Public report — lightspeed, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
173findings with an exact file:lineof 179 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
40/113dimensions across the health lenses145841 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
smartcomputer-ai/lightspeed is sound in substance but carries real gaps (59%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Event Sourcing (100%) — its event log is trustworthy to replay. Architecture (100%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (37%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (69%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); 1 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI (Tooling).
For scale: Large (~145,841 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.4 person-years (~1–3 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event Sourcing foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] interop/ts-client/package-lock.json
D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0221 Cargo.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.8× (at 59% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~1.4 person-years of build effort (about ~€210,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 37% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with common.sh.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Large asset (~1.4 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 37%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
The top fix pays for itself · High · Economics
The top-ranked fix costs roughly 1–3 engineer-days once. Not doing it costs about 57.8–385.4 engineer-days every year, paid as drag on the ~1,156,166 lines this team changes annually — a bill that arrives whether or not anyone books it. On those figures the fix breaks even in roughly 1–2 months and is free after that. Method, stated so this is not read as a quotation: debt from the ranked task's effort band; interest = annual changed lines (measured, annualised from the 90-day window) ÷ an ASSUMED 150–400 lines per engineer-day × the 2–5% drag implied by the code-quality signals; breaking point = debt ÷ annual interest. A modelled planning range built from measured inputs and one named assumption — not a quotation, a valuation, or a certified figure.
Evidence: D15 churn: 285,082 line(s) changed over a 90-day window ⇒ ~1,156,166/year · D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 7.4/10 ⇒ a 2–5% drag on each change · top-ranked remediation: Low effort ⇒ about 1–3 engineer-day(s)
→ Do the top-ranked fix now if this code will still be yours in 2 months.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 7.4/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 2–5% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 7.4/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
299 modules, 911 dependencies — 7 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 69% · Adequate · gated by R3
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
21
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure-as-code, documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures to ensure true disaster recovery. Next, resolve the single leaked secret in common.sh and add eslint to package.json scripts for automated linting in CI. Then, increase test coverage by adding tests for the unreached production modules. Finally, implement an approval gate with required reviewers before production promotion to secure the deployment process.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with common.sh.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 38 of 40 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 40 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 173 of 179 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
24 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was admit::admit_command at 79. A further 8 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being BuiltinTool::name_str at 36 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 13 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 tooling finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with tooling.rs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 workflow_tool finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with workflow_tool.rs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 drive finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with drive.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 32 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 11 GatewayAgentApi finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with workflow.rs (4), mod.rs (3), skills.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 run finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with run.rs (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 workflow_tool finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with workflow_tool.rs (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 36 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with mod.rs (2), session.rs (2), workflow_tool.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (36 warning-level).
Resolve the 10 TooManyFunctions finding(s) in God Classes — start with context.rs, lib.rs, fleet.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with mod.rs, api_client.rs, driver.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with common.sh. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
163 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs.
Small-team knowledge concentration
What to do
Resolve the 1 Small-team knowledge concentration finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Lightspeed's documentation is clear and complete for a project of this size: an excellent README with a compelling why-and-visual comparison showing the OS-per-agent versus Lightspeed single-worker model; detailed profiles docs covering import syntax, batch processing, multi-tenancy, and the public MCP echo test server; a thorough local Docker environment guide including services, start/stop/reset commands, runtime env vars, and hosted-server invocation; and an outline of every named document. The visible content is exemplary.
The 'Example Profiles' section shows how to import workspace-backed profiles but does not explain the CLI behavior when importing a non-empty JSON array of profile objects for batch import/check.profiles/README.md
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2local/common.sh:52detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with common.sh (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×3interop/ts-client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 · ×4Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0012 · ×3Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×3interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 4 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3), Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2), Cargo.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Medium advisory (unsound) finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain identifiers are strongly typed (a newtype wrapper) rather than raw primitives — consistency once an idiom exists.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.
