerfile (2), bot.Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with bot.Dockerfile, csi.Dockerfile, bff.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with support.Dockerfile, bff.Dockerfile, prometheusrule-shortlink-metadata-grpc.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×38boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×11boundaries/bff/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]boundaries/api/api-gateway/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 38 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (37), go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (38 issue-level).
Resolve the 11 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (7), go.mod (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels5.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — NavbarSearch.tsx:27
A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one. (×3) — Notifications.tsx:148, Notifications.tsx:199, AsyncForm.tsx:74
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — index.html:4
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. — ThemeToggle.tsx:40
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
This stylesheet animates but never checks prefers-reduced-motion, so motion-sensitive users can't opt out. Wrap motion in @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference). — index.html:78
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
An a11y linter is configured (Documented) but there's no automated a11y test or CI gate. Add vitest-axe to verify at runtime, then gate it in CI.
What to do
Accessibility linting is already configured — assert with vitest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
The domain package `github.com/shortlink-org/shortlink/boundaries/api/api-gateway/domain` imports `pkg:infrastructure` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/broker/auth). The dependency direction points from the domain layer to infrastructure; invert it behind a domain-owned port. — api.go:10
What to do
Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED3 · Event naming7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.
`LinkEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — LinkEvents.ts:52
`LogEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — ILogger.ts:5
What to do
Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
84 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 6 of 19 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.6 pts.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
boundaries/ui/src/components/Dashboard/profile.tsx:138 · boundaries/ui/src/components/Dashboard/profile.tsx:172 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — profile.tsx:138
boundaries/ui/src/app/admin/links/page.tsx:110 · boundaries/ui/src/app/links/page.tsx:110 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — page.tsx:110
boundaries/ui/src/app/admin/groups/page.tsx:73 · boundaries/ui/src/app/admin/users/page.tsx:73 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — page.tsx:73
boundaries/ui/src/components/Page/admin/user/linksTable.tsx:32 · boundaries/ui/src/components/Page/user/linksTable.tsx:39 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — linksTable.tsx:32
boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Notifications.tsx:34 · boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Notifications.tsx:72 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — Notifications.tsx:34
boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Notifications.tsx:252 · boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Personal.tsx:295 · boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Profile.tsx:236 · boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Security.tsx:133 — the 4 copies are spread across 4 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — Notifications.tsx:252
boundaries/ui/src/components/user/integrations/page.tsx:48 · boundaries/ui/src/components/user/reports/page.tsx:98 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — page.tsx:48
boundaries/ui/src/components/Dashboard/profile.tsx:21 · boundaries/ui/src/components/Dashboard/profile.tsx:68 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — profile.tsx:21
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).
Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.
boundaries/proxy/src/application/exceptions/ErrorHandler.ts:5 imports boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/logging/ILogger.ts against the layered-src rules. — ErrorHandler.ts:5
boundaries/proxy/src/application/pipeline/AuthorizationInterceptor.ts:2 imports boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/logging/ILogger.ts against the layered-src rules. — AuthorizationInterceptor.ts:2
boundaries/proxy/src/application/pipeline/LoggingInterceptor.ts:5 imports boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/logging/ILogger.ts against the layered-src rules. — LoggingInterceptor.ts:5
boundaries/proxy/src/application/pipeline/__tests__/AuthorizationInterceptor.test.ts:9 imports boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/logging/ILogger.ts against the layered-src rules. — AuthorizationInterceptor.test.ts:9
boundaries/proxy/src/application/pipeline/__tests__/LoggingInterceptor.test.ts:4 imports boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/logging/ILogger.ts against the layered-src rules. — LoggingInterceptor.test.ts:4
boundaries/proxy/src/application/services/LinkApplicationService.ts:14 imports boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/logging/ILogger.ts against the layered-src rules. — LinkApplicationService.ts:14
boundaries/proxy/src/application/services/__tests__/LinkApplicationService.test.ts:8 imports boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/logging/ILogger.ts against the layered-src rules. — LinkApplicationService.test.ts:8
boundaries/ui/src/application/link/index.ts:2 imports boundaries/ui/src/infrastructure/http/link/linkHttpGateway.ts against the layered-src rules. — index.ts:2
What to do
Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — RabbitMQMessageBus.ts:193, KafkaMessageBus.ts:152, link.ts:21, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage4.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — page.tsx, Api.ts, Personal.tsx, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 32 application, 31 tooling and 41 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (32 application, 31 tooling, 41 test roots considered) (×7) — useErrorHandler.ts, profile.tsx, Security.tsx, …
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — next.config.js:19, shortlink-org-ui-kit.d.ts:3
Declared in boundaries/mobile/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — telemetry.ts:25
Only test files import it — move it to devDependencies. — App.spec.tsx:2
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 62 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.rb, .ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~6190 lines of test source are present (.go, .ts, .tsx) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.rb, .ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .py, .rb, .scala, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.go, .rb, .ts, .tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, .py, .rb, .scala, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go, .ts, .tsx) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): a Go event-sourcing framework import (watermill/eventhorizon/EventStore/eventsourcing); 3 Go aggregate(s) recording domain events (own events-slice append / raise-record)
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 95 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×38
