Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
simnova/sharethrift is sound in substance but carries real gaps (56%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Maturity (96%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (43%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (48%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene).
For scale: Medium (~80,873 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.0 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 43 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 56 → ~64.
New since the last scan (100+)
- D19 · LLM evaluation failed
- D20 · No real context/problem and no explicit decision; the body is a boilerplate template filled with filler status fields apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0001-code-ql.md
- D20 · Informative title ("EdgeScan") and context are both weak: the decision itself ('dynamic DAST/penetration testing services') is stated in the header line before any concrete coverage or status; no real problem statement and no consequences/trade-offs apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0002-edgescan.md
- D20 · Informative title ("GitHub Dependabot") and no explicit Context/Decision sections; trade-offs of manual compensating controls over automation are not stated apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0003-github-dependabot.md
- D20 · The body is an assessment metadata dump with no explicit decision (implement secret scanning) and consequences/trade-offs are deferred to TBD rows apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0005-secret-scanning.md
- D28 · Secret: private-key packages/cellix/mock-payment-server/src/index.ts
- D28 · Secret: jwt apps/ui-sharethrift/src/components/layouts/signup/components/payment.container.tsx
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml
- D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml
- D29 · High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies pnpm-workspace.yaml
- D29 · High: pnpm-minimum-release-age pnpm-workspace.yaml
- D29 · High: pnpm-trust-policy pnpm-workspace.yaml
- D29 · Medium: cors-misconfiguration packages/cellix/server-oauth2-seedwork/src/router.ts
- D29 · Medium: cors-misconfiguration packages/cellix/server-oauth2-seedwork/src/router.ts
- D35 · Boundary-crossing change coupling: index.ts ↔ messaging-conversation.repository.ts packages/cellix/service-messaging-twilio/src/index.ts
- D35 · Boundary-crossing change coupling: oidc-config.tsx ↔ require-auth.tsx apps/ui-sharethrift/src/config/oidc-config.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: reservations-grid.tsx ↔ reservations-table.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservations-grid.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: query-by-id.ts ↔ query-by-user.ts packages/sthrift/application-services/src/contexts/conversation/conversation/query-by-id.ts
- D35 · Change coupling: reservation-card.tsx ↔ reservations-view.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservation-card.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: navigation.tsx ↔ index.stories.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-shared/src/molecules/navigation/navigation.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: reservation-card.tsx ↔ reservations-table.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservation-card.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: reservations-view-active.container.tsx ↔ reservations-view-history.container.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservations-view-active.container.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: conversations.ts ↔ item-listings.ts apps/server-mongodb-memory-mock/src/seed/conversations.ts
- D35 · Change coupling: index.ts ↔ messaging-conversation.repository.ts packages/sthrift/persistence/src/datasources/index.ts
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- R10 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 4 locations) apps/server-messaging-mock/src/seed/seed-data.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 4 locations) packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 3 locations) packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) packages/sthrift/ui-admin-route-root/src/components/pages/messages/components/conversation-list.container.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) packages/cellix/service-payment-base/src/index.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 3 locations) packages/sthrift/ui-admin-route-listing-operations/src/section-layout.tsx
- R2 · Complex function ThemeDemo (cyclomatic 37, cognitive 36) packages/sthrift/ui-shared/src/theme/theme-demo/ThemeDemo.tsx
- R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 31, cognitive 22) packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/account/pages/settings/components/settings-view.container.tsx
- R2 · Complex function (top-level) (cyclomatic 27, cognitive 26) packages/sthrift/domain/src/domain/contexts/value-objects.ts
- R2 · Complex function checkLayeredArchitecture (cyclomatic 25, cognitive 36) packages/cellix/arch-unit-tests/src/checks/circular-dependencies.ts
- R2 · Complex function performAs (cyclomatic 22, cognitive 26) packages/sthrift-verification/e2e-tests/src/contexts/listing/tasks/create-listing.ts
- R2 · Complex function checkFrontendArchitecture (cyclomatic 22, cognitive 25) packages/cellix/arch-unit-tests/src/checks/frontend-architecture.ts
- R2 · Complex function checkGraphqlResolverDependencies (cyclomatic 21, cognitive 27) packages/cellix/arch-unit-tests/src/checks/graphql-resolver-conventions.ts
- R2 · Complex function (top-level) (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 18) packages/sthrift-verification/verification-shared/src/settings/local-settings.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file packages/cellix/server-payment-seedwork/src/index.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file packages/cellix/server-messaging-seedwork/src/store.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file build-pipeline/scripts/detect-changes.cjs
- R4 · No test reaches this file packages/sthrift-verification/acceptance-api/src/contexts/reservation-request/step-definitions/create-reservation-request.steps.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file packages/sthrift-verification/acceptance-ui/src/contexts/reservation-request/step-definitions/create-reservation-request.steps.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file packages/sthrift-verification/verification-shared/src/pages/adapters/jsdom-adapter.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file apps/server-mongodb-memory-mock/src/seed/item-listings.ts
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €46,000–€230,000
| Cost to rebuild | €46,000–€230,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 56% quality) |