`AgentSessionWorkflow.universe_id` is a raw primitive id while the repo already defines newtype typed-ids — an inconsistently-adopted typed-id idiom. Give this identity its own newtype so it can't be confused with another entity's id or a plain value. — mod.rs:68
`AgentSessionWorkflow.session_id` is a raw primitive id while the repo already defines newtype typed-ids — an inconsistently-adopted typed-id idiom. Give this identity its own newtype so it can't be confused with another entity's id or a plain value. — mod.rs:69
What to do
Adopt the repo's newtype typed-id idiom consistently — wrap every entity identity in its own newtype.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain entities own their behaviour (invariant-enforcing commands) rather than being data-only structs driven by a foreign service.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a domain type's identity-bearing field stays immutable — a `pub` mutable field under a hand-rolled Hash/PartialEq breaks the value-identity invariant.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (diesel/sea-orm/sqlx) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the recovery-replay fold is deterministic — state derived purely from each event's own fields, no clock/random/IO on the replay path.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether domain events stay immutable (private fields, set once) rather than carrying mutable state.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a README to the 17 of 23 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.5 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×2) — client.ts:206, generate-tools.mjs:77
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files2.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
3 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: interop/configurator-mcp/src/generated/tools.ts (7082), interop/ts-client/src/generated/types.ts (4321), interop/ts-client/src/generated/methods.ts (1845).
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×3) — generate-tools.mjs, config.ts, bin.ts
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓
What to do
Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~25499 lines of test source are present (.rs, .ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Cargo manifest), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.rs, .ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .rs, .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.rs, .ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored — an aggregate and a value object cannot be told apart from source alone here (every struct holding a struct reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) is indistinguishable from a single embedded aggregate. Reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored — a domain type leaking across a crate boundary cannot be told apart from source alone from a legitimate shared-kernel crate. Reported as guidance rather than measured
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored — detecting 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not resolvable from source alone here. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 10 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×4
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json— fast-uri 3.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.5 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json— ip-address 10.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — ip-address is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ip-address to 10.3.1 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ip-address 10.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 10.3.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 10.3.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against ip-address 10.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] interop/ts-client/package-lock.json— js-yaml 4.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock— quinn-proto 0.11.13: [GHSA redacted] — quinn-proto is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by quinn 0.11.9, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p quinn-proto@0.11.13 --precise 0.11.15`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against quinn-proto 0.11.13, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.11.15 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.11.15 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against quinn-proto 0.11.13: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×3
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] interop/ts-client/package-lock.json— postcss 8.5.15: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.18 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.15, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.15: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json— postcss 8.5.16: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.18 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.16, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.16: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock— rustls-webpki 0.103.9: [GHSA redacted] — rustls-webpki is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by rustls 0.23.36, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p rustls-webpki@0.103.9 --precise 0.103.13`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against rustls-webpki 0.103.9, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.103.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.103.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against rustls-webpki 0.103.9: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], RUSTSEC-2026-0098, RUSTSEC-2026-0099.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret local/common.sh:52— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
FileTooLong: service/mod.rs crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs:0— FileTooLong — 2662 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: components/workflow_tool.rs crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1575 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/fleet.rs crates/temporal-server/src/fleet.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1565 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/lib.rs crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1480 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: core/drive.rs crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1327 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: chat/driver.rs crates/cli/src/chat/driver.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1285 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: components/tooling.rs crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1215 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: worker/session_tools.rs crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1194 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), about 66% of them inside a single declaration: SessionTools (73-1089). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: components/context.rs crates/engine/src/core/components/context.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1177 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/jobs.rs crates/host-bridge/src/jobs.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1000 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/session.rs crates/store-pg/src/session.rs:0— FileTooLong — 977 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/main.rs crates/eval/src/main.rs:0— FileTooLong — 938 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: openai/responses.rs crates/llm-clients/src/openai/responses.rs:0— FileTooLong — 931 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/auth_cli.rs crates/cli/src/auth_cli.rs:0— FileTooLong — 906 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: anthropic/messages.rs crates/llm-clients/src/anthropic/messages.rs:0— FileTooLong — 861 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: components/run.rs crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs:0— FileTooLong — 847 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/openai_responses.rs crates/llm-runtime/src/openai_responses.rs:0— FileTooLong — 829 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/sessions.rs crates/api/src/sessions.rs:0— FileTooLong — 811 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: storage/session.rs crates/engine/src/storage/session.rs:0— FileTooLong — 758 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/anthropic_messages.rs crates/llm-runtime/src/anthropic_messages.rs:0— FileTooLong — 738 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/vfs_transfer.rs crates/cli/src/vfs_transfer.rs:0— FileTooLong — 672 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: core/admit.rs crates/engine/src/core/admit.rs:0— FileTooLong — 671 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/mcp_cli.rs crates/cli/src/mcp_cli.rs:0— FileTooLong — 663 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/environment.rs crates/store-pg/src/environment.rs:0— FileTooLong — 659 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/profile_cli.rs crates/cli/src/profile_cli.rs:0— FileTooLong — 640 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
GatewayAgentApi::append_context (cognitive 26) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs:2213— GatewayAgentApi::append_context has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 12, if/else 11, loops 3 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
GatewayAgentApi::start_session_internal (cognitive 21) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs:1021— GatewayAgentApi::start_session_internal has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 5, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::ensure_core_environment_job_workflow_tools (cognitive 21) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs:1217— GatewayAgentApi::ensure_core_environment_job_workflow_tools has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, loops 2 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_context_append_outcomes (cognitive 21) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/workflow.rs:186— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_context_append_outcomes has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 6 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_context_keys_removed (cognitive 21) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/workflow.rs:251— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_context_keys_removed has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 6 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_context_compaction_complete (cognitive 18) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/workflow.rs:312— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_context_compaction_complete has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_active_environment (cognitive 17) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/environments.rs:34— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_active_environment has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_session_toolset (cognitive 17) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/session_toolset.rs:90— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_session_toolset has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_skill_catalog (cognitive 17) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/skills.rs:200— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_skill_catalog has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_skill_activations (cognitive 17) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/skills.rs:234— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_skill_activations has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_config_revision (cognitive 17) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/workflow.rs:133— GatewayAgentApi::wait_for_config_revision has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Hotspot: crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs— crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs changed 44 times in last 90 days, max complexity 51. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: crates/engine/src/core/admit.rs crates/engine/src/core/admit.rs— crates/engine/src/core/admit.rs changed 22 times in last 90 days, max complexity 79. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs— crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs changed 39 times in last 90 days, max complexity 34. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs— crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs changed 61 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs— crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs changed 36 times in last 90 days, max complexity 27. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: crates/engine/src/core/codec.rs crates/engine/src/core/codec.rs— crates/engine/src/core/codec.rs changed 18 times in last 90 days, max complexity 50. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: crates/cli/src/chat/driver.rs crates/cli/src/chat/driver.rs— crates/cli/src/chat/driver.rs changed 36 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs— crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs changed 14 times in last 90 days, max complexity 36. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs— crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs changed 19 times in last 90 days, max complexity 23. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: crates/eval/src/main.rs crates/eval/src/main.rs— crates/eval/src/main.rs changed 25 times in last 90 days, max complexity 17. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