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.29.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— @fastify/static 9.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @fastify/static is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 10.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 9.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 9.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against @fastify/static 9.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.14.4. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— @grpc/grpc-js 1.9.15: [GHSA redacted] — @grpc/grpc-js is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the 1.14.3 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @grpc/grpc-js to 1.9.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against @grpc/grpc-js 1.9.15: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— @opentelemetry/auto-instrumentations-node 0.72.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @opentelemetry/auto-instrumentations-node 0.73.0, but the vulnerable 0.72.0 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own @opentelemetry/auto-instrumentations-node entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or pin @opentelemetry/auto-instrumentations-node to 0.75.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— @opentelemetry/exporter-prometheus 0.214.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @opentelemetry/exporter-prometheus 0.215.0, but the vulnerable 0.214.0 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own @opentelemetry/exporter-prometheus entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or pin @opentelemetry/exporter-prometheus to 0.217.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger 2.6.1: [GHSA redacted] — @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger to 2.9.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— @opentelemetry/sdk-node 0.214.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @opentelemetry/sdk-node 0.215.0, but the vulnerable 0.214.0 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own @opentelemetry/sdk-node entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or pin @opentelemetry/sdk-node to 0.217.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— @xmldom/xmldom 0.7.13: [GHSA redacted] — @xmldom/xmldom is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @xmldom/xmldom to 0.8.13 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @xmldom/xmldom 0.7.13, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.8.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.8.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against @xmldom/xmldom 0.7.13: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.12: [GHSA redacted] — @xmldom/xmldom is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @xmldom/xmldom to 0.8.13 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.12: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/chrome-extension/pnpm-lock.yaml— adm-zip 0.5.16: [GHSA redacted] — adm-zip is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin adm-zip to 0.6.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: boundaries/chrome-extension/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— axios 1.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^1.15.2 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 28 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 1.14.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 28 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.14.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— axios 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^1.15.2 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 18 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 1.15.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 18 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.15.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/chrome-extension/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 1.1.13: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.13, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: boundaries/chrome-extension/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.13: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 2.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 5.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 5.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 5.0.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.0.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.0.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 5.0.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— fastify 5.8.4: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares fastify ^5.8.4, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.8.5, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so fastify moves onto 5.8.5 or later; if the flagged 5.8.4 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin fastify with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— find-my-way 9.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — find-my-way is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin find-my-way to 9.7.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— form-data 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 3 dependency files: boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml, boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/link/go.mod— github.com/docker/docker 28.5.2+incompatible: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; github.com/docker/docker is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent. (in 2 dependency files: boundaries/link/go.mod, boundaries/metadata/go.mod) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against github.com/docker/docker 28.5.2+incompatible: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— hono 4.12.10: [GHSA redacted] — hono is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin hono to 4.12.25 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 24 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against hono 4.12.10, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.12.34 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.12.34 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 24 advisories this scan raises against hono 4.12.10: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— http-proxy-middleware 3.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 3.0.7 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 3.0.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.0.7 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.0.7 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 3.0.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— immutable 5.1.5: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against immutable 5.1.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— js-cookie 3.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares js-cookie ^3.0.5, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 3.0.7, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so js-cookie moves onto 3.0.7 or later; if the flagged 3.0.5 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin js-cookie with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:10— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 52 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:78— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: pnpm/action-setup@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `pnpm/action-setup@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/pnpm/action-setup/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/npm-publish.yaml:31— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: pnpm/action-setup@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `pnpm/action-setup@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/pnpm/action-setup/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age boundaries/proxy/.npmrc:1— This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a minimum release age (`min-release-age = 7` for the npm CLI, `minimum-release-age = 7` for pnpm, `minimumReleaseAge` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, or `npmMinimalAgeGate: 7d` in `.yarnrc.yml` for Yarn Berry) — use the key your package manager reads; Yarn Classic has no release-age setting, so pin exact versions and review lockfile bumps there instead to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies boundaries/proxy/pnpm-workspace.yaml:1— Missing or incorrect blockExoticSubdeps. Set `blockExoticSubdeps: true` to prevent transitive dependencies from being installed from untrusted sources (git URLs, tarball URLs and local paths a dependency pulls in behind your lockfile). Added in: v10.26.0 Reference: https://pnpm.io/settings#blockexoticsubdeps. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: pnpm-minimum-release-age boundaries/proxy/pnpm-workspace.yaml:1— This pnpm workspace configuration does not set a minimum release age. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `minimumReleaseAge: 10080` (minutes) to wait at least seven days before installing newly published package versions. Added in: v10.16.0 Reference: https://pnpm.io/settings#minimumreleaseage. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: pnpm-trust-policy boundaries/proxy/pnpm-workspace.yaml:1— Missing or incorrect trustPolicy. Set `trustPolicy: no-downgrade` to prevent malicious package updates from downgrading security settings. Added in: v10.21.0 Reference: https://pnpm.io/settings#trustpolicy. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age boundaries/ui/.npmrc:1— This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a minimum release age (`min-release-age = 7` for the npm CLI, `minimum-release-age = 7` for pnpm, `minimumReleaseAge` in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, or `npmMinimalAgeGate: 7d` in `.yarnrc.yml` for Yarn Berry) — use the key your package manager reads; Yarn Classic has no release-age setting, so pin exact versions and review lockfile bumps there instead to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.docker/.github/workflows/ci.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.docker/.github/workflows/ci.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.docker/.github/workflows/ci.yml:55— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.docker/.github/workflows/ci.yml:60— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.docker/.github/workflows/release.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.docker/.github/workflows/release.yml:30— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.pip/.github/workflows/ci.yml:22— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.pip/.github/workflows/ci.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.pip/.github/workflows/ci.yml:53— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.pip/.github/workflows/ci.yml:58— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.pip/.github/workflows/release.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/geerlingguy.pip/.github/workflows/release.yml:30— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/bff/go.mod— github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C boundaries/bff get github.com/jackc/pgx/v5@v5.9.0`, which updates the require line boundaries/bff/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 5.8.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5004.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/api/api-gateway/go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.47.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C boundaries/api/api-gateway get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line boundaries/api/api-gateway/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.47.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/link/go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.48.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C boundaries/link get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line boundaries/link/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.48.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/bff/go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.49.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C boundaries/bff get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line boundaries/bff/go.mod already holds for it). (in 2 dependency files: boundaries/bff/go.mod, boundaries/metadata/go.mod) This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.49.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— jspdf 2.5.2: [GHSA redacted] — jspdf is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.0.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.5.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.5.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against jspdf 2.5.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.2.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.2.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against jspdf 2.5.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/proxy/pnpm-lock.yaml— protobufjs 7.5.4: [GHSA redacted] — protobufjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin protobufjs to 7.5.5 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against protobufjs 7.5.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.6.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.6.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against protobufjs 7.5.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/chrome-extension/pnpm-lock.yaml— shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— shell-quote 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— tar 6.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 12 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against tar 6.2.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.21 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.5.21 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 12 advisories this scan raises against tar 6.2.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml— vitest 3.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — vitest is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^4.1.4 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin vitest to 3.2.6 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/notification/bot.Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/csi.Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/bff.Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/ui.Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shortdb/shortdb.Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Leaked secret: private-key ops/cert/gitlab/registry-auth.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: private-key ops/ansible/playbooks/roles/nginx/files/nginx.key:1— private-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: signing-key ops/docker-compose/application/auth/keycloak/conf/realm/shortlink.json:19— signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] boundaries/api/api-gateway/go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.80.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.82.1 (in 4 dependency files)
Medium IaC: DS-0001 .clusterfuzzlite/Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: DS-0001 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/landscape.Dockerfile— ':latest' tag used A `:latest` base pins nothing: the stage rebuilds against whatever that tag points at on the day, so the same commit produces different images and a change you did not make arrives without a diff. The step: pin the base to a concrete release and, where the registry offers one, its digest — `FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:…` — then bump it deliberately, which is a review a bot can raise. A build stage that only compiles is worth pinning for the same reason: it decides what ends up in the layers you ship.
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/proxy/ops/proxy/templates/observability/grafana-dashboard.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/metadata/ops/metadata/templates/observability/grafana-dashboard.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/grafana-user.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/configmap.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/grafana/postgres-datasources.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/store/grafana/postgres-dashboard.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/common/ops/common/templates/observability/grafana/shortlink-dashboard.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 boundaries/bff/ops/bff/templates/observability/grafana-dashboard.yaml:1— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/backstage.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/csi.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/ui.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/support/support.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added to container images
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_9 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/notification/bot.Dockerfile:30— Ensure that APT isn't used
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/notification/bot.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/bff.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/landscape.Dockerfile:10— Ensure the base image uses a non latest version tag
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/go_wasm.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shortdb/shortdb.Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium: use-tls boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/graphql/infrastructure/server/graphql.go:100— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/ws/infrustracture/ws/server.go:25— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-of-sha1 boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/ws/infrustracture/ws/ws.go:34— Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: insecure-ssl-version ops/dockerfile/boundaries/api/conf/templates/ssl.conf:7— Detected use of an insecure SSL version. Secure SSL versions are TLSv1.2 and TLS1.3; older versions are known to be broken and are susceptible to attacks. Prefer use of TLSv1.2 or later. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
Medium: use-tls poc/cel/validator.go:50— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: use-tls poc/xa/dtm-example/main.go:34— Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/cloudevents/infrastructure/server/server.go:33— boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/cloudevents/infrastructure/server/server.go:33-46 | boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/graphql/infrastructure/server/server.go:35-48 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/cqrs/cqs/postgres/cqs_link.go:18— boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/cqrs/cqs/postgres/cqs_link.go:18-31 | boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/cqrs/cqs/postgres/cqs_link.go:59-72 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/add.go:47— boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/add.go:47-60 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/delete.go:31-44 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/add.go:47` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/usecases/sitemap/parser.go:89— boundaries/link/internal/usecases/sitemap/parser.go:89-98 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/add.go:183-192 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/usecases/sitemap/parser.go:89` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/get.go:55— boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/get.go:55-64 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/list.go:111-120 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/get.go:55` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/handle_add.go:18— boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/handle_add.go:18-27 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/handle_update.go:18-27 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/handle_add.go:18` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/ram/ram.go:107— boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/ram/ram.go:107-119 | boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/mongo/mongo.go:90-102 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/ram/ram.go:107` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/cqrs/query/postgres/get.go:51— boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/cqrs/query/postgres/get.go:51-63 | boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/cqrs/query/postgres/list.go:75-87 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/cqrs/query/postgres/get.go:51` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/dgraph/dgraph.go:61— boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/dgraph/dgraph.go:61-71 | boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/dgraph/dgraph.go:162-172 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/dgraph/dgraph.go:61` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/error.go:18— boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/error.go:18-28 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:18-28 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/error.go:18` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].docPath | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 995.
D20 · ADR Quality· Context and consequences are both cited to an external source (Michael Nygard's blog + adr-tools repo), leaving the ADR itself uninformative and its own rationale buried in links · ×1
Context and consequences are both cited to an external source (Michael Nygard's blog + adr-tools repo), leaving the ADR itself uninformative and its own rationale buried in links docs/ADR/decisions/0001-record-architecture-decisions.md— Replace the Context/Consequences with a one-paragraph rationale explaining why records matter and where they will live, then explicitly state the decision and any trade-offs of adopting an external tool
D20 · ADR Quality· Informative title ("3. Observability") is generic rather than naming the observable problem or decision; trade-offs of adding HTTP endpoints and probes are not stated · ×1
Informative title ("3. Observability") is generic rather than naming the observable problem or decision; trade-offs of adding HTTP endpoints and probes are not stated docs/ADR/decisions/0003-observability-health-check.md— Give the ADR a specific title reflecting the observable problem (e.g., "Standardised Health/Performance Monitoring for Services") so readers know what it addresses, plus add a Consequences section on trade-offs such as added routing overhead and the cost of maintaining three new endpoints per service
D20 · ADR Quality· Decision and consequences are present but the visible text clips mid-context before any trade-offs (e.g. storage overhead, lookup cost) can be assessed · ×1
Decision and consequences are present but the visible text clips mid-context before any trade-offs (e.g. storage overhead, lookup cost) can be assessed docs/ADR/decisions/0004-use-uuid-as-primary-keys.md
D20 · ADR Quality· Informative title (uninformative) plus thin context (only one sentence about CODEOWNERS purpose) with no trade-offs; the decision is a bulleted example linked to an external blog post but there are no consequences in text form · ×1
Informative title (uninformative) plus thin context (only one sentence about CODEOWNERS purpose) with no trade-offs; the decision is a bulleted example linked to an external blog post but there are no consequences in text form docs/ADR/decisions/0006-codeowner.md— Rename the ADR to something like '6. Codeowners: defining responsible teams and projects' so readers know what it addresses, then add a Consequences section covering trade-offs such as how team/project additions scale with growth
D20 · ADR Quality· The decision (what change was proposed) and its trade-offs are not visible before the stub clip · ×1
The decision (what change was proposed) and its trade-offs are not visible before the stub clip docs/ADR/decisions/0007-optimization-network.md
D20 · ADR Quality· Context is 'We want to know product metrics by each services.' and Decision is 'We made grafana dashboard for product-metrics by each services.' with Consequences only beginning ('1. Requirements dashboard') · ×1
Context is 'We want to know product metrics by each services.' and Decision is 'We made grafana dashboard for product-metrics by each services.' with Consequences only beginning ('1. Requirements dashboard') docs/ADR/decisions/0008-product-metrics-by-services.md— Add the real problem (e.g. lack of single source of product-level performance across services) so Context is informative, and flesh out the consequences section to explain what each Requirement type means
D20 · ADR Quality· Context is a one-line rationale ('We use tracing and logging systems to track application events') with no trade-offs; consequences are citations rather than real consequences · ×1
Context is a one-line rationale ('We use tracing and logging systems to track application events') with no trade-offs; consequences are citations rather than real consequences docs/ADR/decisions/0009-naming-spans-and-attributes.md— Expand the Context section to state why OTLP naming matters (e.g. reproducibility, debugging) and add a Consequences section on how not following it breaks observability
D20 · ADR Quality· Consequences are thin ('We use next material for made our logger format') rather than trade-offs such as OTel integration cost or operational complexity · ×1
Consequences are thin ('We use next material for made our logger format') rather than trade-offs such as OTel integration cost or operational complexity docs/ADR/decisions/0010-logger-format.md— Add a Consequences section covering the trade-offs of relying on OTel distributed tracing (e.g. trace_id storage, sampling overhead) and how they will be managed
D20 · ADR Quality· Consequences are restatements rather than trade-offs (e.g. learning curve for PlantUML/C4-PlantUML vs existing tools) · ×1
Consequences are restatements rather than trade-offs (e.g. learning curve for PlantUML/C4-PlantUML vs existing tools) docs/ADR/decisions/0011-application-architecture-documentation.md— Add a Consequences section on the skill/learning curve needed to adopt C4-PlantUML and maintain the documentation set
D20 · ADR Quality· Context and decision are identical ('We want to have a monorepository...') with no context/problem and no consequences; only one sentence in body · ×1
Context and decision are identical ('We want to have a monorepository...') with no context/problem and no consequences; only one sentence in body docs/ADR/decisions/0012-use-monorepository.md— Replace the duplicate title with an informative problem (e.g. 'Centralize platform code across services so shared libraries and CI work seamlessly') then flesh out Context, add Consequences/trade-offs, and document why a monorepo is preferred over multiple repos
D20 · ADR Quality· Context is a single sentence ('We want to use integration tests to verify the correctness of our code.') and decision restates 'We will use k6' with no rationale; consequences are boilerplate install commands (go install + xk6 build) plus one plugin link · ×1
Context is a single sentence ('We want to use integration tests to verify the correctness of our code.') and decision restates 'We will use k6' with no rationale; consequences are boilerplate install commands (go install + xk6 build) plus one plugin link docs/ADR/decisions/0020-k6.md— Add why k6 was chosen over alternatives, a trade-off section on test coverage vs tooling cost, and the benefits of distributed tracing
D20 · ADR Quality· Uninformative title and thin context (only one sentence) with only the decision and an ADR template present · ×1
Uninformative title and thin context (only one sentence) with only the decision and an ADR template present docs/ADR/decisions/0021-microservice-structure.md— Rename the ADR to something like '21. microservices structure: context, decision, consequences' so readers know what each section is about.
D20 · ADR Quality· Context is thin ("This ADR addresses the need to standardize our code style tool, considering efficiency and developer experience."), decision is a one-line rationale with no trade-offs or alternatives considered · ×1
Context is thin ("This ADR addresses the need to standardize our code style tool, considering efficiency and developer experience."), decision is a one-line rationale with no trade-offs or alternatives considered docs/ADR/decisions/0032-python-code-style-selection.md— Expand Context by stating why Flake8 was rejected (e.g. slower on large files) and add Consequences covering alternative tools' shortcomings
Consequences are thin: only one bullet stating the outcome and no trade-offs (e.g. performance cost of reduced transparency) docs/ADR/decisions/0039-ui-accessibility.md— Add a Consequences section noting any downsides such as slower rendering under high contrast or increased blur on dark backgrounds
D20 · ADR Quality· Consequences section is sparse and only lists benefits with no trade-offs (e.g. vendor lock-in to Storybook tools, component quality vs. third-party alternatives) · ×1
Consequences section is sparse and only lists benefits with no trade-offs (e.g. vendor lock-in to Storybook tools, component quality vs. third-party alternatives) docs/ADR/decisions/0040-ui-kit.md— Add a Consequences section on trade-offs such as the long-term maintenance burden of relying on external UI kits and how decisions will be made when components are not yet written
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 2 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/mongo/mongo.go:59— boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/mongo/mongo.go:59-79 | boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/postgres/postgres.go:63-83 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/repository/crud/mongo/mongo.go:59` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/cloudevents/cmd/api.go:24— boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/cloudevents/cmd/api.go:24-39 | boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/graphql/cmd/api.go:24-39 | boundaries/api/api-gateway/gateways/grpc-web/cmd/api.go:24-39 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:53— boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:53-67 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:96-110 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:53` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:40— boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:40-51 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:83-94 | boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link/get.go:43-54 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/usecases/link_cqrs/api.go:40` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/rpc/link/v1/get.go:31— boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/rpc/link/v1/get.go:31-38 | boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/rpc/link/v1/update_response_dto.go:10-17 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `boundaries/link/internal/infrastructure/rpc/link/v1/get.go:31` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Low IaC: DS-0026 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/platform/support/support.Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 9000`, so a request to `localhost:9000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 ops/dockerfile/boundaries/shop/bff.Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 9991`, so a request to `localhost:9991` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: KSV-0039 boundaries/metadata/ops/metadata/templates/observability/alerts/prometheusrule-shortlink-metadata-grpc.yaml— namespace 'shortlink-link' has no LimitRange — 3 manifest document(s) were flagged individually; aggregated to one finding per namespace
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.go, .ts, .tsx) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 53 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: boundaries/ui/src/app/add-link/page.tsx, boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Personal.tsx, boundaries/ui/src/components/Profile/Profile.tsx, boundaries/ui/src/app/admin/sitemap/page.tsx, boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/messaging/RabbitMQMessageBus.ts, boundaries/metadata/internal/usecases/metadata/metadata.go, boundaries/proxy/src/infrastructure/telemetry.ts, boundaries/proxy/src/di/container.ts (+45 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a Codecov configuration (.codecov.yml) and a coverage step in CI (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.txt -covermode`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.go, .ts, .tsx), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`, or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read — No dependency manifest this pass reads for hygiene (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fca93-315b-72f4-87fd-00825bf82100 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 95 · Warnings: 58 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 02:21 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.