| Size & shape | Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
| Dead frontend code | ~3070 LoC unreachable (42 file(s)) |
This codebase represents roughly ~1.0 person-years of build effort (about ~€140,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 43% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 10 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 3 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a tested disaster recovery plan by documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures, as backups alone are insufficient. Next, improve dependency hygiene by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports. Then, implement versioning in your build manifests to ensure all releases are traceable. After that, increase test coverage by adding tests for all unreached modules. Finally, enforce quality gates in CI/CD by running the test suite on every merge.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery). | +11.8 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +11.8 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +11.6 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with copilot-setup-steps.yml (5), pnpm-workspace.yaml (3). | +3.9 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +5.5 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`pnpm test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it. | +4.9 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Resolve the 23 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (23). | +2.9 pts | Medium | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with index.ts, payment.container.tsx. | +1.3 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| pnpm-lock.yaml | 0.2 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| pnpm-workspace.yaml | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies |
| packages/cellix/server-oauth2-seedwork/src/router.ts | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: cors-misconfiguration |
| packages/cellix/mock-payment-server/src/index.ts | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: private-key |
| apps/ui-sharethrift/src/components/layouts/signup/components/payment.container.tsx | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: jwt |
| packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservation-card.tsx | 7.8 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: reservation-card.tsx ↔ reservations-view.tsx |
| packages/cellix/service-messaging-twilio/src/index.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: index.ts ↔ messaging-conversation.repository.ts |
| apps/ui-sharethrift/src/config/oidc-config.tsx | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: oidc-config.tsx ↔ require-auth.tsx |
| apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0001-code-ql.md | 8.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: No real context/problem and no explicit decision; the body is a boilerplate template filled with filler status fields |
| apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0002-edgescan.md | 8.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: Informative title ("EdgeScan") and context are both weak: the decision itself ('dynamic DAST/penetration testing services') is stated in the header line before any concrete coverage or status; no real problem statement and no consequences/trade-offs |
| apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0003-github-dependabot.md | 8.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: Informative title ("GitHub Dependabot") and no explicit Context/Decision sections; trade-offs of manual compensating controls over automation are not stated |
| apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0005-secret-scanning.md | 8.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: The body is an assessment metadata dump with no explicit decision (implement secret scanning) and consequences/trade-offs are deferred to TBD rows |
| packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservations-grid.tsx | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: reservations-grid.tsx ↔ reservations-table.tsx |
| packages/sthrift/application-services/src/contexts/conversation/conversation/query-by-id.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: query-by-id.ts ↔ query-by-user.ts |
| packages/sthrift/ui-shared/src/molecules/navigation/navigation.tsx | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: navigation.tsx ↔ index.stories.tsx |
| packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservations-view-active.container.tsx | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: reservations-view-active.container.tsx ↔ reservations-view-history.container.tsx |
| apps/server-mongodb-memory-mock/src/seed/conversations.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: conversations.ts ↔ item-listings.ts |
| packages/sthrift/persistence/src/datasources/index.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: index.ts ↔ messaging-conversation.repository.ts |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 36 of 38 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 38 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 76 of 86 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D7 · Architectural Integrity
Of 16 mechanizable ADRs, 14 are prevented by analyzers, 2 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
16 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is packages/sthrift-verification/e2e-tests/src/contexts/reservation-request/step-definitions/create-reservation-request.steps.ts.
D20 · ADR Quality
Evaluated 38 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.1/10 (consistently complete and clear). 4 flagged with a specific gap.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No real context/problem and no explicit decision; the body is a… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-code-ql.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Informative title ("EdgeScan") and context are both weak finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0002-edgescan.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Informative title ("GitHub Dependabot") and no explicit Context/Decision… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0003-github-dependabot.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D28 · Secrets (history)
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with index.ts, payment.container.tsx. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
10 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with copilot-setup-steps.yml (5), pnpm-workspace.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with router.ts (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
12 of 284 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is packages/cellix/ui-core/src/components/molecules/require-auth/require-auth.stories.tsx.