TooManyFunctions: crate::core::components::context crates/engine/src/core/components/context.rs:96— TooManyFunctions — 69 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs:852— TooManyFunctions — 66 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::fleet crates/temporal-server/src/fleet.rs:1412— TooManyFunctions — 56 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::chat::driver crates/cli/src/chat/driver.rs:104— TooManyFunctions — 43 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::core::components::workflow_tool crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:282— TooManyFunctions — 36 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::prompts::assembler crates/tools/src/prompts/assembler.rs:95— TooManyFunctions — 34 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::auth_cli crates/cli/src/auth_cli.rs:604— TooManyFunctions — 33 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::openai_responses crates/llm-runtime/src/openai_responses.rs:189— TooManyFunctions — 33 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate crates/eval/src/main.rs:310— TooManyFunctions — 32 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::core::components::tooling crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:72— TooManyFunctions — 31 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
run::apply_event (cognitive 43) crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs:569— run::apply_event has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 40, boolean chains 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 20). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
run::plan_next (cognitive 19) crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs:424— run::plan_next has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
run::match_existing_run_submission (cognitive 16) crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs:905— run::match_existing_run_submission has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, match/switch 4, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
run::match_existing_message_submission (cognitive 16) crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs:986— run::match_existing_message_submission has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, match/switch 4, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
workflow_tool::apply_config_event (cognitive 33) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:1078— workflow_tool::apply_config_event has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27, boolean chains 3, loops 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
workflow_tool::validate_invocation_against_state (cognitive 25) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:1781— workflow_tool::validate_invocation_against_state has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, boolean chains 4, loops 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
workflow_tool::apply_event (cognitive 18) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:1212— workflow_tool::apply_event has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 5 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
workflow_tool::validate_completion_promises (cognitive 17) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:1706— workflow_tool::validate_completion_promises has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, boolean chains 3, loops 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TooManyMethods: GatewayAgentApi crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs:640— TooManyMethods — 124 methods, declared across 16 files: service/mod.rs (29), service/workflow.rs (23), service/profiles.rs (14), service/session_jobs.rs (11), +12 more file(s). That list is where to read them, not a suggestion to split the file: the members belong to the type wherever they are declared, so moving them between files leaves the count unchanged. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: HttpAgentApi crates/cli/src/api_client.rs:87— TooManyMethods — 57 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ChatSessionDriver crates/cli/src/chat/driver.rs:204— TooManyMethods — 35 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: SessionTools crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs:62— TooManyMethods — 31 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium advisory (unsound) · ×4
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock— anyhow 1.0.102: RUSTSEC-2026-0190 — upgrade to 1.0.103
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0221 Cargo.lock— event-listener 5.4.1: RUSTSEC-2026-0221 — event-listener is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by sqlx-core 0.8.6, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p event-listener@5.4.1 --precise 5.4.2`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0002 Cargo.lock— lru 0.12.5: RUSTSEC-2026-0002 — lru is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by ratatui 0.29.0, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for lru — 0.16.3 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.12.5, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it).
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Cargo.lock— rand 0.9.2: RUSTSEC-2026-0097 — this repo declares rand 0.8, but the vulnerable 0.9.2 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, resolved for quinn-proto 0.11.13 and tungstenite 0.26.2, so editing your own rand entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or force it with `cargo update -p rand@0.9.2 --precise 0.9.3`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
tooling::defer_tool_batch (cyclomatic 23) crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:1340— tooling::defer_tool_batch has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
tooling::apply_event (cyclomatic 19) crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:925— tooling::apply_event has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
tooling::plan_next (cyclomatic 16) crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:72— tooling::plan_next has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
workflow_tool::apply_config_event (cyclomatic 19) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:1078— workflow_tool::apply_config_event has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
workflow_tool::validate_invocation_against_state (cyclomatic 17) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:1781— workflow_tool::validate_invocation_against_state has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
workflow_tool::apply_event (cyclomatic 16) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:1212— workflow_tool::apply_event has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
drive::tool_call_completed_proposals (cognitive 97) crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs:1384— drive::tool_call_completed_proposals has cognitive complexity 97 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 77, loops 8, match/switch 8, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 64). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
drive::tool_batch_deferred_proposals (cognitive 27) crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs:813— drive::tool_batch_deferred_proposals has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 7, boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
drive::attach_promise_control_runtime (cognitive 18) crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs:733— drive::attach_promise_control_runtime has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, loops 3, match/switch 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
tooling::defer_tool_batch (cognitive 34) crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:1340— tooling::defer_tool_batch has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, boolean chains 7, match/switch 4, loops 2 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
tooling::plan_next (cognitive 21) crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:72— tooling::plan_next has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, boolean chains 2, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
tooling::apply_event (cognitive 21) crates/engine/src/core/components/tooling.rs:925— tooling::apply_event has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, boolean chains 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×3
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0012 Cargo.lock— backoff 0.4.0: RUSTSEC-2025-0012 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. backoff is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by temporalio-client 0.4.0 and temporalio-sdk-core 0.4.0, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0384 Cargo.lock— instant 0.1.13: RUSTSEC-2024-0384 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. instant is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by backoff 0.4.0, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0436 Cargo.lock— paste 1.0.15: RUSTSEC-2024-0436 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. paste is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by ratatui 0.29.0, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×3
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json— @hono/node-server 1.19.14: [GHSA redacted] — @hono/node-server is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.5 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.19.14, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.19.14; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 Cargo.lock— crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 — crossbeam-epoch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by moka 0.12.15, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p crossbeam-epoch@0.9.18 --precise 0.9.20`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 Cargo.lock— quick-xml 0.39.2: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 — quick-xml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by object_store 0.13.2, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for quick-xml — 0.41.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.39.2, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against quick-xml 0.39.2: RUSTSEC-2026-0194, RUSTSEC-2026-0195.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] interop/configurator-mcp/package-lock.json— hono 4.12.29: [GHSA redacted] — hono is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin hono to 4.12.34 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock— jsonwebtoken 9.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 10.3.0
Medium CVE: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Cargo.lock— rsa 0.9.10: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; rsa is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by sqlx-mysql 0.8.6, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
drive::tool_call_completed_proposals (cyclomatic 34) crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs:1384— drive::tool_call_completed_proposals has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
drive::tool_batch_deferred_proposals (cyclomatic 21) crates/engine/src/core/drive.rs:813— drive::tool_batch_deferred_proposals has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
GatewayAgentApi::start_session_internal (cyclomatic 18) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs:1021— GatewayAgentApi::start_session_internal has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
GatewayAgentApi::append_context (cyclomatic 17) crates/temporal-server/src/gateway/service/mod.rs:2213— GatewayAgentApi::append_context has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
SessionTools::invoke_batch (cognitive 35) crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs:1263— SessionTools::invoke_batch has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23, boolean chains 7, loops 5 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
SessionTools::read_environment_jobs (cognitive 16) crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs:482— SessionTools::read_environment_jobs has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 11, if/else 4, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
CoreAgentProjector::project_event_kind (cognitive 33) crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs:254— CoreAgentProjector::project_event_kind has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 24, loops 9 (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
CoreAgentProjector::project_tool_batches_for_run (cognitive 16) crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs:719— CoreAgentProjector::project_tool_batches_for_run has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 8, if/else 6, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
parser::parse_one_hunk (cognitive 21) crates/tools/src/fs/apply_patch/parser.rs:178— parser::parse_one_hunk has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, loops 4 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
parser::parse_update_file_chunk (cognitive 19) crates/tools/src/fs/apply_patch/parser.rs:271— parser::parse_update_file_chunk has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 5, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
eval::run_cli (cognitive 19) crates/eval/src/main.rs:320— eval::run_cli has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, loops 4, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 10). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
eval::collect_observations (cognitive 18) crates/eval/src/main.rs:910— eval::collect_observations has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
anthropic_messages::materialize_tools (cognitive 19) crates/llm-runtime/src/anthropic_messages.rs:517— anthropic_messages::materialize_tools has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 8, if/else 6, loops 5 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
anthropic_messages::materialize_block (cognitive 16) crates/llm-runtime/src/anthropic_messages.rs:428— anthropic_messages::materialize_block has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 7). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Change coupling: main.rs ↔ config.rs crates/eval/src/main.rs— `crates/eval/src/main.rs` and `crates/temporal-workflow/src/config.rs` change together 53% of the time (9 of the 17 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: config.rs ↔ drive.rs crates/temporal-workflow/src/config.rs— `crates/temporal-workflow/src/config.rs` and `crates/test-support/src/runner/drive.rs` change together 53% of the time (9 of the 17 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE (that is what the inversion buys) and the thing to add is a comment saying so, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
admit::admit_command (cyclomatic 79) crates/engine/src/core/admit.rs:15— admit::admit_command has cyclomatic complexity 79 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
CoreAgentProjector::project_event_kind (cyclomatic 51) crates/api-projection/src/lib.rs:254— CoreAgentProjector::project_event_kind has cyclomatic complexity 51 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
codec::core_agent_event_envelope_kind (cyclomatic 50) crates/engine/src/core/codec.rs:105— codec::core_agent_event_envelope_kind has cyclomatic complexity 50 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
run::apply_event (cyclomatic 36) crates/engine/src/core/components/run.rs:569— run::apply_event has cyclomatic complexity 36 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
conformance::assert_host_data_conformance (cyclomatic 28) crates/tools/src/host_protocol/conformance.rs:56— conformance::assert_host_data_conformance has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
SessionTools::invoke_batch (cyclomatic 27) crates/temporal-server/src/worker/session_tools.rs:1263— SessionTools::invoke_batch has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ChatTuiApp::apply_slash_command (cyclomatic 24) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/app.rs:360— ChatTuiApp::apply_slash_command has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
turn::apply_event (cyclomatic 24) crates/engine/src/core/components/turn.rs:241— turn::apply_event has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
EnvironmentJobWorkflow::run (cyclomatic 24) crates/temporal-workflow/src/workflows/environment_job.rs:42— EnvironmentJobWorkflow::run has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AgentSessionWorkflow::run (cyclomatic 24) crates/temporal-workflow/src/workflows/session/mod.rs:122— AgentSessionWorkflow::run has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ComposerState::handle_key (cyclomatic 21) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/bottom_pane/composer.rs:39— ComposerState::handle_key has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
seek_sequence::seek_sequence (cyclomatic 19) crates/tools/src/fs/apply_patch/seek_sequence.rs:5— seek_sequence::seek_sequence has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
SlashCommandKind::command_with_args (cyclomatic 17) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/slash.rs:186— SlashCommandKind::command_with_args has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
TranscriptState::apply_chat_event (cyclomatic 16) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/transcript.rs:50— TranscriptState::apply_chat_event has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
admit::admit_command (cognitive 119) crates/engine/src/core/admit.rs:15— admit::admit_command has cognitive complexity 119 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 83, loops 15, match/switch 15, boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 66). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
EnvironmentJobWorkflow::run (cognitive 42) crates/temporal-workflow/src/workflows/environment_job.rs:42— EnvironmentJobWorkflow::run has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, match/switch 9, loops 8, boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AgentSessionWorkflow::run (cognitive 39) crates/temporal-workflow/src/workflows/session/mod.rs:122— AgentSessionWorkflow::run has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, match/switch 13, loops 1 (nesting depth added 20). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
turn::apply_event (cognitive 35) crates/engine/src/core/components/turn.rs:241— turn::apply_event has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 31, match/switch 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
seek_sequence::seek_sequence (cognitive 32) crates/tools/src/fs/apply_patch/seek_sequence.rs:5— seek_sequence::seek_sequence has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, loops 10, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
JobManager::schedule_ready_jobs (cognitive 31) crates/host-bridge/src/jobs.rs:401— JobManager::schedule_ready_jobs has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23, loops 7, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jobs::validate_and_resolve_start (cognitive 28) crates/host-bridge/src/jobs.rs:874— jobs::validate_and_resolve_start has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, loops 6, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
conformance::assert_host_data_conformance (cognitive 27) crates/tools/src/host_protocol/conformance.rs:56— conformance::assert_host_data_conformance has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, boolean chains 6. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
insert_history::insert_history_lines_with_mode (cognitive 25) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/insert_history.rs:36— insert_history::insert_history_lines_with_mode has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 10, boolean chains 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ToolChainCell::display_lines (cognitive 24) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/cell.rs:298— ToolChainCell::display_lines has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, loops 6, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
WorkflowToolEmissionReadProjection::observe_config (cognitive 22) crates/engine/src/core/components/workflow_tool.rs:958— WorkflowToolEmissionReadProjection::observe_config has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14, match/switch 6, loops 2 (nesting depth added 12). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
engine::compute_replacements (cognitive 22) crates/tools/src/fs/apply_patch/engine.rs:206— engine::compute_replacements has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TranscriptState::apply_delta (cognitive 21) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/transcript.rs:228— TranscriptState::apply_delta has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 4, boolean chains 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 11). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
codec::core_agent_event_envelope_kind (cognitive 21) crates/engine/src/core/codec.rs:105— codec::core_agent_event_envelope_kind has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 21 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
ProcessManager::read_process (cognitive 21) crates/host-bridge/src/process.rs:192— ProcessManager::read_process has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FleetService::spawn (cognitive 21) crates/temporal-server/src/fleet.rs:74— FleetService::spawn has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, match/switch 4, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
wrapping::adaptive_wrap_line (cognitive 20) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/wrapping.rs:18— wrapping::adaptive_wrap_line has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 4, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ChatSessionDriver::follow_until_quiescent (cognitive 19) crates/cli/src/chat/driver.rs:377— ChatSessionDriver::follow_until_quiescent has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 11, if/else 8 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
shared::normalize_path (cognitive 19) crates/host-protocol/src/shared.rs:354— shared::normalize_path has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
path::normalize_path (cognitive 19) crates/tools/src/fs/path.rs:224— path::normalize_path has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
MessageCell::display_lines (cognitive 18) crates/cli/src/chat/tui/cell.rs:70— MessageCell::display_lines has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
CompletionStream::next_chunk (cognitive 18) crates/llm-clients/src/openai/completions.rs:534— CompletionStream::next_chunk has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, loops 4, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ResponseStream::next_event (cognitive 18) crates/llm-clients/src/openai/responses.rs:1068— ResponseStream::next_event has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11, loops 4, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
PgStore::resolve_segments (cognitive 18) crates/store-pg/src/session.rs:220— PgStore::resolve_segments has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
storage::materialize_await_result (cognitive 18) crates/temporal-server/src/worker/activities/storage.rs:118— storage::materialize_await_result has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 11, if/else 5, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
grep::invoke_grep (cognitive 18) crates/tools/src/fs/tools/grep.rs:42— grep::invoke_grep has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 3, boolean chains 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
openai_responses::materialize_input_item (cognitive 16) crates/llm-runtime/src/openai_responses.rs:343— openai_responses::materialize_input_item has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9, match/switch 7 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Recommendation — 6 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.rs, .ts) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor· Small-team knowledge concentration · ×1
Small-team knowledge concentration — 163 file(s) are concentrated to one author — the ambient state with 2 active author(s), not 163 separate risks. The signal becomes meaningful as ownership spreads; no per-file action implied now.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The 'Example Profiles' section shows how to import workspace-backed profiles but does not explain the CLI behavior when importing a non-empty JSON array of profile objects for batch import/check. · ×1
The 'Example Profiles' section shows how to import workspace-backed profiles but does not explain the CLI behavior when importing a non-empty JSON array of profile objects for batch import/check. profiles/README.md— Add a brief note on what happens when multiple profiles are imported (e.g. whether they all run in parallel or sequentially) so the distinction between single-profile and batch processing is clear.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Low vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] interop/ts-client/package-lock.json— esbuild 0.27.7: [GHSA redacted] — esbuild is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin esbuild to 0.28.1 with an `overrides` entry).
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rs, .ts) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`, or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Cargo manifest) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fca52-71e4-77ab-a496-5bc6108698b4 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 10 · Warnings: 161 · Recommendations: 6 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 01:10 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.