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: reservations-grid.tsx↔reservations-table.tsx 64%; query-by-id.ts↔query-by-user.ts 64%; reservation-card.tsx↔reservations-view.tsx 55%
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
54 finding(s): 4 critical, 26 high, 21 medium, 3 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 23 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (23). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
AC2 · Forms & labels
AC3 · Page structure
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- This element's Tailwind text/background colour utilities fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Pick a darker or lighter shade. — listing-information.tsx:27
- `.sharer, .sharerIcon` sets color: #fefdfa on background-color: #3f8176 — 4.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — theme.css:352
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — your Biome config enables no a11y rules and there's no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by turning on Biome's own a11y rule group to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain you already use: enable Biome's a11y rule group in your biome.json `linter.rules` (it is off whenever `recommended` is false and the group is unlisted), then assert with vitest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a README to the 27 of 55 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
What to do
- Grow the ADR log (currently 40) — reach 50 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`pnpm test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
P11 · BDD / executable specs
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
- Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
R1 · Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
- apps/server-messaging-mock/src/seed/seed-data.ts:46 · apps/server-messaging-mock/src/seed/seed-data.ts:69 · apps/server-messaging-mock/src/seed/seed-data.ts:92 · apps/server-messaging-mock/src/seed/seed-data.ts:115 — all 4 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — seed-data.ts:46
- packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:285 · packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:394 · packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:474 · packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:562 — all 4 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.ts:285
- packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:395 · packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:475 · packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:563 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.ts:395
- packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:475 · packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:563 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.ts:475
- packages/sthrift/ui-admin-route-root/src/components/pages/messages/components/conversation-list.container.tsx:49 · packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/messages/components/conversation-list.container.tsx:52 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — conversation-list.container.tsx:49
- packages/cellix/service-payment-base/src/index.ts:502 · packages/cellix/service-payment-base/src/index.ts:559 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — index.ts:502
- packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:634 · packages/cellix/service-payment-cybersource/src/index.ts:793 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — index.ts:634
- packages/sthrift/ui-admin-route-listing-operations/src/section-layout.tsx:74 · packages/sthrift/ui-admin-route-root/src/section-layout.tsx:74 · packages/sthrift/ui-admin-route-user-operations/src/section-layout.tsx:74 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — section-layout.tsx:74
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — ThemeDemo.tsx:39, settings-view.container.tsx:76, value-objects.ts:1, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — index.ts, store.ts, detect-changes.cjs, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
R7 · Dead Code
- 23 file(s) (~1384 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — e2e-tests
- Unreachable from the 147 application, 78 tooling and 569 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (147 application, 78 tooling, 569 test roots considered) (×6) — create-reservation-request.steps.ts, create-reservation-request.steps.ts, jsdom-adapter.ts, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
- Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — seed.ts:1
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
- packages/sthrift-verification/verification-shared/src/servers/test-mongodb-server.ts → packages/sthrift-verification/verification-shared/src/test-data/index.ts → packages/sthrift-verification/verification-shared/src/servers/test-mongodb-server.ts — test-mongodb-server.ts
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 90% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 90% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 96% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Readiness | 43% | Weak — gated by R8 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 48% | Weak — gated by D29, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 77% | Strong | Solid. |
Not included — 75 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~56288 lines of test source are present (.ts, .tsx) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json and a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — none of 38 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json and a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.tsx) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts, .tsx) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 42 finding(s)
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:30
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:33
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:46
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:63
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:79
- High: pnpm-block-exotic-sub-dependencies pnpm-workspace.yaml:1
- High: pnpm-minimum-release-age pnpm-workspace.yaml:1
- High: pnpm-trust-policy pnpm-workspace.yaml:1
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Secret: private-key packages/cellix/mock-payment-server/src/index.ts:99
- Secret: jwt apps/ui-sharethrift/src/components/layouts/signup/components/payment.container.tsx:18
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: index.ts ↔ messaging-conversation.repository.ts packages/cellix/service-messaging-twilio/src/index.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: oidc-config.tsx ↔ require-auth.tsx apps/ui-sharethrift/src/config/oidc-config.tsx
Warning — 35 finding(s)
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
- Change coupling: reservations-grid.tsx ↔ reservations-table.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservations-grid.tsx
- Change coupling: query-by-id.ts ↔ query-by-user.ts packages/sthrift/application-services/src/contexts/conversation/conversation/query-by-id.ts
- Change coupling: reservation-card.tsx ↔ reservations-view.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservation-card.tsx
- Change coupling: navigation.tsx ↔ index.stories.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-shared/src/molecules/navigation/navigation.tsx
- Change coupling: reservation-card.tsx ↔ reservations-table.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservation-card.tsx
- Change coupling: reservations-view-active.container.tsx ↔ reservations-view-history.container.tsx packages/sthrift/ui-sharethrift-route-root/src/components/pages/my-reservations/components/reservations-view-active.container.tsx
- Change coupling: conversations.ts ↔ item-listings.ts apps/server-mongodb-memory-mock/src/seed/conversations.ts
- Change coupling: index.ts ↔ messaging-conversation.repository.ts packages/sthrift/persistence/src/datasources/index.ts
- Medium: cors-misconfiguration packages/cellix/server-oauth2-seedwork/src/router.ts:117
- Medium: cors-misconfiguration packages/cellix/server-oauth2-seedwork/src/router.ts:123
- LLM evaluation failed
- No real context/problem and no explicit decision; the body is a boilerplate template filled with filler status fields apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0001-code-ql.md
- Informative title ("EdgeScan") and context are both weak: the decision itself ('dynamic DAST/penetration testing services') is stated in the header line before any concrete coverage or status; no real problem statement and no consequences/trade-offs apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0002-edgescan.md
- Informative title ("GitHub Dependabot") and no explicit Context/Decision sections; trade-offs of manual compensating controls over automation are not stated apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0003-github-dependabot.md
- The body is an assessment metadata dump with no explicit decision (implement secret scanning) and consequences/trade-offs are deferred to TBD rows apps/docs/docs/threat-assessments/0005-secret-scanning.md
- Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] pnpm-lock.yaml
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2
- Test reliability not included
- Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 3 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 10 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 54 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |